

ADV

A DIFFERENT VIEW

Issue 28
April 2009

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Editorial

Welcome to Issue 28 of A Different View

Felipe Nunes
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Welcome to issue 28 of A Different View. This time the main story line will involve the financial crisis, which some months ago turned into an economic one. With job losses on the rise, growth rates shrinking and world leaders gathering to solve the problem, it seems as if another crisis fades into the background: climate change. It seems short-sighted of world leaders to go back on their environmental agreements, just so they can save some money in the short run. According to most predictions, the cost of climate change will far outweigh any costs incurred while trying to limit the repercussions of climate change.

While for some times it looked like the financial turmoil would mostly hit industrialized countries, it now turned out to be global. Having read an article recently in the German newspaper “Der Spiegel”, maintaining that Africa remains unaffected by the economic downturn, it lately titles that Africa is as expected very much affected by it, and even India, which only globalized its economy since 1991, and is not an export driven economy like Germany and China, is experiencing lower growth rates.

Generally, times appear to be quite apocalyptic, with an economic crisis, and environmental crisis, and an epidemic on the march (although one has to see how

the latter one plays out in the end).

This is why we asked people to contribute to these topics, and here is what we got:

In his opinion article our regular contributor Sven Brendel argues that in times of economic and financial crisis consumption and spending are vital tools to boost a slugging economy.

Bennet Strang provides us with some theoretical and policy-making background to probably the most important problem of financial control and climate/environmental protection: implementation.

Akos Kiss-Dozsai is taking a critical look at Hungarian past, present and future in times of financial crisis, while Kargare is reporting about the Indian state of affairs. Our last article, by Yann Tavez, looks at the ramifications for the EU, the EU often being called a soft power, because of its monetary and customs union. Where will the financial crisis leave the EU, when it cannot act as one, in a crisis that affects its only power status: its soft power?

Opinion Articles

Shopping to Save the World - In Defense of American Consumerism

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Do you shop a lot? I certainly do. Last weekend, I bought four shirts, one pair of pants, ate out twice and that's just discretionary spending. Quite frankly, I would be bored if it was not for all the shopping I do. Some people feel guilty about shopping too much. I don't. I don't because I understand the socio-economic chain reaction shopping sets in motion. If you are like me, and like to shop, you should not feel guilty either. Not only that you should feel proud. You are helping the cause of peace and liberty. As strange as it may sound, going to the mall is one of the best things you can do to save the world. Ironically those who advocate cutting down on consumption often do so out of honest concern for the poor. I recall a left-wing student at my university instructing me that "we need to cut down on all this consumption." Indeed, at this point any die-hard leftist or committed Marxist has probably come to the conclusion that this is some neoliberal propaganda piece. Like the student I mentioned above, he or she has probably concluded that I am some apologist for the global bourgeoisie and American economic imperialism. Not so fast comrade. No, I am not a left-winger. Nor am I a radical by any means. But I am not a "neoliberal" (or conservative) either. I am a liberal in the tradition of Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Joseph Stiglitz. I am

a registered member of the U.S. Democratic Party and voted for Barack Obama last November. As a matter of fact, there is an Obama sticker in the rear window of my car. Liberal that I am, however, I am a pragmatic and will adopt those policy proscriptions that reason and evidence suggest will work. In the case of American consumption, evidence and reason tell me that more is better. Our consumption is the engine behind the mechanism that will make this world more prosperous and secure for generations to come.

The logic of consumption is simple: the more stuff people buy, the more stuff needs to be made. The more stuff is made, the more people are hired to make it. The more people are hired, the tighter the labor market gets and the higher wages rise. At this point in the cycle, more people are earning higher salaries. What do they do? Consume! And the cycle repeats itself over and over. Each time, the overall amount of goods and jobs increases as do living standards. Anyone who doubts this claim might want to compare America of 1947 to America of 2007. In 1947, a family at the 20th percentile (i.e. a family richer than 20% of its counterparts, but poorer than 80%) had an annual income of \$12,000. By 2007 that figure had risen to \$26,000. And that's adjusting for inflation. In the meantime, consumer goods have gotten cheaper. In

1949, for instance, the average American had to work 83 hours to buy a basic washing machine and 13.5 hours to buy a toaster. In 2008, average Working-Joe only had to work 18 hours for the washing machine and only 1 hour for the toaster. Now, it is true that some serious problems have developed in the American political-economy over the past three decades. Unlike in the decades following WWII, overall economic growth has no longer automatically translated into equally large increases in family income. Had it, the average American family would have an annual income \$30,000 above its current level (\$91,000 instead of \$61,000). That's largely because the median hourly wage has been virtually flat since 1973, and the only headway ordinary American families have made is because now both spouses are working and working longer hours to boot. But this concerning trend notwithstanding, the long-term trajectory of the U.S., and all other managed market economies, is one towards greater prosperity, which brings greater freedom and peace.

As bad as working conditions are in third world sweatshops, these factories often provide the only economic opportunity available and boycotting their products is counter-productive. The main problem of poor countries is a lack of consumer demand. In a poor society, people are not able to consume. Because nobody is buying, nobody is selling. If nobody is selling, nobody is making anything. If nobody is making anything, people are not employed. If people are not employed, they are poor. It is very opposite of the cycle of prosperity I described above. The lack of consumption leads to a lack of economic opportunity. To escape this trap, poor countries have started to cater to the rich. Countries like the U.S., Britain or France have an abundance of consumer demand. Countries like China have tapped into rich world consumer demand, which has given hundreds of millions of Chinese a way out of the most miserable of poverty. Yet, there is still a lack of consumer demand. The very existence of sweatshops is a manifestation of lackluster consumption. If people were to consume more, more people would be hired. The demand for labor would rise in proportion to the supply of labor. As any introductory economics textbook tells us, when people want something and demand rises faster than its supply, its price goes up. So if people consume more and more goods, more and more labor is demanded to make all the goods necessary to satisfy all those new consumers. If more labor is demanded, employers will have to start competing for employees. They will have to offer better working conditions and higher wages to attract more workers who are becoming an increasingly scarce commodity in sight of increasing demand for consumer goods. The pool of people with few prospects willing to do virtually anything will have decreased and employers will have to attract people who are already employed. Unfortunately, we

still live in a world full of people with little to no prospects; willing to work in oppressive conditions for next to nothing. If consumption were to increase dramatically, demand for workers would as well. The result would be an inevitable rise in wages and better working conditions. As I said in my last column (*Money, not Bombs*), prosperity and economic opportunity are also the best way to create peace. People with prospects are people with a stake in maintaining the social order. Since jobs and opportunity are not created without consumption, peace requires consumption as well.

This is not to say we should fall for the idea of *laissez-faire*. Consumption is not a panacea for the world's problems. Shopping may be a requirement for prosperity, but without government addressing the limitations of the market mechanism the benefits of consumption will not be fully realized. The market only functions when certain conditions are present economists call them the "standard assumptions." When the standard assumptions fail, the market does not function efficiently without government intervention. The gains from consumption and increased economic opportunity must be supplemented by government programs that guarantee access to the resources necessary for self-development (something the market cannot do owing to its inherent limitations). From health care, to education, social insurance, environmental regulations and infrastructure investments, the role of government in the economy must be quite extensive. Without consumption, however, the jobs and tax revenue that allow for the development of a prosperous, functioning mixed market economy will be missing. Consider this statistic. When combining private-but-publically-supported and purely public social welfare programs, the U.S. invests a little more than a third of its GDP, or about \$5 trillion (\$16,000 per capita), in social services. To do the same, China would need to spend \$19.6 trillion and grow its GDP to an astounding \$60 trillion (more than the entire world's current GDP!). Developing countries desperately need growth; the most important thing the world needs are jobs and opportunity. To get those, we need consumption. Consumption sets in motion a chain reaction of prosperity, liberty and peace. Consumption is the corner stone of human development and it is most certainly not to be stigmatized by society. If the left-wing has truly the interests of the poor and oppressed at heart, it will need to rethink its opposition on American consumerism.

Opinion Articles

Do cultural rather than institutional factors explain why some Member States have a better implementation record than others?

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Is it cultural rather than institutional factors that explain why some Member States have a better implementation record than others? The relevance of this question lies in the fact that uneven implementation undermines legal certainty and consistency throughout the Community. My answer to this question is a qualified no. 'No' because I will argue that institutional factors more convincingly explain why some Member States have a better implementation record than others. 'Qualified' because, firstly, the relative impact both cultural and institutional factors have on implementation is difficult to disentangle. The reason is that, from a historical institutionalist perspective, path dependent institutional cultures develop. There is, thus, not necessarily a dichotomy between the explanatory value of institutional and cultural factors. Secondly, the relative strength of both factors in explaining implementation also depends on the policy area in question.

The argument proceeds in the following steps. Firstly, I will briefly discuss, clarify and present my understanding of the terms 'implementation', 'institutional' and 'cultural'. In a second step, the weaknesses of cultural explanations for implementation will be evaluated. This will be

followed by a discussion of the strengths institutional factors have when it comes to accounting for implementation records in the third section. Subsequently, I will present some reasons why one should also bear the policy area in mind when discussing implementation and why both cultural and institutional factors have some (albeit asymmetric) explanatory force in illuminating varying patterns. Finally, a conclusion will be given.

Not clarifying how one understands the terms 'implementation', 'cultural' and 'institutional' leads to conceptual imbalance. A major problem of the whole literature on the subject is that almost no author states his or her understanding of 'implementation'. This contains the danger of talking about different things, drawing unintended conclusions and may lead to confusion. Implementation entails a whole policy chain, which ranges from legal implementation (Bailey, 2002; Bursens, 2002), ie the transposition of a Directive into national law, to practical implementation (ibid.), which refers to the actual compliance with and enforcement of the legislation. A Member State may perfectly transpose a Directive without ever complying with it, even against the threat of being sued. Formally, it is nevertheless implemented. "(Improving) formal compliance does

not necessarily lead to (more) effective practical application and enforcement...” (Börzel, 2000, p. 160). Bursens (2002) thus points to the need to keep the whole implementation process in mind by defining it as “...the whole of the actions exercised by the various relevant authorities of the member state in order to effect European legislation within that member state” (p. 175). The term 'implementation' is hence ambiguous.

Accounting for implementation empirically and explaining it is even more difficult. There is first of all a data problem. Relying on Commission statistics means to accept their inherent bias. Those figures only show the cases the Commission wants to pursue and reflect only the tip of the iceberg (Mastenbroek, 2005; Mbaye, 2001). Furthermore, they necessarily can only capture legal implementation. Another problem is that nearly all studies focus on implementation of environmental legislation. This provokes doubts with regard to the general value of their findings (Mastenbroek, 2005). In any way, all studies acknowledge that “...we need to bring domestic politics...in to explain EU compliance” (p. 1110). Börzel (2000) holds that “...compliance problems result from an interplay between European and domestic factors” (p. 142). Cultural and institutional factors are said to be the filter which mediate the implementation pressures and lead to different degrees of implementation. What do these two terms refer to?

'Institutional factors' catch variables such as constitutional characteristics, veto players, administrative inefficiency, lack of resources and insufficient coordination processes (Mastenbroek, 2005; Mbaye, 2001). The general expression 'cultural factors' refers to norms, ideas, values, belief systems and normative obligations, which are allegedly important for explaining implementation. The vast majority of authors arguing from this historical institutionalist or constructivist perspective fail to give a clear definition or even indication as to what they consider as cultural factors. This highlights that the variable is very hard to operationalise, even more so than institutional factors. Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998) are the notable exception and define “...political culture...[as] the set of beliefs, ideas, norms and values that prescribe particular patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that in turn affect the political input and performance of the system which members perceive or potentially experience as having an authoritative or binding force” (p. 239). How well do cultural and institutional factors explain varying degrees of implementation?

The merits of cultural factors in trying to explain implementation are limited. The work of Falkner et al. (2007) can serve as an example. At no point in their article do they define or operationalise 'political culture'. Its explanatory power relative to other (institutional) factors is not accounted for. The

allegedly causal relationship between cultural factors and implementation patterns is not convincingly established. Moreover, the three world typology rests on the basis of the implementation of EU labour law only, which results in serious doubts with regard to its general applicatory validity. This adds to several qualifications with which the authors evaluate their own argument. One example is that although cultural factors are said to determine implementation patterns in the world of law observance, “...special conditions may trigger non-compliance” (Falkner et al., 2007, p. 20). Unfortunately, the authors remain silent on what these conditions may consist of. Another example concerns Germany and Spain. Both are attached to the world of domestic politics. Nonetheless, Germany clearly has a better (legal) implementation record than Spain (Börzel, 2000).

The article by Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) may serve as a second example. They take the example of a Common European Railway Policy to which Germany's institutional veto players were initially opposed and maintain that the way the EU framed the debate changed their minds. Hence, “[b]y altering the belief systems of actors, European legislation increased the potential for national reform by reducing the relevance of institutional veto points in the national decision-making process” (p. 35). Both authors do not account for other influences which might have been decisive for the move from opposition to support. It is only insinuated that the EU's framing of the debate changed the minds of the opponents. In any case, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) implicitly acknowledge that both German veto players (*Länder* and trade union) matter because their responsiveness to the EU proposal was decisive for reaching an agreement. It is not that their relevance was reduced, as the authors hold, but that they simply changed their mind.

Finally, two findings of Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998) also cast doubt on the explanatory merits of cultural factors. Firstly, “...despite the high political culture scores, Greece has not been able to meet its requirements concerning the implementation of European policies” (p. 246). This statement is significant given that the authors were also the only ones who operationalised 'political culture'. Should one have not expected that a high political culture would be positively correlated to a good implementation record? Secondly, “...Spain...receives the lowest political culture scores and nevertheless has succeeded fairly well in the implementation of European policies” (ibid.). Again, this finding is also counter-intuitive from a cultural point of view. All the examples given in this part question the explanatory merits of cultural factors to explain implementation records convincingly. Institutional explanations do better.

The example of the implementation of the Drinking Water Directive in Germany will illustrate

that "...the key to explaining compliance lies in the presence or absence of institutional veto points that allow domestic actors to frustrate compliance" (Mastenbroek, 2005, p. 1111). The culturalist point of view would be that "...the number of veto players does not have a decisive impact on member state implementation performance" (Falkner et al., 2007, p. 8) for both countries. Cost-benefit calculations are said to influence the German decision whether to comply or not. The opposing institutional explanation would be that the number of German veto players negatively impacts on Germany's ability to implement the Directive. The evidence lends support to this account. Germany implemented the legislation late because the *Bundesrat* delayed the respective German law, acting as a veto player in this multi-level governance system. Falkner et al. (2007) also acknowledge the importance of institutional factors by stating that "[i]t is only in the countries that belong to the world of domestic politics...that the veto player argument actually seems to make sense" (pp. 16-17). The authors contradict themselves in this regard because they undermined the veto player argument at the beginning of their article too. Institutional factors thus appear to be more convincing than cultural ones.

Denmark is another example. Similarly to Falkner et al. (2007), Bursens (2002) focuses on environmental and labour policies but presents a more convincing explanation of the high Danish implementation record than just saying that Denmark has a culture of law observance. He points to hard institutional factors such as efficient consultation processes, the involvement of potential veto players in the policy formulation stage and the coordinating role of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which explain the high implementation record. This is much more concrete, empirical and convincing than vague law of observance explanations. Even if Denmark belongs to this world, there are still institutional factors which Falkner et al. (2007) do not mention at all. Hence, "...smooth transposition is more likely to occur when a range of institutional conditions is more favourable" (Bursens, 2002, pp. 190-191). Yet, there is a need to keep the respective policy area in mind and a potential for combining institutional and culturalist accounts in the explanation of implementation records.

Börzel (2000) states that "...there is considerable variation [in implementation], not only between states but also between different policies within one state" (p. 158). This might be the case because different policies activate either formal or informal veto players or even both (Bursens, 2002). Take the example of Germany. There are policy areas in which the *Bundesrat* is not involved. Accordingly, any German law transposing a Directive the content of which deals with such an area would not have to pass the *Bundesrat*. Thus, it could not act as a veto player.

Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) also state that the "...empirical evidence indicates that the domestic impact of Europe varies somewhat unsystematically across...policy sectors..." (p. 3). Looking at the policy area thus can be helpful for explaining implementation.

It can also be helpful to combine cultural and institutionalist explanations. Bursens (2002) holds that "...an institutional analysis cannot be limited to structure alone but must be complemented by historical and cultural mechanisms" (p. 181). Likewise, Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) argue that "...there is no single approach for explaining the varying domestic impact of European policies" (p. 10), while Knill (1998) points to the fact that institutions are embedded in political cultures. Therefore, far from being a dichotomy, cultural and institutional factors can be combined to explain implementation records.

After having clarified some terms, this essay tried to cast doubt on the explanatory value of culturalist factors when it comes to accounting for implementation. The examples show that institutional factors do more convincingly explain different implementation records. In addition, it is necessary to keep the respective policy area in mind. Though there is potential to combine cultural and institutionalist accounts, the latter are on the whole more salient for explaining implementation patterns.

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Academic Article

Back to the future

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Two Hungarian professors are having a chat back in the communist era. The first one says: “You know, there are two ways out of this situation for the intelligentsia.” “What are they?” - asks the other one. “Well, the first path is alcoholism and the other one is impassable.” This used to be a popular joke several decades ago, because it clearly showed how miserable the future looked like. Some 20 years have already passed since the transition to democracy and one wonders and ponders whether the vision of the future has changed for Hungarians. After the accession to the EU and the foundations of democracy strengthened by 20 years of freedom of speech or act, one would presume that the future seems much brighter. Still, Hungarians are sometimes said to be pessimistic, individualist and are suffering from short term thinking. Obviously, if these traits are generally true, there must be ample reason to support it.

The financial crisis has hit Hungary severely. The government had to ask help from the IMF in October 2008 and was lucky enough to get a 25 billion dollar credit to overcome the pressure on the Hungarian currency and the huge interest rate burden. Since then, almost 6 months elapsed and Hungarians are still eagerly waiting for a rescue package. The economic turmoil spun off to a political and in early

April 2009 a new government was formed to tackle the different aspects of the crisis. Amongst other measures, the tax regime will be altered, social benefits cut and most importantly the expenditures of the state will be reduced. The aim being the preservation of the solvency of the state in the short term, and in the long run to put the economy on a course of growth. However, large-scale, top-down reforms are usually bound to fail unless a general consensus is reached within the political elite and the society itself. This is a crucial point as Hungary is deeply divided in both senses.

After winning the last elections in 2006, the Hungarian Socialist Party got tangled up in an embarrassing scandal. A recording was aired from an inner circle meeting of the party where the freshly elected prime minister stated that his party basically cheated the voters to gain support. Subsequently, the opposition left the plenary whenever the prime minister gave a speech and ceased to offer any cooperation to pass reforms in the parliament. Reforms that were badly needed, such as the renewal of the social insurance system with the introduction of private enterprises in health care or the introduction of tuition fees in education in order to make both systems sustainable. However, without legitimacy citizens will

not abide by the new rules. Without trust in the political elite and long term visions people will focus on immediate benefits and reward the parties that supply these on large scale. The phenomenon is called populism and it surely crept in your daily political life. Sadly enough this climate does not establish fertile ground for long term sustainability and thus enforces individualism or as it is often referred to “survival techniques”.

These techniques are not newborn babies of the Hungarian heritage. Not that Hungarians were any worse or better than other nations, it is partly the socialist system that encouraged false behavior to solidify. During the communist era, it was a virtue to steal from the state or to find loopholes in the regulation and thus evade paying taxes. The underlying reason being the state's missing legitimacy. After the transition to democracy in 1990, people were full of hopes and desires, just to see the old ruling class avail himself of privatization and exchanging political power for economic. In 1994, voters saw the main liberal party team up with the socialists. The old faces from the communist nomenclature returned holding hands with the party that just a few years back worked as hard as it could to bring about their downfall. Doesn't that resemble George Orwell's “Animal Farm”, where in the end man and pig are sitting at the same table, drinking the same substance and playing cards with joyful faces? Naturally, life is never as black and white and one can dig up plenty of explanations and excuses. In the end however, it all comes down to what we achieved and what could have been attained. This is why people are cynical about politics and this is the reason for the survival of old techniques. A vicious circle it is, which is extremely hard to escape from. Nevertheless, there is always something to be done. Imre Madach (a Hungarian playwright) exquisitely expressed this notion in “Tragedy of Man” with the following words, where the Lord speaks to Adam: “Mondottam ember: Küzddj, és bízva bízzál!” - “*Man, I have spoken: strive on, trust, have faith!*”. The question is how we strive on?

In the Middle Ages an apprentice had to travel abroad and learn under the hands of other masters before he could become a master himself and join the local guild. The idea is still breathtaking if we contemplate all its benefits. One learns self-reliance, independence and tolerance towards other cultures. On the other hand, one is forced to cooperate with others as building up your life on your own is a harsh matter and one needs a friendly hand in it. If the number of young people reaches a critical amount who spent years abroad return to Hungary and bring their colorful mindset and cooperative attitude, we might see a change in behavior patterns. Naturally, one inclines to blend in with the majority, but if a critical mass is obtained, maybe it will be worth cooperating in contrast to individual survival. To theorize this train of

thought let's scrutinize game theory, to be more precise: prisoners' dilemma. Two prisoners are in two cells and they face the following options. If both testify against each other, they receive 5 years each in prison. If both deny their guilt, they get 1 year. If one admits the crime and the other denies it, the first one can walk away while the latter receives 10 years sentence. The matrix below shows the possible outcomes:

	Admits	Denies
Admits	5 , 5	0 , 10
Denies	10, 0	1 , 1

It is easy to see no matter what the other prisoner does, it is worth admitting for both of them. This will be an equilibrium but by far not an optimum. The moral lesson is that unless we learn to cooperate, we will come to a suboptimal solution. Hence it is vital to see other behavior patterns in order to be able to think “out of the box”.

Nowadays the old joke about the intelligentsia doesn't hold. People have the freedom to travel, see the world and educate themselves. It is their own choice to make a change, the question is whether they are brave enough and have the inclination to do it.

Academic Article

The Indian Predicament: Growth, Poverty and Climate Change

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In the financial circles, there is an often-repeated phrase, that when the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold. Surprisingly, even as the world's largest economies, the US, Europe and Japan went into recession, India remained uncharacteristically immune to the financial flu. It became the poster child for the decoupling theory, which held that emerging economies would remain relatively unaffected by the crisis because of their stable banking systems, prudent policies and significant foreign exchange reserves. However by the end of last year, this apparent immunity was wearing off, and India was revealed as being just as vulnerable as the rest of the world. The decoupling theory, never wholly credible in a rapidly globalizing world, was completely confuted with the disclosure of the Satyam Scam early this year, which is the largest scam in Indian corporate history till date.

Since the 1980s, India has been experiencing unprecedented growth rates, clocking a phenomenal nine per cent for the last three years and becoming one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. However, in contrast to China's export-led growth model, explains economist Gurcharan Das, India's growth has been propelled by “domestic markets more than exports, consumption more than investment,

services more than industry, and high-tech more than low-skilled manufacturing”. Indeed, its merchandised exports account for less than 15 per cent of its GDP against a thriving service sector that contributes a significant 54 per cent. Apart from growth driven largely by domestic demand and consumption, India also has a very healthy banking sector which has not had any direct exposure to the failed financial institutions or the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Given India's minimal wading in murky financial waters, what is puzzling for most Indians, is that India has been affected by the financial crisis at all.

The answer to the enigma, as Dr. Duvvuri Subburao, Governor to the Reserve Bank of India explains, lies in globalization. For the past quarter of a century, India has been rapidly integrating into the world economy, with structural reforms starting in 1991 that took place under Dr. Manmohan Singh, the architect of India's new economic policy as well as current Prime Minister. Using trade as a measure of globalization, India's two-way trade, that is, both exports as well as *imports*, account for a whopping 34 per cent of its GDP. Its integration with the world financial markets is just as deep if not deeper, illustrated by the increasing reliance of the corporate sector on external financing. Moreover, with India's

image as a fast-growing, emerging economy, more investors had been willing to take risks and provide funds at low costs, with capital inflows amounting to more 9 per cent of the GDP. Thus, the prime reason that India has been affected by the financial crisis is the same that has contributed to its phenomenal growth in recent years, namely, its speedy integration into the world economy.

The outlook for India is mixed with growth predictions for the year 2009 ending at a mere 6 per cent. Despite many structural advantages such as resilient financial markets and stable banking systems that will help it recover relatively fast from the crisis, India needs economic growth of double digit figures in order to lift its millions out of poverty to meet the Millennium Development Goals of poverty alleviation. Already, over 300 million people in India, the size of the population of the US, live on less than a dollar a day. Understandably, the per capita carbon foot print of such a populace is amongst the lowest in the world at 1.20 metric tons. This figure is well below the 20.6 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per capita of the US and other advanced countries which average around 11 tons.

Yet, India is known as the Bad Boy of climate change, the reason being that despite being one of the major emitters, it is unwilling to commit to emission cuts. According to the UN Human Development Report, 2007, India is the fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. However, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India, rejects the entire concept of "major emitters" because it is based on *total* emissions. He argues that it is unfair to talk about cutting carbon emissions without talking about per capita usage, for heavily populated and developing countries such as India, which account for one-fifth the total population of the world.

The other factor that has contributed to India's uncompromising image toward climate change is its strong stance on a "common but differentiated" principle, meaning that those countries who have been historic emitters should take the first steps toward mitigation. In the sensitive atmosphere of the financial crisis, growth is all important for a developing country like India, which is why it is reluctant to commit to emissions targets, although Dr. Manmohan Singh, India's Prime Minister has undertaken to ensure that India's per capita emissions remain well-below those of developed country levels. For an emerging economy like India's, even a decline in growth by 1 percent means that an additional 20 million people will sink into poverty, according to World Bank estimates.

Yet, if India, along with other big, fast-growing economies continues to industrialize and grow at the previous, stupendous levels, and its average incomes converged at developed country levels, then to be safe from a warming stand point, the per capita emissions

would need to reduce by a factor of 4. However, the current state of technology is incapable of reducing emissions of such magnitude. Therefore, in one sense, the financial crisis by slowing growth the world over, has proved to be something of a mixed blessing. While on one hand, the financial crisis affects poverty alleviation efforts in developing countries as well as compromises funding toward adaptation efforts, on the other hand, the decelerated pace of growth also translates as reduced emissions. It also means that attempts can now be combined towards sustainable growth from the climate point view.

Like many other rapidly industrializing nations, India has taken steps in this direction by launching a National Climate Change Action Plan in 2008. Given its massive energy needs which will only increase exponentially in the coming decades, the Action Plan focuses largely on renewable sources of energy, clean growth and lowering carbon emissions. By 2030, India aims to derive 49 percent of its energy from clean, renewable sources.

The sudden intrusion of the financial crisis in the wake of fears of climate change emphasizes the extent of uncertainty involved in both, economic growth as well as climate change. Therefore it is not prudent to extract precise commitments from developing countries to reduce emissions, nor will it result in agreement. There is still a lot we do not know about the cost of reducing emissions in terms of effects on poverty alleviation on one side and the long-term impact on climate change on the other. In such a scenario, the world should not enter into quantitative arrangements for the distant future and shut itself off to newer developments and options. At best, we can only set interim mitigation targets and change policies as more information becomes available.

Academic Article

Does Soft Power provide an adequate characterization of the power and influence exercised by the EU in International Relations ?

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INTRODUCTION

The European Union appears to become a “global actor” of increasing importance in world politics. First representing an economic union between sovereign states, the Union has evolved toward a more political entity through several treaties. Nice, Maastricht, Amsterdam □and maybe Lisbon□ have all brought their share of political innovations to provide stability in a region that suffered so much from the atrocities of the Second World War. Such development logically encouraged scholars and policy□makers to think of the avoidance of war between European states in the first place. However the continuing process of regional integration soon brought interrogations about the role of the EU as an individual actor in International relations. The Schuman declaration that set the ideological fundamentals of such union was already promoting the ideal of the Kantian peace as one of the main European principles. Thus, Europe was to be peaceful domestically thanks to economic integration but, how could it be peaceful externally was a concern of growing importance. Since the 1970s, in the context of the détente, scholars started to examine the difficult position of the European Community as a global actor. Soon the concept of civilian power was thrown by

Duchêne to characterize an international presence that did not rely on the use of force. Such posture could now be seen through the concept of soft power □in opposition of hard power□ that has been developed by Joseph Nye and that has been often used to characterised the external face of the EU. This paper will discuss and verify the validity of that concept to characterize the European Union. It will do so, not through a description of soft power's means that the EU possesses, but rather through an analysis of the evolution of EU's political organisation in the context of European Integration. To finally argue that if soft power had been a powerful concept in describing the EU while its geopolitical context and limited political integration allowed only for soft power capabilities, recent developments towards a more common and unified voice on the international stage have allowed for a more efficient combination of soft and hard power under the CFSP regime and undermine the idea of a soft power Europe. First, the following will present the original concept developed by Nye at the end of the 1980s. The notion of soft power rests on the assumption that, due to the advent of a more globalized world and new means of communications, military power cannot be seen anymore as the only source of power that a state can and must□ exert. Power can be

considered here under the Weberian approach that considers power as the capacity of state or a group of states to control or influence actions of other states. Thus, soft power, by the use of intangible sources of power is a power that seduces rather than constrain. In developing such power, a political entity is able to shape others entities' decisions in order for them to comply with its own interests, without having to use coercive means. In a second time, this paper will examine the reasons that have prevailed for qualifying Europe as a soft power. Starting with Duchêne's definition of a civilian power as a 'civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces', we will highlight two reasons that have allowed for Europe to be considered as a civilian power: its geopolitical environment marked by American military protection since the end of the Second World war and the creation of NATO (Petiteville, 2002), secondly Europe's inability to go into the sphere of high politics due to its peculiar organisation of sovereign states (Holm, 2001). In a third part, we will highlight the contradictions of a civilian power Europe brought by the development of the CFSP/ESDP since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. While some scholars argue that the militarization of the EU make of it a classical power (Smith, 2002), others see a change from a civilian power by default to the status of a civilian power by design (Stavridis, 2001). However, it appears that either ways, the EU is doting itself of hard power means to achieve civilian power ends. Therefore, it will be argued in conclusion, that the EU had developed means that are better able to promote civilians values in a post-modern world. Still relying on soft power as an important component of its diplomacy the Union had been able to move forward toward an more efficient diplomacy after the deception of the two Bosnian Wars. Such is diplomacy is now a combination of soft and hard power that give the EU a proper posture to face the new realities of the post-September 11 international system.

THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER

The concept of soft power was born at the end of the 1980s while scholars were witnessing an accelerated transformation of the world order. The fall of the communism that left alone an American superpower, and that also noticed an increase phenomenon of globalization, opened space to rethink the conception of power. This particular period witnessed thus the raise of multiple non-state actors, the advent of new means of communication and the use of brute force started appearing to become an increasingly blunted instrument. Those profound changes therefore involved a reconsideration of the notion of power. Thus, the advent of a "complex interdependence" of a wide range of actors (Nye and Keohane, 1977) though to render obsolete the realist conception of power that was strictly based on the

military dominance of a country. Whereas the liberal theories advocated the growing importance of the economic power within the inter-state relations, Joseph Nye, Harvard University Professor and later Bill Clinton's Defence Adviser (1994-1995), pointed out the importance of intangible sources of power: "The changing nature of international politics has also made intangible forms of power more important. National cohesion, universalistic culture and international institutions are taking on additional significance. Power is passing from the "capitalrich" to the "informationrich." (Nye, 2004, p. 75). In considering particularly the case of the United States, Nye explained its power by the ability to engender and conserve a form of "soft power", a persuasive form of power that was of a growing importance in the world order. Thus, Joseph Nye defines the soft power as the capacity of a political entity to achieve its goal by a power of seduction and attraction, rather than with the use of sticks and carrots (Nye, 2005). Soft Power is then an influence than is not exerted by the constraint but by the capacity to persuade others to adopt the same objectives. This power use resources such as culture, ideology and internal institutions that make other countries to voluntarily accord with the country that dispose of such resources. This phenomenon also assumes the capacity to render universal a peculiar world vision to convince that the domination exerted is legitimate. Thus, by legitimizing the political objectives of a country, soft power would make others follow the lead without having to constrain them. Such instrument would therefore be less costly in one hand and permit a better behaviour of others in another hand voluntary action being always best performed than constrained action. It exists multiple sources of soft power, as the notion that Nye developed is quite diffuse and extensible. However, in the Nye analysis of the American soft power, three main attributes can be denoted as participating to the development of such power. In a first time, the culture, even if such instrument is likely to not be state controlled, plays an important role. The values that pretend to be universal such as liberty, social mobility or human rights as well as the seducing American Way of Life, are diffused within the world by a culture that export itself massively (one can think of the Hollywood's powerful movie industry as an example). Such phenomenon creates a kind of imitation, more or less mindful, of American compartments either in ways of consumption, interests, arts or political orientations. Secondly, the domestic political model influences the image that is perceived by other countries. The style of government, economic strengths, social or political attributes can become an example to be followed by nations that want to become as successful. Thus, as a consequence of a "domestic" attractiveness, other countries are de facto encouraged to follow the same path, and therefore become influenced to undertake

the same decisions as the dominant power do. Last but not least, the external policy also constitutes a vector of soft power. Nye argues that, considering the emergence of globalization and international institutions becoming increasingly influential, power of a country is also determined by its ability to become a legitimate “agendasetter”. Such characteristic will, to a certain extent, model the preferences expressed by third countries as well as define a framework of possibilities that correspond to the dominant interests (Battistella, Smouts, Vennesson, 2003, p. 142).

THE DEBATE UNDER HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Why relate soft power to the European Union in the first place? Since the end of the Second World War, the construction of a peaceful Europe had been led by the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 that provided the basis for an European Integration scheme was already rejecting war prone policies considering that economic cooperation between European nations “will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims” (Schuman, 1950). Such background that still prevails into the European “mythology” provides thus ideological fundamentals for Europe to be characterized more by its influence and soft power, rather than by a more realist conception of power. Furthermore, elements that relate the EU with the use of soft power can be found within its specific intrinsic organization. As a matter of fact, the EU is before anything else a reunion of sovereign states. One of the core assumptions of the realist paradigm relies on the distinction between high politics (diplomacy/defence) and low politics (economy, commerce, environment, etc...). Thus, realist scholars have for long pointed out the difficulties of the EU to become a proper international actor regarding its inabilities to access to the domain of high politics (Holm, 2001). Such argument appears to be difficult falsifiable. During the 1990s for example, the European Union had remained a secondary actor at the international level in the Balkan conflicts resolution of Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo 1999, showing then its inability to play as a sovereign power in the sphere of high politics. Soft Power had therefore been seen as a reunion of instruments that allowed Europe for an external presence without the necessity of possessing hard power components such as military forces (Petiteville, 2002, p. 152). Such considerations have been at the core of the development of the notion of a “Civilian Power Europe” that had been highly influential within the field of European Studies, also fostering the debate on the external representation of the EU. Closely related to soft power, the concept of civilian power was first developed with regards to Japan and West

Germany. It thought at that time to describe a situation of paradox between a growing influence on the world stage of the two countries, and their limited political and military independence (Stavridis, 2001, p. 5). Later on, Francois Duchêne, director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies between 1969 and 1974, expanded that notion to the European Economic Community. An European civilian power was thus seen as “an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise influence on states, global and regional organisations, international corporations and other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors” (Twitchett in Stavridis, 2001, p. 6). However it can be argued that the concept was thus being developed and becoming influential at a time of détente between the two blocks. Strong reliance on the United States as a security provider was then giving the European Community the opportunity to not rely excessively on force to ensure its security and its world voice. Europe has been seen therefore as a civilian power by default rather than by design (Ibid, p. 7). Hedley Bull also argued in 1983 that the existence of the civilian power Europe was only made possible by the historical context and conditioned by the existence of the OTAN protecting occidental Europe (Bull, 1983), thus questioning the normative aspect of the academic concept and calling for a more realistic European power. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, constituted a revolution for Europe in regards to its external relations. Whereas before the Treaty, European states were still preoccupied by the so-called “*domaine réservé*” of foreign affairs, Maastricht gave for the first time some provisions toward a common European vision on external relations. The advent of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the article V of the Treaty installed the basis of an European diplomacy according to the following objectives: “safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; preserve peace and strengthen international security, promote international cooperation; develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Part. V □ Article J.1(2) of the Treaty on European Union). Basis for external unity were thus established, yet implementation and choice of instruments were to be two future problematic concerns. The choice was to be made between the only reliance on civilian means and therefore the use of soft power as the only tool of an European diplomacy, or the creation of an intervention force capable to safeguard EU interests with the use of hard power. The conflicts of Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 brought up some new developments with regards to that dilemma. The first war that erupted in Europe after the tragic Second World War took place

in EU's own backyard. In that sense it constituted a decisive, yet disappointing, test for the dispositions provided by the Maastricht Treaty. Whereas the Bosnian War was erupting in March 1992, eyes were fixed toward the EU to take common dispositions in order to achieve what could have been the first success in conflict resolution for the newly born CFSP. Instead, credits were given to the American diplomacy (Dayton Agreements) and to the efficiency of the "new" post cold war Atlantic's organization (Petiteville, 2002, p. 153). European action was not inexistent as the EU adopted economic sanctions against Serbia or helped for reconstruction and civil administration for example. However, events strongly highlighted the need for an armed force able to deploy in the context of conflict prevention/resolution and capable to deter for an increased weight in international negotiations. In that regards, the paradox that some authors had pointed out before of the posture of a civilian power Europe in an "uncivil world" (Pijpers, 1988) was revitalized. The post September 11 strategic realities that witnessed an increase of global insecurity came further to reinforce the idea that an effective security for Europe was also to be pursued through the use of hard power when necessary.

MILITARIZATION OF THE EU: STILL A CIVILIAN POWER?

The Saint-Malo Agreements of 1998 paved the way for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) by stating that the EU should possess an "autonomous action backed up by credible military forces" (Franco-British's Saint-Malo Joint Declaration, December 1998). Further agreed by the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999, the creation of a common military force able to protect European interests has fostered a debate among scholars that questions the current validity of the concept of a European civilian power. Can the EU still be considered as a civilian power (Stavridis, 2001 ; Whitman, 2002) or has it evolved to become a classic power (Smith, 2002) ? As Jan Orbie describes, the debate lays on the differentiation between means and ends, and they importance in regards to the qualifier of a civilian power Europe (CPE) (Orbie, 2006, p. 125). Thus, is the use of non-civilian means in order to achieve civilian ends part of a civilian power "mandate"? Stavridis argues that Europe has changed his status of civilian power by default to become a civilian power by design (Stavridis, 2001, p. 7). He therefore takes into account the second dimension of Duchêne's definition of a civilian power considering that the "European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards" (Duchêne, 1972, p. 9 in Stavridis, 2001, p.6). Such extension of the concept, that tends to focus more on the ends than on the means when it comes to the diffusion civilian standards, allows him to reject

any dismiss of the CPE. Instead he argues that the use of military forces is not contradictory with the CPE as long as it respects civilian ends. Finally military power can even reinforce a civilian posture on world issues by increasing the efficiency of civilian actions on world issues. However, his view implies a dichotomy between what is civilian action and what is not, independently from the use of military force. One could then argue that the EU was never a civilian power in the sense that, the CFSP being designed to serve Europe's interests before anything else (Hill, 2003) the EU had not necessarily always acted according to its civilian rhetoric. Is the EU really locked into a "civilian military posture" by the fact that it privileges civilian means over others and because it follows the Petersberg Tasks' agenda as Richard Whitman argues (Whitman, 2002, p. 21 in Smith, 2004, p. 8)? In another hand Keren Smith dismiss completely the compatibility between armed force and civilian power Europe. She considers that the originality of not having military capabilities within the EU is now lost and deplore the move toward a new larger sovereign state that does not refute the Hobbesian nature of the international system anymore (Smith, 2004, p. 12).

CONCLUSION ON THE SOFT POWER EUROPE

What conclusions can be drawn from the civilian power Europe debate? First it appears that being a civilian power does not imply a constant reliance on soft power. Thus, when the EU implemented economic sanctions on Serbia during the 1995 Bosnian war, no controversy was created about the fact to know if the EU was still a civilian power. Another example that illustrates such paradox can be found in the Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 between the EU and the ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific states) in order to promote development and trade cooperation with those regions. Thus, in order to benefit from such agreement (especially regarding access to the highly lucrative EU agricultural market), ACP nations committed themselves in the article 9 to the respect of some civilian values: "The Partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance" (Cotonou 2005: ACP/CE/en 17). Therefore, some remarks can be drawn regarding EU commercial soft power. Even if EU is promoting trade and development, certainly increasing its influence by polishing its image within those countries, it also does so through the use of commercial "sticks and carrots". As a matter of fact, pursuing civilian ends (here under the mutual obligation clause of the agreement), EU is still using means that belong to hard power. Once again, little questioning about the validity of the EU being still a civilian actor can be found in the academic

literature regarding such commercial policies. As a second conclusion, the move toward a classic power in the view of Smith or toward a civilian power by design in Stavridis' views implies an increase used of military power to achieve civilian goals. Soft power is therefore not disappearing due to the recent developments of the CFSP, rather it is better complemented by hard power in order to achieve a more efficient common diplomacy (Nye would consider a move toward a "smarter" power, Nye & Armitage, 2007). Humanitarian aid, environment policy, commercial policy, OMC interventions, Human Rights' defence, European Delegations around the world, etc... are instruments that still prevails within the CFSP and still deserves the soft power created by the European Union. Being pictured as a civilian power also represents a certain form of soft and even normative power in a sense. But are all this characteristics sufficient to describe the EU as a soft power in itself? In my view they are not, at least not anymore. Soft power was an effective concept in characterising the EU until the end of the cold war. Until then, no provisions were really given in favour of a common external policy. Hard power was then not absent of the European States' external relations. It was either employed by individual nations while the absence of European coordination let no alternative to do it through a common agreement, or either used by a coalition of states (most likely through the OTAN) to achieve European objectives (Kosovo's intervention is one example). Therefore, the Union as such was left with soft power as the only tool that it could factually employ to exercise power on behalf of the Member States. Although, facing a multiplication and a diversification of security threats in the post-September 11 era, the EU had to adapt in order to best comply with its objectives. Furthermore considering the constant evolution of European Integration, it is arguable that European states have gradually delegated their individual use of hard power toward the supranational entity (at least economically undoubtedly). Thus, since the creation of the CFSP and increasingly with the recent development of the ESDP, the European Union moved toward a more efficient common diplomacy. Such diplomacy is now better able to combine hard and soft power in order to best promote civilian ends. Therefore, it can be concluded that the EU that has been characterized as a soft power has evolved to become a civilian power by design, which tends to optimise its use of soft power but cannot rely only on it in order to face the world order's current realities while being a primary actor.

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