

ADV

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Editorial

Welcome to Issue 32 of A Different View

Felipe Nunes
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Welcome to issue 32 of a Different View. Due to the summer vacation we have decided to pool the August and September issue and now present you with a mixture of contributions from students across the globe.

In our opinion article section Melek Akça from Turkey and Hovhannes Nikoghosyan from Armenia remind us of the frozen conflict in Nagorno Karabakh which has been a constant item of concern between Yerevan and Baku. They argue that there is a need for more efforts from both sides to substantially alter the status quo. Furthermore, our regular contributor Sven Brendel from the United States explains his view of U.S. liberalism and compares it to similar political ideologies in Europe.

In our academic article section Kira D. Baiasu from the American University in Cairo elaborates on the challenges the Palestinian economy has to undergo, particularly in relation to its neighbours. She seeks to highlight ways in which a more stable and continuous growth could be achieved. Camila Penna from Brazil then discusses democratic transition and democratization in Latin America.

The editorial team wishes you a pleasant reading and a good start into the new academic semester.

Opinion Articles

Nagorno Karabakh: Digging for a common ground

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Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) lies in a place of vital importance for the whole region. As one of my professors used to say, "a heartland of Caucasus". The legality (not legitimacy!) of NK authorities is still not recognized by the international community. Azerbaijan is more pessimistic about the real solution to the issue than the Armenian side. The fact is that most Armenians believe that the issue is more or less resolved and they have nothing to do with the other conflicting part. Coming to the peace negotiations, to be honest, recently they seem like a panel for another manifestation of patriotic position by Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliiev, and ready-to-compromise smooth statements by Armenia's Serzh Sargsyan. Sometimes even these meetings seem like a waste of resources and time, as the parties declare the same "no optimism for breakthrough" before meetings and "negotiating positions remained unchanged" afterwards.

President Ilham Aliiev of Azerbaijan delivered a speech at Chatham House in London on July 13 of this year. There he made several interesting points which are of great interest for framing the Azeri attitude towards the "Madrid" process. *"Azerbaijan will never agree to such a peace plan that would predetermine the independent status of Nagorno-*

Karabakh. This is completely out of question", underlined the tough-speaking President. Making the image full, let's quote also President Sargsyan dated back to July 6 saying that "No new developments within Nagorno Karabakh negotiation process, and naturally, we have not changed our approaches. *One thing is obvious, all involved parties know that the principal issue of the conflict resolution is the one about the status of Nagorno Karabakh"*.

The most interesting and controversial development of recent period was, of course, the publication of so-called Basic Principles at WhiteHouse.gov on July 10, best known as "Madrid principles", presented by Minsk Group co-Chairs in Madrid, November 2007. Surely, there were no news for the professionals in this issue, as far as for the first time they were unveiled by International Crisis Group on 14 November 2007, in a report ["Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War"](#). Last summer (2008) Armenian President even said jokingly that the then-secret Madrid principles could be found online. As now has been published officially, one ought to pay tribute to mediators as they left no room for Armenian and Azeri Presidents to step back before their societies and deny present-day truth: *concessions must be done by all parties*. This can also lead to social and political

unrest in Yerevan, Baku and Stepanakert. Over the years the Karabakh issue has gained much more profound domestic internal context than international dimension for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. To this end, the factor of democratically elected governments is serious and yet a poorly discussed dimension of all conflicts in South Caucasus - South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh. The theory says that authoritarian regimes all over the world through history have always needed to draw an image of "external threat/enemy" to ensure the reigns of power in their hands. Cutting the long story short, **"Karabakh" endue power and takes back, too. It is the only master of Armenian and Azeri politicians. The history since 1991 does not give the right to doubt about this assumption.**

The Nagorno Karabakh issue has a large destructive effect upon governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh itself. For instance, a well-known fact is that the major losses of Azeri army coincided with the period of political unrest in Baku in early 90s when no one was in power. Turning back to history, then-leader of Nagorno Karabakh A.Ghukasyan spoke on October 7, 1997: "It was told that Armenia would agree with any decision made in Nagorno Karabakh. In this regards, our differences [with Yerevan] raise some concerns and that is bad. If those differences worsen, I think, Armenia should keep her promise and let Karabakh to decide. We must decide what deem necessary" [Thomas de Waal, "Black Garden"]. The political tensions in Yerevan went on to deepen and worsen. Then, by and large, the Karabakh peace-plan resulted in the "velvet revolution" in 1998 when Levon Ter-Petrossian had no alternative but to resign. And, speaking on behalf of all mentioned parties, a major resource for re-election of incumbent regimes lies behind the cultivation of "enemy images" and the much supposed disloyal character of any new and unknown candidate.

And now, at least in Armenia (in Azerbaijan the regime is quite monolithic), the history seems to repeat. On July 15 Nagorno Karabakh Foreign Office "considered it essential to release a statement": "Real progress in the negotiation process can be achieved only in the case of Karabakh side equal participation in all stages of the negotiations". The "silent client", as Karabakh appears now to be, has announced a need to "re-launch of distorted negotiation process". Immediately next day Armenian FM Nalbandian left for Stepanakert to ease the contradictions and shape the edges between Armenian sides. "Armenia considers Karabakh's participation in the negotiations obligatory and a guarantee for effective peace settlement. Naturally, Karabakh may have different [rather than Armenia] approaches to certain issues, but ... the opinion of NKR is of great importance for us [in Armenia]", said Armenian FM after meeting with Bako Sahakyan.

As has already been mentioned, the most difficult issue is about the status. The "Madrid principles" proclaim, "legally binding expression of will" to determine the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh. Going further with the notion of "legally binding expression of will", one may point out the case of Montenegro, which at first formed the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro" by joining Belgrade agreement in 2002, and later, as known, gained independence by a referendum on May 21, 2006 (corresponding clause was inserted into the Belgrade agreement stating that Montenegro could begin independence procedures in 2006). The European Union, the United States, Russia, other permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Serbia itself - have all recognised Montenegro's independence. Of course, this is a nice example. **But here Karabakh, Armenians and Azeris are not Europeans** - paraphrasing the answer of then-President of Nagorno Karabakh A.Ghukasyan to European mediators about the case of Aland Islands in mid 1990s.

We should assume that decision-makers in Yerevan, Baku and Stepanakert are not ready to cross the rubicon because of further catastrophes that may occur. For Armenian troops, for example, the Baku - Ceyhan lies in 25-30km from the frontline. For Azeri troops, as no ethnic Azeri left in Karabakh, Stepanakert and other cities can become a natural firing field for newly-purchased arms. But now we should better keep a finger on the dynamics, understand and predict the evolution of the overall process, if we want understand the realities today and the choices before us.

To our mind, the common ground lies on maximum exclusion of "hostility" language in the official statements and media reports which are mostly encouraged by the first ones, bearing in mind the stubborn situation with mass-media in all post-soviet countries. For instance, the recent visit of Armenian and Azeri intelligentsia to Stepanakert, Yerevan and Baku was a quite positive event for peace-building, being the second one after June 28, 2007, on the initiative of Ambassadors (to Russia) Armen Smbatyan and Polad Bulbuloglu. Thus, all kinds of confidence-building measures should be encouraged. For instance, between 1998-2000 a very active phase of mutual visits of Armenian and Azeri NGOs took place and then stopped, as rumors went, by single decision of President Heydar Aliyev.

Observing the various dimensions of Armenian-Azeri contacts we assume that only multi-dimensional, international (and not regional) levels are more effective. Being engaged in Euro-Atlantic initiatives, Armenians and Azeris are able to find the common ground better and sooner than betting on regional projects.

Opinion Articles

Liberalism in the U.S.

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Many commentators seem under the impression that liberalism in the U.S. is the equivalent of European social democracy. Such is not the case, however. American liberalism is a form of modern liberalism, or what some Europeans call “social liberalism.” It is in many ways the most American of political philosophies. America is renowned for its emphasis on practical pragmatism, innovation, individualism and flexibility. American liberalism combines all these qualities with a belief in positive liberty – the idea that to be free a person needs to have the realistic opportunity to achieve his goals. It developed out of the classical liberalism of the Founding Fathers and Enlightenment Europe. The idea that every person is an end in him or herself and must not serve as the means to the ends of the collective is its main philosophical foundation. Since all people are ends in themselves, American liberals see everyone as entitled to personal fulfillment whichever form that may take. Liberals, see the lack of economic opportunity, poverty, discrimination, illness and environmental pollution as threats to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is the role of government to enable the individual pursuit of happiness by ensuring universal access to the resources necessary for self-development, fighting socio-economic and

environmental ills that limit freedom and protect civil liberties. Since liberty is liberalism's primary objective, government must use the least coercive means necessary to pursue these ends. It must only use coercion when necessary to prevent harm, including the harm done by the lack of liberty; i.e. it must be in accordance with the harm principle. Simply put, American liberals will pragmatically endorse and advocate any public policy that enables the pursuit of happiness and prevents suffering so long as it does not violate the harm principle.

American liberalism's support for positive liberty and its pragmatism gives it considerable common ground with social democracy. It is the reason American liberals and social democrats often find themselves pursuing the same goals, using similar approaches. After all, the difference between freeing and empowering people is quite small. If it is my goal to set everyone free, an ideology that seeks empower everyone is likely to support policies similar towards my own. The similarities between American liberalism and social democracy are illustrated by statements made by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, one of the most powerful and prominent liberals in American history, and the agenda of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). In his State of the Union

Address in 1944, FDR gave a summary of the American liberal policy priorities:

We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. Necessitous men are not free men. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.

In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed.

Among these are:

The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation;

The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;

The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living;

The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad;

The right of every family to a decent home;

The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;

The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;

The right to a good education.

According to Sackery, Schneider & Knoedler (2008), “the SAP believed that all Swedish citizens should have the right to a decent job, to security in their old-age, to health care, to day care, and to a decent standard of living.” These sentiments are also echoed in the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which guarantees everyone the right to “economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for dignity and the free development of

personality.” More recently Democratic U.S. vice president Joe Biden has promoted positive liberty with the simple statement, “before you can expect people to pull themselves up their own bootstraps, you need to give them boots.” Not surprisingly, both American liberals and Swedish social democrats can claim the creation of a modern welfare state on their resumes. While the SAP has enjoyed a more influential position in Swedish politics than liberal Democrats in the U.S., both have pursued large-scale social programs to empower and enable the masses; to ensure that everyone has the realistic chance to live a fulfilling life.

Major differences between social democracy and American liberalism do, however, exist. These are largely owing to American liberalism's individualism and adherence to mainstream Neoclassical-Keynesian economics. In the liberal view the individual must not be sacrificed for the sake of the group, since all individuals are ends in themselves. Instead, groups and collective action exist only to promote *individual welfare*. Not vice versa. American liberalism, like all prominent political philosophies does advocate large-scale collective action. Even American conservatives, who love to espouse the doctrine of rugged individualism, advocate large-scale collective action for such needed to provide the basic building block of capitalism: property rights. Without a government, without collective action that is, private property cannot exist. Thus, conservatives, liberals and socialists are all collectivist to the extent that they advocate coordinated large-scale collective action. The difference lies in the limits placed on collective action and the purposes for which it is conducted. Totalitarian socialists, like Pol Pot, were diametrically opposed to liberalism for they were willing to sacrifice the individual for the sake of the collective. There is no single statement more opposed and in starker contrast to the American liberal tradition than Pol Pot's “to keep you is no gain, to loose you is no loss.” As I have previously described in American liberalism it is the well-being of *each and every single individual* that matters. The group exist only to make the individual pursuit of happiness and possible and may only coerce the individual if doing so is necessary to prevent other members of the group from coming to harm. The default position taken by a liberal society is always one of permission. Unless it can be shown to do non-negligible harm, individual initiative must not be prohibited.

Unlike socialism in any of its forms, including successful social democracy, American liberal policy is largely built on the neoclassical synthesis, which combines neoclassical microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics. Liberalism's acceptance of mainstream economics is revealed by the self-identification of American economists. According to recent surveys 63% identify as liberals and Democrats

outnumber Republicans by 2.5-3 to 1. American liberalism is the political philosophy of choice among American economists, and the neoclassical synthesis their analytical tool of choice. American liberals do not advocate a welfare state to ease class tensions or empower the proletariat. Instead they do so because the market by itself is simply not capable of providing liberty for everyone. As Barr, has pointed out the market can only function under the conditions of *perfect competition, perfect information, and complete markets* and only in the absence of *externalities, public goods and increasing returns to scale*. Furthermore, to provide a good universally, income transfers will be necessary even if markets work perfectly. Since the market is able to operate on a basis of voluntary exchanges without coercive supervision, American liberals are inherently pro-market. Unlike social democrats, their actions and ambitions are limited by they believe that if the market can handle it, if individuals can do it themselves, collective action is neither needed nor desirable. While many of their policy stances and actions are similar, American liberals differ from social democrats profoundly in that they do not advocate state action to redistribute class power. This stance has resulted in American liberals favoring market-based initiatives and what liberal scholars and personal acquaintances of Barack Obama, Cass R. Sunstein and Robert Thaler have termed “paternal libertarianism.” American liberals may often conclude that the measures necessary address market shortcoming in delivering liberty as similar to those of social democrats, but such is not always the case and thinking that drives liberals is inherently different from social democrats.

Academic Article

Economic Development: Impediments and Possibilities for the Growth of the Palestinian Economy

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Introduction

Palestinian economic development has been crippled for decades by numerous internal and external factors. The objective of this paper is to explore the potential for the Palestinian economy to foster growth through an analysis of closure policies and trade restrictions, sources of funding, capacity to attract private investment, and the correlation between Palestinian employment rates and Israeli demand for labor. The paper is divided as follows: the first section will canvass Israeli closure policies, trade restrictions, and the transaction costs accrued to Palestinian business owners. The following segment will assess the handicapping affect of the Paris Protocol on the Palestinian Authority's (PA) ability to administer its tax system and how the PA's reliance on foreign aid and loans for capital expenditures increases external debt and counteracts economic self-sufficiency. The subsequent section will examine the obstacles to attracting private investment from Israeli closure policies to security concerns. The last part will review labor trends of the past two decades and the interconnection between the Palestinian employment rate and Israeli demand for Palestinian labor. This segment will assay the relationship between politics

and employment and how Palestinian political decisions, as well as Israeli security policies, affect Palestinian employment levels. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the prospects and possibilities for Palestinian economic development.

Closures, Trade, and Transaction Costs

Israel's security policies are one of many factors impeding the growth of the Palestinian economy. Closures and long security check points not only affect labor and employment but also trade. They create high transaction costs for businesses, deter private investment, and cause tax revenue to decline, weakening the PA. Under the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement, the West Bank was formally cantoned. The rules set forth assigned the PA control of urban centers while the Israeli military continued to have authority over the areas around and between them, thus, commanding both internal and external movements.

Closures take three forms: general, total, and internal. Internal closures entail limiting mobility within the West Bank between Palestinian localities. In this circumstance, the partial or total restriction of movement takes place and separates Palestinian

communities from one another. In the case of total closure, all movements between the Gaza Strip and West Bank are banned, as well as contact between the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and international markets. In this scenario, only Israeli-owned vehicles are permitted to cross the borders and even Palestinians in possession of Israeli work permits are denied access to Israel. Total closure usually takes place in response to Palestinian attacks on Israel and is unpredictable, thus, increasing the volatility of the Palestinian economy. The third type of closure is general closure where “overall restrictions [are] placed on the movement of labor, goods and the factors of production...and is typically accompanied by long delays at border crossings and prolonged searches” (Roy, 1998, p. 15). These restrictions on the mobility of people and goods lead to an increase in transaction, production, and operation costs.

Not only do closures obstruct Palestinian goods from being competitive in the world market, but they have also caused a shift in Palestinian agricultural production due to spoilage. During the 1995-1996 season, “approximately 15 million carnation stems were lost due to closure related problems” (Roy, 1998, p. 24). Because of these losses, in the 1997-98 season, 25 percent less land was planted with flowers. Spoilage as a result of closure policies has also affected the attractiveness of growing strawberries and has compelled farmers to grow flowers with a longer life span after being cut. The fear of spoilage has led Palestinian farmers to shift from cultivation of more perishable goods to produce with an extended lifespan such as potatoes and onions. Closure policies in conjunction with trade restrictions are causing, particularly in the agricultural sector, the Palestinian economy to become a self-subsistent, increasingly closed economy, producing more for the OPT than for trade.

Border closures and permit regulations significantly increase transaction costs. “Transaction costs refer to all costs involved in creating and operating institutions underlying the processes of production and exchange in an economy, including search and bargaining costs, and costs of coordination between and within institutions and organizations” (Said, 2001, p. 61). High transaction costs lead to an economy of inefficiency and perpetuate both a reduction in competitiveness and inequities within the business environment. Within the Palestinian economy transaction costs are characterized by: restrictions on access to external (foreign) markets, red tape and governance issues, limited access to financing, a weak judicial system, a complex regulatory and legal framework, and inadequate infrastructure. Transaction costs rise because of difficulties in obtaining and remaining updated on

information pertaining to the rules and regulations that govern trade and transport. “The permit and closure policies that Israel has implemented since 1993 constitute a major new constraint and challenge to economic development in the WBGs” (World Bank, 1999, p. 4). In addition to the restrictions on mobility for workers and goods, delivery costs are increased, the production process is interrupted, and production and operational costs rise. These transaction costs not only cripple businesses already existing within the OPT, but also deter new, outside investment.

Palestinian businesses are not only constrained by closures, but also face trade restrictions. The rules of trade were defined in the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations, which was incorporated into the 1995 Interim Agreement (Calika, 1998, p. 52). The trade regime formulated under the Protocol was similar to a customs union. The arrangement allows the PA limited control in determining the rates of customs and other import taxes. However, the Palestinian Authority is required to apply the same level of customs and duties on goods as is prevailing in Israel. The PA is also unable to provide import concessions to countries to which Israel does not bestow these allowances and cannot lower tariffs below Israeli rates. Quality standards must also adhere to Israeli guidelines.

While Palestinian trade protocols are dictated by Israel, the PA has no say in Israeli policy. Palestinian international trade is hampered because their exports are not as competitive as Jordanian and Egyptian goods (Calika, 1998, p. 54) due to transaction costs associated with Israeli security measures. Even prior to the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations, “The trade regime that existed between Israel and the Palestinian economy since 1967 is best described as an involuntary, one-sided, impure, customs union” (Arnon, Spivak, & Weinblatt, 1997, p. 88). The PA has little autonomy in creating its own trade policies and those in place are often detrimental to economic expansion. Without greater control over trade and external borders, it will be difficult for the Palestinian economy to further progress.

The future of the Palestinian economy will be conditioned on its ability to increase production in the private sector and trade its commodities openly on the world market. Achievement of these goals depends on Israel removing barriers to trade. According to the World Bank, “Easing internal closures throughout the West Bank must be accompanied by a credible Palestinian security effort; as long as Palestinian violence persists, the case for dismantling closures will be contestable” (World Bank, 2004, p. 162). Thus, Palestinians must break the cycle of violence that supplies Israel with an excuse for closures and, in turn,

Israel must provide more economic freedom and reduce restrictions on mobility.

Taxes and Foreign Aid

Over the past decade, the Palestinian GDP has fluctuated between stagnation and contraction (United Nations Development Programme 2009). In addition to Israeli closure and trade restrictions, Israeli control of the tax system appears to be impeding progress. However, Palestinian dependence on foreign aid and their failure to attract outside investment suggests that both parties are culpable for hindering economic advancement.

In order of contribution, PA revenues stem from value added taxes (VAT), customs, international aid, and non-tax revenue. The PA is restricted in its ability to revise and remodel its tax system due to the Paris Protocol agreement, which predominantly provides for Israeli control. Since Hamas came to power in 2006, the PA has had difficulty claiming tax revenues from Israel, and beginning in 2007 Israel used its tools of economic statecraft to impose a full economic blockade on Gaza. The PA “depends on \$40 million to \$50 million a month in customs duties that it levies on goods destined for the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (The New York Post, 2006, p. 5). Israel's direct control over a significant segment of Palestinian tax revenue places the Palestinian Authority and its ability to operate at the financial mercy of the Israeli government.

In addition to a problematic taxation situation, Palestinians face a difficulty evident in a number of developing nations, which is reliance on foreign aid. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) budget increased from 18 million in 1972 to 321 million in 2004-2005. The NGOs' budgets in 2003 covered 80-90 percent of education, 30-40 percent of health, 30-90 percent of social work, 40-50 percent of training and research, and 80-100 percent of human rights (The Economic Research Forum, 2006, pp. 18-19). Rather than using aid as a starting point to becoming self-sufficient in providing these services, the PA has become increasingly reliant upon donor aid at an accelerating rate. The idea of using international aid to rebuild infrastructure emerged out of the 1993 Peace Process. In 2003 half of all aid was allocated to support the Palestinian government budget and the other half for development projects (The Economic Research Forum, 2006, p. 20). The Palestinian Authority receives approximately \$1 billion in foreign aid annually. The PA's heavy dependence on foreign aid and loans for the functioning of its most vital sectors reveals an extreme lack of self-sufficiency crucial to economic progress. In order for the Palestinian Authority to expand its economy it must detach itself from its reliance on foreign aid and loans.

Continuing to incur debt will only leave the Palestinian government further accountable to foreign governments. The PA must instead demonstrate a commitment to attracting and encouraging private investment, which will lead to greater development of the economic system.

Attracting Investment

With the external debt rising rapidly “Salam Fayyad, the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Muhammad Mustafa, head of the Palestinian Investment Fund, which manages the PA's investments, have been trying to wean Palestinians off their massive dependence on foreign aid by encouraging entrepreneurship” (The Economist, 2008, p. 66) and attracting international, private investment. However, with constant security concerns, investors are wary of committing resources to the OPT. The numerous obstacles to attracting investment include security issues, closure policies, and destruction of property.

Security issues continue to plague the OPT. In 2008, while the Palestinian Investment Conference was taking place, a truck bomb exploded at a border crossing in Gaza. Many investors are interested in the prospect of developing business ventures in the OPT, but are concerned about the political and security risks. Samer Khoury of the Consolidated Contractor's Company, a Greek firm founded by diaspora Palestinians, said, “Many business people are waiting for the outcome of peace talks between Israel and the PA before committing themselves. We are investing very little at this time...we are waiting to see if the peace process does develop into a framework agreement” (The Economist, 2008, p. 66).

In addition to security issues, Israeli imposed closures are a credible concern for private investors. Abdel Rahman Abu Yusef, who owns a tourism and telecommunications business in Saudi Arabia, said that “he is skeptical about whether the barriers to movement in the West Bank would make investing in the Palestinian economy a viable option right now” (Mitnick, 2008, p. A15). The transaction costs of running a business in the OPT, caused by closures, fail to make private investment in the Palestinian economy a lucrative option. Israel's economic blockade on Gaza has only further deterred private investment. During the Palestinian Investment Conference, “Panelists concurred that the current situation in Gaza-brought on by an economic siege enforced by Israel-makes investment there a difficult proposition. One participant from the Bank of Palestine estimated it would take \$20 billion to \$30 billion in investment to rebuild the blighted strip” (Mitnick, 2008, p. A15).

The 2008-09 Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza created even more distrust in the safety of

investing in the OPT. During the siege, 2,800 homes were completely destroyed and 1,900 homes were partially demolished leaving tens of thousands homeless. In addition to the residential destruction, 600-700 factories, workshops, and business enterprises were decimated by the Israeli army. "Of 255 Gazan plants connected to the construction industry, 63 were hit directly, totaling an estimated \$36 million in damages" (Prusher, 2009, p. 2). With Hamas continuing to send rockets into Israel and Israel threatening additional action against Hamas how could any company seriously consider setting up shop in the OPT?

In March of 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a statement at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the Reconstruction of Gaza pledging \$900 million in U.S. aid to assist the people of Gaza and the West Bank (State Department, 2009). While the funds might be initially helpful, they do not address the real problems facing Palestinian economic development. As long as Israeli military operations threaten the OPT and closures and security issues persist, \$900 million will continue to be a band aid on a large wound, and the bleeding of the Palestinian economy will continue. The Palestinian Authority must attract private-sector investment in order to grow the economy. However, until the PA can placate security anxieties caused by both Israel and the Palestinians, sustained economic development will remain out of reach.

Labor as a Factor in Economic Development

One of the largest hurdles to economic development is reliance on labor migration from the OPT to Israel. While exporting labor allows for a large portion of the population to be employed, Palestinians' dependence on the export of labor hinders them from facing the real task at hand which is to develop their own industries and economy in order to provide sustainable employment within the OPT. The second problem inherent to labor migration is that Palestinian laborers rely on Israel for employment, yet Israeli closure policies cause volatility and instability in the labor market. With Hamas controlling Gaza and Israel increasing restrictions, Palestinian labor prospects have diminished considerably. Thus, while labor migration may have been beneficial to the Palestinian economy in the past, it appears that in the future, increasing private sector job opportunities within the OPT will best sustain the economy in the long-run.

In order to understand the relationship between politics and employment in the OPT it is helpful to examine labor trends in the past two decades and the effects of politically induced policies on labor. The peak of Palestinian unemployment in the first quarter of 2001 was 35% with almost 20% of the Palestinian

population losing jobs in Israel (Valdivieso, Allmen, & Bannister, 2001, p. 35). The high rate of unemployment coincided with the Al Aqsa Intifada, which began in September of 2000. During the Second Intifada, Israeli-Palestinian violence surged. In response to the security threat, Israel initiated military curfews, the demolition of Palestinian houses, sniper attacks, a reduction in the number of Palestinians permitted to work in Israel and an increase in the number of checkpoints and closures at border crossings. Historically, the rate of employment has been tied to the number of job opportunities available in Israel. In 1996, Israeli closure policies caused the unemployment rate to rise from 18 percent to 28 percent, and between 1993 and 1996 500,000 Palestinians became unemployed due to closures (Valdivieso, Allmen, & Bannister, 2001, p. 49). The Palestinian economy went into recession because of a reduction in demand for Palestinian labor by Israel.

In 2006, the Palestinian labor participation rate was 41.3% (44.1% in the West Bank and 36.1% in the Gaza Strip). The unemployment rate was 23.6% (18.6% in the West Bank and 34.8% in Gaza) (Bishara, 2007, p. 206). In 2007, unemployment skyrocketed to 29 percent, six out of ten Palestinians lived below the poverty line, and 62 percent of households earned half of what they earned in 2000 (Voice of America News, 2008). By 2008, the already high unemployment rate reached 30.3% and the poverty rate was as high as 68% (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). The rapid increase in the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2008 is tied to the Hamas victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections where they won 76 of the 132 chamber seats. Hamas' ascent to power has led to serious economic consequences for the OPT. The international community, particularly the United States, the European Union, and Canada, decided to withhold all aid, other than humanitarian aid, to the PA. In addition, Israel refused to transfer funds to the PA. "Financing for the Palestinian Authority depends upon transfers from Israel as described in the Paris Protocol, and on outside assistance from the donor states. The decision taken in 2006 not to transfer funds to the Authority or to even discuss a trade regime, has turned the Palestinian economy into an entity unlike any other in the world, as it has no legal framework within which it can function" (Amon, 2007). By September of 2006, the PA was already experiencing over \$500 million in losses (Voice of America News, 2006) and by the end of 2006 its income had dropped by 60%.

Not only has the election of Hamas, and the increase in faction violence caused by their election, restricted funding to the PA, it has also severely reduced Palestinian labor prospects within Israel. Since the election of Hamas, "the number of

Palestinians working in Israel has been reduced from 150,000 to less than 50,000” (Voice of America News, 2006). Looking at the historical statistics on Israeli labor demand for Palestinian workers and its relationship to the Palestinian employment rate, it is no surprise that Israel's reduction in Palestinian labor permits, because of the election of Hamas, has led to high unemployment in the OPT.

Labor migration from Palestine to Israel has, in the past, served to provide employment to the large number of unemployed in the OPT. However, this type of employment is volatile and may be in lesser supply in the future. By relying on Israeli employment, Palestinians amplify Israel's power potential by increasing Israel's influence over their economy. In the long-run, the PA must invest in infrastructure and development of the private sector in order to create sustainable employment within Palestine so that labor migration is less necessary.

Conclusion

While the PA is compelled to function within the economic parameters set by Israel, the PA must assume more accountability for the aspects of the economy that are within its control. Because Israel has authority over the Palestinian tax system and has the power to withhold tax revenues, the PA must be more resolute in its efforts to seek out alternative sources of funding. Thus far, the PA has continued to rely on foreign aid and loans to support its budget. Instead of using loans as a starting point to self-sufficiency, it is becoming increasingly dependent on them, masking the real economic deficiencies in the economy. Economic progression within the OPT will not take place until the Palestinian Authority detaches itself from its reliance on foreign aid and increases its efforts to develop private industry. By investing in the private sector, employment needs can be met within the Palestinian economy itself. The OPT must also decrease its reliance on the Israeli market for trade and employment. Not only does Israeli demand for Palestinian labor fluctuate, causing economic instability and volatile employment rates, but also Palestinians are relinquishing power to Israel by allotting it greater dominion over their economy.

The solution to many of the quandaries plaguing the Palestinian economy is clearly increased private sector investment. However, private investors will continue to be deterred from developing business ventures in the OPT as long as security concerns persist. There are a few steps that the Palestinian government can take unilaterally to greater ensure security within the OPT and improve its relations with Israel, the first of which is Hamas renouncing violence. Secondly, in order to negotiate with Israel, the Palestinians must speak with one voice. According

to Mohammed Abed Rabbo, “Without a national unity government, nothing will be rebuilt, even if it rains money on Gaza” (Prusher, 2009). Without consensus between Hamas and Fatah, particularly on how to approach diplomatic negotiations, it will be difficult to reconstruct Gaza or form any credible economic and political policies. Solving these problems is instrumental to encouraging outside investment. Until violence within the OPT and between Israel and Palestine desists, the Palestinian economy will remain stagnant.

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Academic Article

Democracy and transitology: a reflection of democratic transition and consolidation literature in the Latin American context

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The essay discusses part of the literature on democratic transition and democratization with a view to point out its limitations to the comprehension of characteristic processes of Latin American democracies, as for instance, clientelism, particularism, social exclusion and direct political participation through extra-institutional channels such as social movement's actions in some countries.

The artificiality of attempts to import European liberal political institutions to the Latin American context, and more specifically to Brazil, was already pointed out by specialists in Brazilian political formation. This preoccupation is present in different authors such as Oliveira Vianna and Raymundo Faoro. In effect, the first argues that implantation of universal suffrage by the 1832 Process Code was a measure dissonant from Brazilian political and social context characterized by kinship clans and feudal clans having contributed only to the transformation of the latter in electoral clans, with the absence of real democratic practices. Faoro points to the survival and interpenetration of patrimonial domination along with bureaucratic rationality (Faoro, 1993). A process that, in Faoro's perspective would implicate the impossibility of political democratic liberalism, as well as economic liberalism. In societies

where the patrimonial is the predominant political domination form, political liberalism would be nothing more than a fiction or a mask that conceals privileges (Hollanda *apud* Faoro, 1993).

Criticizing the adoption of political liberalism as a model and the implications that this process had to the country, Faoro (1993) recalls Hollanda while pointing out that the mask of liberalism manufactured an "artificial reality where our real life dies asphyxiated".

Converging with the elements presented in those historical analyses of Brazilian political formation is our first critic to transition and democratic consolidation literature. Studies that became reference in the field known as transitology and democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, 1988 e Linz e Stepan, 1999) conceive political democracy as a desirable end to the process of democratic transition. Political democracy understood in the terms of Dahl's concept of poliarchy (*apud* O'Donnell, 1997). Thus, the literature on transition emphasizes as criteria to democracy the existence of free and competitive elections and the respect to individual and associational rights (O'Donnell, 1986). But conceiving that political institutions characteristic of a poliarchy in the model of old poliarchies consolidated

in Eastern Europe and the United States would be the desirable end to transitions in Latin America implies an artificiality such as the import of European political liberalism of the XIX century once historical processes of each of these countries, that go beyond political authoritarianism, are unconsidered. Processes that could thwart the implantation of poliarchies in the shape of those existent in countries presented as examples.

We are talking about political practices and types of social and political relations that would lead to blurred limits between public and private sphere what would be contradictory with the definition of poliarchy. O'Donnell points out two of these practices, clientelism and particularism: "Types of non-universalistic relations, varying from vertical particularistic exchange, patronage, nepotism and favors, actions that under the package of poliarchy would be considered corrupt (O'Donnell, 1997, p. 49)"

Conceptions that democratic transition forms bureaucratic authoritarian regimes should have as a desirable end the implementation of a political democracy (O'Donnell, 1986) or of a poliarchy (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1988), creates some problem when we contrast this model with real existent Latin American democracies (Vitullo, 2007). In other words, the idea that transition from an authoritarian regime would lead minimally to a political democracy with individual rights and well functioning democratic institutions confronts with the prevalence and reproduction of practices such as clientelism. That instead of been interpreted as a historical process, characteristic of political formation in Latin American countries, is treated by transition literature as an anomaly, defect or pathology in the working order of poliarchy.

It is on this aspect that we suggested before an analogy between the artificiality of the idea that transition in Latin America would be consolidated with a poliarchy implantation, in the format of developed countries, and the artificiality and fiction of political liberalism implantation in a patrimonial society, as pointed out by Faoro (1993).

Political variables available in the poliarchy package also do not offer enough analytical tools to deal with phenomena such as clientelism, patrimonialism, *mandonismo*, etc. This has originated more recently an auto-critic by one of the referents of transitology, who pointed out that poliarchy concept has little capacity to understand the reality of Latin American democracies since it doesn't account, among other things, to informal rules such as clientelism (O'Donnell, 1997, p. 42-43).

An attentive discussion of historical fundamentals of practices and social relations which lead to blurred limits between private and public sphere is made by Carvalho (1997). The author proposes a theoretical delimitation of concepts such as

coronelismo, clientelism, and *mandonismo* based on historical and geographical determinants of each concept. A historical treatment of the phenomena contributes to understanding its use on current political context. It also adds to the essentially political variables available on the poliarchy package, allowing as well, to a change in the usual approach given to those themes. From elements alien to democracy anomalies or pathologies that live along formal democratic procedures to processes which are historically part of social and political formation in Latin American countries, and have to be approached as such, insofar as they have been determinant to the construction of formal political institutions.

Among the concepts discussed by Carvalho (1997) is the one of *coronelismo*, first delimited by the work of Nunes Leal "*Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto*" (1948). Carvalho defines *coronelismo* as: "A national political system based on exchanges between government and colonels. The state government guarantees the colonel power over his dependents and his rivals, mainly by giving him control of public posts, from the police delegate to the school teacher. The colonel gives its support to the government mainly on the form of votes. In the superior sphere the state governors give their support to the president of the republic in exchange of the acknowledgement of his domain on the state" (Carvalho, 1997, p. 5)

This characteristic network of *coronelismo* is historically delimited, going from 1880 when the president Campos Sales created the "politics of governors", replacing the previous process of state governors indication by the president to the end of this form of federalism with Getulio Vargas government (1930-1945) new centralization, in which state governors were again to be indicated by the president. This historical delimitation differentiates the concept of *coronelismo* from those of *mandonismo* and clientelism. *Mandonismo* implies the existence of a local oligarchic structure, personalized with power, where there is personal and arbitrary domain of the boss, who may or may not be a colonel. It's a characteristic of local politics, but not a system with the whole network, as *coronelismo*. It could be said that *coronelismo* is a type of *mandonismo* restricted to a specific historical context.

The frequent use of the term *coronelismo* in reference to relations between urban political actors, municipal oligarchies and even rural relations in which the colonel figure is no longer present should be replaced, according to Carvalho (1997), by the term "clientelism".

After this brief discussion of concepts recurrently present on literature of democratization we can present our second critic to the minimalist notion of democracy found, among others, in the concept of poliarchy. If on the one hand practices such as clientelism are seen as problematic from the point of

view of institutional functioning, on the other hand political variables used to evaluate institutional functioning most of the time don't offer tools to approach the conditions that make those practices reproduction possible. When we speak of conditions that make the reproduction of practices such as clientelism, *manodonismo*, patrimonialism possible we are talking, among other things, about social inequality and poverty, categories absent from the poliarchy model, that detaches social and economic conditions from institutional functioning: "evidence simply does not support the hypothesis that a high level of socio-economic development is both a necessary and sufficient condition to a competitive politics, neither it supports the reverse hypothesis that competitive politics is both a necessary and sufficient condition to a high level of social-economic development" (Dahl *apud* Reis and Cheibub, 1993, p.254-255).

The following examples will illustrate the argument exposed above. The first one is an essay that works on the minimalist conception of democracy, qualifying political systems where free elections are present but constitutional rights are not guaranteed as "illiberal democracies" (Smith and Zigler, 2008); and the second one questions the validity and permanence of the concept of poliarchy when contrasted with inequality and poverty indicators (Reis and Cheibub, 1993). According to the first analysis the illiberal democracies prevail in Latin America as a result of democratic transitions on the last decades. This result is crossed with a series of social, political and economic variables, such as presidential elections, hyperinflation, social uprising, etc. However a democracy concept restricted to criteria of free elections and constitutional rights guarantee doesn't allow considerations regarding possible gains for each country's democracy other than these two criteria, such as an increase of political participation of social sectors previously excluded. The authors instead arrive to general conclusions on the correlation between certain variables, superficially analyzed, and the presence of a model that would be ideal: free elections + respect to constitutional rights. Considerations about how these two criteria can coexist along with clientelistic practices in liberal democracies are also not present in the analysis.

The work of Reis and Cheibub (1993) on the other hand, approaches directly social problems specially growing poverty levels on the first democratic government after transition as limitations to democracy consolidation in Brazil. The authors point out that "when social inequality reaches a critical level it constitutes a threat to the regime because it alienates vast sectors of the population from the political game" (Cheibub and Reis, 1993: 237). In effect population living under the poverty line has no incentives to be part of civil society or to participate on

the political sphere. They demonstrate, instead, a high degree of apathy in relation to the state, a lack of trust on politicians and a growing resource to private justice which could increase the levels of criminality and cause problems to the state. This alienation resultant form social inequality has negative effects to democracy consolidation: "failure in assuring political loyalty from the unprivileged would represent a threat to democracy because it would allow the institutionalization of some form of democracy highly restrictive. Therefore, what should be feared is not an immediate social mobilization against Constitutional order, but the crystallization of a restrictive political system that would sanction the social *apartheid de facto* existent" (Cheibub and Reis, 1993: 251)

It is worth noticing that this social approach presented here opposes the central argument of democratic stability literature (Huntington, 1975). The main preoccupation is not with institutional stability facing a popular mobilization threat, but with the discredit and lack of interest that could lead to a lack of legitimacy of democratic system. Lack of legitimacy insofar as this regime would be sanctioning a social apartheid as long as it is believed that it could function well notwithstanding existent social conditions.

Considerations about the disappointment of poor and excluded social sectors with representative democracy lead us to our last critic on theories of democratic transition working with the poliarchy concept as a goal for democratic consolidation. As this concept of democracy highlights free electoral competition and adequate formal institutions functioning as determinant criteria of democratic consolidation, it also leaves unconsidered forms of political participation other than through the electoral channel (Avelar, 2004). In other words, understanding democracy as just a procedure to guarantee political representation may result on a blind eye to popular participation in collective actions and protest, which are also part of democracy.

In a critic review of transition and consolidation literature Vitullo (2006) argues that it could be considered conservative and elitist inasmuch as it places negotiations and pacts among elites as the central element of democratic transition, not paying enough attention to civil society mobilization during the process of transition. Hence, this literature tends to consider direct political participation (such as mobilizations, demonstrations, strikes, etc.) as the cause of instability during democratic transition and as a threat to governability. In opposition, insufficient treatment of social movement and other collective actors organized as agents of democracy's amplification is pointed out by Vitullo (2006) as one of the biggest political science deficiencies. The author argues that the discipline cannot underestimate these processes or place them outside the limits of what is usually conceived as democracy: "a certain disruptive

capacity results necessary, not only to enrich debate on public sphere, to call attention to the majority, surpassing communication manipulation and a restrict concept of public order, if not in a pluralism perspective, at least to include alternatives excluded from the hegemonic consensus of what is possible” (Máiz *apud* Vitullo, 2006, p. 11)

Taking into account this last argument we can conclude turning our attention to what seems to us a contradiction present on democratic transition and democratization analysis. If at one side some of its representatives latter began to question the validity of poliarchy's canonic concept to understand Latin American processes, at the other they don't break with representative democracy minimalist conception. This contradiction can be seen in O'Donnell (1997) who notices that bad quality social life can come together and live along with many types of poliarchies, what leads him to argue that poliarchy concept should be better worked and typified so as to allow a better understanding of differences and alternatives existent in countries such as Latin Americans.

However, the permanence of poliarchy as an epistemological limit inhibits the visualization of all the political collective actions made outside institutional channels that can press for a real change in life quality. On the one hand there is discontent with inadequacies of Latin American democracies to the concept of poliarchy, or even with the presence of formal criteria accompanied by informal rules, such as clientelism. On the other hand these inadequacies are seen with great pessimism since the only way out of it is trough political representation characterized, on these countries, by unilateral delegation (O'Donnell, 1993). In this sense the analysis is pessimist and determinist insofar as the theoretical referential doesn't offer analytical tools to conceive other possible forms of political actions. Actions that are also agent and motor of change in social life, such as social movement actions, claims made in the form of direct collective action and other types of disruptive action that “offer alternatives previously excluded from the hegemonic consensus”.

Notes

1. Terms created by Phillip Schmitter and used by Vitullo (2006).
2. Following the line suggested by Shumpeter (1975) that the definition of democracy should be free of any normative charge regarding its ends (the idea of a common good) referring only to methods through which a party or coalition comes to power in a competitive system, Dahl defines the minimal requirements to speak in poliarchy. These requirements are: secret elections, universal suffrage, regular elections, party competition, right of association, and executive responsibility (Dahl *apud* Wefort, 1992, p. 91-92).
3. In Brazilian context the colonel is also understood as a local leader. During a period of the empire military power was delegated to local leaders (mainly farmers) and those received the title of “Colonels of the National Guard”.

4. With the new measure the governor had to be elected by his state, what would imply negotiations with local oligarchies in control of each region of the state (oligarchies led by the colonels).

5. The same critic is made by Avritzer (2002), who calls attention to the elitist character of democratic transition literature that gives a marginal role to civil society participation on transition processes. The author proposes, instead, an interpretation according to which the emergence of political democracy is connected to the “formation of a public space where citizens can participate as equals and can guide the formal process of political decision” (Avritzer, 2002, p. 5).

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