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CONTENTS

Editorial

- 01** **Welcome to Issue 23 of A Different View**
Tobias Franke, Thomas Bobinger, Felipe Nunes

Opinion Articles

- 03** **Terrorism in India: Two years later**
Thomas Bobinger
- 08** **Security policy in the eyes of Russia on the example of the latest Caucasian crisis: A rough sketch**
Elena Teibenbacher

Academic Articles

- 10** **Conceptual Analysis of the Concept of 'Security': A Comparative Analysis between Karyotis and Van Munster**
Moritz Pieper
- 14** **Is the European Union an economic giant but a political dwarf on the international scene?**
Bennet Strang
- 18** **Bureaucracy in the EU's CFSP: About a Cake, a Crawler and Mysterious Shadows**
Nina-Louisa Remuß
- 24** **Europeanization and Security: Two Concepts Hard to Reconcile**
Tobias Franke

Editorial

Welcome to Issue 23 of A Different View

Tobias Franke
Thomas Bobinger
Felipe Nunes

A Different View, the monthly political magazine of IAPSS, enters a new cycle on its evolution. After six months of standstill, IAPSS Ex-Com has appointed a new team of editors. Let us shortly introduce ourselves: **Tobias Franke** from Germany will soon obtain his M.A. in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Bath, **Felipe Nunes** from Brazil is following an M.A in Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais, and **Thomas Bobinger** from Germany recently finished an LL.M in Law and Politics of International Security at the Free University of Amsterdam. We are grateful for this opportunity and together we will dedicate a large part of our free time to make A Different View a successful online journal and to enhance IAPSS's visibility.

The year 2008 is close to come to an end. In retrospective we have seen a considerable amount of security incidents - the Russian-Georgian conflict and the terror attacks in India are just two prominent examples amongst them - hence, the editors' desire to dedicate our first issue to the concept of 'security'.. In our opinion articles Thomas Bobinger will open the subject

with his contribution about the November terrorist attacks in Mumbai. By highlighting the role of India's neighbour Pakistan and by arguing that a tougher police state will not solve the underlying problems, he emphasizes two important developments in the realm of security within the last decades. Firstly, security has become increasingly interlinked and cannot be seen as an isolated national variable. Secondly, the most disturbing new threat in terms of security - terrorism - also urges policy-makers to re-think their strategies. As an asymmetrical threat in a globalized world, terrorism cannot be combated effectively with mere military means. Instead, democratic reforms, participation and education are needed to drain the swamp on which terrorism nurtures. None the less, classical threats of security, i.e. interstate conflict and war, are still on the agenda as Elena Teibenbacher reminds us in her contribution about the Russian-Georgian conflict. Putting into perspective the different points of view on the issue, she seeks to illuminate the Russian view in particular.

In our academic articles we will then set

the focus on European Union security, an area of controversies and vivid developments, declared as a top priority by the current French presidency of the Brussels-based organ. To begin with, Moritz Pieper will provide us with a conceptual analysis of the notion 'security' by comparing two views of the influential Copenhagen School. As the meanings of security have changed in the aftermath of 9/11, he uses his analysis to stress and important development: the misuse of the concept of national security to justify government actions. Afterwards, Bennet Strang reminds us of the debate around the EU as an economic giant vs. a political dwarf on the international scene, drawing upon the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In this view,

the EU is still stuck in its dwarf status, mainly because the member states themselves have a hard time leaving traditional patterns of security behind and committing more fully to a project endangering the core of national sovereignty. Closely linked to this article is Nina-Louisa Remuß contribution which further dives into the functionality of CFSP. Discussing the role of politicians and bureaucrats, she observes that the latter appear to witness and increase of influence in the CFSP policy-making process. Last but not least, Tobias Franke attempts to shed light on the concept of Europeanization in the area of security. He argues that these two concepts - both inherently difficult to define - appear, nevertheless, hard to reconcile.

Berlin, December 24th 2008

Opinion Articles

Terrorism in India: Two years later

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The last time I wrote about terrorism in India was in November 2006 (“The Mumbai Experience”, ADV Issue 8). Since then the number of terrorist attacks in India has skyrocketed. Just take a look at the following list (Figure 1), which is not at all exhaustive.

In November 2008, for three days we watched in disbelief and with dismay as a small group of young men exposed the powerlessness of the Indian police, and the elite National Security Guard of this supposedly mighty, nuclear-powered nation. Some people argue it is just the first wave, and now that Pakistan is without a strong leader there is more to come.

When you try to analyse Indian security politics you always have to look at its major regional rival Pakistan. They are historically connected; they share a common colonial history, which is in large parts the root cause for many of today's social, economic, and security challenges, and they will stay connected by virtue of the power of social and structural change that we call “globalization”.

So what is the situation in Pakistan? For starters, the Pakistani secret service, ISI, has been given a carte blanche now that Pervez

Figure 1

February 19, 2007	Terrorists attack the “peace train” that runs between New Delhi and the Pakistani city Lahore. 60 people are injured, 69 are killed.
August 25, 2007	Two bombs explode in the South Indian city of Hyderabad. 50 people are injured, 42 are killed.
May 13, 2008	In the tourist city Jaipur, the capital of the Indian state Rajasthan, eight bombs explode leaving 118 injured and 63 killed
July 26, 2008	In the West Indian metropolis Ahmedabad 16 bombs explode leaving 150 injured, and 56 killed
October 30, 2008	In the Indian state Assam, in North-East India a series of bomb attacks kills more than 80 people.
November 26, 2008	A series of attacks in Mumbai, leave about 300 people injured, and two hundred dead.

Musharraf is gone. It is common knowledge that the ISI supports terrorist activities and often undermines or deviates from official government politics. The fact that Zadari promised to work closely with the US to fight terrorism is likely to stay an meaningless phrase. The reason is simple: In order to fight terrorism, the government would have to go against their own population in areas such as Baluchistan and Karachi and along the mountainous borders with Afghanistan. Going against one's own population however is highly unpopular and will lead to social unrest. In addition, American drones shoot at terrorists and kill civilians instead. This angers the population. America's war on terror has been a catastrophe in Pakistan, and operations there are largely mishandled. In fact, the US has managed to radicalize also the Pakistani north, which so far has been comparably peaceful. Fortunately, analysts have finally realized that Al-Qaeda is not only active in Afghanistan but operate in Pakistan because this ailing state serves as a sanctuary. Tribal leaders in Baluchistan offer protection, separatist warlords offer support, and every effort of the Pakistani government alienates their people more, and radicalizes even more. Pair such a situation with an economic downturn and you will come to the conclusion that the end of the government cannot be far away.

The idea of Pakistan as a failed state, as "Asia's Somalia" is an idea with horror and is still often suppressed, also because of the nuclear danger that would ensue in such a case. Some people might remember the "nuclear e-bay" of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Yet, Pakistan suffers like no other country from the financial crisis. The country might even go bankrupt. What would that mean? Not being able to pay for its foreign debt, not being able to import foreign goods, Pakistani people will soon experience a food crisis and the industry will collapse. That leaves millions unemployed; millions without health-care and millions will go back to being utterly poor after they experienced an increase in their income over the last years. The economic growth of the last years will be done away with in a split second. This also has ramifications on the security sector in Pakistan.

When ordinary police men are not able to buy food from their salary anymore, they start abusing their authority and turn to corruption and racketeering. Local warlords and tribal leader who have money will be able to bribe the security authorities and make them turn a blind eye to terrorist camps, or terrorist movements. The population of a collapsing country is also vulnerable to radicalization, nationalist rhetoric and chauvinism. The government will need

successes in foreign policy to distract from internal problems. It has been that way for centuries and it is a simple rule of thumb: When you have great internal problems, create even bigger external ones. A financially ruined Pakistan, although a nuclear power, will lose its weight in the region. Currently, the most powerful Muslim country, its leadership might be taken over by Iran or Saudi Arabia. Turkey might also be a candidate, but the accession process to the EU is preventing a re-orientation to its Muslim roots for the time being. Apart from the financial crisis and the infringements on their sovereignty by American attacks, Pakistan's leader Zadari has no power over the military, and no control over the secret service. It is only a matter of time until he is either killed or steps down. In such a situation, although it sounds harsh it can only be hoped that the military steps in to prevent radical Islam to get control over the nuclear arsenal.

Coming back to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India: The attacks in India throughout the last two years show a pattern. First, the attacks happen throughout the whole country, in east, west, north and south India. No area is safe! Secondly, India has blamed most of these attacks on Islamist militant groups based in Pakistan or Bangladesh which, it says, have links to the ISI. Preliminary investigations into the Mumbai attacks pointed to involvement of at least some Pakistani nationals in the attacks on Mumbai.

India's Muslims have long complained of discrimination at the hands of its Hindu majority. Many also object to Indian rule in Kashmir. Al-Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to attack India in revenge for its policies in Kashmir, although Indian security officials maintain that the group has no active presence within the country.

For a short time there were fears that "Deccan Mujahedeen" a group which claims to be responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, is an offspring of the Indian Mujahedeen, an Islamist group that was also unknown until it said it had caused a series of multiple bomb attacks on Indian cities in the past year. Some officials claim that the Indian Mujahedeen have links to Pakistan, but some fear that it might be the first home-grown terrorist group to have emerged from India's 151 million strong Muslim population. By now secret services around the world believe that it was Lashkar e Taiba that is responsible for the Mumbai attacks and Indian and Western secret services are sure that Lashkar e Taiba has links to the Pakistani secret service ISI. Those jihadists were supported by the ISI to fight a guerrilla war in Kashmir, the disputed area between Pakistan and India. Their aim is to destroy India, the increasingly pro-American,

democratic, free and Hindu society that has opted for deep military links with Israel. As Lashkar e Taiba's leader Hafiz Saeed said: "There can't be any peace while India remains intact. Cut them, cut them cut them so much that they kneel before you and ask for mercy." Terrorism thus undermines the whole subcontinent, including Pakistan and Afghanistan, and such is the concept of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and recently in Islamabad. A transformation of Pakistan into a failed state would entail the loss of any real borders between Afghanistan and India. Without the Pakistani borders, Afghanistan would not be separated from India anymore. As Arundhati Roy stated: "If Pakistan collapses, we can look forward to having millions of "non-state actors" with an arsenal of nuclear weapons at their disposal as neighbours." The Pakistani security services do everything in their power to undermine the Afghani government, and to radicalize people from Afghanistan. As recruiting agents for America's jihad against the Soviet Union, it was the job of the Pakistani army and the ISI to nurture and channel funds to Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The US government seems never to have heard of the tale of Frankenstein, until the attacks of 9/11. Now the ISI deploys their informal troops against the US and against India. A destabilized Afghanistan provides a base where to train militant groups which can then be sent off to Kashmir and wreck havoc on the civilian population there, or in any greater city of India. At the same time, India spends a great amount of money to aid Afghanistan to avoid exactly that scenario.

So yes, it looks like there is more to come from Pakistan, and that India is going to suffer even more loss and horror in the hearts of its big cities. Unsurprisingly, the millions of rifle-holding watchmen in front of every shop and city gate do not prevent terrorist attacks from happening. The Mumbai attacks of November 26, 2008 killed the Indian chief of the anti-terror squad, seized hostages at the luxury hotels Taj Mahal and Oberoi. They were seeking out especially British and American citizens. They attacked at least ten top businessmen in the Taj and burst into a delegation of European Members of Parliament, who when they come back to Europe will probably ask for more stringent anti terror laws in the EU because of their experiences. A nightmare to liberal citizens who love their freedom and who know that perfect security is a myth.

The group also attacked "Leopold Café", a place that I have frequently visited myself during my stay in Mumbai. Two years ago, when my friends and I walked by the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and dined at Leopold's no one feared a

terrorist attack. Sure there had been attacks before. Memories are fresh of July 11, 2006, when 200 people were killed by seven bombs on Mumbai's train network. In 2001, an assault on the Indian parliament by Islamic militants left 12 people dead and India and Pakistan almost went to war over it. Yet, why would someone attack a bar popular with tourists and backpackers?

The reason is simple and involves a strategy that has been used recently in Pakistan itself where it worked perfectly. What I am talking about is the attack on the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad. The recent attacks in Mumbai appear to fit into a new campaign to hit busy urban targets, popular with foreigners and wealthy people, to cause maximum damage to the country's economy and international reputation. It is not enough anymore to kill as many people as possible (a strategy mostly seen in the Middle East), the victims also have to be influential and rich. If India accuses Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of masterminding this attack, it will almost certainly cause another crisis in bilateral relations that were thawing in the last years with great diplomatic efforts from both sides. Indeed, rapprochement on the issue of Kashmir seems further than ever. What is more, the attacks on Mumbai focus the world's attention on India. The worst that could happen to India now is tribal and inter-communal violence. This would demonstrate that India is not as stable and secure as the world has thought and that Indian democracy is not strong enough to keep its multiethnic citizens together. Violence and internal fighting between Hindus and Muslims would ruin India's image in the world, and it is from this perspective that I applaud the Muslims demonstrating peacefully and openly disengaging from the murderers of Mumbai. Only a strong demonstration of Indian unity and the acknowledgment that there were victims among both sides, Hindu and Muslim will tell the world that India is still the developing world's most successful democratic experiment... despite the social failings, and regrettable failure to provide for basic human rights to some segments of its population, such as the LGBT community.

However, there is one thing about Mumbai that is striking. The 16 million strong population of the capital of Maharashtra, is evidence of a melting pot rarely seen on this planet. Mumbai is home to the headquarters of all the most important Indian financial institutions, multinational companies and the world's largest film industry. Extremely rich people and utterly poor souls are living "together", whereby together means that crowds of begging children trail behind the men in suits. About half of the city's

population lives in the slums, the sea of shabby huts and little barracks, filthy and disease ridden can be overlooked from the skyscrapers in the gentrified areas where people with large rifles are guarding the islands of wealth. Fault lines do not only run between the rich and the poor, but also between the religious and ethnic groups. When the local ethnic group, the Marathis, succeeded to incorporate Mumbai (back then its name was Bombay, but the city was renamed by the far-right Hindu Shiv Sena party which came to power in 1995) into the Indian state of Maharashtra in 1960 (instead of making it an independent city state) protesters took to the street and clashed with riot police leaving a hundred dead. In 1992, communal tensions (between Hindus and Muslims) exploded into riots causing over 900 deaths. Arson, killings and the destruction of property occurred and as a result of the riots about 200000 Muslims fled their homes.

So why is it so stunning that Leopold's Café was an aim of the attackers? The recent terrorist attacks, one of many in a long series of violent events in the city and certainly not the last that we have heard of, are of a new quality as they were directed against the basis on which the city thrives: the foreigners. It was an attack against the city's multiculturalism, against foreign direct investment fuelling banks and the film industry, against Leopold Café, which is in fact an Iranian-Zoroastrian café, and as such a product of the Indian Parsi community. It was also an attack on the diplomats and foreign emissaries that visit Mumbai during each trip they make to India. Finally, it was an attack against the just 70000 strong Jewish Community. When I talked to the rabbi of the Blue Synagogue in Mumbai in 2006, he told me that the Jewish community goes largely unharmed by the communal tensions between Muslims and Hindus. It seems as if this is about to change.

Besides communal strife, there is a danger that India is already facing for years: hollowing-out the rule of law and democracy. The war on terror especially in Western societies has cost the people a large part of their freedom. Anti terrorism legislation in the US, and in the EU, undermines fundamental rights such as the right to be subjected to a fair trial, to have legal remedies, due process, the assumption of innocence, the right to privacy. International legal instruments such as the convention against the forced disappearance of persons, the convention prohibiting torture, and various human rights treaties are undermined by American extraordinary renditions, and the outsourcing of torture to Syria. India, should not follow the trail of our only superpower, which has lost its reputation

in the world through extrajudicial killings of persons, water boarding techniques, and data protection scandals. India, should not follow in the footsteps of a nation that has spent billions on homeland security, without being able to prevent the killing of their people abroad. Fancy measures proposed by the US such as the Container Security Initiative, the PNR agreements, the Advanced Passenger Information transmission, the Entry-Exit System, and the Automated Entry Authorisation System, already have led to a downturn of student numbers in the US. Universities are complaining that students take to other locations for their exchanges, their masters and their PhDs, and tourist boards warn about serious damages to the industry in the face of such restrictive immigration measures. India, despite having 500000 soldiers in Kashmir, is still not able to contain terrorism there, and if 20 men manage to keep a grip on a 20 million city like Mumbai for three days, then the Indian government should learn a lesson if it wants to prevent the *Kashmirization* of the whole Indian Union: **Terrorism is the idea of a few condemnable people, multiplied and spread by socio-economic failings of the state.**

The solution is not a police state, but an increase in democracy. India should transform its police along ethical and human rights guidelines, and pay them more, so they will not ask for bribes and will stop blackmailing the shop owners, the street beggars, and the taxi drivers. Indian Encounter Specialists should be taught there suspects should still be alive after the encounter, and judicial review should be impartial, swift and thorough. The Indian government and political parties should advocate the common aims of a society that needs every one of its citizens to achieve economic growth and political stability. The government should not divide and separate but unite the different segments of its society. Participation in the democratic system, secular education and inclusion in the economic growth through redistributive policies is the key. As a positive signal the government could cherish and acknowledge the Muslim demonstrations after the Mumbai attacks in which they distanced themselves from the atrocity and confirmed their loyalty to the Indian state.

What is striking about Mumbai is that it will survive these attacks. A city that is still the hope for many Indians seeking for a better life cannot be brought down by such attacks, however outrageous and xenophobic they were. It is striking that despite communal tensions and fault lines, the city experiences extraordinary growth and attracts talent and foreign direct investment from all around the world. The damage will be

repaired, like they did repair the train stations after the 2006 attacks and millions of people will continue to pass by the Chhatrapati Shivaji station every day. The primary task for the government is now to tackle the problem that many of them are followed by groups of begging children.

Opinion Articles

Security policy in the eyes of Russia on the example of the latest Caucasian crisis: A rough sketch

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In the aftermath of the latest armed conflict in the Caucasus, Dmitry Medvedev, new president of the Russian Federation, made an interesting offer to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, current President of the European Council. He arrogated a new Euro-Atlantic model of foreign security policy respecting the rules of international law on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. At first sight one cannot help but to call such an offer from a state so often criticized for its disrespect of international law quite hypocritical. It is obvious though that this behaviour stresses merely political interests. It has to be seen after all as a response to a largely aggressive foreign policy from the United States especially under the government of George W. Bush.

Shaping the world in terms of its own interests the USA never kept it a secret that it was either with them or against them. In attacking Iraq it disregarded international law as much as it is now criticizing Russia for having done so in Georgia respectively in South Ossetia. In acknowledging the independence of Kosovo the USA on the one hand confronted Russia and on the other hand gave it exactly the explanation it

needed for the acknowledgement of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Why should their segregation be more violating international law than the segregation of Kosovo? But this was only a clever move in a much bigger game about prestige and power.

For the last 18 years the USA basked in its position as the most powerful country after having shared its title with the Soviet Union for over 50 years. Now Russia is making its way back onto the international stage and is not willing to be a simple pawn in the USA's game. I am not talking about an upcoming second Cold War. Let us not meet trouble halfway! Nonetheless we can recognize an old pattern in US-Russian relations that is action and reaction. The US has confronted Russia with the threat of building antimissile defence in Poland and Russia reacted by publicly planning to station missiles in Kaliningrad.

When the USA acknowledged the independence of Kosovo, there was not really anything Russia could have done against it but being officially aggrieved. In the Caucasus, though, it should have been obvious that it would not be that easy. The USA and NATO were

approaching those countries eager to get out of the Russian sphere of influence while Russia was not less eager to keep them within. The Caucasus has been for centuries Russia's backyard and, in other conflicts like that with Chechnya, the country already proved that it is still not to be trifled with.

One might consider Russia's efforts to channel South Ossetian and Abkhazian separate movements into a certain willingness to become again a part of Russia, well planned. At least the Russian explanation why it entered into war with Georgia, namely to officially defend the life of Russian citizens, worked well. Except for some very harsh statements by politicians and journalists especially in the USA, there were no sanctions from the UN Security Council. Of course one should not forget the fact that Russia is still a permanent member of this council.

In the journal *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2008) we can find the following quote by Charles King: *For future historians, the South Ossetian crisis will mark a time when Russia came to disregard existing international institutions and began to fashion its own**. Surely it remains a fact that Russia disregarded international law when it violated the national integrity of Georgia. Nonetheless one could say the same about certain international actions the USA have performed during the last decade.

Yet, we do not want to point a finger in this article. It is an attempt to explain how political infightings occurred under the disguise of "security policy". Russia officially fought to defend its citizens. The USA officially supported Georgia in the name of its sovereignty. Despite their harsh criticism neither the UN nor the European Union were able to identify the main responsible and to bring an end to the crisis. Russia still refuses to accept Georgia's sovereignty without the country's official recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.

Nevertheless, due to the intervention of President Nicolas Sarkozy the armed conflict finally ceased and now Russia's president has set his interest on the development of a new security policy without American rule.

Is this a new effort to present Russia as a country deliberately submitted to international law and human rights? Or is it merely another move in the game for power trying to diminish US influence in the European-Atlantic hemisphere making Russia a new indispensable and valuable partner?

Hence, are we really talking about guaranteeing the security of nations and people or are we rather talking about sheer political and strategic interests?

Notes

* King, Charles: *Checking Russia*. In: *Foreign Affairs* 87; 6. New York 2008. p.: 2 12.

Academic Article

Conceptual Analysis of the Concept of 'Security': A Comparative Analysis between Karyotis¹ and Van Munster²

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Introduction

“No social science concept has been more abused and misused than national security” (p.26), Baldwin (1997) writes. In fact, it seems that almost every political action on the international stage can be justified in the name of 'national security'. If any other justification for statist agitation proves to be not self-sufficient anymore, politicians apparently can have the certainty to be able to refer to the solid foundation of 'national security'. Not only in the field of foreign policy, even in domestic matters, the citation of 'security' turns out to be a self-explanatory justification which does not need further theoretical foundation- an axiom, thus.

Especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the hysterical and imprudent use (or rather abuse) of the concept have blurred any limitations to the conceptual scope of 'security'. Hence, in order to be capable of well-founded contributing to political discussions, it is crucial to develop a certain sensitivity as to such concepts.

By way of a comparative analysis, this paper will thus examine the conceptional usage of 'security' in Georgios Karyotis'

of 'security' in Georgios Karyotis' "European migration policy in the aftermath of September 11" and Rens van Munster's "Logics of security: the Copenhagen School, risk management and the war on terror" respectively.

The (semantic) meaning of 'security'

In his essay "European migration policy in the aftermath of September 11", Georgios Karyotis argues that European security policy increasingly had been prone to link migration to crime and terrorism, a tendency further reinforced after the events of September 11. He observed the stance of EU policy-makers to interpret "population movements in terms of their danger to national security" (p.1) which served as a legitimation to adopt restrictive measures on migration.

Basically supporting the constructivist approach to international security of the Copenhagen School, Karyotis argues that security issues are constructed by political discourse. Although a trend towards the merging of migration with existential dangers to international security had already been recognizable from the 1980s onwards, the

attacks of 9/11 “further reinforced the security logic of migration” (p.6), he says. Henceforth, “it became equally, or even more, unthinkable to refer to migration without referring to security” (p.6).

Karyotis names political, societal, criminological and economic concerns that subsequently contributed to the construction of the notion of migration being a security threat. “Migration in Europe was securitized” (p.12), as he puts it; with 'speech acts' (rhetoric means of mobilization by political and security elites) being one of the catalysts (albeit not the only one, as is the theory of the Copenhagen School). 'Security', then, is a socio-political construction, emerging mainly from anti-immigration discourses which implement an intrinsic fear of migration due to its socially perceived nexus to terrorism.

Rens van Munster also takes the theory of the Copenhagen School as the point of departure for his depiction of “the dynamics of securitisation in world politics” (p.10). In his essay “Logics of security: The Copenhagen School, risk management and the war on terror”, he argues that in politics, the Copenhagen School's theory of security experts and political actors convincing a population (“an audience”) of the exceptional situation of a real-existing threat (which legitimizes the breaking of normal democratic procedures) is complemented with the logic of risk management which makes sure that risks are prevented from becoming concrete dangers. Where the logic of the exceptional decision (anchored in the Copenhagen theory) is reactionary, risk management acts preventive.

“Taken together, both logics are able to provide a complex picture of the dynamics of securitisation in world politics” (p.11), Munster writes. If these two approaches intertwine in daily politics, their common aim obviously is to look after national security.

Given the fact that Munster describes securitisation as the attempt to counteract against an external threat and a preventive strike as an attempt to eliminate an assumed risk respectively, security (as can be deduced by implication), is the strife to achieve the condition of absolute safety- a condition that is achieved when there is no danger anymore that threatens the survival of a society.

Reconstruction of the intention of the authors and contextualization of the texts

It is crucial to note that both texts have been published several years after the attacks of 11 September 2001 that had dramatically altered the international political landscape- debates on international security, terrorism and cultural

confrontations reached an actuality and significance like hardly before.

Political reactions like the US-American war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the war in Iraq in 2003 prove the immense importance of debates about 'security' given the threat of terror that the world had now painfully realized.

Hence, Georgios Karyotis from the Department of Government in the UK (Study finds, 2008), with a specialisation in international relations, migration policy and terrorism analyses how issues enter the security agenda of states and especially how securitisation gets linked with immigration and terrorism- a tendency that he apparently could observe in the aftermath of September 11.

Karyotis investigates the societal pervasive “security-migration nexus” (p.1) by referring to the concept of “securitisation” of the Copenhagen School. Thereby, he clarifies the theory of the Copenhagen School and extends it at the same time because “it relies exclusively on a single mechanism, namely speech acts, to explain how an issue is securitized” (p.3). He therefore reproaches the Copenhagen School with a certain reductionism and adds reasons for his opinion that the observed “securitisation of migration” also emerged due to institutional (Trevi, Schengen area), instrumental (SIS) and ideological initiatives (merging migration, terrorism and crime). The perceived nexus between migration and security can therefore not only be reduced to a “purely verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric” (p.3).

Furthermore, by stating that the beginnings of this process already date back to the 1980s, he opposes the notion that the attacks on 9/11 were the instigator of such a migration policy.

Moreover, Karyotis elucidates the contributing elements (“the main axes”) to the discursive construction of migration as a threat, showing that this “self-referential practice” (p.12) cannot be reduced to a single causality.

Finally, Karyotis intention is to prove that the whole security-migration discourse is “a construction that is both exaggerated and problematic” (p.1). By using such a politically stirred vocabulary, he seduces his readers to directly spurn that obviously constructed nexus, trying to evoke a necessary sensitivity and differentiated understanding regarding this culturally and politically sensitive issue.

Same as Karyotis, Rens van Munster reacts to the securitisation tendency of states in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, a policy matter that within just a few years gained absolute priority before other issues.

Above, it is interesting to note that Munster's essay was published in October 2005, only one month after the controversy over the Muhammad cartoons in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* - a fact that might have touched Munster especially due to the fact that he is enrolled at the University of Southern Denmark in International Politics (Study finds, 2008), which probably let him experience and debate the issues in close vicinity and which might have given him the inspiration to write about securitisation policy as possible consequences of cultural-religious confrontations.

Therefore, he basically supports the logic of the Copenhagen School which "can add to our understanding of how 'security' performs its constitutive function" (p.1) of the political.

However, he articulates the need to clarify their theory by adding Carl Schmitt's conception of the friend/enemy distinction in order to conceive a comprehensive security concept. But he does not stop there and even acknowledges that "the Schmittian logic does not exhaust all possible forms" (p.1) of the performative act of security in politics. Thus, he extends both the Copenhagen and the Schmittian theories by "theoretically complement[ing them] with the more routine-like logic of risk management" (p.1).

Moreover, he opposes Bigo (2001) and Williams (2003) who hold that these concepts of securitisation would lack reference to the everyday reality of politics: Munster contends that the current war against terrorism indeed proves the opposite.

Finally, Munster explicitly wants to make the reader aware of obvious disadvantages and morally controversial aspects of (preventive) risk management. Writing about the possible violation of privacy, the highly queasy level of uncertainty in preventive actions or the tendency to discriminatory measures against certain social groups, Munster seduces his readers to morally reject the practice of preventive risk management and appeals to them to critically reflect upon this method of security which might "operate in ways that are undesirable for, or even in direct opposition to, the democratic ideals of liberty and equality" (p.2).

Critical reflection

I basically support Karyotis' view that the 'migration-security nexus' is both exaggerated and problematic. But he may overstate the impact of the perceived threat of migration because other factors may contribute to a process of securitisation as well - factors such as domestic weaknesses motivating governments to introduce protectionist measures that result in a

defensive political stance or bilateral tensions leading to an overall securitisation. So one could reproach Karyotis with a theoretical reductionism due to the fact that not only migration policy constitutes security policy.

Another starting point for criticism is already anticipated by himself: "Admittedly, not all confuse terrorists and migrants" (p.8). In fact, the intensity of the perceived 'migration-security nexus' highly depends on the level of literacy and cultural edification of a society. Certainly, intellectual contentious debates in public help to contain and to counteract such generalized opinions in the population.

Moreover, not all politicians can be measured by the same yardstick- the process of securitisation with politician's speech acts as instigative catalysts only applies if one proceeds on the assumption that no politician is interested in understanding among nations and cultural reconciliation- which is certainly not the case.

So Karyotis disregards possible attenuating circumstances that alleviate his ostensibly all-pervasive 'migration-security nexus' in the EU- albeit one has to concede that he correctly realizes that dangerous tendency.

Munster conceives a differentiated model of security policy in today's world politics. By combining the theory of the Copenhagen School (together with the Schmittian bipolar enemy/friend representation) with the preventive practices of risk management, he gives a sophisticated outline of the often complex security policies today. Therewith, he acknowledges that security cannot be reduced to a single political practice but that rather several factors and motivations intertwine.

However, simply by the evocation of an existential or potential threat (by the demonization of an enemy or by the presentation of the verisimilitude of a danger respectively), neither a population nor any security council will be convinced of the need to crush an enemy whatsoever. As a precondition, there will have to be already pre-existing indicators of a danger that are perceived by a population as such (this is the case e.g. if there is already a high degree of xenophobia in a society). Munster does not consider this aspect and presents the decision to eliminate a threat solely as one of the reigning cabinet. The fact that George W. Bush's decision to wage war in Iraq in 2003 without explicit approval of the UN-security council alienated many states proves the importance of popular and, if possible, international approbation.

Finally, I fully support Munster's arguments against the logic of risk management which is morally extremely difficult to justify. Any

preventive intervention or insinuation of guilt opposes the Kantian logic of reason and ethics of conviction. Philosophically, ethics of conviction are opposed by social utilitarianism- an approach that is theoretically very difficult to justify; but maybe in daily politics a crucial component.

Concluding remarks

Karyotis and Munster show that the debate about 'security' is a major one in today's politics. In order to fully comprehend the implications of such a concept, it is indispensable to develop a certain conceptual sensitivity.

Especially with the example of Karyotis' 'migration-security nexus' it has become clear that such a sensitivity is necessary in order not to succumb to seductive simplifications and generalisations. Concepts are "re-examined, re-defined and re-conceptualized" (p.2), as Karyotis notes - it is therefore a mandatory provision to critically reflect upon both explicit meanings of concepts and the context in which they are used if one wants to be able to stand the pace of today's political and ideological controversies.

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Academic Article

Is the European Union an economic giant but a political dwarf on the international scene?

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Introduction

Is the European Union (EU) an economic giant but a political dwarf on the international scene? Considering milestones such as the inauguration of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht, the creation of the post of the High Representative at Amsterdam, the beginnings of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at St. Malo and the related decision to acquire hard power capabilities in the form of EU Battle Groups, it seems as if the EU gradually grew out of its international dwarf status. The relevance of doing so lies in the fact that international challenges such as Iran require multilateral responses. This necessitates the coming of age of the EU actorship capabilities (Sjøstedt, 1977).

However, this essay will argue that even though the EU has grown politically since 1993 and its status of being an economic giant is self-evident (Smith, 2003), it is still little more than a dwarf internationally. This claim will be substantiated in the following steps. First, it will be shown that national historical baggage is more often a curse for a coherent and effective EU foreign policy than a blessing. To this adds itself

the continued dominance of intergovernmentalism in the second pillar, which puts a strain on coherent EU positions above the lowest common denominator¹. Third, even if coherent policy positions could be arrived at, the means to implement them remain largely absent, given that the capabilities-expectations gap is still too wide.

Why historical baggage is rather a curse than a blessing

What keeps the Union from being little more than a dwarf internationally is that there are necessarily diverse strategic foreign policy cultures and approaches to the use of force in a Union of twenty-seven with all the conflict potential this entails (Hill, 2004). There are so-called Europeanists and Atlanticists, both of which were pitted against each other with regard to Iraq (Vanhoonacker, 2005), and neutrals, such as Sweden.

Multiple Member States enviously guard their historical *domaines réservés* in particular and each protects its national foreign policy interests in general. France considers itself to be the protecting power of the Lebanon and set

up a Mediterranean union outside of the Barcelona Process, Spain always had considerable influence in North Africa and Austria in the Balkans. While these backyard interests are not necessarily always in conflict with each other, the danger nonetheless continues to exist. A common EU position has then a hard time to come up.

Different national foreign policy cultures also react differently to external stimuli. As a result, lingering fault lines break up. An example is the 'loyalty question' asked by the United States (US) in the run-up to the Iraq War. Another example is the recent auto-proclaimed independence of Kosovo. Due to fears of establishing a negative precedent and of encouraging separatist movements, several Member States such as Spain did not recognise Kosovo, while others did. Hence, "...the problems in developing a common foreign policy are not only the result of a lack of political will, but...follow from the different interests, world views, and strategic cultures of the member states..." (Keukeleire, 2003, p. 45). Every enlargement round adds some more into the garbage can (Gordon, 1997/1998; Hill, 2004). The next section will show that lowest common denominator decisions are likely to ensue as a result.

Why the second pillar is not conducive to effective foreign policy

The Member States can hardly complain about the EU's status of still being little more than an international political dwarf, given how they designed the second pillar. After German unification, the CFSP was rather a political symbol and a device to commit Germany than a sincere attempt to integrate national foreign policies (Gordon, 1997/1998; Keukeleire, 2003). Member States could easily agree to it given that decisions had to be taken unanimously in this system of "... 'rationalized intergovernmentalism'..." (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002, p. 258). Moreover, its instruments such as common strategies and demarches turned out to be ineffective. CFSP has its merits with regard to "...internal diplomacy..." (Keukeleire, 2003, p. 31), i.e. the promotion of mutual trust and of diplomatic conflict among the Member States. Those were in turn more occupied with themselves than with reacting to external crises. Thus, a downward spiral set in: CFSP failed at numerous occasions (e.g. Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia etc.) due to its inherent shortcomings with the result that the big Member States turned their back on it and exerted their influence in other international forums (ibid.). Given that national foreign policy interests were

everything but converging, CFSP was strained by the fact that the EU always had to "...balance the competing incentives for cooperation among its member states with their inherent desire to act unilaterally in world affairs" (Smith, 2005).

Subsequent changes to the decision-making structures of the second pillar did little to help the EU growing out of its political dwarf status. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002) holds that "...new structures were built into the decision-making system of CFSP and ESDP... which will... change the intergovernmental aspect of the Second Pillar significantly" (p. 259). However, they will hardly change much in reality. First, Amsterdam introduced qualified majority voting (QMV) and thereby addressed one of the most important underlying impediments to an effective EU foreign policy, the unanimity rule. Nevertheless, Member States continue to take their decisions unanimously. Even though not all have equal weight, all have an equal say. It seems hard to imagine that a Union of twenty-seven plus x can come to anything but lowest common denominator decisions against this background. CFSP seems to remain trapped in the downward spiral. Second, Amsterdam and Nice tried to alleviate the unanimity shadow with the introduction of constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation respectively. Yet, the latter excludes military and defense issues with the result that "...the integrative added value of this instrument thus remains very limited..." (p. 269). Even more worrying is that these devices have considerable disruptive potential by stimulating the emergence of first and second class states (Hill, 2004). Decision-making deficiencies will thus continue to loom over CFSP and weaken it.

Third, even though much has been made out of the alleged 'Brusselisation' of foreign policy making, as if it could compensate for the abovementioned shortcomings, it is not likely to lead to the dwarf's growth. The notion broadly can be defined as the ever increasing making of foreign policy in Brussels, which is said to lead to the Europeanisation of national foreign policies (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002). Its meaning is, however, neither very precise (Nuttall, 2005), nor has it been sufficiently delineated from 'bureaucratisation', by which is meant the everyday interaction of diplomats in Brussels (Duke/ Vanhoonaeker, 2006) or 'supranationalisation'². Key is the assertion that "administrative governance itself and the processes and contacts that are entailed by it have modified intergovernmentalism to the extent that the CFSP is much more than merely the lowest common denominator amongst the

Member States” (p. 181)³. Attributing the lack of empirical results for this pretension to the constructivist flavour of the concept, it does not stand closer scrutiny either.

Take the example of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which prepares CFSP themes for the Council. It meets in the formation of the heads of the political departments of the national foreign ministries, who are *not* constantly present in Brussels and of the PSC-delegates. For the former, a 'Brusselisation' effect hardly sets in. Even Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2002) concedes that the “...political directors look at CFSP activities through spectacles of *national* hue... [emphasis added]” (p. 266). Stating that 'Brusselisation' leads to the Europeanisation of national foreign policies thus means overstressing the case. And even if both PSC formations went 'native', it would not matter as the Council's last word must be a unanimous one. Crowe (2003) even holds that the empowerment of Solana by the big Member States to act on their behalf is more conducive to the genesis of an effective EU position than are PSC deliberations. Hence, neither will 'Brusselisation' result in a gradual denationalisation of the second pillar⁴, nor is it likely to make up for its inherent decision-making inefficiencies. 'Brusselisation' is not going to help the dwarf growing.

Fourth and finally, even though the High Representative for the CFSP has successfully raised the EU's presence (Allen/ Smith, 1990), he has always faced constraints and does not embody a communautarised foreign policy accordingly. Solana's high-profile as a former Spanish prime minister and NATO secretary-general has given the EU much visibility. Yet, he always had to remain within the boundaries set by the big Member States in particular and, therefore, is little more than an agent. Having been accused of being the servant of the big-three, he cannot act without their support (Keukeleire, 2003). As indicated above, he is the best example that only being in Brussels does not mean that foreign policy is more communautarised. In fact, he has no own resources and his Policy Unit, to which Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) would point as a prime example of denationalising 'Brusselisation', depends not only on supply of information by the Member States but also has only a staff of twenty-four officials (Smith, 2003) and had its responsibilities clarified (delineated) at Amsterdam. Still, the High Representative is mainly responsible for a more mature EU foreign policy.

Why the capabilities-expectations gap is still too wide

Even if the EU could take efficient and coherent foreign policy decisions, the benefits of this ability are constrained, given that it lacks the means to implement them. Good news first. The European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, cross-border mergers in the defense area (Smith, 2005) and EADS projects, such as the long-range airlift carrier 'A-400M' and the attack helicopter 'Tiger', led to a narrowing of the capabilities-expectations gap in the 1990s (Ginsberg, 1999). Nevertheless, “[a]ll these advances cannot obscure the fact that there is still a long way to go before full Petersberg operationality” (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002, p. 281). Hill (2004) maintains that the EU can only assume the low-end, i.e. peacekeeping, of the Petersberg tasks. For the EU still lacks the capabilities to wage high-intensity warfare independently from NATO (Crowe, 2003). It suffers from a lack of reconnaissance and communications systems, interoperability and intelligence (Gordon, 1997/1998). Galileo has military potential (Howorth, 2005) but its realisation is still not certain and the A-400M will only be introduced in the coming years. Neither are Member States making a visible effort to increase their defense spending to match their rhetoric, nor is there a realist prospect of persuading France and the UK to trade off their seats in the UN Security Council for a European one. The gap will hence not be closed any time soon. The acting-capacity of the Union is going to remain dwarf-like too.

Conclusion

This essay has shown that national heritages, intergovernmental mode of governance and the capabilities-expectations gap are mainly responsible for an ineffective EU foreign policy. Even if progress in the field of defense will be made with the Headline goals for 2010 and even if the gap should gradually narrow (Howorth, 2005), the unanimity shadow in the second pillar precludes much effective decision-making but is instead conducive to lead to lowest common denominator decisions in a Union of twenty-seven plus x.

For the dwarf to really grow, the following three issues must be sincerely addressed. First, what should the EU's hard power be used for? Although the European Security Strategy (ESS) already addressed this question, there needs to be much more (public) debate on it. Different national foreign policy traditions and approaches to the use of military power will make it very hard to find common

Strang - Economic giant but political dwarf?

ground, especially because the Cold War has created a European "...culture of security dependence..." (Gordon, 1997/1998, p. 95).

Second, the issue of decision-making in the second pillar has to be addressed. Malta does not have the same weight as France and accordingly should not have the same influence. For CFSP to be effective, it cannot always be common. The EU of twenty-seven is not a club of equals. This commonplace will have to be sold politically.

Third, defense spending will have to be increased. Europeans need to realise that security is not for free. This is also politically challenging and may conflict with the goal of equilibrated budgets. If this is not being done, the EU will continue to be dependent on NATO and the dwarf will never become a giant.

Notes

1. Although it is acknowledged that the EU also wields (structural) power (Keukeleire, 2003) by means of its common commercial policy, i.e. the first pillar, this essay with focus on foreign policy-making within the second one. The reason is that the EU's international capacity to act with hard power is determined by the characteristics of the CFSP pillar and ESDP.

2. Presumably, 'Brusselisation' contains elements of all of them and can, thus, rather be described as a garbage can concept.

3. Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) and Smith (2003) even go so far to call 'Brusselisation' a new mode of governance for the second pillar. Interestingly, Vanhoonacker (2005) contradicts herself later.

4. Likewise is an interpillar approach not an "...infusion of supranational authority in the CFSP..." (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002, p. 276) but an example of the European Council deciding intergovernmentally (Keukeleire, 2003).

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Academic Article

Bureaucracy in the EU's CFSP: About a Cake, a Crawler and Mysterious Shadows

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Introduction

▼ *Who runs Europe?* Is the question most often wondered about when looking at the relatively large role of bureaucrats within the European Union. Being to a large degree influenced by both EU and national civil servants on the one hand, and politicians on the other hand, it remains difficult to assess the relative power of politicians of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers within this complex web of factors that eventually influence the EU policy process.

Taking the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an example, this essay will shed light on the various institutions and committees that eventually influence the policy process in this field. Bearing in mind the 'sensitive' character of this policy area, it will eventually be shown in how far a consequent 'Brusselization' is perceived to be a threat by the member states. In order to answer the question 'who governs politicians or bureaucrats?' (Page, 1997) the first part will therefore focus on the role of the Council, while the second part will give an overview of the working and functioning of the Council's General Secretariat, and the third part will place the

the Commission within this inter-institutional framework. By coming back to the initial question, the last part will try to solve the mystery about who is pulling the strings.

The Influence of Bureaucrats and Politicians

When trying to answer the question about who is influencing policy-making most, bureaucrats or politicians, it seems to be useful to initially clarify the meaning of these two terms. The Oxford Dictionary defines a politician as 'a person who is professionally involved in politics, especially as a holder of an elected office' and 'a person who acts in a manipulative and devious way, typically to gain advancement' (Oxford Dictionary, 2006c) while a bureaucrat in turn is defined as 'an official' (Oxford Dictionary, 2006a), being 'a person holding public office or having official duties' (Oxford Dictionary, 2006b). Hence, looking from a broader perspective the European Parliament is clearly composed of politicians while the Commission, being non-elected seems to be composed of bureaucrats and the Council is of a mixed-nature¹. Having established this general division, it becomes immediately obvious that there is no general answer to the initially

posed question as the 'balance of power between the array of institutions (...) as reflected in having a decisive impact on European legislation, changes from issue to issue and time to time' (Page, 1997, p.3). The following analysis can therefore not be generalized but is only valid for decision-making in the analyzed field.

The **Council of the European Union** (also known as the Council of Ministers; in the following: the Council) is a Community institution (Art.7 TEC), having both executive and legislative powers (Bainbridge, 2003). It is organized around four structures: the Council configurations, the presidency, COREPER and the Secretary General with the General Secretariat (The European Union online, 2005). The Council² is the main decision-making organ in the CFSP legal order (Art.13 TEU, para.3³). The provisions governing the Council in the area of CFSP state, *inter alia*, that "the Council shall adopt joint actions" (Art. 14, para. 1) and "common positions" (Art 13, para. 3). Decisions are to be taken unanimously, yet allowing for 'constructive abstention'. Even though since the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP became possible, the Council has hardly ever made use of this provision. It bases its decisions regarding the implementation (e.g. joint actions) on the general guidelines as established by the **European Council**, being composed of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and the President of the Commission (Art. 4, TEU). In contrast to the Council the European Council is not a Community institution (Art.7TEC)⁴. It "shall decide on common strategies" (Art. 13 TEU, para. 2). Reaching decisions on the legal guidelines exclusively by unanimity ("consensus"), it becomes obvious that the Member States are the principal actors in deciding about the general principles of the CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002).

Having established this general distinction between the tasks of European Council and the Council with regard to policy-making in CFSP one might conclude that CFSP is actually run by politicians, as Heads of State and/or Government as well as ministers certainly fall within the scope of this definition. Yet, such a conclusion would be superficial as can be seen when looking at the policy process in details. Being prepared by numerous subsidiary organs of the Council (Wessel, 1999), CFSP decisions are mostly adopted without any debate. Picturing the Council as a "cake with different layers"⁵, draft decisions have followed a long path through various subsidiary organs. Starting at the bottom, there are the CFSP-Counsellors⁶, as well as

experts and working groups⁷. Results are passed on to the next "layer", being the **Political and Security Committee** (COPS/ POCO) also called "the linchpin" of the Unions's defense, foreign and security policy (Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP). As decided in St. Malo the Political and Security Committee is a permanent Brussels based body (Duke, 2004), consisting of ambassadors of all member states, representative of the EU Commission and representatives of the Council General Secretariat⁸. The main tasks of COPS as defined by Art. 25 TEU are the monitoring of international situations in the area of CFSP, delivering of opinions on policy definitions to the Council and the monitoring of implementation of the agreed policies⁹. Besides the fact that it is obviously not the ministers in GAERC that influence policy-making most, one has to acknowledge the possibility for "circumvented decision making" (Duke, 2004, p.19) that results from the autonomous character of COPS as derived from Art.25 TEU. In a crisis COPS monitors the situation, comes up with possible responses by the EU and evaluates its implementation. Practically, this means that COPS not only advises the Council on Joint Actions but as part of its exercise of "political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations" (Art 25 TEU), COPS can exert power that usually lies with the Council. Regarding the question who is running the EU in the field of CFSP one can therefore say, that the "relevant competencies do remain ultimately at the disposal of the Member States" while "formulation and implementation of policy will be increasingly europeanized [...] by functionaries and services permanently at Brussels" (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002, p.261).

Coming back to the cake metaphor, COPS' opinion is passed on to the Council through **COREPER**¹⁰. Hence, "points of agreement and discord on any proposal" (Bainbridge, 2003, p.106) are already clarified by mid-rank civil servants from the national representation before being passed to COREPER or eventually the Council (Steenks, 2006). The Presidency will then avoid re-opening of points, being already settled at a lower level. Again, one can see the great degree of power of mid-rank civil servants, falling within the definition of 'bureaucrats', in this system (Ibid.).

However, one should not underestimate the degree of influence of the **Presidency**¹¹ within the policy process. While on the one hand trying to push as many items through as possible in order to appease the national government, it has

on the other hand the position of an 'ice-breaker' that mediates between the different national positions at stake (Steenks, 2006). Lying formally with the Member States and the Commission (Art.22 TEU, para.1), it is in practice the Presidency that proves to be the source of most initiatives for Common Positions and Joint Actions (Allen, 1998)¹². Furthermore, it is responsible for the implementation of decisions relating to CFSP (Art.18 TEU, para.2). Hence, even though Council meetings are already prepared by mid-rank civil servants (bureaucrats), it is formally the politicians that 'run the show'.

The Presidency is assisted by the **High Representative** for the CFSP (HR) (Art.18 TEU, para. 3), being also known as 'Mr. CFSP'¹³, through the 'contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties' (Art.26 TEU). Furthermore, he shall 'in particular ensure that the European Parliament and all members of the Council are kept fully informed of the implementation of enhanced cooperation (...)' (Art.27d TEU¹⁴). Being obliged to place Mr. CFSP¹⁵ within the general distinction between bureaucrats and politicians, one can say that he moved from being a bureaucrat to being a politician (Culley, 2006). While being initially a bureaucrat, who managed administrative work, he became a political figure, a political actor, leaving the stamp of the 'bureaucrat' for the Deputy Secretary General¹⁶.

The Presidency is furthermore assisted by the **General Secretariat** of the Council (cf. Art. 207, para.2 TEC & Art. 28, para.1 TEU), which shall prepare and send out notices of meetings and produce, translate and circulate Council documents (Fraser, 1998, p.64 & Wessel, 1999, p.86). According to Art.23(3) of the Council's rules of procedure, the main objective of the General Secretariat is to 'organise, coordinate and ensure' the Council's work. Additionally, it 'shall assist the Council and the Presidency in matters concerning the common foreign and security policy' (cf. Culley, 2006). Being initially a 'small bureau providing logistical support, legal opinion and political advice, developments (...) in foreign and security policy, have turned the secretariat into a sizeable executive agency.' (Christiansen, 2002, p.82). Accordingly, it moved from its traditional role in contributing 'to the search for compromise agreement in the legislative process' to 'the heart of the proceedings in treaty reform and at the forefront of the evolution of the

(Ibid., p.83). Being composed of different types of staff 'permanent and seconded; legal, diplomatic and military' (Ibid.) its degree of influence on policy-making is particularly interesting (Ibid.). Although responsibilities and opportunities for influence are in all pillars similar, the Council's Secretariat is a 'entirely different animal' (Ibid., p.89) with respect to EU policy making in the second pillar. Given the fact that its work concerns to a great degree the running of committees (e.g. COPS) it has in practice 'developed into a quasi-executive agency making policy in its own right' (Ibid.)¹⁷ and can be considered the 'unseen hand' working out of the shadows (Ibid.). Besides COPS, the HR and the Policy Unit, it came to enclose significant parts of the Western European Union (WEU) secretariat and additionally established the EU's own military staff (EUMS). 'Most of the appointments in the new posts in the area of CFSP and military staff have been filled with officials seconded from national foreign and defence ministries' (Ibid., p.90). As a consequence of this recent development, one can observe a shift from legislation to diplomacy. Hence, declaratory acts, being also called 'CFSP-statements' (Ibid.) are used more frequently than legislation. They are usually issued 'by the Presidency on behalf of the Council' but 'also from the CFSP machinery directly' (e.g. speeches, statements and interventions made by HR). Given the autonomous character of this 'CFSP-machinery' one can assume a shift away from politicians towards bureaucrats that is accelerated to a certain degree by the 'Brusselization' in the area of CFSP, which aims at fostering a perception of EU identity, and consequently centers 'around the work of the HR, the policy unit and other parts of the Council secretariat' (ibid. p.91).

Having shed light on the shadow bureaucracy lying behind the policy process in the second pillar, the question arises how the **Commission** can be placed into this framework. Having both legislative and executive powers, the Council has often delegated the latter to the European Commission. Furthermore, the Commission remains the initiator of all legislative proposals within the European Communities (Stevens & Stevens, 2001). It ensures and coordinates the consistency in external policies, is a participant, an initiator, an executor and an arbitrator at the same time (Regelsberger, 1997, p. 100). Being more precise it is the DG for External Relations (DG RELEX) together with the Commissioner for External Relations that by establishing a coherent external policy 'enables the EU to assert its identity on the international scene'. By working together with GAERC and the

HR 'the External Relations Commissioner also ensures that the Commission has a clear identity and a coherent approach in its external activities' (The European Union online, 2006).

Conclusion

Coming back to the initial question '*Who runs Europe?*' *Politicians or Bureaucrats?* it has to be concluded that in the area of CFSP the balance seems to shift more and more to the latter. Bureaucrats seem to dominate. This can especially be seen when looking at the policy process within the Second Pillar. Like a 'caterpillar' the proposal will 'crawl' from one layer of the cake to the next. Being formally decided by the Council (GAERC) it is the 'unseen hand' (Christiansen, 2002), working 'out of the shadows' (Ibid.) that prepares the proposal so that it reaches the highest level in form of a 'butterfly' that can no longer be vetoed. However, as already suggested before one cannot measure the relative power of the politicians of EP and Council, and in turn cannot determine 'whether bureaucrats themselves might be acting on behalf of politicians, or in anticipation of their reaction' (Page, 1997).

One of the reasons for this shift from politicians to bureaucrats seems to lie in the increasing 'Brusselization' of CFSP, aiming at establishing a coherent European identity in external relations. Given however the relatively sensitive character of CFSP, the question arises whether this 'out of the shadows' policy (Christiansen, 2002) is not contrary to the interests of the Member States. A policy process that is mainly conducted through Brussels-based experts can easily be criticized as being undemocratic. Yet, when looking at the development of CFSP more generally, a shift towards Brussels cannot be avoided, when aiming at an efficient *Common Foreign and Security Policy*.

Notes

1. This mixed nature will be described more detailed later on. I regard the whole Council machinery here and not only the highest level, which is actually called 'the Council'.

2. Usually CFSP decisions will be taken by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States.

3. For the sake of simplicity it is referred to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, which includes the renumbering since the Treaty of Amsterdam.

4. The new European Constitution would have finally given the European Council the status as a Community institutions, once ratified.

5. This metaphor has been used by Tom Casier during the course *Great Expectations* in 2004.

6. CFSP Counsellors are a group of deputies, one representative of each Member State and one representative from the Secretariat and the Commission. They are supposed to be experts on foreign policy questions. They meet once a week to discuss financial and judicial issues arising in the context of CFSP (Allen, 1998).

7. The working groups, being composed of representatives of the Member States and the Commission, amend and transform proposals and carry out certain preparatory work (Wessel, 1999).

8. Another part of this essay will explicitly focus on the role of the General Secretariat within the decision making in the area of CFSP.

9. COPS meets at least twice a week and has a rotating presidency (Vanhoonacker, 2005).

10. COREPER "brings together the ambassadors of member states, their deputies and relevant colleagues, to discuss the agenda of forthcoming meetings of the Council." (Bainbridge, 2003, p.105).

11. The Presidency of the Council is based on a six-month-rotating principle.

12. Regarding the intra-institutional relations, the Presidency shall consult and inform the European Parliament in CFSP matters (Art.21 TEU).

13. As laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam the HR is appointed by the Council using QMV. This is however still to be decided as the success of the person filling the post depends to a great degree on his personal reputation.

14. This Article was inserted by the Treaty of Nice.

15. As he is representing the Union as a whole he can definitely be said to be one of the main 'brusselized' factors within CFSP.

16. For the sake of completeness one cannot neglect the Policy Unit (PU), being introduced by the ToA under the supervision of the HR that conducts analyses, recommendations and

strategies for CFSP at request of the Council, the Presidency or on own initiative. Having no decision making power and being mainly an analytical preparatory framework it will not be discussed in details. It should however be stressed that it contributes further to the 'Brusselization' of CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002). Within the PU framework it is especially the Situation Centre (SitCen) that monitors international crisis situations 24/7.

17. See also the previous part on the Political and Security Committee.

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Academic Article

Europeanization and Security

- Two Concepts Hard to Reconcile -

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Introduction

In recent years the study of Europeanization and its applicability to various policy areas has steadily increased. Besides the more supranational sectors like agricultural and economic policy, Wong emphasizes that even the intergovernmental portfolio of foreign and security policy “is not a special case immune to Europeanization...” (Wong, 2005, p. 137). However, Major underlines that those studies are fewer, which “may be due to the unique nature of foreign and security policy”, and points out that there are inherent problems in applying Europeanization to this sector (Major, 2005, p. 182). A primary challenge seems to be to distinguish 'foreign' from 'security' in the analyses. Scholars have found considerable evidence that foreign policy - which includes a variety of fields from trade agreement negotiations to consultation reflexes in foreign offices - has been Europeanized (see e.g. Howorth, 2005). However, it appears that there is little research whether security policy, encompassing, for example, military and intelligence, and arguably the most sensitive subpart of foreign policy, has been Europeanized

substantially.

In order to contribute to the scholarly debate the paper will therefore examine the impact of Europeanization on security policy. Security will be understood as “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger...” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). The paper thus sees security in a rather restricted Waltian sense and abstains from enlarging the concept as proposed by Buzan (Walt, 1991 and Buzan, 1990 in Smith, 1999). Recognizing that Europeanization is essentially an ill-defined concept the paper will make recourse to Wong and apply four different definitions of Europeanization (Wong, 2005).

The paper will argue that regardless of the definition of Europeanization applied, security policy can hardly be considered Europeanized as the very concepts of 'Europeanization' and 'security' appear difficult to reconcile.

Consequently, the paper is divided into four parts each reflecting one of the definitional approaches assembled in Wong's work (Wong, 2005).

National adaptation

Ladrech defines Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994 in Wong, 2005, p. 136). He thus perceives it as a top-down process of national adaptation (*ibid.*). How can one apply this definition to the realm of security? On the one hand, Wagner outlines in his study of the Europeanization of German security and defence policy that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has “assumed a dynamic of its own”, which has the potential to support Ladrech's definition of an 'incremental process' (Wagner, 2005, p. 456). On the other, Gross points out that “ESDP instruments have been used selectively since the policy's creation” (Gross, 2007, p. 502). While this does not as such contradict Ladrech and Wagner, it, however, casts into doubt the 'continuity of process' which is implied by both authors. In this respect Wagner also highlights how German commitment to European security has weakened and while showing signs of rhetorical dedication, practical matters were neglected (Wagner, 2005). For instance, whilst Germany agreed to purchase 73 long-range aircrafts in the framework of the European commitment conference, it eventually cancelled the order as national security topics were given more priority (*ibid.*). Consequently, while authors might differ in opinion on the scope of autonomous dynamic security policy has taken on a European level, they tend to agree that the impact on the state (i.e. national adaptation) is hard to observe (Gross, 2007; Wagner, 2005). The nature of security appears as more ad hoc and therefore less susceptible for incremental dynamics and change.

In how far can the nature of security then be combined with the 'misfit' - one of the strong explanatory tools of Europeanization, coined by Börzel (Börzel, 2005)? In her view, the larger the misfit, the larger is the pressure for the state to adapt, and to incorporate EU dynamics into the logic and decision-making of the state (*ibid.*). None the less, Wagner and Gross both demonstrate that European pressure on German security policy has frequently led to the rejection of adaptation (Gross, 2007; Wagner, 2005). When European partners urged Germany to reform army structures and abolish conscription, the German government re-affirmed this practice as a fundamental pillar of German security understanding (Wagner, 2005). Major accounts for such reactions by stating that “national opportunity structures conditioning a country's

position and reaction in a unique policy area were particularly salient in the realm of foreign and security policy” (Major, 2005, p. 183). One could therefore be inclined to reverse Börzel's concept for the realm of security: the larger the misfit, the larger the incentive for the state to omit pressure or deny cooperation. Once more, the nature of security seems to explain why Europeanization is hard to reconcile with it. In security “there is a risk of overestimating Europeanization as an 'all explaining' factor, forgetting the importance of other endogenous or exogenous influences” (*ibid.*). Externally, both the end of the cold war and NATO are two factors conditioning security considerations of the states. Internally, states are not bound by European legislation and the EU lacks judicial means to foster pressure via enforcement procedures (Major, 2005).

This latter is underpinned by the example of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). While it was first regarded as a success of European security cooperation allowing for more efficient combat of terrorism (Rees, 2005), the Cyprian, German and Polish constitutional courts have annulled the decisions implementing the EAW in 2005, deeming them either unconstitutional or incompatible with fundamental human rights (House of Lords, 2006). In conclusion, one can affirm that the first definition of Europeanization is hard to balance with security. It comes into view that in security Europeanization can neither play on the incremental spread of its influence nor on the governance of hierarchy (as supranational institutions lack the power to impose their will), which consequently impedes the anchoring of these dynamics in national decision-making and politics.

National projection

In contrast to Ladrech, Bulmer and Burch conceive Europeanization as a bottom-up process of national projection (Bulmer and Burch, 1999 in Wong, 2005). The underlying idea is that “nation-states are primary actors and agents of change rather than passive objects” (Wong, 2005, p. 137). The goal of member states thus is “to export domestic policy models, ideas and details to the EU” (*ibid.*). Testing the applicability of this definition to security, the paper seeks to take a closer look at the European Security Strategy (ESS), arguably the main instrument articulating European security interests. In order to find substantial evidence for Europeanization one can expect two outcomes. Either the ESS is marked by the influence of one dominant country, or it reflects a harmonized view of the member states “without falling into lowest common denominator rhetoric” (Howorth, 2005, p. 195).

Regarding the first possible outcome Howorth outlines that “governments, often against their wishes, are being forced into directions they had not anticipated” (Howorth, 2005, p. 182). It is indeed appealing to relate this idea to an evaluation of the ESS. Certain policy sectors have in the past been dominated by particular member states. An often cited example is the uploading capacities of France in agricultural policy. Other member states accepted this process either because of a lack of bargaining power or a lack of interests at stake (Börzel, 2005). Therefore, one might imagine, for example, a highly British dominated ESS. However, the circumstances in security are different and therefore tend to impede Europeanization. Negotiations on the content of the ESS in the European Council are marked by unanimity and a rather cumbersome decision-making process. All states thus possess an equal amount of bargaining power. In addition, in the portfolio of security all member states have interests at stake as security represents the core of the states' sensibility (Gowan, 2008). No evidence could be found to support the idea that any state had imposed a substantial part of its national security agenda. As Bulmer and Radaelli highlight other states will resist such pressures as policy-legacies and policy preferences of states are deeply-rooted and hard to change (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004 in Major, 2005).

Concerning the second anticipated outcome Börzel noted that “Member States share a general incentive to up-load their policy arrangements to the European level” (Börzel, 2005, p. 63). Accordingly, can one witness an uploading with a new, harmonized synthesis at the European level or is the ESS a mere lowest common denominator approach that can accommodate all member states' views? The ESS seems to display a tendency towards the latter. For example, it pinpoints the UN Security Council as the “primary [responsible] for the maintenance of international peace and security” (ESS, 2003, p. 9). However, it abstains from explaining its role further and thus stays broad enough to allow interpretation for all member states. First the UK takes no blame for having participated in a non-sanctioned attack on Iraq, as the UN is not portrayed as a legitimizing authority for the use of force. Second Gowan highlights that there are “internal disputes over the UN's role” (Gowan, 2008, p. 44). While the UK and France continue to enjoy privileges as permanent members of the Security Council, Germany demands its proper place between them (Gowan, 2008). Hence, no particular Europeanized sound policy approach can be

detected, which could prescribe any coherent future path of action. The diverging views of the states could only be reconciled by over-stretching the formulations to an extent that is risk an ample loss of meaning.

It seems that this resistance to Europeanization is reflected in the character of security. As Hobbes has stipulated security is an absolute value; meaning that security allows for two options: either one is secured or one is not (Hobbes, 1651 in Smith, 1999). It is under this premise that one has to understand the lowest common denominator approach to the ESS. It has to stay as vague and broad as possible in order to give each member state the possibility to see its own security apprehension and perceptions reflected. Harmonization would imply some level of compromise, entailing less than a hundred percent of national security concerns. In Hobbes, admittedly black and white rationale, this means an unsecured state of affairs which states will seek to prevent (ibid.).

Identity reconstruction

Smith understands Europeanization as an identity reconstruction which manifests itself in a teleological movement (Smith, 2000 in Wong, 2005). It leads to “the fading away of member states' monopoly on the loyalties of their citizens over the long term, to the benefit of European attitudes and objectives” (Wong, 2005, p. 138). Parson further elaborates this and holds that “ideas may not only cause actors to make certain choices, but ... the institutionalization of certain ideas gradually reconstructs the interests of powerful actors” (Parson, 2003 in Rieker, 2006, p. 516). Rieker, a proponent of this social constructivist approach to Europeanization, thus casts into doubt the classical international relations (IR) theory, which advocates that national identities and interests are fixed (Rieker, 2004). He substantiates his point by an analysis of the Scandinavian security identities: The EU security doctrine has appeared incompatible with Swedish and Finnish neutrality. Convinced that this misfit between EU and member state is at the root of the changes, he highlights that both Sweden and Finland altered their constitutions to soften their neutrality clauses (Rieker, 2004). In a later work he uses the example of France, stipulating that French security discourse and consequently identity has changed from a military offensive approach to a more comprehensive European security approach due to the influence of European discourse (Rieker, 2006).

This approach bears the danger of “attributing every policy change to the vague idea of Europeanisation”, whilst other explanatory

factors are neglected (Major, 2005, p. 177). Exemplary is the end of the Cold war, regarded as an event that has triggered the re-definition of national security concepts, as aged military defence scenarios did not prove viable. Similarly, traditional IR would advance that the changes described are a result of the state's intention to maximize its power. Bearing this in mind the events analyzed by Rieker could have taken place *in parallel* but not *in reaction* to European policies and discourses. Major adds to this critique stating that "by considering Europeanisation as a process it is suggested that this process generates an observable result" (Major, 2005, p. 177). This causality between process and result, however, could be cast into doubt. Moravcsik relates his critique more directly to social constructivist premises and insists that most of the claims brought forward by constructivism can hardly be empirically tested (Moravcsik, 1999). The analysis by Rieker indeed provides little room for empirical testing. On the aspect of causality Moravcsik notes that constructivist still need to demonstrate "*which* ideas and discourses influence (or do not influence) *which* policies under *which* circumstances" (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 671). This critique appears equally applicable to this definition of Europeanization and their proponents. For example, in Rieker's study it is not clear which European discourse has changed or influenced which French discourse and consequently French security identity (Rieker, 2006).

These causalities appear to be particularly hard to reveal in matters of security not only because of the secrecy prevalent in most dossiers. As Pantev stresses in issues of security "European solidarity both at the institutional and the individual levels, is not yet strong enough to replace the motivation, stemming from the ideals of the national state and sovereignty" (Pantev, 2005, p. 4). In sum, this third definition of Europeanization gives the impression to fit uneasy with security.

Policy Isophormism

By policy isophormism Radaelli understands convergence in policy areas. He suggests that there is 'direct' Europeanization in which member states pass power to the EU, and 'indirect' Europeanization, which is regarded as the development of a "shared sense of legitimate (and illegitimate) choices" (Radaelli, 1997 in Wong, 2005, p. 139). Since transferral of powers in security from member states to the EU is negligible, the paper seeks to focus in on the 'indirect' Europeanization effects. It appears that

Wong tends to agree that while foreign policy as a whole has seen the upcoming of a dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate policy choices, this tendency is yet to be observed in security (Wong, 2005). How can one account for such an observation? It appears that a lot of soft foreign policy issues allow for a development over time. Conferences, dinners and receptions allow for formal and informal coordination of policy plans. However, security questions arise ad hoc and do not always permit for a process of consultation not necessarily because of member states unwillingness but because security issues cannot be pre-conceived. Therefore, Wong's claim that "convergence processes are not irreversible or pre-determined" proves to have validity in the case of security (Wong, 2005, p. 148). The example of Iraq substantiates this point. While it was deemed to be accepted standard that member states would only use force against other states with express permission of the UN, several member states followed the US demands for solidarity. This can be explained by the fact that the EU still represents a "flexible and disaggregated series of patterns, arrangements and institutions which express a collective yet pluralistic identity, and of which others are increasingly aware" (Allen and Smith, 1990 in Wong, 2005, p. 141). Thus, exogenous factors managed to super-impose themselves over seemingly collective legitimate choices. The degree and intensity of Europeanization in security can thus be tested most explicitly in situations of ad hoc crisis. In this respect, Gross highlights that "...considerations of Europeanization did not significantly condition policy responses with respect to military crisis management" (Gross, 2007, p. 513). Webber further explains that "Europeanization does not necessarily suggest complete harmony of European views" (Webber et al, 2004, p. 17). Webber's remark draws attention to another possible contradiction with security. Security appears to demand a more or less coherent, unified view. While in matters of economy different views can coexist within the framework of a decision, security and its task to deal with matters of life and death is inclined to rule out such an option (Pantev, 2005). Whereas economy allows for decisions to be taken in a much wider time frame, i.e. an ideal decision might be taken at point A, but might still be profitable at point B, security displays the tendency to manifest itself in a juxtaposition of 'now or never'. In this regard former German foreign minister Fischer remarked that Europe is "not yet built for the question of war and peace" (Fischer, 2002 in Gross, 2007, p. 516). Hence,

Major's observation that "Europeanisation [...] may lead to increasing convergence but will not automatically produce it" is even the more noticeable in respect to this fourth definition (Major, 2005, p. 181).

Conclusion

The paper has sought to demonstrate the low validity of Europeanization as an explanatory variable in security policy. This oddity stems from the nature and characteristics of the concepts of 'Europeanization' and 'security'. Even when applying Wong's four different definitions of Europeanization to security - national adaptation, national projection, identity reconstruction and policy isophormism - can one hardly find a basis on which to reconcile the two concepts (Wong, 2005).

In contrast to Europeanization, security is more ad hoc, operates in different time frames and is less susceptible for incremental dynamics. A genuine 'misfit' between policies seems to cause inertia or revolting tendencies instead of adaptational pressures. Moreover, governance of supranational institutions is rarely anchored in security and can thus not propel Europeanization. Contrariwise, other endogenous and exogenous factors play a role in security and hence increase the difficulties to single out Europeanization as a descriptive factor. In addition, security's high sensibility and long-standing policy-legacies and preferences make it difficult for feeble intergovernmental bodies to Europeanize. In particular the Hobbesian absolute value of security serves as an instructive variable to highlight why lowest common denominator policies prevail (Hobbes, 1651 in Smith, 1999). Social constructivist approaches of identity reconstruction in security can hardly be empirically tested and thus prevent a clear causality between processes and results. In thus far, convergence between member states' conceptions of legitimate choices appears low.

Bearing these features of security in mind one must read Wong's observation about Europeanization: "[It] does not put forward a series of inter-related premises concerning the dynamic or the end-state of the European integration process" (Wong, 2005, p. 149). It is this point that most accurately has described the core of the conceptual problem relating to security and Europeanization observed in this paper. While most policy sectors can float with the influences and various definitions of Europeanization as they do not necessitate an end-state, security is unable to do so as it needs an end-state, i.e. a clear attribution of who is in charge of security, in order to work effectively.

Thus, 'security' seems to be unable to become a European concept through Europeanization. If a European position in security was desired, states would have to consciously transfer the whole, or at least a substantial part, of security responsibilities and resources to the European level (Gross, 2007; Pantev, 2005).

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