


A Different View

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IA P S S

WITH

**MICHAEL TEODORO G. TING JR. * TOBIAS FRANKE *
MAHIR ZEYNALOV**

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by Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr.

Hobbesian philosophy would bear relevance to the present times, as sound and as striking as it can get. More particularly with respect to his concept of hypocrisy, of the need for “faking” to achieve peace, and of the premium of doing what would be peaceful over doing what is right, Hobbes's genius has spawned writings of valuable lessons in human political history, most especially of paramount significance in Philippine politics and government.

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TOPIC OF THE MONTH

Hobbes, Hypocrisy, and Peace

by Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr.

Introduction

Thomas Hobbes, English philosopher and political theorist, is generally regarded in moral theory as a pioneer of the Utilitarian school. His kind was a perspective from the pragmatic, rather than ideal or myopic. He did justify obedience to moral rules on a purely nonsectarian basis as the means to peaceable, social, and comfortable living. Nonetheless, he took cognizance of the view that the laws of nature are actually God's commands. In his political theory he analyzed the conditions necessary for peace and security. Then he went on with his version of the social contract, laying down attempts to bring about a resolving construction of an ideal state in which these conditions could properly be addressed. His basic concept was natural right rather than natural law, speaking essentially that of a right to self-preservation. For him no man is bound to act in accordance with the law of nature if he thinks such conduct to be inimical to his own security. However, peace cannot be availed of without adhering to the law of nature. At this juncture, Hobbes stressed that the only remedy is to give everyone a guarantee, an assurance, that good behavior can be and will be elicited from his fellows by forging a power enough to keep them in awe. This power will be put in place only if each person promises every other person that he will carry out whatever commands the chosen authority shall deem necessary for the peace and security of all. This sovereign may survive even if all his subjects desire to depose it. His right shall be as absolute as his power, his responsibility only to God. Therefore, he cannot be unjust to his subjects, since it is from them where the authority of his actions emanate. Nor is the sovereign bound by any covenant with his people.¹

Social and political philosophy then, drawing along the lines of 17th century English monarchism², would seem archaic to the contemporary man. However, if only taken and studied in serious methodological depth, Hobbesian philosophy would bear relevance to the present times, as sound and as striking as it can get. More particularly with respect to his concept of hypocrisy, of the need for "faking" to achieve peace, and of the premium of doing what would be peaceful over doing what is right, Hobbes's genius has spawned writings of valuable lessons in human political history, most especially of paramount significance in Philippine politics and government.

Hobbes's Life and Philosophy

As much as philosophy is a way of life, a discussion on Hobbesian philosophy should aptly dwell on a biographical account, concise it may be, of its proponent. Thomas Hobbes was born the second son to a common vicar of Westport, England in 1588. Fear was his twin, as his mother had gone into labor upon hearing the false rumor of the approach of the Spanish Armada. His mother's dread of the Spanish invasion made Hobbes treat caution as a primary political virtue, with religion giving fear a useful focus. Later Hobbes would motivate persons in the state of nature to contract with one another to set up an authority to "overawe them all" and persuade them to obey that authority for the sake of peace.³ Hobbes would later study at Westport and Oxford, taking up literature and philosophy. Then he would serve as a tutor and



¹Thomas Hobbes. *Leviathan* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 143-152.

²Michael Oakeshott. *Rationalism in Politics*, pp. 221-223.

³ Alan Ryan. *Hobbes's Political Philosophy*, pp. 208-209.

confidential secretary to the Devonshire household, of particular service to the young earl of Devonshire. Later he would translate Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, his first published work which would relay so clear a message - that democracies collapse into factionalism and chaos as their search for freedom and glory ends in civil war and self-destruction.⁴

Hobbes would later enter the field of law, working for Lord Chancellor Sir Francis Bacon, and expounding on jurisprudence with his *Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law*. Hobbes would seem to have desired a showing of a political system that would define law clearly and unequivocally. For Hobbes, there should be only one source of law, which, as soon as declared, was law. An absolute authority must therefore be established to hurdle the task of transforming a community with no clearly enunciated rules of conduct into a social order governed by definitive, determinate, and ultimate dictates of law and enforcement. In establishing such authority, problems clearly have risen. The arrogance of the common lawyers was there, always of the staunch view that "the law is such a one as will have no sovereign beside him. Then there was the foolishness of those of the belief that only a republican or "free" government could be legitimate and that the laws of a monarchy limited freedom and was bereft of binding force. They clearly failed to comprehend that any law is a limit to freedom and that the freedom or liberty aimed by republics is not that of particular men but that of "the Commonwealth."⁵ The "Libertie of the Commonwealth" Hobbes spoke of is independence as a sovereign state, as to which "whether a Commonwealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same."⁶ Still another setback was the "madness of religious fanatics" who believed that God spoke through their dreams, conferring on them the power to legislate for others and the power to "absolve them from the decrees of the unrighteous."⁷ Hobbes would say in this wise: "To say that he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say that he hath dreamt that God spake to him." Hobbes would prefer that the sovereign put a demarcation line between religion and private fantasy as a matter of "law not truth."⁸

A recipient of sound Greek and Latin classical education though, Hobbes spent most of his life flourishing as a mathematician and geometer, venturing into writing and philosophy only later in life in his 50s. Nonetheless, his acquaintance and countless intellectual debates with the greatest scientific minds of the day would later contribute to his manner of "geometizing" and "mathematizaing" the science of politics and governance in a manner that is truly scientific, as opposed to the subjective and the rhetoric. Having lived midway of an intellectual, political and religious revolution, Hobbes would always deal with politics as a science, and analyze political controversies scientifically.⁹

Truly a scientist and mathematician, Hobbes maintained that the only effective cure for the disorder that had plunged England and Europe into chaos during 17th century was to give members of these society a "sound, rational argument for the correct political structure of the state as rigorous as any of Euclid's geometric proofs." Hobbes espoused the belief that, using correct physical facts about us, we can derive true ethical and political conclusions. In his *Leviathan*, Hobbes has shown a chart describing relationships of the different sciences, representing ethics as simply a branch of psychology, which actually is a branch of physics.¹⁰

⁴ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁶ *Leviathan*, 149.

⁷ *Hobbes's Political Philosophy*, 211.

⁸ *Leviathan*, 257.

⁹ *Rationalism in Politics*, 222-223.

¹⁰ Jean Hampton. *Hobbes's Science of Moral Philosophy*, 48.

For Hobbes, “politics” should be distinguished from “political prudence,” the latter pertaining to practical wisdom to be exercised in the light of lessons from our history. Prudence or *prudentia* is essentially experiential working through a historical method, a genuine form of knowledge, of how things have worked out in the past. Historically probable it may be, generalizations and conclusions gathered from such experience would always fall subject to contingencies brought about by novel, unexpected occurrences. In contrast, *sapientia* has science as its basis. It is hypothetical, general, and infallible.¹¹

Political Theory

Much of Hobbes’s political theory has been discussed in the *Leviathan*, acclaimed as the greatest and sole masterpiece of political philosophy written in the English language.¹² For Hobbes, each person has the natural right and duty to preserve oneself, a right equal to anyone and everyone else’s. Absent any system of law, everyone has a right to all things and no obligation to defer or yield to anyone else. This equality of right is matched by a rough equality of capacity, an equality of hope, and an equality of grief. Each person is a potential threat to everyone else because of three main reasons: First, the state of nature or competition is a world of scarcity, setting people at odds over the same wants and desires. Second is fear or diffidence, the logic of interaction between two entities that can each annihilate each other with the ability for revenge. People are driven to attack one another by the logic of the situation, no matter what their motives, thereby giving each person a reason to fear another who might need to attack him. Third, there is pride or vainglory. Human desire can be very indeterminate to the extent that cannot be measured except by human envy. The first two causes of human conflict can moderately be remedied. On the one hand, competition can be dealt with by the attainment of prosperity, as guaranteed continued subsistence would topple any individual reason to fight or compete. On the other hand, fear or diffidence can be translated to peace, rather than conflict, once a mechanism such as the police force is in place. Once there is the police, each has a reason not to attack another and also a reason to think others will not attack him. Hence, peace is attained, or attainable at the very least. As regards the third cause of human conflict, pride or vainglory, no simplistic solutions will suffice. Pride or vainglory, unsatiable by nature, can only be addressed if each person can reach the top position or the peak of success. However, there can only be one top position, a single space sought after by many, the object of individual desires and the source of conflict. Thus explain Hobbes’s treatment of pride as the worse threat to peace. For Hobbes, it is the one attitude that has to be suppressed rather than merely diverted. Thus explain why the *Leviathan* came to be a genesis account of the king over the children of pride.¹³

The collective weight of competition, fear, and pride can bring the scales of humanity down to the war of all against all, down to a poor, lonely, nasty, brutish and short living. Lest facing this, men ought to engineer institutions that will exact rules of conduct that ensure peace. This necessitates the discovery of the law of nature. 17th century England had a traditional structure - an organic unit ruled on the strength of the policies of the King, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. For Hobbes, political rule should be based on the roots of all these institutions - the laws of nature, no less.¹⁴

Simplistic it may seem, the laws of nature according to Hobbes present one basic precept or general rule based on reason: *man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it*

¹¹ *Hobbes’s Political Philosophy*, 212-213.

¹² *Rationalism in Politics*, 223.

¹³ *Hobbes’s Political Philosophy*, 220-223.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 222.

may be best preserved.”¹⁵ Simply put, the laws speak of both man’s right and duty to self-preservation. Samantha Frost, a contemporary Hobbes reader, has put it in this wise:

In claiming that the will can have nothing but what appears to be beneficial to vital motion as its object and aim, Hobbes proposes that whether or not an individual is mistaken in judgment about what may come of a given course of action, that individual cannot but will what she believes will tend to her own preservation. Within the parameters of Hobbes’s metaphysical materialism, then, the fact that people CANNOT knowingly harm themselves follows from the unerring impulse of vital motion to perpetuate itself. Hobbes describes this ineluctable tendency toward self-preservation as a natural law, “a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it maybe best preserved.” [italics and uppercase supplied].¹⁶

For Hobbes, natural laws will be discovered by tracing the movements of cause and effect in and among thinking-bodies.¹⁷ “Thinking-bodies” pertain to human beings possessed of animate bodies with capacities to think. What makes the human distinct from any other body is “Vital motion” constitutive of the spontaneous functioning of the body, a reflexive or physically compulsory motive force. The human will comes as “the last act of our deliberation,” the last movement in the series of thoughts and considerations constitutive of deliberation.¹⁸ Coming now to the human will, Hobbes averred that the natural law, right or impulse, to self-preservation can be decoded into a social or political desire for peace. Hence come the first law of nature, that individuals “seek Peace and follow it.”¹⁹

This desire for peace or desire for self-preservation through the pursuit of peace, Hobbes further contended, can be attained through our capacity to read one another, by way of a pattern of inferences to apprehend and evaluate one another’s socio-political deportment. Peaceable attitudes and responses can only be provoked when they are “signify” and are “read.” Since manifest and overt signs are the only ones that can “signify” and be “read,” individuals should project themselves how they must contrive to be seen by others. “Signs” through gesture and comportment, or the manner human actions are portrayed, articulate human desires and fears in a manner productive of a pattern of inferences. Therefore, to seek, establish, and maintain peace, a person should present himself in such a manner that others would “read” him as well amenable to the cause for peace. As the cliché goes, “actions speak louder than words.” From these inferences from bodily expression and action do we analyze and understand social interaction. Thus, the principle of self-preservation, translated as a social and political desire for peace, is made a key reference to social behavior.

Other laws of nature proceed from the first. People must perform their covenants made. Every man must strive to accommodate himself to the rest. There should be abstention from seeking revenge and waging war. People should cultivate a “peaceable” public effect in the interest of peace. Men should respect or at least appear to respect the fundamental equality of all others. Frost has established this point:

Hobbes explains that whatever status, aptitude, or achievements one enjoys, “every man looketh that his companions should value him, at

¹⁵ *Leviathan*, 91.

¹⁶ Samantha Frost. *Faking It: Hobbes’s Thinking-Bodies and the Ethics of Dissimulation*. POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 29 No. 1, February 2001, pp. 30-37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

the same rate he sets upon himself: and will fight to “extort a greater value from his contemnners, by damage; and from others, by example.” To avert conflicts and reprisals arising from perceived condescension or insolence, each individual must act as if he or she believes in the fundamental equality of all others. Whether one truly believes in the natural equality of each and every person is, in this account, of small consequence. If one is to participate in the practices by which one constitutes oneself as a legible thinking-body, one must “acknowledge other for his Equall” in one’s gestures, bearing, and actions. Those recalcitrant few who lack the “humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and cumbersome points of their greatnesse to be taken off,” “who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without which there can be no society” run the risk, again, of the social and political exile that is the lot of enemies at war. [italics supplied]²⁰

This is “faking it,” Hobbes’s concept of physical outward projection of individuals’ attitudes in the interest of peace. As an individual is generally considered to be author of his actions which are presumed to be his own, any disguise or outward appearance of a man is seen and understood by others as his person. Here we speak of a “public face,” the object of a public gaze. Even if dissimulated, “faking it” is ethical if it is contributory to peace and the establishment of an environment in which peace appears to be possible. This ethics of dissimulation, as a necessary tool towards the formation of a peaceful environment, would then carry particular weight in the field of politics. In as much as the success of political action and political rule depends largely on the community upon which it is placed, ethics of dissimulating behavior to achieve peace would not only be contributing to peace formation but would also engineer communal adherence to political rule out of the social and political desire for peace. Thus, to be intelligible or “legible” comes as a matter of necessity to be politically correct and hold power.²¹

Contemporary Philippine Context

Traversing the geographical boundaries and barriers of time, Hobbesian “ethics and dissimulation” has permeated history and even contemporary Philippine politics and governance by surprise. In a third world democracy such as the Philippines, political dissimulation, or the art of feigning political action to project social goals and aspirations, has been a craft honed by too many. Dr. Miriam Santiago, a seasoned politician, expressed in this blunt wise:

The president maintains the popularity which is crucial to political stability. The president’s ability to mobilize support ensures that the public will comply and cooperate with his administration. His or her popularity supports the legitimacy of the regime. When the president is unpopular, he or she will resort to authoritarianism, and will tend to resort to repression and ideological manipulation. This is the problem of a non-elected president, such as President Arroyo. [italics supplied]²²

Dr. Santiago went on to say:

Unfortunately, most recent presidents, instead of addressing the problems and pressures of the presidency, have resorted instead to merely cultivating symbols of their performance, and placing

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 40.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 48-51.

²² Miriam Defensor Santiago. *Politics and Governance With Philippine Constitution* (Quezon City: Central Professional Books, Inc., 2002), 133.

*personality over policy. Thus, the administration of President Aquino tried to project her as a pious saint; President Ramos as a military protector; President Estrada as a champion of the poor; and President Arroyo as the clone of a movie star formerly popular with the masses. All these were shallow attempts at packaging that ultimately failed, because events will always place substance over style in the presidency. [italics supplied]*²³

Ironically, even Dr. Santiago used Hobbesian dissimulation in her political campaign trails, projecting the image of a staunch advocate of the rights of the “masa” and “icon of Generation Y,” which she used to elicit supporters largely from the youth and the student crowd. This almost catapulted her to the Presidency in 1992.²⁴ However, the public face she projected as pro-poor and pro-youth began losing luster through the years until it fell down the drain. Her public image would later reveal indications of an intellectual snob. Down the memory lane, a common citizen may not easily forget her boisterous, elitist remarks against “Gloria labandera!” and how she categorized her detractors as “lower life forms who have not even passed or taken the UPCAT or have set foot on Harvard, Cambridge or Oxford.”²⁵

Aptly described by Santiago, indeed, Philippine politics is and has always been really mass-oriented and popularity-based. Unfortunately, the Filipino “masa” consists mostly of the poor and uneducated. To them, the public image or charisma a political candidate projects outweighs any genuine political ideal or social agenda. In fact, in the recent State of the Nation address, President Arroyo gained the biggest applause when she said “I cannot grow taller but I can always get better.”²⁶ The humor in the statement made the sparks, erasing general public doubts on the statistical accuracy of the all of her 55-minute speech. Nonetheless, noted economist Solita Monsod made remarks on what she perceived as inaccurate and inconsistent.²⁷

Hobbesian dissimulation has been imbedded in Philippine political life that to do away from it would be hard, if not impossible. Even former President Corazon Aquino, once at the height of popularity which placed her in command of the ship of State, recognized this:

*I realized that I could have made things easier for myself if I had done the popular things, rather than the painful but better ones in the long run. After all, in the long run, I wouldn't be around to be blamed. I could have invited the military to share in the government, rather than keeping them out and fighting them off to the disarray of the economy. But I was called to restore a democracy, not divide up a country as spoils. I could have put pressure on the courts when they favored the enemies of democracy, but I felt that the best protection for freedom must lie in strong and independent courts. I sued a newspaper for libel but never used my office to advance my cause. I lost the case...I couldn't adopt the ideal solutions proposed by those who had the luxury of private life. Quite often, official actions were dictated by the pressing realities of the moment [italics supplied].*²⁸

Hobbesian dissimulation is really the principle behind public relations in a Philippine politics. Public opinion is very important in a democracy like the Philippines. As Dr. Leveriza, an eminent Filipino public administration consultant notes:

²³ *Ibid*, 134-135.

²⁴ *Ibid*, iii.

²⁵ Selected from actual print and broadcast media appearances, June 1998 – March 2001.

²⁶ Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. State of the Nation Address, July 22, 2002.

²⁷ Solita Monsod. Television Interview, *SAKSI*, GMA-7, July 22, 2002.

²⁸ Corazon Aquino. Acceptance Speech, the 1996 Fulbright Prize for International Understanding (Fulbright Prize Ceremony, US Department of State, Washington D.C.).

Politics becomes the basic activity by which the people achieve and control government. The process affects every aspect of governmental operation that has a distinct role to play in the realization of the overall pattern. The totality of these roles depends on the type of government concerned. In a dictatorship, for instance, power and authority emanate from one body. In a democracy, there is wider diffusion of authority that permits a greater degree of freedom for the varying roles and values to focus together a strong public opinion. Thus, public opinion emerges as the strongest arbiter of policy in this type of government...

Public opinion makes the government understand the people. With such understanding, it could make itself be better (sic) understood and accepted by them. The government should never force its program to the people. Success of it could never be attained if the people are coerced by the government in its implementation...[italics and sic supplied]²⁹

Public opinion is placed at a pedestal in our democracy, where, ideally and constitutionally, sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.³⁰ Moreover, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are constitutionally declared essentials for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.³¹ At the height of democratic liberalism, contemporary public opinion would, as a matter of course, frown upon despotism, dictatorship and its vestiges. At this juncture, Hobbesian philosophy might take a full circle. Anent the culture of despotism, Hobbesian reader Wolin, would say:

Absolutism comes into the picture because, according to Hobbes, men want to flee the consequences of natural equality. The rough equality among men leaves each insecure. A man can never become sufficiently powerful in nature to prevent others from harming him. Thus the natural equality which allows for the covenant that makes society possible also makes absolutism necessary.

The extent to which the authority of the Hobbesian sovereign complement the despotic nature of Hobbesian man was not accidental. It rests upon a vision whose unique power lies, not in its defense of absolutism, but in its conception of a culture of despotism that reproduces a conception of mind: it is at one and the same time conception of mind and an ideal of collective mentalite³².

Conclusion

As in the past, contemporary Philippine politics and governance is permeated by the Hobbesian “ethics of dissimulation.” Politicians continue to thrive on public perception and the “public face” continues to be the single most significant criterion to gain electoral mileage. As Philippine democracy hurdles the path towards socio-economic growth in an age of continued and sustained globalization and free market, public opinion remains the crucible of public policy. Unfortunately public opinion speaks of the majority, most of whom are bound by the chains of poverty and ignorance, most of whom are shaped by superficial publicity. Hobbes might have devised dissimulation as a political principle. But nowhere can

²⁹ Jose P. Leveriza. *Public Administration: The Business of Government* (Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1990), 209.

³⁰ Article II, Sec. 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

³¹ Article II, Sec. 5, 1987 Philippine Constitution.

³² Sheldon S. Wolin. *Hobbes and the Culture of Despotism*, 33.

it be seen as an end itself. Rather, it is the means towards a social end—that of attaining peace and self-preservation.

The Philippine model should take publicity and public image in the same context—a mere instrument, not an end in itself. However, the collective power of the majority imposes a collective will only to accept public image at its face value. No more, no less. It has happened before. It is happening now. History has been repeating itself. Why? The Filipino people, shapers of their destiny and makers of their history, continue to rewrite the same old story. Will there be twists or turning points? Only the Filipino can answer.

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ARTICLES

The European Security Strategy and Policy Credibility: Unsatisfactory answers to four key security questions

by Tobias Franke

Introduction

“Coherence, like coordination is a principle everyone in the EU agrees with – but only when it applies to someone else”³³

The notorious 1998 Anglo-French agreement in St. Malo was not only the starting signal for a decade of transformation and change in European Union (EU) policy but also the fuel for an intense scholarly debate about the nature and future of the Union. Most of these deliberations explicitly or implicitly address the question to what extent the EU and its member states (MS) have been able to develop a credible foreign, security and defence policy. Broadly speaking, on the one end of the scholarly spectrum authors like Biscop and Smith view the EU as a credible actor, underlining its distinct and unique approach, while on the other authors like Hanna and Heisbourg highlight the EU’s deficiencies mainly drawing on a more traditional approach (Biscop, 2008; Smith, 2004; Hanna, 2006; Heisbourg, 2004).

In an attempt to a meaningful contribution to this debate, this paper focuses primarily on the aspect of security. Despite the fact that Buzan underlines the difficulties of defining ‘security’ (Buzan, 1996 in Terriff etc. al, 1999) the paper will turn to a traditional conception, which sees ‘security’ as “the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger; freedom from fear” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2004 in Biscop, 2004, p. 4). Furthermore, it will regard the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a point of reference. Drafted by Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, it is the EU’s first and sole attempt to define a common vision of security, and thus deemed evocative to a security analysis (Heisbourg, 2004).

Furthermore, one should note that the problem statement features the particularly normative notion ‘credible’ which complicates the quest for an answer. The paper thus defines ‘credibility’ in connection with security as the ability to answer four distinct questions: Whose security? What threats? Who provides security? With what means? Hence, the EU’s security policy would be deemed credible if these questions were tackled satisfactorily.

On this basis, the paper will argue that the EU and its MS have been able to develop a credible security policy only to a very limited extent as the ESS either fails to address the four questions (stewardship gap) or addresses them but the EU and its MS fail to live up to them in reality (expectations-capabilities gap). Accordingly, the paper will be divided into four parts, each dealing with one of the four questions.

I. Whose Security?

The question of “whose security” is what Terriff calls the quest for ‘the *object* of security’ (Terriff etc. al, 1999). A security policy risks to lose meaning and hence credibility if it cannot clearly state who or what it seeks to secure. The ESS is particularly difficult to approach in this respect. The reader is quick to notice that throughout the document one refers to “we” and “us”, without, however, specifying who (or what) “we” and “us” is; e.g. “we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed” [emphasis added] (ESS, 2003, p. 5). Keeping in mind that the ESS was adopted by the European Council, an intergovernmental meeting of

³³ Senior EU Official quoted in Andersson, 2008, p. 122

heads of state and government, one could be tempted to remark that security appears to be about *regime security*. The latter is defined by Ball as government policy whose purpose “is not to make citizens secure but to safeguard the elite’s grip on power” (Ball, 1988 in Terriff etc. al, 1999, p. 19). However, further observing the document, reference is made to the security of the Member State. This would fit more neatly with the realist approach of *state security*, which treats the state as the referent point (Terriff etc. al, 1999). Ayoob elaborates on this point and notes that “security must be used in the relatively restricted sense of applying to the security of the state – both in terms of its territory and its institutions”, however, excluding its population (Ayoob, 1997, p. 130).

In juxtaposition to Ayoob, Dalby views security as being “about the protection of a political community of some sort, with community understood as a population with attributes in common”, thus clearly including the people (Dalby, 1997, p. 9). This conception of *societal security* is also reflected in the ESS, most notably when talking about terrorism. It is displayed as a threat that can “undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies” (ESS, 2003, p. 3). As Buzan highlights, security is thus aimed at protecting society – which is distinct from the state – from foreign influences which could undermine its identity. Values such as openness and tolerance form part of this identity (Buzan, 1996 in Terriff etc. al, 1999). The reader will have noticed that while Buzan speaks about society, the example from the ESS refers to *societies*. To complicate matters further, the next paragraph of the section on terrorism then refers to the phenomenon of religious terrorism which can be seen in “our own society” (ESS, 2003, p. 3). This leaves one with the question of whether the ESS sees one single society or an agglomeration of separate societies as its referent object. If one agrees with the latter, one could cast doubt on the applicability of Buzan’s definition, as several societies will most likely not share one common identity and consequently common threat perceptions to their identities. Building on this argument, the particular situation of the EU necessitates reflection on the perceptibility of the security receiver: Maull notes that “the growing reluctance of people even in the old core member countries to be ‘taken over’ by Brussels has recently surfaced strongly...” (Maull, 2005, p. 788). Thus, in the face of Dutch and French rejections of the European project, one has to wonder whether societies would desire or recognize the ESS policy. In brief, one can cast into doubt that there exists a genuine reciprocity of conception.

The uneasy co-existence of several concepts of security is again demonstrated in the phrase of terrorist activities being a threat “to European countries *or* their citizens” [emphasis added] (ESS, 2003, p. 6). Not only does it appear to allow one to choose between state and societal security, but it also brings up the question of whether the ESS has the intention to extend security to states and/or populations outside the EU but inside Europe. The paper makes no attempt to resolve the contradictions outlined above. Rather, this first part has tried to gather evidence that the ESS has no clear answer to the question of ‘whose security’ and so far cannot affirm Cornish and Edwards findings that the ESS “does provide a much-needed conceptual framework for European security...” (Cornish and Edwards, 2005, p. 810).

II. What Threats?

Turning now to the question of what are the ‘sources of threat to security’, the ESS appears to give a more sophisticated impression as compared to the first part. It enumerates terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime in a “concise list of primary threats”, which can be regarded as a “global approach to Europe’s security interests” (Heisbourg, 2004, p. 29). By focusing on a rather succinct inventory of threats the ESS abstains from an overstretched Buzanian threat conception which includes military, political, economic, societal and environmental threats; which could render the notion ungraspable (Buzan, 1991 in Terriff etc. al, 1999). Walt fosters this point by highlighting that “broadening the concept of security threatens to destroy its intellectual coherence and make[s] it more difficult to devise solutions...” (Walt, 1991 in

Terriff etc. al, 1999, p. 6). Relating this argument to the previous question of ‘whose security’ Dalby stresses that “extending the ambit of security without simultaneously investigating the formulation of what it is that is being rendered secure...” is a questionable approach (Dalby, 1997, p. 5). Thus, in the face of several shortcomings concerning the question of ‘whose security’ in the first part, the ESS’s narrow approach to ‘what threats’ can be appreciated and might have the potential to mitigate some of the conceptual defaults outlined previously.

However, when observing the ESS more carefully one can notice that the five key threats are rather vacuous notions that can be filled *ad libitum*. For example, it states that regional conflicts have an “impact on European interests directly and indirectly” (ESS, 2003, p. 4), without, however, specifying which conflicts are meant and - equally important - what the affected European interests are. In this respect, Haine claims that these five threats only provide a “common ground between the inevitably different threat perceptions ... of the Member States” (Haine, 2008, p. 21). Elaborating on this point he notes that “Spain looks at terrorism through the prism of immigration, Poland through international crime, Italy keeps a close eye on the Balkans, [and] France is focused on Algeria ...” (ibid.). Elaborating on the example of terrorism Den Boer notes that “it has proved difficult to establish common ground on a harmonized definition of terrorism” (Den Boer, 2002, p. 20). This disaccord has also been reflected in the MS’ quarrels over the successor to the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator Gijs de Vries, whose post stayed vacant for almost six months. Moreover, one could wonder why a coordinator for a top security priority of the EU is only equipped with marginal powers (Heisbourg, 2004).

Biscop emphasizes that the importance of terrorism and WMDs is generally exaggerated in the ESS, and has partially attained such a high level of attention in order to build a bridge to the United States’ (US) security concerns (Biscop, 2004). On the other hand, softer elements in threat perception such as the need to fight organized crime reflect a distinct EU approach to security (ESS, 2003). It therefore seems as if the ESS reflects to a certain degree the divide between the Atlanticist and Eurocentric camp of security (Wallace, 2005). Consequently, the question of ‘what threats’ tends to materialize as a compromise between MS rather than a genuine single perception. Despite the fact that an answer to the question has been provided it seems safe to assume that in reality an expectations-capabilities gap has become visible. Hence, even the identification of threats seems to be “conditioned and circumscribed by [the EU’s] highly specific political subject and its equally specific *modus operandi*” (Maull, 2005, p. 778).

III. Who Provides Security?

Concerning this third question the ESS appears to provide three answers to none of which it intends to commit fully: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), EU and/or the MS, and the United Nations (UN) (ESS, 2003). While Smith argues that this approach can be deemed a success (Smith, 2004), the paper is convinced that the brick by brick architecture of security is deficient. Security providers should rather use the metaphor of a pregnancy: either one is pregnant/in charge of security, or one is not.

The ESS states that “[t]he United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO” (ESS, 2003, p. 1). Hence, it highlights that when talking about NATO one is bound to talk about the US as well (Arnold, 1993). Unfortunately, the ESS does not position the EU vis-à-vis the US, and cannot say what it assumes about the transatlantic relationship (Heisbourg, 2004). Thus, the ESS prevents taking a clear stance on one of the core debates between EU states, and leaves room for interpretation with on the one side of the spectrum the Eurocentrics – assuming that NATO is supplementary to the EU’s autonomous capacities – and on the other the Atlanticists – placing EU capabilities within NATO. At this point it should suffice to point out that the current half-way approach in which the EU relies on NATO capabilities to undertake independent

operations bares some risks: veto powers outside the EU, e.g. Turkey, can withhold authorization (Cornish and Edwards, 2005). Therefore, it seems questionable that a distinct effective European approach can arise within NATO as is advocated by several authors (Everts and Keohane, 2004; Freedman, 2004). It appears more plausible that “the EU is caught in between contradictory processes”, in which both European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and NATO could be interpreted to be security providers (Hanna, 2006, p. 62).

This debate is further complicated by the relationship between the EU and the MS. The ESS stipulates that “we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable” (ESS, 2003, p. 11). Assuming that ‘we’ designates the MS, one has to underline that they frequently do not meet these expectations in reality. Unanimity in an already cumbersome decision-making process prevents swift reactions to security challenges and usually leads to declaratory rather than real policy outputs (Smith, 2004). Overcoming this problem would mean introducing institutional mechanisms like those of the European Monetary Union (EMU); consequently allocating power to the EU (Maull, 2005). Such a scenario is unlikely though with van Staden holding that MS will not “accept the authority of a supranational body in questions of life and death” (van Staden, 1994 in Hanna, 2006, p. 60). Despite long-standing consultations and socialization processes between MS there is no “logic of automaticity” or political spillover in security policy (Hanna, 2006, p. 60), thus leading to an absence of security culture with everyone paying “lip service to the principle of coherence” but in fact “no Member State [...] has ever been prepared to give up completely its own role in this field” (Andersson, 2008, p. 123). This half-way house amounts to a partial shift of power from the state to the EU; however, “without attaining a new synthesis” at the European level (Waever and Kelstrup, 1993, p. 68). If one desires to allocate the role of security provider to either the MS or the EU one has to discuss the finality of the European project, including federalist outcomes (Wallace, 2005).

As a third possibility, the ESS pinpoints the UN Security Council as the “primary [responsible] for the maintenance of international peace and security” (ESS, 2003, p. 9). However, the ESS is broad enough to allow interpretation for all MS; including the UK, which has just participated in a non-sanctioned attack on Iraq. Moreover, Gowan doubts that the UN could be a viable security provider for the EU, highlighting the “internal disputes over the UN’s role” (Gowan, 2008, p. 44). Thus, in particular on the field of security EU MS have diverging votes and interests in the UN. While the UK and France continue to enjoy privileges as permanent members of the Security Council, Germany demands its proper place between them instead of lobbying for one common EU-seat, which could be a way out of this dilemma. Additionally, Allin outlines that by referring to the UN the ESS restrains the EU as an effective security actor due to possible external variables outside its control, like a Russian or Chinese veto (Allin, 2003 in ESF, 2003).

Concluding this third part, it is outlined that the ESS can find no definite answer to the question of ‘who provides security’. In all three examples the EU should move away from a half-way house and accept the pregnancy metaphor. The fundamental debates outlined above ought to be tackled in order to allocate a security provider and to forestall that the idea of ‘the more the merrier’ in the end leads to a lack of security instead of a value added.

IV. With What Means?

The paper now turns to the question with what means security is ensured. The ESS stresses that security threats today are “multi-faceted” and therefore require a “mixture of instruments”, which go beyond mere military means (ESS, 2003, p. 7). To tackle terrorism, for example, it recommends a combination of “intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means” (ibid.). In this context the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) is portrayed as a successful instrument already in place to counter terrorism.

Den Boer agrees and appraises the EAW as an “extraordinarily rapid progress...on key aspects of its internal anti-terrorism agenda” (Den Boer, 2002, p. 14). However, in 2005 the Cyprian, German and Polish constitutional courts have annulled the decisions implementing the EAW, deeming them either unconstitutional or incompatible with fundamental human rights. As a result, countries like Spain cannot rely on the EAW as their constitutions necessitate reciprocity for such instruments (House of Lords, 2006). More generally, it appears that the EU features a large portfolio of instruments (also including Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Position), which potentially touches upon most topics relevant to security. Yet, when these instruments are more far-reaching, like the EAW, the MS are unwilling to surrender sovereignty, which in turn decreases the effectiveness of the means (ESF, 2003).

While in the above example instrument effectiveness is *directly* limited by national decisions, *indirect* constraints arise from the issue of financing. On the one hand, civilian ambitions, like the administration of the city of Mostar, suffered a setback as MS kept financial contributions intergovernmental but frequently delayed payments. On the other, military ambitions are hampered by a seemingly contradictory approach of the MS: “the EU’s pursuit of a strategic identity is comprehensible in declaratory terms, but its inadequate implementation appears to risk strategic isolation ... as well as operational inadequacy” (Cornish and Edwards, 2005, p. 806). Thus, whereas Headline Goals, Capabilities Commitment Conferences or Capabilities Improvement Charts underline the MS willingness on paper, there has been little progress in reality. Germany, for example, committed to the purchase of A-400 transport machines but opted out as defence spending was cut by 26 billion for a five year period (Howorth, 2008). Moreover, the pooling of armed forces and defence budgets, which would prevent duplications and free resources, is unlikely as the underlying rationale remains the states’ fear to lose sovereignty (Hanna, 2006; Howorth, 2008).

Apart from the issue of sovereignty another factor seems to underpin the shortcomings in security capabilities: the hierarchy in security means. Regarding this point Biscop notes that EU has already developed a “comprehensive notion of security, which starts from the interdependence between all dimensions of security – political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military...” (Biscop, 2004, p. 6). This notion of comprehensive security tends to be marked by an absence of hierarchy. Indeed the EU has a tendency to spread its resources over a magnitude of means as security is not as narrowly defined. Thus, while Smith and Cornish and Edwards support the idea of a wide portfolio and higher institutionalization of security, Freedman stresses that security should focus more on buying new defence equipment (Smith, 2004; Cornish and Edwards, 2005, Freedman, 2004).


This debate over the hierarchy of instruments brings up the question of the importance of the military as a means to security. Bull argues that the EU “could only ever become a successful international actor if it bestowed itself with a credible military component” (Bull, 1982 in Treacher, 2004, p. 59). Treacher and Zielonka though, highlight that the militarization of the EU would threaten its civilian nature (Zielonka, 1998 in Treacher, 2004). Nevertheless, this argument could be cast into doubt when looking at the ESS, which states that, countries placing “themselves outside the bounds of international society ... should understand that there is a price to be paid...” (ESS, 2003, p. 10). Yet, the ESS does not spell out, or cannot spell out, what this price entails (ESF, 2003; Heisbourg, 2004), which leads Heisbourg to point out “a missing link between policy aspirations ... and a willingness to act” (Heisbourg, 2004, p. 32). Therefore, the paper is inclined to agree with Stavridis who notes that only a militarized Union can “act as a real civilian power in the world” (Stavridis, 2001 in Biscop, 2004, p. 36). In order to ensure its security and shape its environment along the lines of its *post-modern* character, the EU must be willing to employ military means as it plays on a *modern* stage (see Cooper, 2000 in Biscop, 2004).

Concluding this last section the paper has attempted to demonstrate that the expectations outlined in the ESS could not be met with effective capabilities in reality. In other words “[h]aving declared their will to act, in the [ESS], EU governments appear so far to have been reluctant to provide themselves with all the means they themselves have argued are necessary” (Cornish and Edwards, 2005, p. 806).

Conclusion

The paper has made an attempt to find evidence that the EU and its MS have been able to develop a credible security policy only to a very limited extent. Having linked the notion of ‘credibility’ to the evaluation of four distinct questions, the paper stipulates that the ESS is testimony to the EU and its MS suffering from a stewardship gap in questions one and three, and an expectations-capabilities gap in questions two and four. In addition, one sought to demonstrate the interdependence of these questions. Thus, uncertainties in answering one question lead to ambiguities in answering another. Consequently, one finds oneself in a vicious circle. In order to reverse this situation into a virtuous circle, the EU and the MS must go beyond what is offered in the ESS and start tackling one of the four questions. Each question is underpinned by three key issues that could be resolved in order to facilitate the quest for a satisfactorily answer (see **Figure 1**).

Figure 1: Interdependence of the four questions of security and main underlying issues



The paper sought to cast into doubt the optimistic approach of scholars like Biscop and Smith who view the EU as a credible security player (Biscop, 2008; Smith, 2004). In particular the “abundance of ‘governance’, but very little real authority” tends to be an obstacle in the

policy area of security (Maull, 2005, p. 792). This is buttressed by the continuous divide between MS and the EU, which led Heisbourg to note that “the EU cannot have a proper security strategy as long as decisions on the use of force rest in the hands of its member governments” (Heisbourg, 2004, p. 28).

It is along these lines that one needs to wonder about the post-ESS future of the EU? The Reform Treaty proposes some valuable changes to the current EU security policy, e.g. giving it more structure through assigning the new High Representative a double function. However, in the light of the crucial questions above, these alterations appear as mere surgeries that do not treat the root of the illness. If the EU wants to become a credible security actor it must face unpleasant questions and show the courage to impose undesired answers for the greater good. MS have the task to look beyond short-term national gains and accept that effectiveness can only be achieved by compromising sensitive areas of sovereignty. Otherwise, one must expect the EU to continue along the lines of ‘coherence for all, but not for me’.

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2007-2008: Year of Politics in Turkey

by Mahir Zeynalov

Turkey, a country overwhelmingly populated by rabble Muslims, has been a major showcase of Islam to Europe for centuries. Abundance with cultural and religious opulence, Turkey is a country where many scenarios have been put into play to fabricate anarchy, make diverse groups confront each other and absorb the wealth of it by keeping this huge country busy with miniscule affairs like *turban*, Kurdish ‘problem’ or determining the ‘religiousness’ of AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Islamic continuum.

This paper is catechizing the last episodes in Turkish politics in an elapsed year. Interestingly enough, although being a Muslim country, almost everything in Turkey hugely builds upon politics. Every breed of political sham and simulation or even political foretells may considerably and nimbly affect economy, social and even personal religious lives of Turkish people. Passed year was a fluctuating year for Turkish inquisition on democracy and vindication of *laicism* in Turkish politics. Sparked by the contested presidential elections in April, crisis over Turkish politics overshadowed the democracy as CHP (Republican People’s Party), the cardinal opposition party, Judiciary used every kind of lanes to deter and obstruct Abdullah Gül’s, AKP’s presidential candidate, march toward presidency. CHP endeavored to inhibit Abdullah Gül, because, this position is seen as the seat of Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic and Ataturk revolutions, laicism is being one of them. Also, although the presidency is a ceremonial one in Turkey, a president has a right to alter key positions in a government and a state. In fact, this practice is present in many countries from Britain to Spain and Japan. However, in those countries there is an ascertained political culture and unique identity on harbor of a country. In turkey, however, parties are handicapped to establish coalition, they cannot launch peace among each other and the existence of one party needs the dearth of the other and vice versa. This is due to the constitution of intersecting principles of the Republic in line with life style of the populace.

For background, Turkey is a country significantly divided in a religious sense due to Westernization ‘project’ in early 20th century which led by strongman hardliner Atatürk, the first president and the founder of today’s Turkey. Although a Muslim country, Muslims suffer in many areas in social life due to restricting laws and clear discrimination of religious people. It is prohibited to wear headscarf in public buildings as well as there is a de facto discrimination against religious people in the country. At first, it is considered that only by adopting western values; Turkey could develop and go further. As it failed during Atatürk’s and İnönü’s period, Turkey’s urban, elite, secular people embraced laicism to preserve their western-oriented identity. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country and thus secular people

covered their identity by labeling CHP as a left party. Turkey has experienced 4 military coup d'états, again because of allegedly blaming Islamic-oriented parties to convert state secular institutions into a religious one. 1960, 1971, 1980 and the last 1998 coup d'états significantly pulled the country backward both politically and economically. Attempts to copy Western institutional secularism have been implemented as individual secularism and thereby huge cleavages came into being in Turkish society. This fact led to conflicts many times and military revolutions are just clear specimens.

After toppling Erbakan's coalition government in 1998, another alliance of Democratic Left Party came to the dominion. As a result of massive financial crisis and political instability, Ecevit's government was forced to resign and call for a new election. 2002 elections fetched a new name – AKP to power by overwhelming majority of seats in parliament. Being the only party in government gained much in terms of economical disentanglement, political stability and auspicious foreign policy regarding European Union.

Main critics from opposition rose up not because of government's course but because AKP members were religious and their wives had headscarf on their head. The reason why early elections were called was punctiliously because of this 'laicism' controversy. When Abdullah Gül, the Foreign Minister of Turkey had been proposed for the presidency, CHP and Constitutional Court have done everything to hinder Gül. So called '367' issue was proposed suggesting that there have to be 367 deputies in parliament to hold the presidential election. Constitutional Court ruled out that the previous presidential elections are false and the new one should be called for. In order to do so, there would need to call for a new election from which CHP and other groups in parliament were expecting to increase their seats.

After the deadlock over presidential elections in Turkey, on July 22nd, Turkey had been tested over its commitment to democracy. It has been a long time that the current government formed by AKP (Justice and Development Party) was criticized for its Islamic roots and allegedly an attempt to transmute Turkish state institutions into a religious one. AKP won a landslide victory over its biggest rivals CHP (Republican People's Party) and MHP (National Movement Party), a left and a right party in Turkish sense of left-right continuum by 47 % of vote. This is one of the loftiest votes in Turkish history of democracy since 1950 that the winner of elections could possibly get.

Landslide victory of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül signaled a course in which Gül would become a president and Erdoğan would carry out policies that he could not conceive in his first term due to the scanty popularity. Now, it would be more facile for him to undergo various programs that he sees as a shortcoming after attainment a huge popularity and legitimizing his power. Beaming star of Islamic world, Turkey, seems to have a headache for some time until it gets cleaned key positions from old-fashioned brains. AKP's triumph had been depicted as the victory of Muslims and AKP had been displayed as an Islamic party in world press. The principal motive behind that is a censure of opposition to AKP on being an Islamic party and absence of refusal of AKP members. The question why AKP did not refuse of being a non-Islamic party is because; there is a blend on institutional and individual secularism in Turkey so that it is arduous for politicians to assent to (religious people are prohibited to be in politics in Turkey), or to spurn (in this case, you take the whole population against you who are Muslims). Actually, in Christian societies, it is compliant to determine who is a 'pastor' and who is not. But in Islam, there is no certain religious structure. Everyone in mosque can lead the prayer and everyone can claim that they are religious. Thereby, it is perplexed for Turkish judiciary to judge on whether or not the one who is in power is a religious guy or not. What judges do is just examining the speeches of politicians and come to an end on decision as in the case of AKP's closure.

One of the agenda of AKP was annulling of PKK terror organization. (Kurdish Workers Party) PKK is a terror organization which is estimated to have around 4000-4500 Kurdish

militants who are living in mountains in very cold and incredibly ill conditions. PKK has been struggling against Turkish government and realizing its bloody terror acts in big cities for 24 years. It is laborious to organize an operation and stop this terrorism because they are living in mountains and it is hard to see and catch them out there. Meanwhile, Northern Iraq is the primary headquarters camp of PKK. PKK funding is mainly coming out of drug trade, trafficking, illegal taxes from civilians and contributions. PKK's chief media board is Roj TV in Belgium and Germany. PKK has huge lobby group in Germany and in Brussels as well as it is being represented as DTP (Democratic Society Party) in Turkish Parliament with 28 deputies though they do not accept of being a political extension of PKK terror organization.

AKP's PKK dilemma had two aims to achieve; first, to stop PKK activities and destroy this organization. Second, AKP wanted to establish close relations with military by taking measures against foreign threat together. In fact, worsened relations between the government and military have recovered during this over border operation to Northern Iraq. Controversial how much AKP achieved to its aims, it is undoubted that Turkey hit PKK strongly this time. This was also the first military expansion of Turkey in a military fight against its neighbors. Huge polemics over Kurdish question is of long-lasting debate around the independence aspiration of small, marginal Kurdish minority using terror way to get its independence. The question to be asked beforehand is whether or not there is an issue or problem related to Kurdish people in this region. Certainly, there is a small minority who is in favor of independent Kurdistan, but it is a movement not supported nationwide among Kurds. "Kurdish terrorists (they call themselves as guerilla warriors) were coming to our village in Van (it is a city where massively populated by Kurds) and taking up small kids to mountains to be future terrorists and also many investment projects have been turned down because of this terror" says Emrullah Kızılarlan, a Kurdish engineering student in Baku, Azerbaijan, "and that was the reason why we moved to Antalya (tourism capital of Turkey) as a family". Kızılarlan claims that majority of Kurds do not support them and hopefully there will not be so-called independent 'Kurdistan'.³⁴ Resolution of this issue is also one of the preconditions of Turkey's European Union accession and has been putting forward by EU as a prerequisite in this bid. This is mainly due to the strong Kurdish Lobby in Brussels.

Another problem which kept Turkish politics busy was turban crisis. It is funny but the whole issue is about whether or not to retain the headscarf ban in universities. "Headscarf is not a problem, headscarf problem is a problem" was the slogan of majority of Turkish people who were in favor of abolishing turban ban in universities. CHP and other leftist organs made it a very big deal for over a month and this problem occupied the very agenda in media. The discussion has two wings: government is claiming that the headscarf is the basic religious right of a Muslim woman and there should be a shift of turban ban in accordance to freedom of religion principle. Opposition and *laic* people argue that the turban is a political symbol of *Sharia* and has no any religious ground. They go further even denying the existence of headscarf in Islamic law. However, more than 450 votes (out of 550 deputies present) codified the lift of headscarf ban in universities. As soon as this issue was over, anarchist found another reason to occupy the agenda and launch unleashed chaos in the country with the introduction of AKP's closure.

A recent event that stuck Turkish politics and economy into deadlock is certainly the case about the closure of AKP in Constitutional Court. Appealed by the Head Judge of the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Turkey, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, 163-page plus additional appendixes appeal has been presented to the Constitutional Court. After the acceptance of appeal, AKP has one month to prepare a defense and if needed, AKP may ask to extend the deadline. Analysts say that there are funny statements in the appeal including some 'religious

³⁴ Personal correspondence.

words' that already became national cultural phrases of which even atheists are using to express certain things. In the appeal, the level of secularism is scrutinized of 71 members of parliament, the president, ministers and other AKP members. Western public opinion as well as leaders of civil society are just 'shocked' by the installment of this process, because it is an unprecedented case in the world history. Many newspapers published their first-page headlines as "Its name is 'judicial revolution'". Other secular, democratic countries did not understand the procedure and how judges are able to overthrow the ruling party. But that lies under the uncertain nature of Turkish laicism and politicians being Muslim. In Western world, those who are out of monasteries and churches are secular people. They do have a little amount of religious practice though very individually. But in Islam, one may be a normal citizen without any religious affiliation and also be a very religious person. This issue actually answers the questions why they allowed the establishment of AKP, run for elections and tolerated until now and proposed the appeal today.

Noteworthy is the way how Turkish economy is enhanced and strengthened during AKP's leadership. It was 19th February, 2001... when Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the former president, threw the constitution to Bülent Ecevit, the Prime Minister before Erdoğan. This event launched giant economic crisis in Turkey and did not end until 2002. However, although some kind of economic loss has been noted in Turkey due to economic crises and stagnation in the USA, two issues show how much Turkish economy became strong in the last decade. Now, Turkish economy does not affect very much from political crisis and statements. This will certainly make anarchists to abstain from their political.



OUR HOUSE – NEWS FROM IAPSS

CONFERENCES

IAPSS Conference: Confronting Energy and Climate Change Policies

CALL FOR PAPERS

A DIFFERENT VIEW, IAPSS

IAPSS CONFERENCES

Ljubljana, Slovenia

26th to 30th of May

Topic: Confronting Energy and Climate Change Policies

During the first half of this three-day conference, the topic of energy politics will play the main role. The second part will focus mainly on the issue of climate change and which policies the different international institutions are trying to implement to counteract this development. At the end of the second part there is going to be a presentation of short movies that will show the consequences of climate change to emphasize the importance of this topic to all the participants.

Information: www.iapss.org

CALL FOR PAPERS

A DIFFERENT VIEW, IAPSS

23rd Edition, 2008

Topic: Music and Politics dedication to Underground Rock Bands of Soviet Era

Deadline: **30th of May, 2008**

The Editorial Board of ADV invites graduate and undergraduate students to submit short academic and opinion articles for publication in its May 2008 issue.

Contact: IAPSSADV@gmail.com

NEWS FROM THE OPPORTUNITY CENTER

SCHOLARSHIPS

The Essex Opportunity Scholarship
Master in Public Policy (MPP) Programme, National University of Singapore
Master Degree in European Integration Studies
Civic Education in Action - South-East Europe - Bonn, Germany
European Online Academy - Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Prague, Rome
Patrick Stewart Scholarships for International Students - University of Huddersfield
International Research Scholarships - University of Brighton, UK

SUMMER SCHOOLS

Fulbright International Summer Institute - Tryavna, Bulgaria
International Summer School – Opole, Berlin and Strasbourg
Summer University of Slovakia – Bratislava, Slovakia

CONFERENCES

The Human Person, The Heart of Peace First UN World Heritage Conscience of Humanity Human Rights Conference on Holy See Diplomacy & Human Rights - Hague, Netherlands
The Patterns of Corruption in the 21st Century - Athens, Greece

CALL FOR PAPERS

VOX

SCHOLARSHIPS

THE ESSEX OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP

The University of Essex, Colchester, UK

The University of Essex is delighted to announce that it will be offering Essex Opportunity Scholarships for students from Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who enrol at the University of Essex in October 2008. An Essex Opportunity Scholarship is available to any student from Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who:

- a) meets the initial entry requirements of the University and is made an offer of a place at the University
- b) holds Essex as their firm choice institution
- c) registers on an undergraduate (bachelor) degree programme.

The undergraduate scholarship is available to Polish, Romanian, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuania nationals and other EU citizens who are residing in one of the above-mentioned countries prior to the start of their course (excluding UK nationals)

Website: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/prospective/finance/scholarships/opportunity.html>

MASTER IN PUBLIC POLICY (MPP) PROGRAMME

National University of Singapore

Deadline: 31 May 2008

Master in Public Policy (MPP) students benefit from the School's growing network of exchange arrangements of up to 1 year with public policy schools worldwide. The School also conducts an active programme of seminars and public lectures by political, not-for-profit and business leaders to enable all students to complement their formal learning with the opportunity to interact with distinguished individuals who are shaping the future. Master in Public Policy (MPP) Programme provides a strong foundation in conceptual and analytical skills for future public service leaders and individuals with an interest in understanding and influencing how public policy choices are made.

Contact: LKYSPPmpp@nus.edu.sg

Website: <http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/> or http://www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/degree_prog_1.htm

MASTER DEGREE IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION STUDIES

Deadline: 6 June 2008

The objective of this call is to award scholarships to select graduates from ENP countries (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine) and Russia to follow courses leading to a degree of master in European Integration Studies offered in EU higher education institutions.

Contact: Mr. Pedro Martinez Macias, pedro.martinez-macias@ec.europa.eu

Website: http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/calls/1508/index_en.html

CIVIC EDUCATION IN ACTION - SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Bonn, Germany

Deadline: 30 May 2008

The Federal Agency for Civic Education and the Robert Bosch Stiftung are awarding 30 scholarships to young professionals from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, working in civic education. The programme addresses qualified individuals who want to be involved in networking civic education in Europe. The participants will spend 8 to 10 weeks as interns in a German education institute. They will work there with their German colleagues, establishing ties for future cross-border co-operation. During the guest term, the scholarship holders are going to develop a project about the social or political situation in their home country. They are going to implement this project together with their guest institute within the scope of the Civic Education Campaign Days, the most important campaign for civic education in Germany. Subsidies to the amount of € 2,700 are available for the project.

Website: <http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/21NR54>, <http://www.bpb.de/files/5PK7LS.pdf>

EUROPEAN ONLINE ACADEMY

Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Prague, Rome

Two years beginning 5 October 2008

Deadline: 5 September 2008

In order to fulfil an ever increasing demand, the European Online Academy seeks to combine both these elements: European integration and new media as a meeting point for colleagues and fellow students, and a place of information resources on recent EU developments. The European Online Academy's, 'Master in EU Studies Online' (60 ECTS) links issues relevant for the future of Europe and its citizens. The virtual workplace pulls resources from the web, processes resources onto results and places them as new resources back into the web. But the European Online Academy is not only virtual. It recognises the paramount importance of face-to-face learning. Through study sessions in Budapest, Prague, Berlin and Brussels we have created a physical as well as a virtual intercultural workspace. The project involves recognised experts with academic and practical background as teachers, tutors and researchers.

Website: www.eu-online-academy.org

PATRICK STEWART SCHOLARSHIPS FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

University of Huddersfield, UK

2008-09 academical year

Deadline: 31 July 2008

The Scholarships are to be awarded to full-fee paying international students applying to study full-time on taught courses (Bachelor or Masters) at the University of Huddersfield (at our main campus in Huddersfield or the University Centres at Oldham and Barnsley). The Scholarship scheme is competitive and all applications will be considered on merit. Applicants must demonstrate outstanding academic performance which they are able to evidence within their course applications. The University reserves the right to request further evidence where necessary.

Website: http://www.hud.ac.uk/international/patrick_stewart_scholarship/index.html

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIPS

University of Brighton, UK

Maximum of 3 years

Deadline: **30 June 2008**

4 University of Brighton international research scholarships worth a reduction of 50 per cent off the cost of your tuition fees for your research programme for up to a maximum of 3 years are available to outstanding international research students in all areas of study.

Contact: International Office: international@brighton.ac.uk; tel: +44/0 1273 642409

SUMMER SCHOOLS

FULBRIGHT INTERNATIONAL SUMMER INSTITUTE

Tryavna, Bulgaria

August 11 - 23, 2008

Deadline: **May 25, 2008**

FISI 2008 will offer one-week intensive courses in a wide variety of subject areas: business, economics and management, politics and international relations, law, education, communication, social, cultural, and Bulgarian studies. All courses will be taught in English by distinguished Bulgarian, European and American professors. This year FISI will be held from August 11 to August 23 in Tryavna.

Website: www.fisi-bg.info.

INTERNATIONAL SUMMER SCHOOL – “NATIONAL MINORITIES-TODAY AND TOMORROW”

Opole, Berlin and Strasbourg

September 15th to 26th, 2008

The Polish organizers, the European House at the Foundation for Silesia Development (Dom Europejski w Opolu) recruit the candidates from Central and Eastern Europe. Centre international de formation européenne recruits candidates from the first fifteen EU member states. The course will be made of a group of 25 participants who should be students in their second or third year of university studies or young professionals. In order to take fully advantage of the course, the candidates should be at an advanced stage of their university studies or justify of sufficient professional experience.

Website: <http://www.cife.eu/indexUK.php>

SUMMER UNIVERSITY OF SLOVAKIA – “THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ENERGY CHALLENGES”

Bratislava, Slovakia

July 20th to July 26th, 2008

The first edition of this Summer University will take place in Bratislava in collaboration with the University of Economics. A group of about 30 participants from Slovakia, European Union and East Europe. The candidates must be graduate students, but we also consider applications from students in their second and third year university studies and young professionals.

Website: <http://www.cife.eu/indexUK.php>

CONFERENCES

THE HUMAN PERSON, THE HEART OF PEACE FIRST UN WORLD HERITAGE CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE ON HOLY SEE DIPLOMACY & HUMAN RIGHTS

The Hague, Netherlands, Netherlands

25 to 30 April 2009

Deadline for abstracts/proposals: **30 August 2008**

The First UN World Heritage Conscience of Humanity Summit to give the global human family the opportunity to critically assess the state of affairs of the Holy See's Diplomatic Service with respect to international human rights compliance. Organized by: The UN World Heritage Institute for the Study of Holy See/Vatican State Affairs (w/ UNESCO)

Contact: The John Paul II Vatican Affairs World Scholar

THE PATTERNS OF CORRUPTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The CRIISEA Research Center, University of Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens - Institute of International Economic Relations

Athens, Greece

Date: 6-7 September 2008, Athens, Greece

Deadline: **9 of June, 2008**

Interested persons should submit an abstract between of about 250-350 words by 9 of June 2008. It should include: the paper argument, its theoretical approach, its findings and its methodology. The Programme Committee might confirm acceptance of submissions before the deadline. Therefore, early submission is recommended. The conference fee is 130 (euro). For Ph. D candidates the fee is 50. The fee is inclusive of refreshments, documentation, two lunches and one dinner.

Contact person: Stella Miliotis, sae@hol.gr, <http://www.idec.gr/iier>

CALL FOR PAPERS

VOX

The next edition of VOX will be on the topic "EAST AND WEST". If you want to write on the possible shift of global dominance from West to East, Asian philosophy, democracy, environmental issues, emerging economies, prospects for social revolution, the Olympic games, politics of development. Undergraduates, post-graduates and academics are all welcome to write.

Website: <http://voxjournal.co.uk>

Contact persons: Ilaf Scheikh Elard and Paul Mertenskötter, Editors vox@clubofpep.org

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS



Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr. holds a Legal Management degree (magna cum laude) from the University of Santo Tomas, and is studying for a Juris Doctor-Master of Business Administration dual degree at De La Salle Professional Schools and Far Eastern University Institute of Law. He has studied Political Science, Conflict Analysis, and Journalism at AIDE, the United States Institute of Peace, and Penn Foster College. He was a 2003 Philippine Nominee to the Georgia Rotary Student Program, and a 2007 Golden Wikipedia Award. His research interests include human security, corporate social responsibility, environmental conservation, global economy, poverty alleviation, and international diplomacy. His hobbies include reading, writing, Internet surfing, playing computer games, watching television and movies, baking cakes and pastries, bonding with cats, and breeding tropical fish.



Tobias Franke is a 24 year-old post-graduate in the Euromaster Programme of the University of Bath. He obtained his Bachelor at the University of Maastricht. His field of interests are the EU in general and the democratic deficit as well as European security in particular.



Mahir Zeynal is a senior student at Qafqaz University at Baku, Azerbaijan. I am the founder of IAPSS Azerbaijan. My academic interest includes Middle East, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Post-Soviet countries, nationalism and cultural issues. This is his second contribution to the ADV.

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To contact the Editor or to contribute to A Different View send an email to: IAPSSADV@gmail.com