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FOREWORD

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Dear reader,

The present Number critically evaluates different aspects of the international community, from problem of democratic deficit and its challenges over understanding of political science students and nation building and security policies towards process of building national identity.

Article The political discourse of Fujimori’s coup d’état

Problems and challenges of democracy in Peru written by Carlos Eduardo Pérez Crespo analyzes Alberto Fujimori’s discourse in the last Peruvian coup d’état in 1992. Owing to the fact that authoritarian discourse could become legitimate once again in a future political or economic crisis in Peru, this research concludes that the Peruvian government should consider the real importance of the issue of political order in contemporary politics.

In a study project titled Understanding the political science student: a comparative perspective. Elizabeth Candy Arceo, José Luis Dueñas Barrera and José Luis Incio Coronado tried to build a model profile of the political science and public administration student taking into consideration three variables: political culture, or the students’ pre-existing idea about political science, motive, as the more idyllic aspect of the profession, responding to the question “why do I study political science?”, and expectations, understood as the direction and goals the student seeks in the field. The study has proven that the student of political science both of Peru and of Mexico understands their professional role in society, making a clear distinction between the politician and the political scientist, identifying him or herself with the second of the two. The average political science student has chosen the career because it is practical, because they consider it guarantees stable employment, and because they are aware of the need to specialize.

In his article, Revolution and Nation Building in France and Turkey: With a focus on the role of the armed forces as well as language and education policies, Mesude K. Dalan examines nation building in Turkey and France, looking particularly at the role of the military and language and education policies in national integration. After discussing definitions of ‘nation,’ and how
national identity is formed, it looks at how France and Turkey each initially articulated their concepts of ‘nation’ and how each formed a clear sense of a shared national identity. It identifies the main factors that aided this process and resulted in nation building. It considers the relationship between revolution and nation building in both countries. It concludes that there is a strong relationship between nation building and the military in both France and Turkey and in addition notes the long term relationship between the two countries.

Mariya Polner graduated of the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium with a Master in European Political and Administrative Studies and batchelor degree in International Relations from Odessa National University, author of article Securing ‘from within’: the EU policies in Transdnistri claimed that the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted not only into independence for Moldova. It also served as a push factor for the secessionist conflict on its territory which due to its unresolved status is referred to as frozen. All attempts of the political settlement since 1990s have ended in deadlock. Interestingly, the EU policies towards Transdnistria changed significantly in 2003-2004. From the ‘security consumer’ the EU has been slowly turning into the ‘security provider’.

The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the EU in ensuring security and stability through its involvement in the Transdnistrian conflict. For this purpose the study will focus on EU-Moldova relations and the instrument it dedicates to ensuring stability, the EU Border Assistance Mission.

Finally in the article Recollection of past memories in Croatia: how processes of rememoration can build a new identity Ilir Kalemaj wants to prove that the end of Communist era and the end of Marxist-Leninist ideology which occupied the Central and Eastern European space for half a century, proved a blessing in many regards for these countries, enabling them to push forward with democratic and free-market reforms that in long run would culminate in their eventual democratization, prosperity and joining European Union.

The articles give a great theoretical and practical insight into specific fields of international political science, which hopefully will prove value-added to your studies and interests.

Enjoy your reading!
THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE
OF FUJIMORI’S COUP D’ÉTAT –
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY IN PERU

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Peru has a long history of democracy’s breakdowns where the construction of political discourse has been very important to legitimize authoritarian measures. Therefore, this article analyzes Alberto Fujimori’s discourse in the last Peruvian coup d’état in 1992. Owing to the fact that authoritarian discourse could become legitimate once again in a future political or economic crisis in Peru, this research concludes that the Peruvian government should consider the real importance of the issue of political order in contemporary politics.

1. Introduction

Political discourse analysis has been absent in Political Science’s researches about Peru and fujimorism.¹ However, its role as a political strategy to gain political support in the public sphere is significant so as to understand the authoritarian legitimacy in the last Peruvian self-coup d’état that was in April of 1992.

In that occasion Alberto Fujimori closed the Parliament with the support of the Army, the business leaders and the majority of Peruvians who were disappointed about the political system and the economic policy (cf. Cotler 2000, p. 20). Thus, in that occasion, Peruvians showed a feeling of deception in the public sphere which allowed the support for Fujimori’s authoritarian political discourse and the attack to Fujimori’s detractors:

¹ At the moment there are eighty-one articles about Peru in the main American Reviews of Comparative Politics. They refer to the following themes: fourteen are about political participation, thirteen about market reforms, thirteen about political regime, nine about state and public policies, nine about political violence and terrorism, five about political institutions, four about indigenous movements and fourteen about other topics (cf. Dargent 2008, pp. 27-28). Furthermore, fujimorism has been analyzed principally through three main perspectives: the social structures, the political institutions and the political agents (cf. Vergara 2008)
'Denial and deception became the defining features of public life in Fujimori’s Peru’ (Conaghan 2005, p. 6).

For this reason, our main purpose is to show how the consecution of political order in moments of crisis is fundamental for the consolidation of democracy in Peru. As Peruvian history shows, indeed, it is common to believe that the only solution to political crisis is the authoritarian decision of a plebiscitary leader (cf. Murakami 2007, pp. 123-126).

Furthermore, along with the report of the Latinobarómetro of 2007, only 8% in Peru believes that all Peruvians have the same opportunities of access to justice, 14% trust political parties and 17% are satisfied with democratic changes. As a result, 72% are unsatisfied with the basic services of the State (Latinobarómetro, http://www.latinobarometro.org). In consequence, the support for democracy in Peru is less than in the past years, hence it is important to study one of the most unsatisfied countries in Latin America.

In this sense, our research is...

...based on the recognition that politics cannot be conducted without language. Equally, the use of language in the constitution of social groups leads to what is called “politics” in a broad sense. (...) Political situations and processes can be linked to discourse types and levels of discourse organisation by way of four strategic functions as an intermediate level. We proposed the following four functions: (i) coercion; (ii) resistance, opposition and protest; (iii) dissimulation; (iv) legitimisation and delegitimisation (Schäffner 2004, pp. 117-119).

This article examines, consequently, these levels of political discourse between Fujimori’s arrival to the presidency in July in 1990 and the coup d’état on April 5th 1992. The methodology of the research is the following: 1) we will describe how Fujimori’s government takes action; 2) how it has to legitimise its action delegitimizing its detractors; and 3) how it finally creates a political discourse to legitimize itself and its measures in the public sphere.

As we will see, Fujimori developed a deep critique to political parties, Human Right’s organizations and constitutional democracy which allowed him to legitimize itself as a strong leader who imposed authority and political order in the country. So...
Fujimori frequently justified heavy-handed solutions to Peru’s multiple crises as the ‘only’ solution to Peru’s problems, and repeatedly attacked politicians, trade unions, human rights groups –even democracy itself, which he resignified as ‘party-cracy’ to imply it had been corrupted to its core by party elites and special interests. In this context, space for the defense of human rights and of basic democratic values (such as due process) was increasingly marginalized (Burt 2006, p. 44).

Firstly, the article describes the context of the Peruvian crisis at the beginning of the nineties and, then, develops Fujimori’s political discourse between July 1990 and April 1992. Secondly, we analyze the Fujimori’s discourse in the coup d’état. Finally, we depict some problems and challenges of democracy in Peru.

2. Fujimori’s discourse between July 1990 and April 1992

This section has three parts. In the first one Fujimori developed a discourse of consensus when he became president, but he changed it when his government announced the economic ‘shock’ on April 9th and finished when he proposed military courts to fight against the subversion in December.

The second began in January and finished in September in 1991 when he criticized Human Right’s organizations and political parties because he said they opposed the government. Fujimori accused them of being against the pacification of the country.

Finally, Fujimori criticized political parties, Human Rights and constitutional democracy between November of 1991 and April of 1992, arguing that these three would block the will of the government and the Peruvian people to finish the political and economic crisis in the country.

2. 1. Political consensus but attacking political parties (July-December 1990)

At the beginning of the nineties Peru experienced one of the most profound crises in its history because of three main problems. In first place, Peru had a severe hyperinflation- the annual rate of inflation reached 7649.60 in 1990 (Tanaka 2002, p. 50). In second place, there was political violence owing to the 3452 deaths which were caused by the conflict between state
and terrorism in 1990 (Kenney 2004. p. 28); and finally, there was also poverty and extremely poverty conditions that reached more than forty percent in the country (Murakami 2007, p. 79). In this context, Fujimori won the national elections of 1990 as an ‘outsider’, since he had no political party and he used an anti-political system discourse in his campaign (cf. Kenney 1998).

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In these circumstances, Fujimori had to achieve three aims: a) the economic stabilization, b) the return to the financial community and c) to execute the antisubversive policy (cf. Murakami 2007, pp. 273-274). However, the main aim was the economic stabilization because people perceived it as the major problem of the country in 1990 (Murakami 2007, p. 225). So, in his first Congress speech as President on July 28th 1990, he stated:

The people chose us in order that we restore a new language of national understanding, which is the language of dialog, conciliation and search of consensuses (...) We have to confront the deepest crisis that the country has passed through in all its republican history (Congress Speech, 28 July 1990, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo.htm).²

² The Congress Speech references have been translated by us.
Thus, Fujimori began his government with a consensus’s discourse calling all the political forces to help him in this purpose. Furthermore, he extended the discourse to subversive groups:

The dialog even with terrorists- as long as they quit the fight- shouldn’t be seen as sign of weakness. People have chosen me to look for the unity of Peruvians, including the ones that are mistaken (Ibid).

However, this calling to consensus was broken when Fujimori announced the economic ‘shock’ on August 9th 1990. The reaction of the political opposition was to criticize the government, as they argued the shock would affect the personal economy of the people, but Fujimori answered ‘I am not a servant of political or economic interests. I only obey to the people’ (in the newspapers, 25 August 1990). Henry Pease, from the opposition, said that ‘after this message we can suppose that the possibility of consensus was ended for the government’ (in the newspapers, 26 August 1990).

Nevertheless, we have to highlight that, despite the fact the economic ‘shock’ was object of a lot of criticism; Fujimori could legitimize his measures because his government diminished the hyperinflation to 5.9 in November and because of this, 59% and 61% of the people in Lima approved him in November and December, respectively (Murakami 2007, p. 252). Therefore, Fujimori could legitimize his economic measures delegitimizing the opposition and political parties. He claimed he was pragmatic and anti-political, in a way his government could resolve people’s economic problems while political parties couldn’t do the same. About old politicians he said they ‘refuse to lose old privileges which they have used

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3 The economic shock was an orthodox economic measure to stabilize the economy, ‘one such policy was price deregulation in which price controls were eliminated and the price of public service goods skyrocketed. The intention of this program was to push the price level so high that consumer demand would fall and subsequently remove inflationary pressure. Although this policy did not initially work as easily as intended, inflation did eventually decrease. Trade liberalization, including sharp decreases in the protection of imports and the elimination of subsidies and differential tax advantages for exports and rural development was also a key component of Fujimori’s economic policies’ (Newbold 2003). Furthermore, this one initiated the process of market reform in Peru, which ‘refers to measures that reduce state intervention in the economy, especially by eliminating or loosening different types of regulations and restrictions (such as import prohibitions and tariffs, labour laws, and rules on foreign investment), by privatizing public enterprises, and by shrinking the public bureaucracy’ (Weyland 2002, p. 13-14).

4 The newspapers’ references have been taken from the editions of Resumen Semanal (N.580 del Año XIII - N.667 del Año XV). It makes a selection of the most important political news of the week. Here we use the numbers published between July 1990-April 1992. They are also our translation.
to receive and surprise to see that technical issues displace political issues’ (in the newspapers, 29 August 1990).

In conclusion, Fujimori said his pragmatic solution of the economic crisis was the most important thing for the people; for this reason, the Minister of Economy, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller, stated ‘there has come the hour of saving the country’ (in the newspapers, 28 August 1990). Fujimori’s discourse, in this sense, was legitimized as pragmatic and efficient while political parties were presented as the contrary.

2. 2. Human Right’s organizations and political parties as enemies of the country (January-September 1991)

On December 6th of 1990, the president Fujimori said he would present a modification of the Constitution in order that the military courts judge the important crimes of terrorist violence, because it would be an effective measure to safeguard the society. However, the majority of political leaders were in opposition to the legislative proposal emphasizing that this one violated the Human Rights. Therefore, APRODEH (Association pro Human Rights) reacted saying that the presidential plan ‘does not have legitimate substance’ (La República, 8 December 1990) and Javier Diez Canseco said the presidential action was a ‘new globe test’ (Novedades, 8 December 1990).

However, Fujimori’s discourse argued, once again, that Fujimori’s measures were pragmatic and effective to fight the subversion. In this sense, the Internal Affairs Minister, Adolfo Fournier, said that ‘there are some mass media and also some elements that act as tontos útiles (useful idiots) who only support the subversion’ (La República, 4 January 1991). That is to say ‘Fujimori created an ‘us versus them’ framework that played on and stoked popular disgust with the political class’s failure to address Peru’s problems’ (Burt 2006, p. 46).

In addition, is important to highlight that in December of 1990, 55% of the people in Lima agreed with the military courts measures; whereas 31% said to be against. This happened because 78% in Lima said that terrorism had created fear in the country, 39% were sure that it would increase and 32% affirmed it would stay on the same conditions in the next years (Apoyo, Informe de Opinión, December 1990). In this way, Fujimori tried to show himself as strong president who was fighting to triumph over the terrorism with pragmatic measures.
This attitude, although, would bring him some problems. On August 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1991 the government of the USA decided to stop the military help to the Peruvian Army for the fight against the drug trafficking, due to the continuous violations to Human Rights. Such measures made Fujimori quit using his discourse of attack and demonstrate the advances of the government’s policies in Human Rights.

For this reason, on September 9\textsuperscript{th} of 1991 some parliamentarians of the USA visited the country to observe the progress in this field. In this opportunity they congratulated Fujimori for the government’s achievements, especially for the creation of Human Right’s offices at all levels of the police, and for the restoration of the dialog with the organizations that watched the Human Rights in the country (in the newspapers, 10 September 1991).

In this way, Fujimori’s government seemed to be aware of the importance of the defence of Human Rights. Nevertheless, after Peru returned to the financial international community on September 12\textsuperscript{th}, because the IMF approved its economic policy, Fujimori turned back to his discourse, suggesting that this achievement showed that political parties and Human Right’s organizations only had wanted to destroy the country criticizing the government:

Nothing was achieved not paying the debt to international organizations of development… The only thing that we obtained was to use up our capitals and stop the maintenance of infrastructure (of the country) (in the newspapers, 14 September 1991).

In conclusion, Fujimori returned to his ‘us versus them’ discourse and used it to delegitimize the Human Right’s organizations and political parties, because he suggested that they represented instability and chaos, so the detractors of the government were the enemies of the country. The majority of the people agreed with these arguments because they saw the achievements of the government, therefore, Fujimori could start with a discourse against all his detractors in September of 1991.

\textbf{2.3. Hostility to Human Rights, political parties and constitutional democracy (November 1991-April 1992)}
Fujimori explicitly began his discourse against Human Rights on September 23rd of 1991, when in a military meeting he stated:

We know that terrorists, their facade organizations or their useful idiots are not going to resign, and they are going to use all the possible resources to damage the image of Peru adducing that the Army violates systematically Human Rights. This one is the principal resource of the main violators of Human Rights in Peru. (...) Why don’t they condemn the death of innocent children after the explosion of car bombs prepared by the MRTA? Why don’t they denounce the atrocities of Shinning Path (SL) against the rural communities? (In the newspapers, 24 September 1991).

Fujimori’s discourse suggested that Human Right's violations are not only perpetrated by the State, but principally by the terrorists and those who are their supporters. That is to say, the enemies of the country would be not only the terrorists but also their supposed protectors: the Human Right’s organizations that obstruct the pacification with their criticism to the government.

After these statements International Amnesty denounced the situation of the Human Rights in Peru in a letter to the president George Bush on September 26th (*Expreso*, 28 September 1991). Besides, on September 29th the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator of Human Rights) said in an announcement: ‘As Human Right’s organizations we reject the language and substance of the presidential judgment for being insulting, not contributing to the dialog and false’ (*La República*, 29 September 1991). Nevertheless, Fujimori answered by delegitimizing these organizations linking Human Rights with poor people’s rights:

I have listened from the mouth of the cocaleros (coca leaf growers) leaders the defence of the fundamental concepts of the Human Rights, in their own language, and they accuse these defenders who keep their silence when crimes are committed by SL (...) Come here (indicating towards the ground) in order that before speaking you get to know this reality, and stop working in offices with carpets, as they have said; because here is the defence of the Human Rights (*El Comercio*, 15 December 1991).

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5 The MRTA and the Shining Path were the principal subversive groups in Peru. Their actions caused thousands of deaths throughout the eighties, but these diminished after the arrest of its major leaders.
Thus, Fujimori repeated his discourse of ‘us versus them’ delegitimizing the criticism to the government about Human Rights linking it with the fight against the terrorism. Such argument was used once again to attack the political parties when the government announced the legislative decrees on November 16th 1991. These decrees produced the conflict between the executive and the Parliament, which at the same time has been considered the raison d’être of the self-coup of 1992 by many authors:

Evidence presented in this and previous chapters show that Fujimori’s lack of legislative majority and the conflict that emerged and worsened between the executive and the legislature placed a central role in the decision to close Congress and suspend the Constitution (Kenney 2004, p. 259).  

Beyond this important hypothesis, what is crucial to highlight for our research is how Fujimori used once again his discourse to delegitimize political parties. For that reason, the parties’ leaders responded criticizing the legislative decrees. The secretary of the APRA (Partido Aprista Peruano), Luís Alva Castro, affirmed: ‘it tries to impose a wild capitalism’ (El Nacional, 20 November 1991), the senator Enrique Bernales said that the decrees of pacification supposed ‘an authoritarian thought of the society’ (El Comercio, La República, 17 November 1991) and Javier Diez Canseco added: ‘it has given a white coup with these legislative decrees’ (El Ayllu no. 5, 21 November 1991).

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6 In the same way, Murakami has mentioned that the conflict with the parliament decided the coup for three reasons: a) the possibility of Fujimori’s overthrow; b) the initiative to limit the presidential powers with the “Law of Parliamentary Control of the Normative Acts of the President of the Republic”; c) and the derogation and modification of the legislative decrees related to the pacification (cf. 2007, p. 294).
Against the opposition, Fujimori defended his legislative decrees accusing the political parties and the Parliament of corruption and of being influenced by the drug trafficking, so he stated on December 6th, 1991:

I do not want to think badly while I do not have proofs, but it is good that the things are explained to the country and I believe that the Congress owes a clear explanation of why it wants to leave without sanction the people who make money laundering of the drug trafficking (Expreso, 7 December 1991).

The paradox in this argument is that according to the public poll done in Lima in December of 1991, 72% agreed with the way the President attacked the Parliament and only 21% disagreed. Furthermore, 75% affirmed that the major problem of Peru was the terrorism and 58% and 51% said that the President and the Army, respectively, were doing well their work in the fight against the subversion. On the contrary, 67% said that both the Parliament and the Judiciary were doing badly their work in this fight (Apoyo, Informe de opinión, December 1991). Such numbers show us how the people supported the way that Fujimori’s discourse attacked the Parliament because they disapproved it and perceived that the government had been efficient, despite of its authoritarian behaviour.

This context allowed Fujimori to criticize constitutional democracy. As we have seen, he was suggesting that democracy had been weak; however, Fujimori’s discourse said that his government was making a strong democracy which imposes authority and political order with the support of the people and the Army against the corruption of political parties and the Parliament, the ‘useful idiots’ working for the Human Right’s organizations and the terrorism caused by SL and MRTA:

The terrorism knows that today they confront a government with authority… (They) don’t have and nor will have the lukewarm atmosphere of a very kind democracy and the weak governments that made them grow (...) …the order and the authority will continue being imposed (...) The terrorist bandits are wrong if they believe they would be able to return to universities to intimidate students, teachers and workers. This one is not a government of useful idiots or pusillanimous. We know that the peace of the citizens and the high interests of Peru are in game and we are not going to yield a millimeter of what has been gained (in the newspapers, 9 October 1991).
The people and the Army are the two columns in which my government lies, because they are solid institutions and are clearly conscious of their institutional role; they are also firm protectors of the moral values (in the newspapers, 10 December 1991).

To sum up, Fujimori’s discourse began calling to a national consensus, but when the government implemented controversial measures like the economic ‘shock’, the military courts and the legislative decrees, Fujimori’s discourse had to attack its detractors to legitimize himself and his measures. This strategy allowed the Army, the business leaders and the majority of the people to support Fujimori even though his measures were authoritarian, because all of them wished the government could solve the deep crisis in the country.7

3. Fujimori’s coup d’état speech

On Sunday April 5th, 1992 at 10:30 pm, Alberto Fujimori, supported by the Army, suspended temporarily the Constitution, dissolved the Parliament, arrested his major detractors and announced an ‘Emergency Government’ and the ‘National Reconstruction’.

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Coup</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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| * Military Coup is when the Army as an institution supports the coup. |

7 In this sense, both the Army and the business leaders subscribed the ideas of economic liberalism and raison d’état in order to achieve a pragmatic solution toward the crisis in Peru (cf. Cotler 2000, p 22).
**Coup refers to a civilian coup with the support of the Army or when a part of the army overthrows the government, but not as an institution.**

In this section we analyze the Fujimori’s speech on April 5th through three main issues which he emphasized in his arguments: a) the necessity of an state of exception to justify the breakdown of the constitutional democracy; b) the fact that Fujimori defended a true democracy supported by the people; and c) he also undermined the authority of the Parliament and political parties, accusing them of political ineffectiveness and corruption.

### 3.1. Political exception:

The calling to the political exception is crucial to understand the legitimacy of coup d’états: ‘A Coup d’état does not only by definition constitute an exceptional event, but must invariable be justified with reference to exceptional circumstances to be successful’ (Bartelson 1997, p. 323). In this sense, Fujimori’s discourse legitimized his authoritarian measures suggesting that the country was in an exceptional political context due to the terrorism, drug trafficking and corruption; for this reason, people wished an immediate solution of these problems:

The country is fed up with this situation and wants solutions. (…) Nobody doubts that Peru can’t postpone indefinitely social and economical fundamental changes. That is why, today, more than ever, Peru needs not a short relieve or a partial reform, but a profound transformation. Peru can’t keep deteriorating because of terrorism, drug trafficking and corruption. (Presidential speech, 5 April 1992, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo.htm).
Consequently, for the Fujimori’s discourse the breakdown of the constitutional democracy had been legitimate because the political situation required a decision in order to rebuild the country.\footnote{The political exception is related to the situation of necessity ‘because civil war is the opposite of normal conditions, it lies in a zone of undecidability with respect to the state of exception, which is state power’s response to the most extreme internal conflicts’ (Agamben 2005, p. 2).} Besides, it is essential to highlight that the president announced the main government’s measures following the argument of political exception:

As President of the Republic, I have stated directly all these anomalies and have felt in the responsibility of assuming an \textit{attitude of exception} to lighten the process of this national reconstruction (...) (one of the measures to achieve this is) to dissolve temporarily the Congress of the Republic, until the approval of a new organic structure of the Legislature, which will be approved by a national plebiscite (...) Peru has only one way: the national reconstruction (Ibid).

Such paragraph illustrates how the argument of Fujimori is not legal but political, because in the Constitution in the Articles 229 and 230 it was prescribed that the Senate could not be dissolved by the president.\footnote{In the Constitution of 1979 the article no. 229 stated: ‘The President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Chamber of Deputies during the state of siege or emergency. Neither can he dissolve it in the last year of his mandate. During this term, the Chamber can only decide the censorship of the Council of Ministers or any of the Ministers with the similar vote of at least two thirds of the legal number of deputies. The President of the Republic cannot exercise the faculty of dissolution but one time during its mandate’.}
However, as we have seen, Fujimori did not refer to the decree of emergency, but to the exceptional decision to save the country.

How could a political exceptional discourse be legitimized? According to a public poll made in Lima before April 5th, 49% affirmed that the principal problem was terrorism; 39% remarked it was economic recession and unemployment; and 31% corruption. Nevertheless, the most important thing of this poll is that 44% of people did not have a clear idea of who else, apart from the president, was the right person to fight against terrorism (Apoyo, Informe de opinión, April 1992).

That is to say, many people had a strong plebiscitary sensation toward the political situation in April of 1992; therefore, the justification of exception in Fujimori’s discourse became attractive for many people who had seen the economic improvement between 1990 and 1992.10

3.2. Real democracy:

The second argument of Fujimori’s discourse was that the breakdown of constitutional democracy had been a measure to consolidate real democracy:

There was no democracy in Peru, there was only the dictatorship of a chain of corruption which stems from the Parliament and the Judiciary and what we have done is to break this chain in order to reach, precisely, democracy (…) The people back all these measures and I am sure that the world will understand that it is all about a popular uprising turned into order. (El Comercio, 12 April 1992).

The surprise for many of constitutional’s supporters was that the majority of the people in Lima affirmed with 51% that the break of the constitutional regime was democratic, whereas 33% considered it as dictatorial. Furthermore, the public polls from Apoyo, Datum and CPI reported that the coup d’état had 71%, 84% and 87% of approval, respectively (Conaghan 2005: p. 33). Nevertheless, according to Apoyo’s public poll, 71% affirmed that they would disapprove the president if he did...

Furthermore, the article no. 230 stated ‘The Senate cannot be dissolved’ (Congreso de la República, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/grupo_parlamentario/aprasta/const28.htm).

10 An analysis of public polls would demonstrate that it is the improvement and stabilization of the economic situation and not the counter subversive fight the fundamental variable to explain Fujimori’s success among the population, as well as also the support to his following measures, as the coup d’état of 1992 (cf. Weyland 2000-2001: p. 217).
not come back to the constitutional regime in the next months (Apoyo, *Informe de opinión*, 8 April 1992).

According to Kenney these results show an apparent contradiction in the legitimacy of the coup with two different lines of reasoning: the first one supposes that the support does not show an inconsistency between the preference for democracy and the support to the coup; and the second one that the coup was an undemocratic measure of urgency to consolidate the democracy in the long term (cf. 2004: p. 231).

Beyond this explanation, what is true is that Fujimori legitimized his authoritarian measure suggesting that the real democracy is not based on the Constitution but on the people who acclaimed him and identified themselves with the coup d’état decision (cf. Schmitt 2002, p. 22). Fujimori stated this issue after the coup:

In Peru, the people is the sovereign and we have assumed this feeling with determination to dismiss the indecisive and passive attitude (...) Don’t tell me: the return to democracy, because that would mean to return to a false democracy. What we are establishing is a real democracy.  (*El Peruano*, 13 April 1992).

In this sense, in spite of the fact that the political parties proclaimed the vice-president Máximo San Román as the constitutional president of Peru, because Fujimori had violated the Constitution, 60% of the population - according to a public poll made in Lima on April 6th - showed their disagreement with this measure (Apoyo, *Informe de opinión*, 8 April 1992). Fujimori’s democracy discourse had been legitimized

**3.3. Delegitimizing the Parliament and political parties:**

Finally, because of the conflict between Fujimori and the Parliament for the pacification legislative decrees, Fujimori’s speech argued that the Parliament and political parties did not have interest in the reconstruction of the country because they were the ones who incited the political crisis:

The ineffectiveness of the Parliament is in addition to the corruption of the Judiciary as well as the obtuse attitude and the open conspiracy against the people’s and the government’s efforts elaborated by the political parties’ elites. These elites- expression of the traditional way of political behaviour- have the only interest of blocking the economical measures that provide an improvement from the bankruptcy situation, in which these elites left the
country. That is the reason of the permanent rejection to an irresponsible, sterile, anti historic and anti national Parliament which emphasizes the interests of groups and partisan elites over the Peruvian interests. The country wants the Parliament to be connected with the great national issues, exempt from the vices of the political caciquism and clientelism. (*Presidential Speech*, 5 April 1992, http://www.congreso.gob.pe/museo.htm).

Owing to these accusations many parliamentarians declared the vacancy of the president, because they argued that Alberto Fujimori ‘is morally incapacitated to exercise this high position, for having incurred in flagrant violation of the Political Constitution of Peru and for trying to subvert the public order’ (in the newspapers, 7 April 1992).

However, why people supported these attacks against the Parliament? In April, before the coup, a public poll had showed that 69% of the population affirmed that the APRA had a determinant influence in the Judiciary (Apoyo, *Informe de opinión*, April 1992). Consequently, in a public poll on 6 April 80% agreed with the closing of the Parliament (Apoyo, *Informe de opinión*, 8 April 1992). In addition, a public poll done in Lima in May revealed that 59% had a bad opinion of the majority of the parliamentarians and 28% of all of them (Apoyo, *Informe de opinión*, May 1992).

In conclusion, Fujimori’s discourse attacked the Parliament and the political parties suggesting that they were corrupted and did not wanted the pacification of the country, therefore, they criticized the government and the president. This way of reasoning was legitimized in the public sphere due to the fact that the people were disappointed about the parties and the Parliament as institution. In this sense, Fujimori’s authoritarian measure appeared attractive once again for the people.

### 4. Problems and challenges of democracy in Peru

Carl Schmitt said that there are some exceptional circumstances where safety, peace and political order are more important than the support to constitutional democracy and, as a result, the head of government could overthrow the Constitution if the situation were of extremely necessity (cf. Schmitt 1998, p 17). Is this issue true? Could the president break the democracy due to the political necessity? In this sense, was the Fujimori’s coup d’état legitimate? Is there any another solution to face the political crisis apart from the authoritarian measures?
Our research has showed how this issue in Carl Schmitt is present in Fujimori’s discourse. He stated that Peru was in an exceptional situation because of the hyperinflation, the terrorism and the corruption, so it was needed a pragmatic decision in order to restore the country. The Army, business leaders and the people perceived this argument as plausible due to the economic stabilization; for this reason, they supported the Fujimori’s attack to the political parties, Human Right’s organizations and government’s detractors.

Consequently, a main challenge to constitutional democracy in Peru is that it should show itself as an effective way to resolve political authority’s problems, due to the fact that the people demand solutions for the economic crisis and terrorism. The problem in Peru is that there is any historical example of democratic solution in these circumstances, because coup d’états always have been a way for the head of government to resolve them: Oscar R. Benavides in 1912, Augusto B. Leguía in 1919, Manuel A. Odría in 1948, Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968, Francisco Moráles Bermúdez in 1975 and Alberto Fujimori in 1992.

Therefore, this is the challenge of a country which has a long history of political instability where Fujimori’s coup was only one example of this one. For this reason, the next Peruvian constitutional governments should show that they are capable to resolve problems without the necessity of authoritarian discourses. Will they be able to do it? They only know it.

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UNDERSTANDING
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENT:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.

Elizabeth Candy Arceo
José Luis Dueñas Barrera
José Luis Incio Coronado

Introduction:

This investigation has been developed by four undergraduate political science students and is the result of several months of effort and dedication. The goal was to conduct a comparative analysis of the political science student. This paper does not pretend to be a completed work, but rather an initial exploration into the topic.

For this study, we tried to build a model profile of the political science and public administration student taking into consideration three variables: political culture, or the students’ pre-existing idea about political science, motive, as the more idyllic aspect of the profession, responding to the question “why do I study political science?”, and expectations, understood as the direction and goals the student seeks in the field.

The samples for this study were collected from the political science departments in Peru and Mexico, specifically from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP) and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Aclatan campus. Both are recognized as influential and traditional in their respective societies. However there are significant differences between the two. First, PUCP is private, while UNAM is a public university. Second, the political science department at UNAM has a long history, while PUCP’s department has only recently been created (its first class has just graduated). These differing populations from which to take the samples, were selected with the intention of identifying the institutional influence that they may have over the construction of the student profile. The most curious and unexpected result of this work is that despite differences the student profiles at both universities are remarkably similar.
This study has attempted to put to test a survey that can be used as a tool for assessing political science student profiles, and has had the objective of implementing it in other countries, expanding the number of cases in future investigations, thus allowing a more diverse comparison.

**Methodology:**

This research is exploratory and descriptive, and has utilized an inductive method. This paper has opted to survey undergraduate students (of different levels) from PUCP and UNAM. Through the data collected, patterns on an individual or subject oriented level have been analyzed. The method is inductive, since conclusions have been derived from empirical observation, while searching for patterns and generalizations. The alternative, a deductive vision, would have limited the study to preconceived models that wouldn’t have necessarily applied to the specific samples.

The survey is based on three variables: political culture, expectations, and motives, which together allowed the identification of a particular political science student profile. Each level has a number of dimensions that have been evaluated according to specific indicators and their corresponding questions. Once the data was collected, the information was arranged so that the diverse statistical measures that would be used in the next step of our analysis could be calculated.

The survey has been applied to 100 students from each country. Students have been selected at random to self-administer the survey and have submitted them within an average of 4 days. The surveys were completed in approximately 20 minutes and have been taken on campus, with the institutional support of the respective faculties. The survey consisted of 56 questions, 49 of which were based on the variables that correspond to the profile. The remaining 7 were designed to collect additional information such as: number of semesters studied and field of specialty. The margin of error was 8%, which implied the elimination of questions with an equal or greater margin of error.

In both Mexico and Peru, questions not correctly answered were eliminated. These were few, and have not greatly affected the number of dimensions capable of being analyzed. In Mexico, the questions which attempted to investigate the social dimension of political culture were the most problematic. In Peru, the measure of cosmopolitanism, through which the breadth of world perspective in the participants was to be discovered, and
from which the knowledge of different cultures and realities was intended to be extricated, also had to be discarded. In Peru as in Mexico, the questions which attempted to reveal the subject’s preferences towards leisure presented problems because they were inadequately answered or left blank. In total, 9 questions were eliminated in Mexico and 7 questions were eliminated in Peru.

With the collected data the mode was calculated and the questions were ordered (from most to least selected). This information was crossed using bi-variable tables, which allowed answers from different questions to be related. The coincidences extrapolated upon the formulation of these tables were very interesting.

III.- Theoretical Frame:

In the brief lines bellow, variables will be described in a clear fashion to allow the reader to have a solid understanding of the categories and conclusions reached. In addition, authors whose concepts provided a base platform for the creation of these variables will be presented.

Do to the exploratory nature of this paper, it is important to note that most of the concepts used are products of a reflexive process that have been based on proven models, but have left considerable room for intuition. The novel nature of this research makes it difficult to sculpt concepts or tasks to existing models. This has compelled authors to seek unique and creative options.

The first variable, motive, is defined as a group of elements, personal or institutional, which have influence over (or hampers) the decision-making process of each student. The motive is a static element, which is manifested in one particular moment: the choice of major. In the following paragraphs, the different dimensions of this variable, namely: culture, economic condition, relative ease, social status, and family, will be explained.

Through the dimension called culture the level of interaction between the subject and their society was explored. That is, the collective opinion about political science in the moment when the student made their decision was identified, as well as the opinion with respects to the type of student who chooses to study the career.
In the dimension called economy, by using a measuring standard valid in both contexts, the differences in incomes of those interviewed was distinguished. Following the logic of election presented by John O. Crites (1969:97), within economic theories that try to explain one’s vocational option, this dimension represents a limit the student must take into account.

Likewise through the relative ease dimension, the external factors that make the choice to pursue political science more attractive were analyzed. Regarding the dimension called social status, the manner in which the subject places him or herself in a social perspective was explored. In this dimension, our indicators try to avoid the repetition of economic status, and focus instead on the selection of information and on social activity. Finally, through the dimension called family, we give importance to the roll the family plays in the moment of selection. In this dimension the following indicators were utilized: tradition, approval, economic support and economic pressure.

According to John Crites, there are specific elements that influence vocation choosing. These elements include: interest, preferences, aspiration, assessments of limitation and others. From this study certain variables were taken to help in the elaboration of the survey. Within the stimulus variables, the variable of subculture-social class, understood as “what people think collectively”, was used as the base to elaborate the social dimension (Crites, 1969:240). The variable family (Crites, 1969:250) was used for the family dimension, which makes reference to how the family nucleus exercises influence over the decision of the individual (for example when a child chooses to follow in the profession of their parents).

On the other hand, Crites talks about aspirations, the formulation of which is determined by the person’s wishes and their personal ideals (Crites, 1969:146). Inspired by this element, a second variable was elaborated: expectation, which is understood as the ideal outcome expected by the student when completing his or her career. These expectations fall under three areas: social, personal, academic and professional.

The social dimension of this variable looks to investigate on how the subject sees social pressures related to their career, as well as the popular belief in society of what must be done and how this is assumed. In this dimension what is being evaluated is the relation subject-society and the “social” expectations, manifested through the contribution that the student wishes to make to their environment.
On the other hand, the **personal dimension** is developed on two levels, the relationship of the student with his or her family and one’s personal perception of satisfaction. Furthermore through the **academic dimension** the subject’s projection with respect to their later personnel-academic development is investigated. In contrast, the indicators of the **professional dimension** revolve around three aspects, from obtaining work to possessing the necessary skills for an excellent professional development.

Our third variable is **political culture**. The notion of political culture, can be understood of as a set of guidelines of reasoning, argumentation and representation of reality instead of as a closed set of values, beliefs, attitudes and guidelines of behavior, acquired through an essentially homogenous socialization process (Castillo 1997,p 65).

Nevertheless, even though political culture refers to conditions and guidelines of a collective character, it contrasts with the characteristics of a political culture analyzed as an individual phenomenon. The individual political culture is reinforced by the intellectual formation of the individual and is used as a mental scheme to make a reading of reality (Castro 2005, p 66).

What then is the influence of political culture in individuals? Obviously, individual decisions are made on the bases of expected benefits, and estimated costs of said decisions. In contrast to an individualism that inclines towards the election of individual interests, political culture represents a bet for collectivism, inclining towards the sphere of values rather than the sphere of interests (Castillo 1997, p 28).

Hence, political culture may be interpreted as a concept able to amalgamate values, ideas and political perceptions of the individuals that conform society, in such a way that the political culture of a society would constitute something similar to the “political language” of that society. (Castillo 1997, p. 29).

**Cultural dimensions between Peru and Mexico**

A study made by Geert Hofstede (1994), titled “Cultures and Organizations” mentions five cultural dimensions used to understand the difference between countries, people and organizations:
1. The image that one has of authority and one’s relationship with it.
2. The relationship between the individual and the group.
3. The application of masculine and feminine concepts at work
4. The way to handle uncertainty
5. The difference in direction towards the future, with a short or long term vision.

According to the study’s results, the highest dimension in the Mexican case is uncertainty avoidance with 82 points in a scale of 100, understood as society’s level of tolerance to uncertainty. In the Peruvian case it also turns out to be the highest dimension with 87 points.

The above demonstrates that the population looks to have total control in order to avoid uncertainty, in such as way that rules, laws and regulations of all type are adopted and implemented.

Both countries show a low level of individualism, with 11 points for Peru and 30 for Mexico. These results reveal a long term commitment between members of a “group”, where members take responsibility for one another.

Using these indices as a base, the variable of political culture has been evaluated through 3 dimensions that investigate what the subject knows of politics (political theory), what is more or less political in his or her perception (between political institutions and actors), and the ideological current he or she is more compatible with.

IV. - Profiles

4.1 - Profile of the Student of Political Science – Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru

**General performances:**
The average political science student of the PUCP is 22 years old. They show preference for the specialty of Administration and Public Management, and are just completing their first career.

**The student’s perception of the career and their past political participation.**
The average student that opts for political science has a conflict between: what others think about the career and what he or she esteems it to be. Although the student considers that the people that surround them think the career is theoretical and unstable, the student perceives their career to be useful. Therefore we can deduce that the student’s opinion is not easily influenced by their environment, with the exception of a proportion of them that were (22%).

Furthermore, 50% of the students who described the career as useful, are from the specialty of administration and public management. Simultaneously the people who described the career as theoretical are those that study the specialties of comparative politics and international relations. Thus, it can be seen that there is a direct relation between the perception of the career and the student’s area of concentration. The students perceive themselves to be responsible, committed and liberal. With respect to their political activities, the students have either not participated in any activity or have engaged in political manifestations, 40% respectively.

**Economic situation and facilities.**

According to the applied survey the students of political science do not feel that studying the career has generated them the necessity to obtain more income (70%). They are students who dedicate themselves exclusively to the university because the majority of them do not work (50%). Thus, we can assume that parents cover the cost of the career as well as the student’s maintenance.

The relative ease or the facilities which are granted by the university or by the context do not seem to have generated much influence in the student’s election. For that reason, those that have not obtained scholarships are the majority (98%), as are also those that were not influenced by the exchange program (62%).

**Media and interest areas.**

The political science student is informed mainly through the Internet and by the written press. They prefer journalistic biweekly publications like “Caretas” (37%) and academic research publications like “Coyuntura”
Family Environment

The students received high levels of approval with respects to their decision to study political science (50%). Hence, 66% of those who received high family approval were not pressured to look for economic security. Furthermore, there is no tradition within the student’s family of parents who studied political science (90%).

About personal, professional and academic expectations

The political science student’s perception is that the political scientist does not have a superior or inferior status with respect to other social science specialties (63%). Nevertheless they have expectations that the career will offer them the tools and whatever else necessary to be able to continue with their option in the future (69%). Of these results, we can see that 100% of those who wish to begin a political career or dedicate themselves to political analysis, think that the career offers stable employment.

The students plan once they’ve finished their career: to study a postgraduate degree (33%) or to dedicate themselves to public administration (25%). Thus they consider that network contacts (98%) are vital for their later development and that they individually as much as through the career, will be provided of them (52%). In this sense most of those who mentioned that contacts should be provided by both personal and career based sources, are those that chose to study a postgraduate degree when finishing the specialty (38.5%). Those that think that the career allows you to obtain these networks alone are by 40% public administration students.

The average student has the goal to obtain personal satisfaction rather than family or social satisfaction (76%). They seek specialization, because it is considered important (92%). Also, students believe that at the end of their studies they will have the sufficient academic level to choose to study
abroad (82%). On the other hand the student believes in his or her own capacity to analyze political and social phenomena (96%).

It is pertinent to observe which types of tasks the student would like to perform in their work place, in relation to their specialty. We have discovered that the average student prefers to design projects in their labor unit (34%). 56.2% of these belong to the administration and public management specialty. On the other hand, 41% of those who want to be in charge of an entire organization are specialized in international relations, whereas 67% of those who are interested in analyzing cases study comparative politics. In this case we see a coherent relation between the areas of specialization and the rolls preferred in their labor centers.

About political culture

The average political science student defines politics as: a form of organizing society (51%). The approach of preference is institutionalism (37%) and the most read authors are: Samuel Huntington (48%), Douglas North (41%), Karl Marx (35%), and Francis Fukuyama (38%).

For students, the problem that most affects society is the inefficiency of the state (48%) and inequality (31%). The perception of politics within the structure of these problems is positive as students consider it to be a solution (58%).

Furthermore, students believe that the greatest virtue that politics must have is that of being inclusive (42%), in this sense the majority of those who have this opinion see politics as a form of organizing society (52%). On the other hand, more than half of the students who study public administration and political communication claim the problem to be the inefficiency of the state (55 and 57%). Those that study compared politics and international relations, in addition to giving importance to this problem (33 and 46%), also adjudicate responsibility to the problem of inequality (41 and 40%).

When we establish a relation between analytical approaches and the perception of the problem, the students who prefer approaches of rational election, institutionalism and games theory see the inefficiency of the state as the problem that most disturbs society (57 and 56%). It is interesting to see that those who prefer a systemic approach and a structuralist-marxist one mention that the problem is inequality (50 and 56%).
When comparing the preferred approaches with the roll politics plays in the problem seen as most urgent, the following results have been obtained: Of those who consider politics to be part of the problem, 37.1% of them prefer a games theory perspective. 47.6% of students who believe politics to be part of the solution, identify themselves with institutionalism.

Students who prefer rational choice tend to read Machiavelli and Huntington. Those who prefer institutionalism have chosen authors such as Huntington and Douglas North. Furthermore, it has been found that students who tend to read with more frequency Machiavelli, followed by Huntington, and Martin Tanaka have opted for a systemic approach. All those who prefer a structuralist-marxist perspective, read works by Marx, followed by Gramsci and Machiavelli. Lastly, those who prefer a games theory analysis read insistently, Fukuyama, North and Huntington. Evidently there is no coherent relation between the theoretical approaches and the authors most frequently read, with the exception of students that prefer a structuralist-marxist perspective, and in part of those who have chosen institutionalism.

With respect to what is or isn’t a political activity, the students surveyed ordered the following options from most to least political: run for a public position, seek dialogue, work in public administration, vote in elections, protest in the street, and lastly, realize social work.

As far as national institutions are concerned, the average political science student ordered in the following manner, from most to least political: the national parliament, the executive power, the government’s political party, the judicial power, the ministry of economy, the armed forces and the mass media.

In the same manner, the students ordered from most to least political, diverse international organizations: UN, OAS, IMF, OPEC, International NGOs and religious organizations.

Students were also presented with a series of political figures, both national and international, that in the same way had to be ordered by their political relevance. The result was the following:

National Figures: Jorge del Castillo, Gonzáles Posada, Abimael Guzmán, Mario Huamán, Raúl Vargas.

4.2- Political Science Student Profile - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

The Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM) in our days

Over the past 450 years, the UNAM has been the largest and most prestigious public university in Mexico. Of the six campuses that make up the university, one of them will be the subject of this investigation: campus Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán (FES-A).

Campus FES-A, is made up of 17,525 students, that study one of the 17 careers offered. Of these students, 1,200 study political science and public administration; a career that is completed in a period of 4 years, which has been taught since 1976.

Studying in the “Place of Canes” (translation of ‘Acatlan’ from native language of nahuatl)

In Mexico, the average political science student on campus FES-A is 22 years old. This indicates that most of them began the university directly after finishing school, thus, political science is their first career. The majority of these students are men; 55% of the total population. Evidently, the proportion of men and women is almost equal, there is no predominance of one over the other.

The data collected showed that while society perceives the career to be theoretical and unstable (31%), the future political science student perceived it to be useful and practical (46%). Furthermore, half of the political science students perceived that society considers them to be responsible and liberal, whilst the other half believe that society considers them to be in part individualists, and in part committed.

In Mexico, the political science student is considered a “grillo”\(^{11}\); that is to say, a person who actively participates in political issues. However, surprisingly enough, the data obtained showed that before entering the career half of the students in question had not participated in any type of

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\(^{11}\) Popular Mexican expresión to describe an activist in political issues
political activity with a minor exception of those who participated in public manifestations.

In the process of choosing a career, the political science student was not subject to any type of either economic or tradition related pressure (that is to say, strain imposed by parents who have also studied and wish for their son or daughter to study political science). In this case, we can identify a process of personalization of the decision making process, analyzed by Lipovetsky (2002), who sheds light on the danger present in neutral and supposedly invisible opinions.

In attempts to identify socioeconomic patterns, a series of questions were made which revealed that when the majority of students initiated their career, they believed there would be a necessity to increase their income (56%). In the long run, this seems to have been only a false perception, as now only a small number of these students work to finance their studies. This perception proved to be erroneous as costs have been assumed by the family in the majority of cases (75%). We must also keep in mind that the UNAM is a public university that only charges an annual fee of approximately US$0.2 or €0.12.

As far as scholarships are concerned, only a marginal percentage of students acquired one in order to begin their studies (12%). This leads us to conclude that in effect scholarships are not important motives that persuade students to study political science. Similarly enough, the exchange program, although available and made known to students, does not seem to be a factor that induces students to choose the career over another.

Follow the steps of Quetzalcóatl (Aztec god of wisdom and knowledge)

One of the axes of this investigation is to describe the conditions in which the students study and interact on a daily bases. With this in mind, questions have been made concerning time of commute to and from the
university, extracurricular activities, academic formation, amongst other factors.

Since campus FES-A is of particular importance, most political science students of Mexico City study here. Due to the size of this metropolis, the majority of the students (50%) commute between 1 and 2 hours from their home to the university. This has obvious repercussions in the time available for participation in political activities, for working and for improving their academic performance. Proof of this was found in the interviews, as few students (37%) participate in social voluntary work, which in another light, may also be interpreted as a lack of interest for the wellbeing of local communities.

This tendency to detach oneself from local problems can be explained by the preference shown in understanding issues of a more national relevance, identified by a common preference for publications that from different and equidistant perspectives analyze and explain national related issues. This is made evident through the written media preferred by the students, being the most popular the magazines Proceso and Negocios (the first of a leftist orientation and the second of a businesslike nature, not even political).

The political scientist considers his or her status to be equal to the status of other related careers (52%), and thus, considers that the career provides the necessary tools for obtaining stable employment (74%), as well as for studying a master’s degree abroad (71%); most of the students speak at least two languages (62%)

There is a clear tendency in the students of political science to want to study a master’s degree (27%), and to dedicate themselves to the praxis of public administration (35%). This can be related to the opinion sustained that creating political relations is important for one’s professional development (87%), which denotes a preference for administrative tasks as they are considered more stable than a political career.

As this investigation was being executed, another investigation of Dutch sociologist, Geert Hofstede, who through a survey explored the cultural tendencies and dimensions of various countries, was used.

In Mexico’s case, it was concluded that the culture tends towards collectivism by 70% and towards individualism by 30%. Hofstede explains that this is due to family and friendship bonds present in the Mexican
society, and in consequence, also in political science students, who seek to satisfy both themselves and their families by studying the career.

In relation to the stated above, most of the Mexican students give equal importance to personal and family satisfaction (67%), in other words, studying their career is a task realized in search of both individual and collective fulfillment. Family satisfaction reveals a necessity to show that one is a good student, and thus a good political scientist due to the family's support.

With respects to their academic formation, the students believe that the career provides the necessary tools for analyzing political and social phenomena (89%). It must be bared in mind that students consider political science to be a multidisciplinary career. This characteristic explains the vast variety of preferences that have been expressed with respects to the labor market, which includes options of a both academic and political nature.

The students were also questioned about their academic preferences, in particular, about authors most frequently read. Machiavelli and Max Weber revealed to be the most popular, and explains why the majority of political scientists interviewed consider politics to be the exercise of power and the way by which society is organized. Omar Guerrero was the third most read author, and reveals the importance national authors have in the study public administration.

Karl Marx as the fourth most read author, that in unison with the authors previously mentioned, reflects an academic liberty that provides knowledge of a variety of theoretical approaches. However, when asked which is the preferred theoretical perspective, 30% of the students favored rational choice, a vision which may be related to postmodernism and that implies the possibility of choosing between a series of options, as long as there is a benefit to be obtained.

The political scientist considers that politics should be above all things, useful. This is a vision once again in tune with rational choice and a postmodernism perspective. Secondly, the political scientist believes that politics should be honest. This reflects the current tendency to promote transparency in Mexico's public administration.

Lastly, the students were asked about what they considered society’s main problem to be. The first answer was the state’s inefficiency (38%).
However, what stood out the most was their perception that politics was part of the problem (57%). This characteristic may be considered contradictory with what is being studied and its objectives.

The variables above compose the profile of the political science student of UNAM.

V.- Comparing Profiles:

1.- Significance of politics for both countries

One aspect considered important to compare is the meaning given by those interviewed to the headstone of our academic field: politics and its role in society.

Students of both countries agree that the main problem that affects society is the state’s inefficiency. This is a problem that responds to an overall feeling of discontent generated by a transition to democracy lived in both countries, which created an incipient democracy with many diluted expectations.

The majority of the population expected important changes in their living styles and waited for the immediate solution to their problems, within a period of 6 years. However the government alone was not capable of making such changes (and is still incapable of it), as a democratic transition implies not only a change in government but also a change in society, as well as in the social and political debate of ideas. Of these conditions, in Peru and in Mexico, changes in government have been made, yet changes in the other two areas are only beginning.

The role politics plays in the state’s lack of efficiency is perceived in a different way in each country. For the political science student in Peru, politics is part of the solution. If it is assumed that politics is an inherent part of society, than it is understandable why political science students of Peru consider politics to be a means by which society is organized.

When asked how politics should be, the political science student of Peru agreed it should be inclusive. Thus, it can be concluded that politics is seen as en elitist activity, which needs to be more open if democracy is to be consolidated, and if effective suffrage is to be transformed into effective democracy.
On the other hand, Mexican students believe politics to be part of the state’s lack of efficiency. This may be understood as a sign of apathy of students who cease to see in their academic preparation the possibility of finding solutions and making positive changes through politics.

Most Mexican students define politics as the exercise of power. Thus, politics is seen as a purpose in itself obtained through political activity. If the Mexican society always expects positive changes to be made through the government’s control of power, then we can understand why this society has tolerated the structure of past regimens where the state was the only organization that held power, and society only respected the decisions made.

When questioning the students from Mexico on what politics should be, the majority answered that politics should be useful. This is a posture in accordance with Rational Choice, which is the preferred focus of analysis, and also to the persistent expectations that democracy alone and with the government’s help, should solve social problems.

More words, less words. Politics possesses many definitions and many social perceptions that go from a virtuous activity to simply a section of the newscast, a lamentable but real situation in a world that has given value to the search of the pleasure and where freedom is no longer a mean, but an end in itself.

2. – Are there are shared expectations among the students of political science of Peru and Mexico?

Through the carried out surveys and in order to identify the elements that characterize the students of political science of both countries, a series of points have been discovered, that together, give the impression that there is a shared profile with counted distinctions of the student of both countries.

The similarity between profiles was an unexpected yet pleasant surprise. This investigation has had as particular and innovative, the fact of wanting to compare samples that come from distinct populations, contexts and diverse historical backgrounds. Hence, it was expected that the profile of a student from a public university studying a career of a long trajectory to be different, of that of a student from a private university, where the career is
new and within a completely different national context. Nevertheless, the result has differed.

An important dimension of this profile consists in the expectation that the student has with regards to their future, and in that sense, the degree in which the career will allow him or her to obtain this result. In this respect, it was discovered that the political science student of Peru and of Mexico share the same objective of either working in public administration (a vast majority) or of extending their studies through a graduate degree. Also, the students consider that specialization is an important requirement for their professional development. To understand these inclinations, let us remit ourselves to the motives that forced the student to opt for the career.

In both samples, the perception of the student of political science before entering the career was similar. It was thought in both countries that the student is responsible, committed and liberal. If responsible is understood as an adjective that reflects a desire to carry out conscious and informed changes, then it can be understood why the student has the determination of acquiring a rigorous education through a master’s degree that allows him or her to specialize in one or diverse topics. Specialization is an idea that has gained much popularity amongst this generation of students, as it is conceived as the most practical, viable and efficient way of competing in the labor market.

The decision to opt for the career of political science seems to respond to a necessity of finding a practical path that guarantees certain professional development. This is affirmed by two reasons. In first place because those interviewed perceived the career as useful, and in second place because there proved to be a high level of trust in the tools that this career provides. The second fact is interesting because in Peru this was not expected, as the professionalism of the Peruvian political scientist is yet to be proven, through graduated students.

On the other hand, if committed is understood as an adjective that makes the political science student one in obligation or in commitment with their studies or with their career, it can be understood why he or she seeks to acquire full academic development. Likewise, if commitment is understood as an obligation towards the problems that the country or the society in general suffers, then why the student of political science wishes to work in public administration can be understood. In both countries it has been said that the largest problem that society endures is the lack of efficiency of the state, and because of this, the reason behind the expectation of working in
public administration is comprehended. In this sense, the career can be considered practical as it offers students the most direct form of solving problems or of assisting topics which are from their personal perspective, more relevant.

Expectations are the reflection of the student’s aspirations in regards to the career, created based on cultural motives, perceptions and opinions (of the individual, not the collective) related to the student and their line of study, ignoring exogenous motives such as facilities, the student’s economic conditions, and possible family related pressures.

VI. - Conclusions

The study has proven that the student of political science both of Peru and of Mexico understands their professional role in society, making a clear distinction between the politician and the political scientist, identifying him or herself with the second of the two. The average political science student has chosen the career because it is practical, because they consider it guarantees stable employment, and because they are aware of the need to specialize. The majority of those interviewed seek to continue their studies through a graduate degree or dedicate themselves to public administration. This is why the ‘traditional’ politician, he or she who plays a protagonist role within the public scenario, who generates public opinion, who represents the ‘people’, the ideologist, and the leader, is not a highly demanded role. The political science students of both Mexico and Peru, are much more practical subjects, they look for solutions to concrete problems, and consider that the best way to do this is through specialized knowledge, within specific areas of interest, through direct contact with these problems, within the apparatus that generates them: the state.

Political Science is ‘useful’. The problem is the inefficiency of the state. The preferred way to reach the solution is through rational choice (Mexico) or through institutionalism (Peru). The utility of the profession is exploited when theoretical currents are used to approach politics and its problems. According to rational choice, the best option or solution depends on how low the costs are and how high the benefits can be. According to institutionalism, solutions to society’s problems are identified, through a careful analysis of both formal and informal institutions, allowing us to obtain realistic perspectives, which is a jumpstart to the creation of more effective solutions. Once again, the practicality of this new generation of political scientists stands out, and thus, we ask ourselves, to what does it owe? A first answer can be constructed by means of a long-term analysis,
through cultural and social variables of both countries, and a second through an institutional analysis, by means of academic and programmatic variables of each university. The construction of these answers depends on a rigorous investigation which can and should be conducted in the future. However, one thing is for certain: public administration, the more technical and least ideologically oriented branch, has gained much importance.

Our study reveals that as far as expectations are concerned, coincidences between students of both countries exist, and cannot be explained through the educational institutions or academic programs, as the universities studied are different, one public the other private, one of a long trajectory, the other of a short one. Thus, the relationship between samples is due to the fact that expectations can be explained by external factors that are more influential than the universities themselves, such as the labor market and society’s necessities which guide students towards certain paths.

As has been pointed out previously, the political science student is influenced by his or her environment, that is to say, by their countries; which in spite of belonging to the same region, have particularities that make each one differ from the other, more so when considering that students come from different universities, of careers with diverse trajectories. When asking students about the perception of political science in their particular context, the answer in both countries was the same: theoretical and unstable. It is odd that in a country like Mexico where diverse universities, through out various decades, have taught political science, there is a society that sees the profession as abstract, with little applicability, and with a limited labor market. This is an answer to be expected in Peru, nevertheless, what is certain is that students of both countries have seen in political science something most have not: a feasible profession.

As far as participation is concerned it is important to mention that contrary to what may be expected, the political science student before entering the university does not actively participate in politics. In both countries students have either not participated politically before entering the career or have only engaged in public manifestations. This together with the results concerning voluntary participation in diverse activities denotes a contradiction to the sum of ideas and preferences of how students have defined political culture, that is to say, if we evaluate results that identify politics as the solution to problems, as a virtuous activity, and as the search for consensus, as well as take into consideration the tools the career offers, what stands out is that students prefer the analysis of social
phenomena rather than active participation in their solution. Thus, although students are sure to have good academic standards, which will allow them to continue their studies in graduate school as well as to find stable employment, they do not count with the component of social participation, which has not been thoroughly developed in the career.

It is remarkable to see that most students dedicate much time to their studies, in this sense, it is important to mention that while 70% of the students in Peru did not feel a necessity to work when first entering the career, 56% of Mexican students did. This reveals that in both countries the search for political practice is not a main motive to develop a labor record jointly with a student life. In addition, in both cases, students are not influenced by scholarships, which facilitate studies and their choice of career, even though it is expected to be a decisive factor for students of a private university, like the case of Peru.

Questions were developed to decipher the main reason for which the students chose political science, demonstrating that it is neither due to an academic trajectory of the family in the study of the profession, or to the advantages the career offered in comparison to other professions (beyond the interdisciplinary character which appealed to most students, and was mentioned as attractive and of interest), which brings us back to the question of, which is the main factor that impels students to choose political science? We consider this to be the guideline for understanding the influential elements, the behavior and preferences of the pupil, their little interest in the development of complementary political activities and the great interest for developing academic and administrative activities.

Without a doubt, diverse external factors related to life, system and culture of each country influences the development of the students. Although obvious differences such as the preferred ideological focus, cosmopolitism, amongst others, mark distinctions between students of Peru and Mexico, coincidences can also be found, in particular, related to the political development of each country, the existing democratic conditions, and the general characteristics present in Latin American countries. The satisfaction the students have expressed with respects to the formation received in their universities is notable, which is reflected by their parallel consideration that the profession offers the same standards and advantages that do other careers within diverse areas of knowledge.

Finally, these annotations and comparisons are interpretations that we propose. Readers are invited to reach their own conclusions and to
generate proposals, to be pro-active and to continue to prepare themselves for the creation of new opinions, sustained by the search for knowledge and by an ample criterion.

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REVOLUTION AND NATION BUILDING IN FRANCE AND TURKEY: WITH A FOCUS ON THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION POLICIES

Mesude K. Dalan

Abstract
This paper examines nation building in Turkey and France, looking particularly at the role of the military and language and education policies in national integration. After discussing definitions of ‘nation,’ and how national identity is formed, it looks at how France and Turkey each initially articulated their concepts of ‘nation’ and how each formed a clear sense of a shared national identity. It identifies the main factors that aided this process and resulted in nation building. It considers the relationship between revolution and nation building in both countries. It concludes that there is a strong relationship between nation building and the military in both France and Turkey and in addition notes the long term relationship between the two countries.

Introduction
Today many countries – especially in the developing world – are seeking their identity. It seems that for many countries, the issue of national identity needs to be answered in order to be able to resolve serious cleavage issues as well as get on with the business of daily life. A shared sense of national identity seems to be a pre-requisite for successful nation building. Study of nation building in world history and in comparison with other nations is helpful in order to be effective, objective and just in future political behaviour. Nation building is a continuous process as each nation must continually adjust to new ideologies, new world orders, market situations, population changes, and so on. But the decisions that politicians and bureaucrats make today are influenced by their national heritage. Each nation has its own symbols and stories of origin that are repeated and enacted over and over. National Days are especially important in building a collective memory and identity. Since it is these stories connected to the founding of the modern nation that are emphasized and continue to influence behaviour and decisions today, this study focuses on the revolutionary founding periods of the Republic of France and the Republic of Turkey.

The first section articulates concepts of nation, national identity and nation building and examines different definitions of each. In addition to the
many ways it is defined in the literature, different understandings are apparent from the way each is discussed in the media or in normal conversation. The second section looks at the role of the military in nation building. It discusses whether military force is necessary for nation building and whether it is more deliberate than most social organizations in its teaching of structure-related values. The third section explains the case of France. It examines the French definition of nation and how national identity was formed. It particularly discusses the roles of the armed forces and of language and education in nation building. The fourth section discusses the same issues but in relation to Turkey. The last section offers a comparative analysis of nation building in France and Turkey based on the questions of sections four and five.

**Concepts of Nation and National Identity**

A quick glance at almost any newspaper, especially over the past two decades, reveals that the concept of ‘nation’ is the subject of much debate and a frequent source of conflict. However, confusion over terminology is not confined to the public. An examination of the literature shows that the concept of nation continues to be a topic of debate among scholars. Keitner (2007) is one of the authors who stress the paradoxes inherent in theoretical definitions of nation and their working out in practice. Hobsbawm (1992) asserts from his examination of the literature on the concept that although there are many definitions, no satisfactory standard criteria for what defines a nation have been identified.

The word ‘nation’ comes from the Romance languages and originally referred to the process of being born or to a group having common characteristics. According to Hobsbawm, before 1884 it referred to inhabitants of a specific region. In 1884, the idea of government was specifically connected to the concept of nation and the idea of ‘the homeland’ was connected to the state. Although ‘nation’ originally referred to origin or descent, in early modern times it began to be used to describe a political community. Most writers accept the ideas of nations and nationalism as a relatively modern phenomenon and connect their emergence to the social and political changes taking place during the late 18th century revolutions. One of the first modern usages of the term is found in the documents of the French Revolution of 1789.

Smith (2000) argues that the behind the view that nation and nationalism are modern is the basic understanding that nation and nationalism are socially constructed. He therefore refers to the modernist approach as ‘constructionist.’ Social constructions assume that nations are created from nationalism, that nations are a recent development
deliberately built by elites, and that the nation could only be invented under modern conditions. A continuation of this idea is that the nation will evolve into a new form in the postmodern age. According to Smith, Hobsbawm is an example of a constructionist. Hobsbawm argues that nationalism began around 1830 with a popular democratic and political nationalism that became more divisive, ethnolinguistic and rightist after 1870. Smith however thinks that cultural engineering or the deliberate creation of traditions began in this later period. He argues that nation and national identities were built on sociopolitical constructs in post industrial societies.

Definitions of nation and stories of national identity are important because they have political consequences. Montserrat Guibernau (2001:243) defines nation as “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself.” Anthony D. Smith (2004:129) outlines the ideal type of the modern nation as having a clear geographic territory, authority connected to that territory, a legal community, a public culture transmitted through public institutions, an autonomous community of citizens, a nation that interacts with other sovereign national states on an international level, and a community that developed from the ideology of nationalism. Smith and Hobsbawm both argue that nationalism comes first and that it is nationalists and the state that create nations.

One of the reasons for confusion is because the term ‘nation’ still has two meanings. Different writers use different terminology but generally the two concepts of the nation are “civic,” territorial,” or “voluntarist” and “ethnic,” “genealogical” or “organic.” In the western understanding of the civic conception, nations are formed through territory, economy, law and education. Smith (2004) argues that the fact that this conception is based on modern industrialization shows it is a modern western interpretation. The ethnic conception of nation is more popular outside the west and is often in opposition to the civic conception.

Hans Kohn in his 1944 writings was the first to differentiate between voluntarist and organic nationalism. He argued that voluntarist nationalism was prevalent west of the Rhine including Britain and North America and organic nationalism was dominant in Central and East Europe, Russia, the Middle East and much of Asia. The main difference is the relationship between the individual and the collective. According to the voluntarist ideal, the person has the right to choose which nation to belong to. According to the organic understanding, the individual is born into a nation and carries the character of that nationality wherever s/he goes (Smith 2000).

While the concept of nation tends to be more abstract and theoretical, it is made more concrete through the building of national identity. The
concept of nation appeals to the mind but the concept of national identity appeals to the heart. National identity is presently one of the strongest forms of collective identity. As Guibernau (2001:243) explains it, “national identity is based upon the sentiment of belonging to a specific nation, endowed with its own symbols, traditions, sacred places, ceremonies, heroes, history, culture and territory.”

Analyses of revolutions and nationalist movements change according to current academic perspectives. Gary Marks and Doug McAdam (1996) note that in the 1960s and 1970s, the collective behavior perspective was dominant. Movements were thought to be temporary and to originate from psychological stresses. They were studied more by sociologists than by political scientists. However, events of the 1960s and 1970s made scholars rethink social movements and revolutions from a more political perspective. The new approach assumed there was a close tie between institutionalized politics and social movements. Marks and McAdam suggest that social-political movements usually develop parallel to state structures and that causation moves in both directions. Again the French case is the classic example. They (Marks and McAdam 1996: 99) suggest that this interaction “is perhaps clearest in the French case, where prototypical movement groups and/or political parties – as represented by the various revolutionary factions – coexist with embryonic state structures.”

The Role of the Military in Nation Building

Literature on the role of the military in nation building has generally focused on the economic and political role of the military in development. Nicola Ball (1981) examined the role of armies in nation building in the third world. She notes that most of the studies have focused on the new nations coming out from colonial rule in the years after World War I. Although these are studies of more modern cases, they discuss some of the different roles of the military, especially in the transition period from monarchy or empire to nation. Many Western social scientists writing in the 1960s and 1970s considered the military to be the most important influence in nation building and suggested this was due to their organizational capabilities, technical training, nationalism, and refusal to cater to the political elites. Other important factors were the education of soldiers in modern attitudes, in use of money, scheduling, and understanding bureaucracy. The structure, discipline and organizational skills of the military were thought to be the right combination needed to effect the necessary changes. However, coordination of government policies uses different skill sets.

Diane E. Davis (2003) found that the literature on the relationship between armed forces and political development focused on the relationship
between the military and regime type more than on the military and state formation. She also notes that studies have been on the role of military or the transition from military regimes to other forms of government in the second half of the 20th century. Davis notes several problems with these studies. The first is that analysis has focused on regime types as democracy or authoritarianism or totalitarianism. It is generally held that the military is under civilian control in a democracy. It was therefore assumed that the military was therefore not a significant political actor in democratic regimes. But she concludes that the military’s power and political influence do not fit so exactly into categories of regime types. Newer studies assume military and state will separate as a country moves from authoritarianism to democracy. Another limitation Davis finds in the literature is that it assumes the military is led by elites and that its main role is external security. It ignores the reality that armies can be used in civil society in many ways. A third problem is lack of recognition of the influence of military personnel in various social, political and economic institutions.

Christopher Clapham and George Philip (1985) discuss the relationship between regime type and the military. The category that is more relevant to this paper is what they call the breakthrough regime. Although neither France nor Turkey started their republics with military regimes, some of the characteristics of the breakthrough regime also fit Revolutionary ideology and actions. The breakthrough regime is the radical reforming regime. It often involves lower level officers of the military and coups against monarchies are the clearest examples. In a breakthrough regime, the military attacks a social order that it views as a threat to its radical nationalism. The breakthrough regime is offensive and there is usually some mobilization of citizens. This is also a tool for unity as others then take on the values of the military.

According to Davis, the military is more deliberate than most social organizations in its teaching of structure-related values. Militaries generally have more authoritarian values related to hierarchical structures. They also tend to value discipline, efficiency, group unity, nationalism, and the particular type of group dynamics that come from spending time together in isolation from the rest of society. But their hierarchical structure makes it difficult for them to implement more than basic political organization.

**Nation Building in France**

In the late 1780s the French monarchy was facing serious financial problems. This was partly because of its military support of the American Revolution. It was compounded by severe bread shortages caused by a very bad harvest in 1788. Louis XVI decided to try to get the support of the people. He summoned delegates from the three estates made up of the
nobles, clergy and the general masses for the first time since 1614. The deputies from the Third Estate made up the biggest group. They wanted a voice that was more proportional to their size. On June 17, 1789 they passed a resolution making national consent a requirement for government action and calling themselves the National Assembly. Keitner (2007:1) asserts that this recognition of “the political power of nationhood” changed French and world politics forever.

The new activists formed the idea of nation as a legitimate alternative to the monarchy. Louis XIV had centralized power under the monarchy more than most other kings. The *parlements*, law courts made up of aristocrats, reacted by trying to protect their power. The political concept of the nation as separate from the king and state gradually developed during these conflicts between the king and the *parlements*. In earlier usage, the Crown, the State and the Nation were used interchangeably. The idea of the nation was first in reference to the general French population. Later it developed more into the idea of the nation as a source of legitimate political power to challenge the exclusive power of the king. Keitner (2007:25) examines an early French definition of nation that appeared in the 1789 *Catéchisme national*. This definition included the ideas of freedom, selection of leaders and submission to law. Everything that belonged to the nation was considered national. This therefore included everything from dress to dinnerware to language to rituals. Language and symbols were very important in creating the new sense of national identity.

The ethnic or organic definition of nation emphasizes historical genealogical kinship relations as well as common language and culture. The civic or voluntarist definition was influenced by the Enlightenment. It was based on rational connections between citizens and polity. France is usually considered to be an example of a voluntarist nation. But several writers argue that nation building in practice is not as straightforward as theory makes it seem. Using the ethnic-civic dichotomy can be useful but it can also add confusion. Kaufmann (2005), for example, thinks that those involved with constructing the nation also construct understandings of state and of nation. Some nations focus more on the civic aspect and some on the ethno-cultural aspect. Some try to work with both. He suggests that pre-modern political traditions tend to have a more ethnic interpretation whereas more recent traditions tend to have a more civic interpretation. France is an example of a nation where the two interpretations were expressed at the same time. The 1789 Revolution was a modern civic expression of nation-state. But the canceling of citizenship of foreign revolutionaries by Jacobin authorities in 1792-94 was based on an ethno-cultural interpretation.

Kaufman stresses the limitation of the civil-ethnic paradigm and
instead suggests that the “real” national identity is tied to the dominant ethnic group. He argues that the key is found in the interpretation. For example, language can be a sign of either civic or ethnic nationalism. The motivation behind the French policy of linguistic homogeneity after 1793 might, for example, have been to exclude non-ethnic French as well as to draw in the ethnic French in the peripheries. But since language has a voluntary element, it can also be used to argue for the liberal or civic interpretation of nation. Kaufman concludes that the French idea of nation can be interpreted either way – “It all depends on how much emphasis you place on the ‘civic’ moments—the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the participation of foreign revolutionaries—versus the ‘ethnic’ ones. Such as territorial demarcation, linguistic standardization and the expulsion of foreigners.” (Kaufman 2005:47)

Hobsbawm’s discussion of the French concept of nation also shows the confusion between the ideal and practice. He states that in the French concept, nation was linked to territory, not to ethnicity or language. French experts refused to make spoken language a criterion of nationality. They argued that nationality was based on citizenship. But at the same time, Hobsbawm acknowledges that in practice, the Jacobins were suspicious of those who did not speak French. Ideally, French identity was not based on having French as mother tongue but on “the willingness to acquire this, among other liberties, laws and common characteristics of the free people of France” (Hobsbawm 1990:21). In order to become a member of the French nation and a citizen, it was necessary to learn French.

Many writers have claimed that France’s borders are ‘natural.’ This substantiates their conviction that their borders are unchangeable. The phrase “France is one and indivisible” was first expressed by the revolutionaries in 1793 but then enshrined in the constitution. France is therefore not only the people but also the land and scenery within its territory. But establishing the territorial boundaries is one of the first requirements of nation building. The first function of the territory is that it provides an identity. It is the shared heritage of all citizens. The second function of the territory is to unify. At the beginning of the Revolution 86 departments of the same size with equal access to authorities were created. This continues to be an important aspect of territorial equality today.

French nationality was based residence within the established territory. Therefore the fact that some citizens spoke other languages was not important to their identity as French people. Del Pup (2005) uses the terms revolutionary-democratic and nationalist instead of the more standard civic-voluntarist or ethnic-organic to describe the new nation. He argues that the French concept of a nation, at least at the time of the French revolution,
was contrary to any standard definition of nation. The revolutionary-democratic perspective was unusual for its time because it did not consider common ethnicity or language as necessary for the definition of a nation.

Keitner (2007) however argues that voluntarist states actually have to start with some kind of ethnic or organic group. The idea of ethnicity can be invented but there needs to be something to use as a basis for building national cohesiveness. There must be a sense of common identity and commitment for members to be willing to obey the rules set up by its leaders. One of the ways to create cohesion, commitment and compliance is through revolution. Revolution challenges the political and territorial make-up.

During the years of the French Revolution, the idea of nation was strongly connected to the idea of self-determination. The connection between nationhood, political legitimacy and civil liberties is generally attributed to the French Revolution. However the French Revolution also showed the struggle between ideas of nationalism and liberalism. The Revolutionaries claimed to follow liberal and inclusive principles but used oppressive measures to bring about change. Voluntarist definitions of nation can be manipulated for political ends. Since the French concept of nation was newly developing, they needed to build internal policies that would help create a strong national identity. During the Revolution, unity often came at the price of inclusiveness. There was a high cost to homogeneity and unity. Policies like language homogeneity meant that there was forced compliance to use the new national language.

One of the key thinkers of the Revolution was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He was influential in the reconceptualization of legitimate political authority. Rousseau thought that governmental institutions emerged from the will of the people. He saw the people as a single, unified entity. The French concept of solidarity, based on Rousseau’s ideas, ended up defending an idea of popular sovereignty that limited diversity and individual freedom. It tended to be exclusive and to enforce conformity. Keitner (2007:41) identifies the ideological struggle underlying Revolutionary thought: “The French Revolution was torn between individualist and collectivist principles and priorities.” But the emphasis on the collective took priority. They believed that the community, which emphasizes social networks, actually blocked the individual’s absorption into the republic. The Revolutionaries thought it should be the state, not the community that creates the social bond and social structure. In order to build the kind of single society they envisioned, the Revolutionaries expected exclusive allegiance to the Revolutionary nation. Associations with guilds, the Church, the province, and other community social structures were discouraged.

The new ideology also separated the concept of nation from that of
state. This made it easier to mobilize the people. According to the French Revolutionary model, the nation-state represented the collective national will. The concept of the nation was originally developed to create a viable alternative to oppose the state as represented by the monarchy. They needed to create a new national identity to appeal to the hearts of the people in order to bind them together. Before the Revolution, the main bond was allegiance to the king. The nation had been defined by the kings. The territory was based on the boundaries of the king’s administration. The Revolutionaries now assumed that those with a French “heart” were willing to live together in the new nation of France. Revolutionary leaders intentionally created a sense of national solidarity. They used symbols, ceremonies and festivals. But they also used executions, purges, and exclusion to get rid of the people they decided were undesirable.

The French nation started with an emphasis on voluntarism. But when the Revolutionaries moved from theory to practice, they found that in order to build the necessary cohesion, they had to include nonvoluntarist definitions. One example of this was the need to define and defend the territorial boundaries. In theory, the boundaries were established according to the wishes of the people. But in practice, the boundaries were set by the people in power. Once the boundaries were set, they were considered inviolable. The concept of national unity meant that no part could be separated. The Revolutionary leaders wanted to block any possible internal threat so they preached the idea of France as a unitary nation. Sovereignty now existed in the unitary body of French citizens instead of in God or in the king. This model does not allow for diversity. Leaders of the new republic did not want to follow the more liberal model of the US that allowed for pluralistic institutions. The conceptual separation of king, nation and state in France emerged out of the political ambition of the French aristocrats and the rational thinking of the Enlightenment. Over time, the new understanding of nation gradually redefined the state.

One of the roles of the National Assembly was to deliberately form policies that would help create a sense of national identity. Legislation was one of the essential tools used to achieve social and legal uniformity. The Revolution began in 1789 and the Republic was proclaimed in 1792. One of their first steps was to put laws in place to bring all of France under one common law. Another important change was to recognize the citizen as a political player and the embodiment of the nation. In France, the law has the highest value. The citizen is the source of the law but the law also says the citizen is ‘sovereign.’ Some of the measures that were introduced by The First Republic and continue in effect today are:

- The Declaration of Human and Citizen’s Rights;
- Reorganization of land that allowed centralization of power; and
Introduction of the *Code Civil*.
The Code Civil of 1804 had several important aspects. One of the additional objectives of each of these was to bring standardization that would first allow opening of the national market and then the external market. The Code Civil led to the adoption of the metric system, to monetary stability, to linguistic and administrative policies with French as the common language, and to the destruction of the old province system.

National identity was defined by both ideological and cultural criteria. One of the most important of the cultural criteria was to make French the national language. Even before the unilingual emphasis of the Revolution, there had been attempts to increase centralization through usage of French. The first official common usage of French dates back to a 1539 edict making French the required language of official communications. Identifying a common language is one of the first priorities in nation building. The Revolution focused on two aspects of standardization. The first was to only allow French in public places and on billboards. The second was to divide the country into roughly equal ‘departments.’ These measures helped everyone feel that they belonged to the same nation and that they were equally citizens of a republic and capable of input. Another early priority was education. Education was critical in ethnic assimilation. Education and language policies were closely linked. Only French reading and writing were taught. Since none of the other dialects were in written form, they lost their influence.

Keitner (2007:77) argues that enforcement of language policies was another area where nonvoluntarist elements were evident. She states that, “campaigns to enforce linguistic uniformity became a central means of promoting and disseminating the new regime’s policies. Language was envisioned as an essential tool for forging unity and concretizing identity.” The universal use of French was to make communication easier as well as facilitate recognition of members of the nation from non-members. Language was chosen as one of the marks of membership and considered to be the main tool of assimilation. Language homogeneity was also needed to ensure understanding of and compliance to the new laws. Enforcing language homogeneity also made it harder for counterrevolutionaries to operate since they tended to use other dialects. Education and language policies were essential in creating national identity. But they were also essential in training a populace that could participate in political life. Language and education were tools to help reach the new objective of equality.

Three of the objectives of the 1789 Revolution that took many years to put into practice were secularization, mass education, and equality. Although one of the goals of the Revolution was to break the power of the
clergy, the Church and State were not officially separated until 1905. Primary education was not compulsory for both boys and girls until the laws of 1881 and 1884. As part of the same laws, civic instruction replaced religious instruction in the schools in 1882. This was another step towards secularization. Religion, language and other differences became part of the private sphere. Secularism was restated in the 1958 Constitution. In spite of the emphasis on citizen rights and equalities and the 1789 Declaration of Rights, women’s suffrage did not take place in France until 1944.

The military also played a significant role in the early years of nation building. Feigenbaum argues that the linguistic and national integration of France began with the army. He asserts that “The French Revolution was surrounded on all sides by hostile powers, and the solution to the defence of the republic was a conscript army” (Feigenbaum 1997:66-67). This was an innovation. Most armies in Europe were mercenary and captained by aristocrats. But in order for this conscript army to be able to work, they had to be able to understand their orders in French. Thus the army became a vehicle for both mass education and language learning.

The French Revolutionaries also thought that they had found the ideal model of nationhood. They thought that they had legitimate reasons to try to force their nationalist movement on other nations and to bring their version of liberty to those oppressed by monarchies. The army was not only important in putting down counterrevolutionaries and defending the territory, it was also active in spreading the political vision of the Revolutionaries through military campaigns. This led to instability in Europe and a decade of war.

One of the important military and political leaders was Napoleon 1 (1769-1821). He was a general during the Revolution and in 1799 led a coup to become the First Consul of the French Republic. Later he declared himself Emperor. He led the armies against almost every European power. Through military victories and alliances, he led France to gain control of most of continental Europe until an unsuccessful invasion of Russia in 1812. He was finally defeated by the British in 1815 at the Battle of Waterloo. Napoleon is remembered especially for his military successes and the Napoleonic Code or Code Civil of 1804 mentioned above.

The army played a significant role in nation building in France that is still celebrated today. Elgenius (2005) describes what can be learned about a nation from its National Day. She argues that the National Day is central to nation building because its collective rituals help build collective identities. National Days are usually connected to historical events symbolizing the birth of the nation. Everything from the location of the ceremony to the flags, emblems, music, and other aspects of the celebration is significant in rallying people emotionally to an idealized standard of national identity. Her
analysis of the 14 July celebrations in France shows that the importance of the military in nation building is reenacted every year. Elgenius states that the focus of the French National Day celebration is almost warlike, with a solemn military parade demonstrating the strength of French defence and solidarity. She argues that French military strength and military victory have been associated with 14 July since its official establishment as National Day in 1880. She (Elgenius 2005: 368) claims that “the French National Day has been drained of its original political and historical substance.” It symbolizes the end of the monarchy and the beginning of the Republic. The national anthem, the Marseillaise, calls the citizens to battle. The focus on 14 July seems to be to show that France is ready to deal with aggression. She observes that the precision of the parades of armed forces and emergency services as they march down broad streets gives the impression that they can deal with any domestic violence and that they were historically able to deal with the many internal fights after the Revolution. The wide boulevard that today’s soldiers march down were originally designed to allow room for the army to manoeuvre against any domestic revolutionary forces.

**Nation building in Turkey**

According to the ethnic conception, a nation is a population with a story of common descent, history, culture and territory as well as a sense of solidarity. According to this definition, the population does not necessarily have to be of same ethnicity. Ethnic categories can be broad and stories interpreted to bring a sense of common kinship. For example, many pre twentieth century residents of what is now Turkey were basically unaware of their ethnic ties but they had a strong sense of solidarity. Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, took this concept and tried to build a common story of origin for the people of Anatolia dating back to the Hurrians and Hittites of the second millennium BC.

In Turkey, the French model of nation building was predominant but some aspects of the German model can also be seen. Atatürk is highly revered by Turks. He is seen as the savior of the Turkish people from their enemies. Atatürk is considered by Turks and many non-Turks as the greatest nation builder of modern times. His vision was optimistic and humanist. His nationalism was against segregation and integrative. Atatürk’s main nationalism orientation is political. (Andrew Mango 1999; Emre Kongar 1986)

What is a definition of a nation in Turkey? Atatürk gave the shortest definition as “a Turk who is anybody who lives within the borders of the
Turkish Republic.’ This is the same voluntarist type of definition as used by the French Revolutionaries in their definition of nation. The emphasis is on those who live within the designated territory as well as on the land itself. Others have emphasized the importance of common culture and common goals. Identification of common culture and goals leads to a more subjective definition and a cultural description of a nation (Emre Kongar 1986; Ergün Özbudun 1997). Atatürk’s definition of nation, however, does not emphasize roots or race. The Turkish understanding of nation is as a political and social community representing the unity of people with common language, culture and goals. The Turkish nation is also made up of the individuals who built the Republic of Turkey. In this definition, Atatürk deliberately used the singular for “person” rather than the plural for “people.” His concept of national identity is communicated as a personal statement of identity as a Turk, but yet a personal identification with the collective whole. This emphasis on primary personal identification with the nation as a Turk was also intended to break down the identification with subgroups and emphasize the individual’s allegiance to the nation. This means that being Turkish does is not connected to religion, race, or language. The main religious communities of Turkey include Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims; Alevis; Yezidis; Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christsains; Jews; and Zoroastrians. The main racial groupings include ethnic Turks, Kurds, Caucasians, Romans (Gypsies), Rums (Anatolian Greeks), Assyrians, Armenians, Persians, and Arabs. Yet the concept of ‘ethnic’ hardly exists in Turkey. The fundamental ideology is, “Ne mutlu turkum diyene” [How blessed is the who says “I am a Turk.”] is fundamental ideology. This ideology is based on the French ideal of national identity, “Ben Fransizim diyen herkes Fransizdır” [“Everyone who says “I am French” is French.”] According to this definition, voluntary nationalism is a fundamental right and freedom (Emre Kongar 1986; Ergün Aybars, 1997).

The consolidation of the nation-state system was at its peak during the first quarter of the 20th century, especially after World War I. Atatürk and his colleagues used the principle of revolution rather than social evolution to build the new nation of Turkey. Biray Kırlı (2002) states that the goal of the nation-state is an integrated population of active citizens with common culture, laws, and policies.

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29 October 1923. The Republic was a new nation forged out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottomans sided with Germany in World War I, the Allied powers occupied different parts of what was to become Turkey as a prelude to carving it up. However, Atatürk rallied the people and successfully led
the War of Independence to oust all the occupying powers. Atatürk and his supporters first determined what they considered to be the enviable borders of Turkey. İsmet İnönü, as the Foreign Minister of the Republican Assembly, negotiated and signed (24 July 1923) the Treaty of Lausanne which established the modern boundaries (other than the province of Hatay that joined by referendum in 1939). Shortly after these settlements, the Republic was declared with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founding President and İsmet İnönü as the founding Prime Minister. The Republic of Turkey was founded on the French Revolutionary model.

In order to be able to strictly focus on nation building and creating a nation identity, they started with a single-party system. The CHP (People’s Republican Party) was founded by Atatürk and was the only party for the first number of years. Its goal was to form, apply and defend principles of revolution. They wanted to be able to plan and implement quickly and to avoid the long, drawn-out process of change. The Secretary General of the CHP Recep Peker, at the Party Congress of 1936 and in lectures at the University of Istanbul, stated that energetic, joint action was necessary. Kirli (2002) also stressed that they particularly wanted to avoid what they saw as the wastes and struggles of individualism and liberalism. Atatürk stressed that they were following a European rather than an American perspective with a system other than liberalism as their goal. He emphasized that the revolution was both in Turkey’s institutions and its ideas.

Like the members of the French Third Estate, the original goal of the Jön (Young) Turks was reformation within the system, rather then revolution. However, pre-Republican attempts at reform did not last. A constitution and parliament were set up in 1876 but only lasted for 14 months. The Jön Turks were officially called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). With their visions of nationalism, they took over what remained of the Ottoman Empire in a military coup in 1908. They had ideas of pan-Turkism and some had ideas of pan-Islam. Some writers claim that their attempts to impose a Turkish rather than an Ottoman identity on other remaining regions of the empire was one of the factors in other versions of nationalism growing through the region. In 1908 the Constitution and parliament were restored. This did not have much effect on the life of the people but did give the reformers a chance to gain education and experience. They held power until 1918, during the turbulent period of World War I. Growing ethno-cultural nationalist movements, promises by members of the Allied Nations to support post-war bids for independence, post-war occupation of parts of Turkey by Allied forces, and struggles for national identity were all factors in the deportations, wars, and purges of religious and ethnic minority groups during this period. Like French
Revolutionaries, Turkish Revolutionaries sometimes took a strong position against those they considered to be working against the nation that was being defined.

Ottoman culture was characterized by the centrality and totality of the state. Most authority was feudal although there was some elementary democracy in the villages. The people basically had high taxes and long periods of military duty but no real benefit from the state. They lacked security. Nevertheless, the people tend to be strong and very loyal to their leaders. This was a significant factor in Atatürk’s success. Once he was able to win the community and spiritual leaders over, they in turn drew their people behind Atatürk and continued to support him with fierce loyalty.

Webster (1939) writes from personal observation of the first years of the Republic and concludes that the main differences between the Ottoman constitutional period and the Republic are that:
1) The Republic leadership is remarkable,
2) The Republic leaders have learned from the mistakes of their predecessors, and
3) The Republic leadership has the advantage of a national integrity as opposed to the disintegration of the Ottoman constitutional period.

The fact that the state had been highly centralized under the Ottomans meant that the people were used to the state taking responsibility for everything. It therefore made sense for Atatürk and the reformers to use grand legislation to initiate changes. The earlier attempts at parliaments had not managed to move beyond debate to action. This made it practical to begin the Republic with a single-party system. The Republican Constitution was adopted within six months of the declaration of the Republic. Part of the reason this was possible was that the reformers had had fifteen years of experience first with the Hamidian constitution reinstated after the 1908 coup and then with the Constitutional Act of the 1920 Kemalist (Atatürkist) provisional government.

The reforms of the first three years focused on acceptance of the constitution, law codes and separation of state and religion. Although several languages were (and are) spoken in Turkey, the constitution named Turkish as the language of the nation. The change in the workweek, alphabet reform and adult education followed by compulsory state primary education raised literacy and education levels and changed work patterns. This prepared the way for the economic reforms with the adoption of the metric system and then fixed-price merchandising instead of bargaining.

Kirli attributes the fact that these dramatic social political changes did not lead to a counterrevolution largely to both the decadence of Islam and the prestige of the CHP government. Religion and state had strongly overlapped under the Sultanate-Caliphate. With the abolishment from the
Constitution of Islam as official state religion in the fifth year, there was a clear separation of state and religion. Loyalty to the republic became stronger than loyalty to God. Gradually other laws were put in place that transformed the religio-cultural behaviour of the people. These included adoption of surnames and abolition of religious dress in public.

The Republican government was quick to make legal changes to provide equality under the law. Although the law gave equal civil status to non-Muslim and Muslim Turks, Webster observed that there was some cultural lag in the application of this. Under the Civil Code, women received equal property, marriage and divorce rights in the third year, municipal voting rights in 1930, and national voting rights in 1935. Women were elected to the First National Assembly in 1935. In addition there were women village presidents and city council members. Almost all women voluntarily cast off the veil as being outmoded.

When the CHP met for their Congress in the fourth year, they focused on 4 main principles:

1. Republicanism,
2. Nationalism,
3. Populism, and
4. Laicism.

At their next Congress four years later, they added:

5. Étatism, and
6. Revolutionism.

Étatism was adopted because of the failed attempt the previous year to form the Liberal Party. Atatürk and the CHP thought that the nation was ready to move into multi-party politics and so had approved the formation of an opposition party. However, when they realized that some thought that this was an opening for counterrevolutionary activity, they delayed the establishment of the multi-party system so that they could give more time for the people to understand democracy. At the same time, continuation of the single-party system allowed them to continue the positive efforts required for the speed of the reforms.

The military has played a significant role in Turkish nation building throughout its history. The Jön Turk movement was essentially made up of military officers. They were active during the last years of the Ottoman Empire in trying to implement reforms. They set up a military government starting with a coup in 1908 and ending in 1918. In addition, the popularity of the leaders of the new Republic such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Enver Paşa was largely based on their legendary military successes. Although ethnic differentiation (the millets) was important to the Ottoman economy, it was an obstacle to building a modern, integrated
nation. The military with its conscript and professional soldiers played a significant role in achieving linguistic and national integration.

Although Atatürk had courted the support of the religious orders, guilds, and other politico-organizational groups for support in the preparation period for the War of Independence and establishment of the Republic, he also knew these organizations had their own loyalties. Like French Revolutionaries, he was concerned that these groups would perpetuate their own socio-religious cultures and allegiances. The reformers wanted to eliminate many of the old institutions, symbols and traditions associated with Ottoman culture and Islam. Their goal was to create a secular, western society. Therefore all religious orders were outlawed in 1925. These were groups that had been part of the initial shaping of the nation but were closed down to make sure they did not become centres of unrest or challenge to the new regime.

Comparison of French and Turkish cases

Many writers have argued that Turkey is struggling to find its identity, especially because of its unique geo-political position between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Even during the Ottoman Period when Istanbul was the capital of an empire that for a time encompassed most of the Middle East, the Ottomans had strong connections to Europe and a desire to be more Western. This was natural since the mothers of many of the Sultans were from European royal families. However, since the beginning of the Republic, Turkey has had a very intentional policy of westernization. Atatürk and the Republicans equated westernization with modernization. They built institutions and formed many of their policies to help meet these objectives. For a long time Turkey has tried to be accepted as part of Europe. Under the Republic, Turkey has tended to define its national identity in relation to Europe. More recently this has been in relation to the European Union. However, it is important to go further back in history and consider that perhaps it was first the Europeans who began to form their identity in relation to the Turks.

A thousand years ago, when the Turks and Vikings were invading mainland Europe, Europe limited government other than the Roman Catholic Church which at that time had finally formally separated from the Orthodox Church centred in Istanbul (then Constantinople). The Holy Roman Empire was essentially a religious system and did not provide the government structure that was needed for dealing with local affairs. Turks on the other hand have a long history of governmental and military organization. It was the success of the Vikings and Turks that forced the Europeans to organize some kind of a defence system. This was one of the factors leading to the development of the feudal system. Over the next
thousand years, Europe continued to create its identity in relation to the different groups of invading Turks and eventually the Ottomans. Because Europe formed its identity in relation to the Turks, Europeans have always identified them as the enemy, as the other, as the barbarians.

Meanwhile, as the Europeans came out of their Dark Ages and began to gain identity and power, and to build their own empires, the Ottoman Empire began gradually to collapse. Over time, just as the Europeans had shaped their identity in relation to the more powerful Turks, as Turks began to lose their power, they began to shape their identity according to the ascending Europeans. Briefly, at the end of almost 900 years of Turk-European struggles for power, the Turks finally found themselves decisively on the powerless side at the end of World War I. The Ottoman Empire had finally collapsed. However, the imminent break-up of all remaining territories among various European powers was too strong a blow to what remained of Turkish identity. Atatürk, the leader of the victorious defence of Turkish territory against Allied attack at Gallipoli, became the natural ‘saviour’ to lead the peoples of Anatolia and part of Thrace to establish their own independent nation. The new Republic of Turkey on the one hand challenged the prevailing perceptions that Europe had finally rendered Turks powerless. On the other hand, it bowed to the reality that Europe was, at that time, more progressive, prosperous, and powerful and so chose to now try to shape its identity according to that of Europe.

Since the times of the Crusades, there have always been enclaves of peoples with French sympathies in Anatolia. Throughout much of the Ottoman Empire and even into the 1980s, many of the elite and the religious minorities spoke French. During the activist period of the Jön (Turkish spelling of the French jeune) Turks, many were in exile in France and busy translating French pamphlets and literature to send into Turkey. The elites were fascinated with French culture and literature. This long term fascination with France and with the Enlightenment made the French Revolutionary model of nation building a natural choice for Turkey.

Issues of nation building in both France and Turkey centre on the challenge of including different cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic ‘nations’ in the first usage of the word in the formation of the territorial, political ‘nation’ according to the second usage of the word. There were both similarities and differences in the processes of centralization, language and education reform and general nation building in France and Turkey. As Keyder (1987) points out, the Young Turks who took control in 1908 were trained in military schools and were strongly influenced by French republicanism as well as the French Comtians. The historical and ideological link between France and Turkey makes a comparative study logical.
In their study of causality in the democracy – regime type relationship, Mousseau and Shi (1999) consider how anterior, concurrent and posterior war may affect democracy. They conclude that war involvement might lead to post-war change in leadership, especially in democracies, and that war might actually have a positive affect on the development of democracy at the systemic level. France and Turkey are both examples of the anterior war effect leading to shifts in regime type and leadership. Clapham and Philip’s findings on the breakthrough regime (mentioned in section two) also fit here. The 1908-1918 Jön Turk government could be classified as a breakthrough regime. The breakthrough regime tends to come from lower level officers who are more intent on changing the social order and in establishing rights for the people. This applies to both revolution situations in France and Turkey. Both countries practiced selective mobilization by conscripting civilians into the army and then using the conscript army in nation building. After the end of the Jön Turk regime, Turkey had five years of transition to establish the Republican government and to begin separation from direct military involvement in the government. France’s military was not so directly involved in instigating the French Revolution but Napoleon’s 1799 coup gave greater importance to the military and Napoleon used his position as military and political leader to engage in wars throughout Europe. France took some years to transition to a more democratic type of government.

In Turkey and France revolutionaries maintained a strong hold on government for the first years of nation building. France’s political centralization started under the absolutist kings. It was continued by Napoleon I basically because it made it easier to efficiently run and control a diverse country. Atatürk also chose to initially maintain the strong centralization that had been present under the Ottomans.

The French Revolution (1789) that led to the establishment and building of the Republic of France had a significant effect, even during that period, on reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Davison (1988) notes that many consider that the Ottoman process of westernization began under the reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807). He claims that Turkey’s westernization began with military reforms using France as the model and with French advisors. Both countries began their nation building with revolutionary ideas and single parties. After national identities had been established, civilian education improved, and a common language established, both countries were able to move to multi-party systems with more democratic popular participation. It seems however that both France and Turkey are swinging from a more leftist cycle with emphasis on social issues to stronger central authority and more rightist tendencies.
Turkey and Atatürk principles and France refuse to recognize minorities based on race, language, etc. They are strongly against any segregation and any division of territorial integrity. Because of historical issues, Turkey has specific recognition of the rights of Christian and Jewish religious minorities in order to protect them. But the state is officially secular. Both countries also restrict religious dress as part of their secularization policies.

Conclusion

Smith (1991) comments that scholars usually date the beginning of nationalism to the period surrounding the French Revolution or, alternatively, to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both of these periods are significant in the development of conceptual models of ‘nation’ and the dominance of the nation-state throughout the twentieth century. As one of the first examples of the nation-state, the political, economic, cultural and linguistic revolutions that transformed France became a model for many other emerging nations. Turkey was one of these. As the Republic of Turkey struggled to rise out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century, Turkey’s elite relied heavily on the French revolutionary model. In order to better understand the contemporary relevance of the concept of nation, it is important to look at historical cases such as France and Turkey. France is an early model of the modern nation-state. Since France had little in the way of models to draw on, it took almost 150 years to process from revolution to full popular participation in nation building through mass education and women’s suffrage.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Young Turks began building a new nation. World affairs plus internal political, ideological, social, and economic factors came together to trigger a huge revolution. Since the eighteenth century, reforms under the Ottomans had generally followed the French example. It was therefore natural for the emerging nation of Turkey to take France as its model of both revolution and nation building. It took France 150 years to build the nation from Revolution and declarations of liberty and equality to their mass application. Using France as a prototype, Turkey was able to implement many of the same elements of nation building in only fifteen years.

France and Turkey are both examples of intentional nation building with concepts of nation and national identity formed by the elite with the goal of building better societies. Both have transformed their respective societies. There have been gains and losses. Setting national standards has often meant the loss of regional cultures, languages and traditions. This study on the early stages of nation building in France and Turkey only provides an
introduction to the processes of nation building that will continue as long as nations exist.

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SECURING ‘FROM WITHIN’:  
THE EU POLICIES IN TRANSNDISTRI

Mariya Polner

Abstract

The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted not only into independence for Moldova. It also served as a push factor for the secessionist conflict on its territory which due to its unresolved status is referred to as frozen. All attempts of the political settlement since 1990s have ended in deadlock. Interestingly, the EU policies towards Transnistria changed significantly in 2003-2004. From the ‘security consumer’ the EU has been slowly turning into the ‘security provider’.

The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the EU in ensuring security and stability through its involvement in the Transdnistrian conflict. For this purpose the study will focus on EU-Moldova relations and the instrument it dedicates to ensuring stability, the EU Border Assistance Mission.

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Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted not only into independence for Moldova. The conflict in Transdnistria, received as a legacy of the Soviet empire, had several important features. It resulted in fewer casualties and was rather short. It also did not have an ethnic, religious or historical background that would date back for centuries. Therefore, it has always been considered that the likelihood of its resolution was higher than in other cases. Nevertheless, despite numerous attempts to achieve a viable solution, the negotiations stalled, thus turning this dispute into another frozen conflict. Why would then a country with an overall population of 3,4 million people (United Nations 2008) with a
secessionist region, inhabited by 550,000 people,\textsuperscript{12} attract so much attention from the side of the EU? The paper is dealing not only with the interests of the EU in the region, but also attempts to measure the efficiency of EU actions to provide security and stability on the borders by fighting illegal trade, corruption and illegal migration.

The analysis consists of several parts. The first one is dealing with the evolution of EU-Moldova relations from 1990s till nowadays as well as discusses the EU interests based on the European Security Strategy. The second part is devoted to the assessment of the capabilities of the EU instrument — the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, as well as analyzes external and internal factors which could impede the fulfillment of its tasks. In conclusion, an analysis of the overall impact of the EU in securing the border is conducted. It will be argued despite certain improvements the impact of the EU is limited to a number of factors, including the lack of strategic vision on security agenda.

\textbf{EU Policies and Interests in the Region}

Three stages of development can be identified in relations between the EU and Moldova. On the first stage, which can be characterised by mutual ignorance, the EU was treating Moldova exclusively within a broader framework of its relations with Newly Independent States. Therefore, the policies it adopted did not differ from the policies adopted in relation to other countries in the region. At that period Moldova was also not prone to foster cooperation with the EU. In the end of 1990s Moldova started pushing the development of its relations with the EU, while the EU was still playing a ‘deaf’ game. A sudden shift from the side of Moldova identifies the second stage. Finally, the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 gave an overall impetus to the development of EU-Moldova relations in the security field and can be regarded as the third stage in their relations. Compared with two previous periods, an overall intensification of cooperation was observed. The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was built upon the ESS and consequently incorporated a strong security dimension, provided with a legal framework for cooperation with the neighbouring countries and Moldova in particular.

\textsuperscript{12} The last census in Transdnistria was conducted in 1989. The population of the region equaled to 750,000 inhabitants. Since then there was no official census organised (Ursu 2008).

The start of the first stage in the EU-Moldova relations was marked in 1994 by conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force four years later. These agreements became a standard procedure for many countries in Central Eastern Europe, thus PCA should not be regarded as an instrument designed solely for Moldova. The usual ‘package’ for the countries in the region included the launching of TACIS (Technical Assistance for CIS countries) programmes. The absence of interest of the EU to develop special relations with Moldova can be characterised by the comparison of the financial assistance via TACIS with assistance provided by other donors. For instance, for the years 1996-2001 TACIS envisaged Euro 52 million, while the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank allocated Euro 310 million and Euro 252 million accordingly (Vahl 2004, p.183). It would be fair to note that at this stage Moldova did not prioritise its relations with the EU either.

A major shift in the foreign policy of Moldova occurred in the end of 1990s, when its leadership declared Moldova’s commitment to the process of the European integration and the EU membership as a clear foreign policy objective. In 1999 a Parliamentary Committee for cooperation between the two parties was created, aiming at bidding for participation of Moldova in the Southeast European Cooperation Process and Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (Skvortova 2001, p.105). At Helsinki Summit in 1999 a decision on elaboration of common strategies of the EU with six countries from Central Eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, but excluding Moldova, was taken. This development was considered in Moldova as a fiasco of its foreign policy (Vahl 2004, p.106) and a clear signal that the EU was not distinguishing prioritising its relations with Moldova even within the context of the Eastern neighbourhood.

A gradual understanding of the need to take a closer look at Moldova started growing in the first half of 2000s. Despite the fact that the major goal of the EU was a proper implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the internal changes in the EU, such as a growing importance of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues, led to the more active developments in the EU-Moldova relations. However, as Marius Vahl (2004, p.175) points out, the intensification of relations was caused by the EU internal structural changes brought by Amsterdam and Nice Treaties.

The first referral to the Transdnistrian conflict was made in the Commission Country Strategy Paper for 2002-2006. Though the Commission considered the Transdnistrian problem, as largely Moldova’s internal issue, it
recognised that the EU should use its instruments, such as a political dialogue, in order to resolve the Transdnistrian problem (Commission 2001). No other measures were envisaged in relation to this issue as further cooperation should have been based exclusively on the implementation of the PCA.

In the beginning of 2002 British and Swedish governments took an initiative of addressing the Commission on the issue of significance of the neighbourhood and promoting the idea of a more “substantial strategy” (Joenniemi, 2007, p.143) towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. However, this call failed, partially because such strategy could be interpreted as a signal of possible membership. Nevertheless, the idea of elaborating a specific security-focused approach to the EU Eastern neighbours in the wake of the enlargement became realistic.

Apparently, security considerations did not take any place in the EU-Moldova discourse until the EU realised that the enlargement would bring the troublesome ‘frozen’ conflict closer to its border. In the end of 1990s the EU was paying much more attention to the developments of the conflict in the Balkans, while ignoring its ‘immediate’ neighbourhood. Thus, as Barbe and Kienzle (2007) have argued, such approach characterises the EU as a “passive security consumer” in its relations with Moldova.

1.2. EU-Moldova relations in 2003-2007: security and democracy promotion

As it was already noted, the ESS gave a major impetus for the intensification of EU-Moldova relations in the security sphere. Therefore, it is necessary to review the ESS in relation to the Transdnistrian conflict.

Analysis of the ESS leads to the following observations. From the strategic point of view, a so-called ‘post 9/11 syndrome’ was reflected in the ESS in several ways. Firstly, the interdependence and inter-connectedness in the globalised world, leading to a need in elaboration of common approaches and cooperation between the countries in order to secure peace and stability, were strongly emphasised in the document (Council of the EU 2003, pp.9-10, 13). Secondly, after 9/11 it became obvious that the current pillar-based structure of the EU was inappropriate to face the ‘new’ threats (e.g. terrorism, illegal migration, money laundering, organised crime). Therefore, cross-pillarisation, as a consequence of the acknowledgment of the link between internal and external security, became a reality. For instance, JHA, which was mainly aimed at the internal security
issues, received a very strong external dimension (see den Boer, Monar, 2002 and Monar, 2004).

In terms of threats assessment, a primary place was assigned to security as a major factor, contributing to stable development. A strong emphasis was also put on the strong link between conflict that generates insecurity and economic development which is consequently hampered by instability (Council of the EU 2003, p.2). These three components create a vicious circle, which does not give a country an opportunity to win a fight against poverty and become economically and politically stable. Regional conflicts are mentioned, as one of five key threats to the European security, along with state failure with its intrinsic features such as corruption and weak institutions, organised crime and terrorism. Interestingly, the definition of the regional conflicts includes not only ‘hot’ or violent conflicts, but also “frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders” (Ibid., p.4), thus drawing attention to the issue of further enlargement and ‘soft security’ problems that arise from it. Though the major emphasis is put on the Balkans, Arab-Israeli conflict, the Mediterranean area and Southern Caucasus, the task “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union” (Ibid., p.8) refers to the EU Eastern neighbourhood as well. Moreover, the ESS laid ground for the further elaboration of the concrete policy to address insecurity coming from the Transdnistrian conflict.

The ESS and further enlargement were two major factors that stimulated the elaboration of a more concrete policy towards the new neighbouring countries. Thus, the years of 2003-2004 were marked by intense negotiations on the ‘construction’ of the ENP. Originally envisaged for its Eastern neighbours, the final version of the policy included 16 countries from different regions. From its very beginning the ENP was seen as a policy to address specific security problems. For instance, the JHA External Relations Multi Presidency Programme envisaged the central place of ENP “to reinforce transnational and cross-border cooperation as regards the fight against organised crime and the control of migration” (Council of the EU 2005). Once elaborated, an existence of a very strong JHA component in the ENP emphasised a clear strong message: contributing to security and stability on the borders and in the immediate neighbourhood in order to avoid the ‘spillover’ of soft security threats such as illegal immigration, trafficking of drugs and weapons. In this respect, the ENP directly addresses wider objectives of the ESS.
Originally the ENP was designed as a technocratic policy with concrete objectives. Action Plans (AP) that are concluded with each country individually, are based on wider objectives of ENP and represent a modus operandi for the relations between the EU and a third country. Thus, as the Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2008) pointed out, the APs were tailor-made for a particular country’s needs. However, one could also observe that within the four years of its existence, the ENP has become more and more politicised (Olaf-Lang 2007, p.19), as the EU is getting involved in ambitious plans of ‘democratisation’ of its neighbourhood and even gradual changes in the political systems.

This vision corresponds to the distinguishing of two policy levels in the ENP: long-term strategic goals such as democratisation, good governance and rule of law and short-term “immediate ‘externalisation’ of regulatory responsibilities and capacities to the countries in the neighbourhood” (Kahl 2007, p.65). In line with this argument, the objective of the EU to create a stable area in its neighbourhood, which could serve as a buffer zone, preventing the ‘spillover’ of crime and control over illegal immigration, corresponds to its short-term vision.

The stabilisation of the situation and bringing prosperity and security can not take place without an active participation of the parties involved. Therefore, in order to be effective, the ENP has to be built on the bilateral rather than unilateral ground, thus requiring for cooperation in order to resolve common problems. As Wilhelms Khelangen (2005, p. 88) puts it, such relationship creates a “functional interdependence” between the partners.

The best illustration of successes and failures of the ENP is the evaluation of the AP implementation. Given a necessity to cooperate, all countries can be divided in four major groups: willing, passive, reluctant and excluded partners (Emerson 2007, p.7). While Moldova is characterised as a willing partner, Transdnistria along with other unrecognised entities, such as Abkhasia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh is an excluded one (Ibid., p.10). Having stated about its membership aspirations as the major goal in relations with the EU, Moldova is willing to cooperate. However, the exclusion of Transdnistria from the process adds certain complexity to it. Overall, relations between Moldova and the EU have gradually changed “from master-student dialogue to equal partnership where the discussions are being led at the qualitatively higher level” (Morari 2008). Thus, the Action Plan became a serious ‘push’ factor for Moldova to conduct substantial reforms. Still, out of all areas of cooperation, JHA is “one of the
most result-oriented, concrete areas, but at the same time difficult to cooperate” (Ibid.). Despite the fact that ambitions of the Moldovan government are not fully accepted in Brussels, Chisinau is very open to cooperation and ready to deliver good results.

A gradual shift in the EU-Moldova relations in 2003 should be evaluated through the perspective of a change in relations with the Eastern neighbourhood in general. The analysis shows that the Transdnistrian conflict on its own was not such a strong incentive for the EU to build ‘special’ relations with Moldova, otherwise, all security considerations and a fear of the ‘spillover’ effect could have been addressed much earlier than in the mid 2000s. Thus, a gradual involvement of the EU in the region since 2003 can be attributed more to the ‘push’ factors derived from its de-facto presence in the region.

1.3. Why get involved: threat assessment and EU interests

Being a small market, Moldova does not have much to offer to the EU. Its share in the EU overall trade reaches only 0,03 percent (Council of the EU 2008, p.8). The economic analysis in the second chapter has shown that the impact of the illegal activities on the EU market is rather negligible as well, because it relates more to the losses of the Moldovan and Ukrainian budgets. Thus, economic interests of the EU have been hardly affected. On the other hand, Moldova represents a growing market with its exports constantly increasing every year. According to one interviewee, trade balance sheets are not a major prerequisite for closer co-operation, otherwise accession of such countries like Malta and Cyprus, which represent a very small fraction of the EU trade, would have not been negotiated (Interview with the representative of the Delegation of the EU to Moldova 2008). From the economic perspective, the role of Moldova should be evaluated more from its potential in enhancing the regional trade. Interestingly, the accession of Romania to the EU has had an adverse effect on the Romanian-Moldovan economic relations, as the free trade agreement between two countries had to be abolished as one of the conditions “to bring Romania in line with the EU” (Emerson 2007, p.16). Thus, it is clear that the EU was driven not by its economic interests.

With the recent developments in the EU and because of post 9/11 syndrome security issues have attracted much more attention than before. Adoption of the ESS and ENP and their focus on the ‘new threats’ and multilateralism are the consequences of these developments. A strong emphasis of the ENP on the security component clearly illustrates that the EU has taken first steps in the security dialogue with the neighbouring
countries. The question, however, is whether the EU interests have changed because of these developments and then, as a consequence whether this change was reflected in the newly adopted policies.

In order to give an answer to this question, it is necessary to take into account several factors. Firstly, as it was previously argued, the security considerations in respect to Transdnistria were not on the EU agenda before 2002-2003. Despite the fact that there were alarming reports from the international NGOs on the issues of weapons, human and narcotics trafficking, the EU kept silent. Arguably, in the 1990s Moldova was representing a much bigger security threat to the regional security than now, however the issue of proximity to the EU borders had a crucial impact on perception of threats. Therefore, the enlargement has definitely played its role as a major ‘push’ factor for the change in the EU threat assessment in the region (Interview with an official 2008). Brussels realised that instability on its Eastern border might affect the security of the EU in the long run as well.

Secondly, once the enlargement became evident, such threats as illegal migration became more visible. In this respect the adhesion of Romania to the EU became a “wake-up call for EU policy-makers” (Barbe and Kienzle 2007, p.526). The fact of the growing numbers of applications for Romanian citizenship from the citizens of Moldova was very appealing towards elaboration of more proactive policies. The issue became of central focus for the EU, because after the enlargement the Romanian-Moldovan border was transformed into the EU external border. Therefore, it needed an enhanced level of protection.

The accession of Central Eastern European countries, as well as Romania, gave the latter an opportunity to bring its concerns on the EU agenda. As Romania is responsible for securing the EU external border, the negative implications of the common border with the ‘new neighbourhood’ became more ‘heard’ in the EU as well. Due to enlargement, it is evident that the focus on the CFSP agenda has shifted as well towards elaboration of more proactive policies in the EU ‘new’ neighbourhood.

Thirdly, there was a growing understanding that the EU could not only “look East, but ...potentially act in the East” (Popescu 2005, p.29). As it was argued above, in the wake of enlargement having a frozen conflict on the border posed a direct threat to the EU security. From this point of view, being engaged in the Balkans and Africa and neglecting security threats in the immediate neighbourhood is rather incoherent. It is important to note
that involvement of the EU would have not been possible without the success of the Orange revolution in Ukraine in December 2004 (Interview with an official 2008). The change of leadership in the country led to the change in the foreign policy priorities of the Ukrainian government, which announced about its commitment to be more involved into the conflict resolution in Transdnistria. On the diplomatic level it was a step forward in EU-Ukrainian relations as well, as the Ukraine declared EU integration as its major foreign policy objective. Taking into consideration the fact that Transdnistria shares a significant part of its border with Ukraine, the willingness to cooperate of the latter is one of the most crucial factors to combat with illegal economic activities and thus move towards peaceful settlement. Moreover, a willingness from the Ukrainian side to contribute to conflict resolution showed that finally, the EU could take concrete measures and influence the situation in Transdnistria.

So far growing security concerns from the side of the EU correspond to the changes in the external environment. From the political perspective, these changes led to growing importance of the “overlapping near abroad” (Vahl 2005, p.1) in EU-Russia relations, which did not give the EU much choice, but get involved in the Transdnistrian problem with a more proactive policy. The dominant position of Russia in conflict resolution and in the region, which has always been considered as Russia’s natural sphere of influence, has a strong potential to limit the actual impact of the EU policies. The deepness of involvement of the EU and its capabilities to have a positive contribution to the conflict settlement is one issue. However, the nominal and actual impact of its policies will always be balanced against the Russian interests.

Last, but not least, the EU has embarked on its role as a ‘democracy promoter’. The whole notion of democratisation of the Eastern neighbours is a rather recent idea in the EU. The perception of the EU as a community, based on such values as a rule of law, human rights, market economy, democracy, and social protection, and its efforts to ‘export’ these values to the other countries and regions have become more apparent in the EU external actions. As the EUSR for Moldova noted, “the next step for the EU is the democratisation of Transdnistria” (Miszei 2008). Compared with the objective of ensuring stability via the ring of ‘well-governed’ countries, the strong rhetoric from the position of democracy promotion shows that the EU active involvement in Transdnistria can not be justified exclusively on short-term security objectives. In the past the EU has been rather successful in democratisation processes in Central Eastern Europe, however this achievement is attributed to the prospect of the EU membership.
Democratisation as a policy to reach a security objective was used in the Balkans. However, in case of Balkans a membership perspective has been playing a role of the catalyst for the governments to ensure security in the region. On the contrary, in case of Moldova, achieving security via democratisation does not lead to any memberships prospects. From this respect democratisation of the immediate neighbourhood is definitely a test-ground for the EU ability to transform the neighbourhood without offering a membership perspective to the willing partners (Dannreuther 2006, p.184). At the same time, inability of Moldova to settle the conflict in Transdnistria requires the EU assistance. The EU involvement could be considered as a trade-off for the conduction of large-scale reforms in Moldova (Frohlich 2007, pp.83-84).

In general, there is a clear evolution in relations between the EU and Moldova. The relations between two parties were always tied to the wider relations of the EU with other countries. In 1990s this was attributed to the NIS framework and later grew into the ENP framework, despite the availability of certain ‘diversification’ within the ENP due to the Action Plans. The analysis in the chapter provides a considerable amount of arguments to prove that the interests of the EU have remained stable. Security problems and ‘externalisation’ of previously internal problems as well as a growing awareness of the need to cooperate with the third countries in wake of the new threats, pushed the EU to adopt special policies and instruments which could allow it to act more effectively in the changing environment. The enlargement brought the Transdnistrian problem closer to the EU and as it has already been argued, the EU had to react more consistently at this new challenge. As a result, new proactive policies were adopted.

2. EU Toolkit for Transdnistria: Assessing the Effectiveness

This chapter analyses the instruments that the EU has used to contribute to the conflict settlement. Though the appointment of the EU Special Representative for Moldova in March 2005 is also one of the tools of the EU policies in the region, for purpose of this paper, the high-level political debates are put aside. Instead, this chapter concentrates on such instruments, as the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine.

2.1. Defining a legal framework for the EU involvement

Within the ENP the Action Plan defines the framework for the EU-third country relations, thus becoming its modus operandi. The Action Plan for Moldova is designed for three years (2005-2008) and complements the PCA, which has been in force since 1998 and will expire in the end of 2008. Referring to the Transdnistrian issue, the AP offers a concrete approach. In
terms of the upgrade of the EU-Moldova relations, the AP envisaged more involvement of the EU into the conflict resolution on the political level by the appointment of the EUSR for Moldova, as well as opening of the EC Delegation to Moldova “as soon as possible” (Commission 2004, pp.1-2). Before 2005 the EC Delegation in Ukraine was responsible for relations with Moldova as well. Within this context the opening of the Delegation was a confirmation of the political will in Brussels and a sign of growing importance of Moldova on the EU agenda. Among concrete actions, envisaged by the AP, a special priority is given to effective border management, especially in the Transdnistrian sector; fighting against organised crime, money laundering and human trafficking; cooperation in the areas of security, conflict management and crisis prevention (with a special attention on fighting against trafficking of arms from the unrecognised entity and customs control of imports, exports and transit operations) and cooperation with Ukraine on the issues of exchange of information on the cross-border flow of goods and people (Commission 2004, pp. 4, 9-12). Thus, the AP renders a legal background for the elaboration of both political and technical approaches.

Following a more proactive involvement of Ukraine into conflict resolution, on 2 June 2005 the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine sent a joint letter to the Commission President Barroso and EU High Representative for CFSP Solana. The letter was requesting the EU support in the elaboration of effective border monitoring system with a special attention to the Transdnistrian segment of the border. (EU Factsheet, 2007) This letter serves as a legal background for the launching of EUBAM, which was deployed on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border on 30 November 2005 (Spokesperson of the Secretary General 2005).

2.2. EUBAM as a sui generis institutional setup

Following a joint request of the Ukrainian and Moldovan Presidents, the next two months were characterised by intense negotiations on the methods of involvement. The Commission and the Member states agreed to respond positively to the request and organised a special fact-finding Mission, led by the EUSR Adrian Jacobovitz de Szeged, which was deployed in Moldova for six days in August 2005. The main task of this mission was to evaluate the situation on the EU-Moldovan border. The fact-finding mission had to report both to the Commission and to the Member states via the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the Council (Ibid.). The mission strongly recommended to “seize the window of opportunity which may not last long” and launch the EC financed Border Assistance Mission “as rapidly as possible” (Commission 2005). The format of the new Mission was under discussion as well: a group of the Member states was insisting
on the creation of the ESDP Mission, while the Commission was claiming its full ownership. There were certain doubts regarding the capabilities of the Commission to lead the Mission. As funds for the Mission were concentrated in the Commission’s hands, the decision to launch the first Commission Mission, which would be a “joint enterprise” (Banfi 2007) of the Communities, was taken.

Interestingly, a double nature of the Mission, which in fact is a sui generis Mission from the point of view of its institutional setup, was preserved through the appointment of the ‘double-hatted’ Head of Mission (HoM). The HoM is clearly subordinated to the Commission, because the Mission is funded and managed by the latter (Ibid.) Thus, the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is responsible for EUBAM. The HoM also serves as a Senior Political Advisor to the EUSR. Despite the nature of the Mission which was created as a technical advisory body, it is operating in a very sensitive political environment where interests of many parties are involved. This leads to the necessity of constant political monitoring and supervision. The EUSR in his turn is responsible in front of the Council Secretariat and deals with the political problems, while his advisors, located in Chisinau, Kiev and Odessa, are monitoring the situation on spot. The HoM is also a head of the group of advisors. Therefore, whenever a need arises to report on the technical issues in front of the PSC, COEST and CIVCOM, the Head of Mission has to report along with the EUSR (Ibid.).

The UNDP is the implementing partner of the Mission. It has a responsibility for the administrative and logistical operations. Since the Commission has no implementation capacities, it had to outsource this task to the UNDP. It would be natural to assume that the OSCE could have taken upon the task of setting up and running the Mission. However, it would have been incorrect to involve the OSCE, because it is engaged in the “5+2” negotiations format (Ibid.)

Within this context there are several important observations to be made. Firstly, though the ideas on deployment of a border/police mission were present in the OSCE, EU and NATO back in 2003 (Interview with an official 2008), the final format and decision would have not been possible without a dramatic change on the political scene of Ukraine and a joint request by

13 All previous missions were led by the Council within ESDP framework.
14 Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
15 Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
16 United Nations Development Programme
two Presidents. This signal was very clearly understood in Brussels and thus the ‘window of opportunity’ was used at its best.

Secondly, the speed at which the EU reacted at the request is astonishing. It took the EU six months to deploy the Mission. Knowing how long the decision-making processes may take, this is definitely an achievement. From this perspective, the fact that the Mission is guided by the Commission played its positive role, as both resources and deliberations were concentrated in the latter. Thus, the Commission, having taken a highly technical approach, left the issues of politically sensitive nature and strategic coordination for the Council Secretariat (Ibid.)

Thirdly, the institutional setup of the Mission is unique. The ‘double-hatted’ position of the HoM is an innovation in the format of Missions. The same refers to its subordination to the Commission instead of the usual ESDP setting and involvement of the UNDP as an implementing partner. As there is no practice and no experience in dealing with such setup and considering that fact that operations of the Mission are being conducted both in Ukraine and Moldova (see Annex 1), the question of feasibility arises. Still, within the last three years of its functioning, the Mission has proven that this setup is working and the EU authorities state that they are satisfied with such an innovative approach (Ibid.).

2.3. Operability of EUBAM and its mandate

Once the format was agreed upon, the next step was to delineate the responsibilities of the parties. The legislative background of the terms and conditions of EUBAM operations on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border is envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding (2005), signed by the Commission and two respective governments on 7 October 2005. According to the Memorandum the tasks of EUBAM include advisory functions to the Border Guard, Customs and other law enforcement agencies of two countries; establishing the information exchange system; prevention of human trafficking and smuggling of goods; fighting against corruption and upgrading the administrative capacities of the border guard and customs services; improving the efficiency of operations etc. The Memorandum explicitly states that the Mission has no executive functions and its duties should be of “advisory or audit nature” (Ibid., p.2). Experts of the Mission closely cooperate with the representatives of the respective agencies. All disputable issues are being resolved according to the provisions of the document.
Initially, the Mission was established for two years with an overall budget of Euro 20 million. In 2007 according to the agreement between the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments and readiness of the Commission it was prolonged for two more years with the budget of Euro 24 million (EUBAM 2007, p.3). Within almost two and a half years of its operations the Mission was able to double its human resources and lobby the necessity for it in front of the Member states that second and cover expenses for their national staff. The capacities of the Mission in 2005 with 69 experts and 40 members of the national staff were very limited. By 2008 the Mission has deployed 119 experts and 111 persons of the national staff, which totals 230 persons (Ibid.).

One of the major projects to enhance the administrative capacities of the customs and border guards is the implementation of the risk analysis system, which allows performing risk assessment of goods and people crossing the border. This technique leads to abolishment of 100% search, and instead, performing targeted search based on risk assessment. Risk management system is relatively new, however it has already proven to be effective in the EU Member states (Banfi 2007). Risk management and other best European practices in the sphere of the integrated border management are not always positively received by the counterparts, because they contradict to their initial way of thinking and education.

Another example could be an objective to create joint border crossing points. The problem is not only in different levels of development of agencies in two countries, which makes cooperation more difficult in terms of capacities utilised. There are many technical and political issues at stake, such as the determination of the location of these border crossing points, sharing costs for infrastructure etc. At the moment, there are five joint border crossing points on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, two of which are not working. Accordingly, “each side has its story on why the two are not functioning” (Morari 2008). It will definitely take a long time to establish fully operational joint controls. However, a mere fact that the issue has been raised on agenda due to EUBAM recommendation is a small step forward.

The objective of establishing cooperation and enhancing exchange of information in relation to import-export procedures is vital. Otherwise, a situation where import on one side of the border is much higher than export on the other is quite common. When such situation persists, it implies that illegal activities take place on one part of the border. As mutual trust did not exist in either agency, one of the first steps of EUBAM was to
bring the services together and make them communicate. Though there was a fear that the mediating role of EUBAM could create a wrong perception of the Mission as a “post box” (Boag 2008) between the Moldovan and Ukrainian parties, this barrier was overcome. At the same time, access to information for the Mission has been a burning issue. Despite the fact that the Mission was entitled to receive information from the counterpart agencies, it faced with numerous cases when Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities used different interpretations of their national legislation to grant or withdraw access to certain documents (Interview with an official 2008). Resolution of such cases shows that success of EUBAM operations depends on the willingness of two parties to cooperate.

As cross-border economic activities involve two parties from each side of the border, the same refers to border control. From the abovementioned examples, it is clear that one of the vital issues on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border is the cooperation between the border guard and customs services in one country as well as cooperation between these agencies across the border. For a long time inter-service cooperation has existed only in the official documents, but not in practice. It comes from the Soviet legacy of the law enforcement and border control agencies, which due to their vertical hierarchy had all information concentrated on top and thus agencies were unaware of actions of their counterparts (ICG 2006). This is a problem of institutional mentality and the way of thinking in the agencies. In order to change the situation, a set of substantial reforms is needed in both countries.

Given the mandate of the Mission, one of the biggest challenges is to gain and preserve reputation in the eyes of its partners, as the only tool the Mission has in its disposal in order to influence the counterparts is ‘blaming and shaming’. The Mission can only recommend and assist how to avoid problems or how to correct mistakes. However, the task of effective patrolling the border as well as implementing all recommendations belongs to the partner agencies. As one interviewee rightly commented, “we can improve the scene, the lights the orchestra but we can not change the actors, who have to play” (Interview with the representative of the EC Delegation to Moldova 2008).

Within two and a half years of EUBAM operations it has managed to establish itself well and become reputable both in Moldova and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian agencies are much more difficult to cooperate with. This refers not only to operations of EUBAM, but also to the operations of the EC Delegations. One of the interviewees underlined that
the government of Moldova is much more open than it used to be. He also noted the following: “Now we are present in the country and the government frequently asks for our advice on pieces of legislation. Our leverage in Moldova is probably higher than in neighbouring countries [Ukraine] due to the relative importance of our assistance and considerable support for the EU among almost all Moldovan political parties” (Ibid.). As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is also important to note that the political situation is more difficult than in Moldova. The Ukrainian population is less supportive of the pro-European policies than its neighbour. Therefore, public support is reflected on the political level. Clearly, the government of Moldova has the primary interest in the functioning of EUBAM and higher commitment to cooperate by default. The Ukrainian party is more interested in strengthening its capacities and diminishing losses to its budget. Size of the countries should be also taken into consideration, as the impact of EU policies is more visible in Moldova than in Ukraine.

2.4. Assessment of internal and external aspects of EUBAM activities

The institutional analysis of EUBAM has shown that the Mission is definitely a unique setup. Its technical nature allows limiting the impact of the political factors dealt with by the EUSR team. A focus on concrete problems and a set of technical solutions in the form of recommendations and trainings have its positive contribution to the conflict resolution. As Hilde Hardemann (2008) underlined, “We looked at Transdnistria and identified areas where we could make a change for better. Avoiding political discussions we are trying to bring transparency on the Transdnistrian border”. Such neo-functionalist approach to problems helps to bring concrete results. A result-oriented and highly technical nature of the Mission is also conditioned by its ‘designer’, the Commission, which is a technical body in itself. A ‘mixture’ of police and customs expertise is also an innovation which enabled EUBAM to provide advice in the spheres, which were identified as the weakest ones in border management. When comparing EUBAM objectives to its actions on the ground, one can observe that EUBAM addresses a whole chain of problems rather than particular issues. Research and observations lead to the formulation of recommendations to the respective partner agencies. Once recommendations are put in practice, EUBAM staff monitors its implementation and advises on the methods of improving it. By means of the technical assistance EUBAM provides equipment and training needed to improve the capacities of the border agencies. Thus, instead of pure monitoring, performed by other EU Missions, EUBAM has managed to address problems in a structural way (Interview with an official 2008).
The EUBAM has been receiving a lot of attention in Brussels and assessment of its overall results has been praised by the EU politicians and decision-makers. Nevertheless, there are certain critical observations. The role of EUBAM as a facilitator to re-establish the links between the borders as well as the mediator in the dialogue between the agencies is crucial. Though cooperation is not totally a success story, positive steps have been made and with assistance of the Mission the information system to detect and prevent smuggling is in place and is being further elaborated. Cooperation takes place on all levels: grass-root, middle and top level. Still the Moldova Progress Report of 2007 (Commission 2008) clearly underlines the necessity to improve cooperation in this respect. The same recommendation refers to the inter-agency cooperation, especially “in the context of implementing an integrated border management system” (Ibid.).

Due to the work of the investigation unit, EUBAM identified key areas of smuggling which were not paid much attention to. Having disproved the myth on massive weapons and narcotics smuggling, the Mission attracted attention of the border control agencies on other forms of trafficking that divert millions of Euros from the state budgets of Moldova and Ukraine in the forms of tax evasion, customs under-valuation and smuggling through the poorly controlled borders. Through its activities EUBAM also pointed out on the car business, which generates enormous profits and hardly takes place on case-by-case basis. Still, the Commission gives a rather restrained evaluation on combating illegal economic activities on the Moldovan border, and especially on Transdnistrian part by pointing out that despite a certain progress, the border “is not properly controlled” (Commission 2008, p.3).

The major incentive of access to the preferential trade schemes with the EU if a company registers in Chisinau led to massive registration of Transdnistrian companies within the last two years and a full accountability of exports operations from Transdnistria. On 1 March 2008, the EU introduced autonomous trade preferences for Moldova. (Council of the EU 2008). Accordingly, almost all categories of Moldovan and Transdnistrian goods\(^\text{17}\), registered in Chisinau, have a duty free access to the European market. Transdnistrian goods can benefit these trade preferences on the equal conditions with the Moldovan goods, if they accomplish all requirements on registration and certification. This step from the EU is partially a result of EUBAM activities, which contributed to the improvement of the certification procedures by the Moldovan customs. Overall, the EU

\(^{17}\) Except for certain sensitive commodities, such as sugar, dairy products etc.
tied the extension of the preferential scheme to the successful implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan. Thus, given a right incentive is in place, it became possible to change the dynamics of trade flows.

The visibility of EUBAM in fight against illegal economic activities and corruption plays a certain ‘deterrence’ effect. Decreasing levels of illegal activities show that economic operators, who have been involved into illegal schemes, started behaving differently. They have either become more aware of risks to be detected and consequently stopped their activities, or found other ways of conducting them. At the same time, it is rather difficult to conduct impact assessment, because as one interviewee rightly pointed out, “we don’t know what was going on in Transdnistria before our involvement” (Interview with an official 2008). It would be also wrong to argue that presence of the Mission has ended all illegal activities on the border. In order to achieve this effect, more structural changes are needed. Still, the presence of the Mission is a certain ‘attraction pole’ for the journalists and international mass media outlets. Media attention should be also taken into consideration as one of factors that have had a positive influence on the decreasing levels of illegal activities and increased efficiency in detection of cases.

While EUBAM managed to ensure its presence on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border by having established controls on the ground, air borders are not controlled. Operations of the military airport in Tiraspol are out of control of both EUBAM and Moldovan authorities. Moreover, the Ukrainian party has been constantly refusing to provide information on air traffic from and to Transdnistria. This issue remains open, and an opportunity of transporting illegal goods is very high (Ursu 2008). It should be noted, however, that EUBAM is not authorised to have any contacts or be present on the territory of Transdnistria, therefore, this problem should be tackled by the Moldovan authorities.

As it was previously mentioned, in order to achieve fruitful results, extensive administrative reforms as well as changes in the way of thinking in the partner agencies should take place. In this respect, a several years long Mission might not have a considerable impact. Therefore, more commitment from the EU is needed. Still, the prolongation of EUBAM mandate is possible only upon a joint request of the Moldovan and Ukrainian Presidents, supported by the Commission. In 2007 the mandate of the Mission was prolonged for two more years until 2009. Further prolongation of the Mission will depend on the willingness of the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments to host it. Therefore, any change in the political
environment one of these two countries might lead to the suspension of mandate after 2009. Within this context it should be also noted that the Commission has no strategic plans on its involvement into conflict resolution after 2009 (Interview with an official 2008). On the one hand such short-term strategy that includes steps only until 2009 is based on the current mandate of the Mission. On the other hand, the Commission, being a technical body, is not responsible for the strategic policies per se. Still, such a limited horizon is rather worrisome, as ‘wait-and-see’ approach does not necessarily justify itself in the long term. Moreover, it may hamper all the activities, taken earlier, as the sustainability of EUBAM impact in case of suspension of its operations in 2009 will be under question.

Conclusions
The EU involvement in the Transdnistrian conflict has intensified since 2003. This gradual shift from total neglect to concrete actions on the ground became possible due to a mixture of external and internal factors. Guided by its security and political interests, the EU could not miss this ‘window of opportunity’ that was created by the dramatic change in the political environment in neighbouring Ukraine and took concrete steps to ensure security in the wider region. Thus, one can clearly observe the evolution from the general policies, based on standard PCA and small technical assistance packages, to democracy promotion and conflict resolution via the enhancement of capacities of the law enforcement agencies, fight against corruption and introduction of administrative reforms. These soft methods of involvement to ensure security ‘from within’ in combination with cooperation in the sphere of JHA allow the EU to be both physically present in the region and act in its ‘near abroad’ within the context of the EU-Russia relations.

With the EUBAM involvement, the EU was able to tackle the very core of the survival of the Transdnistrian authorities. A change in the external environment evolved into the protests both from the Transdnistrian and Russian parties. Though EUBAM managed to bring more visibility to the problems of illegal trade, corruption on the border and assisted in legalising export flows from Transnistria, the success of its operations and of the EU policies to ensure stability in the wider region are considerably limited by several crucial factors. Given this, quelle finalité for the EU policies in Transnistria?

Firstly, Transnistria is a point of intersection of Transdnistrian, Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian economic interests. Some of these groups are not keen on changing the status-quo and may impede further steps to bringing transparency into import-export activities. Thus, the actual impact of the
EU is still limited by the level of Russian involvement. For instance, the recognition of Kosovo may lead to the change of Russia’s position on Transdnistria. This issue should be researched further.

Secondly, the issue of inter-agency cooperation is very important, as the border has to be secured from the two sides. Recent years have shown how the change of the political climate in Ukraine might affect its willingness to cooperate. Therefore, the situation in Ukraine needs to be also properly monitored and assessed.

Thirdly, the mere fact that the EU has no concrete strategy in respect of conflict resolution after 2009 is rather worrisome. The goal of democracy promotion and creating stability and security is impossible to achieve through a short-term commitment and partial involvement. One of the most interesting issues in referral to EUBAM is the sustainability of results achieved after the Mission stops its activities. Confidence-building measures as well as administrative reforms take a long time. In order to achieve results, the way of thinking in the agencies that is based on Soviet legacy, should be changed. Otherwise, such problems as corruption and ineffective governance will always be a hindrance for a positive development. Another factor to be taken into consideration is a relatively weak leverage the EU has to make neighbours comply. As discussed in the thesis, a membership perspective has always been a very ‘tasty’ incentive. However, the motivation for conducting painful reforms without such a perspective might be too weak to bring considerable changes.

In conclusion, there is no way for the EU to turn back. The fact is that the frozen conflict is on the EU border. The geographical proximity implies that everything that will be going on in Transdnistria and in Moldova will have an effect on the neighbouring countries and, consequently, on the EU. Thus, it is in the EU interests to ensure a long-term practical commitment to the conflict resolution. Otherwise, regional stability will remain an unattainable objective of the European Security Strategy.
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RECOLLECTION OF PAST MEMORIES IN CROATIA: HOW PROCESSES OF REMEMORATION CAN BUILD A NEW IDENTITY

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Introduction
The end of Communist era and the end of Marxist-Leninist ideology that occupied the Central and Eastern European space for half a century, proved a blessing in many regards for these countries, enabling them to push forward with democratic and free-market reforms that in long run would culminate in their eventual democratization, prosperity and joining European Union. A rather awkward exception to this rule has been the former federation of Yugoslavia, which experienced an abrupt change from Tito’s somewhat relaxed communism toward a violent disintegration that cost thousands of lives, exhausted billions of dollars and left behind wreckage and devastation, whose imprints can be still distinguished. It is rather puzzling that Yugoslavia did not experience any kind of (liberal)-democratic opposition, or that long time dissidents of the communist regimes like Milovan Djilas, Dobrisa Costić or Franjo Tudjman to mention just a few, instead of being promoters of an organized opposition to the regime, were either marginalized or turned nationalists, leaving thus little room for a peaceful, democratic change that was the norm elsewhere. A lot of explanations are offered of why this violent disintegration took place and different interpretations of the empirical observations, ranging from elite conspiracies to electorate pressure to foreign intervention as the main causes of the breakdown of the state and eventually war. Nevertheless, it seems that efforts of state-building through a reshaping of the understanding of nationalist identities and the means employed for such ends have been rather missed from the existing literature, especially in the case of Croatia.

The case of Croatia is taken into analyses, given that while it was one of the two biggest states together with Serbia, little attention has been paid in the literature, which has focused almost exclusively on Serbian case and its rapid rise of nationalism and subsequently irredentism, which led to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Croatian sudden rise of nationalism and its
active irredentist engagement in Bosnia that soon followed is somewhat overlooked, especially in an interpretive, historical context. Furthermore, as Jill Irvine has put it, among the post-Yugoslav states that engaged in intra-state fighting afterwards, “state-building has developed most extensively there” (Irvine, 1997) and this process of state-building, as well as nation-building as this paper argues, was largely based on revival of memories and ‘living the past into the present’. The aim of this paper is to analyze the shaping of a new nationalist identity from the perspective of the recollection of past memories, mostly the ones from the pre-World war II period, which eventually led to the rise of a new discourse in post-communist Croatia and created the conditions for ethnic cleansing and other related phenomena that accompanied the first years of transitions.

The main question that this essay answers is how memories of pre-communist Croatia were brought into the public fora and came to be dominating the discourse of late 1980s, which in turn led to the rise of new nationalism and subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia? Proxy questions that are related to this, are: how the new (nationalist) identity was shaped by these recollection of past memories? What role did the honoring of memory of the pre-communist period came to play in the aftermath of communism in Croatia? Finally and related, if were to paraphrase French historian Pierre Nora and adopt a narrow concept of its lieux de mémoire, what role did the commemoration processes, new emblems, anthems, mottoes, or institutions, as well as men, who make possible the creation of many of the means through which “memories are perpetuated” (Nora, 1996: xvii) came to play in the aftermath of communism in Croatia and forging of the new identity?

The case of Croatia, where patterns of a desire to re(built) a post-communist identity, based on strong national identification and exclusion of the other (non-Croat), were visible and encouraged, leading to a strong executive, under the leadership of Tudjman, is telling. This rebuilding process was forged through processes of commemoration, in an attempt to (re)create the past in the present and although at first sight this may sound counter-intuitive, it aimed at state-building, rather than nation-building, as Nora would have put it. Thus, it goes along the lines of Francis Fukayama, when he reminds us that: “[the] overwhelming bulk of wars (including Yugoslavia) have not been related to democracy, but to state-building” (Fukayama, 2007).

The paper is composed of four main parts. In the first section, a general theoretical framework that draws mostly from the works of Pierre Nora and Friedrich Kratochwil is delineated. Second part deals with a short background of Croatian pre-Communist era, to follow in the next section with post-Communist Croatian commemoration of national myths. Then, it
proceeds with an overview of the recent past, referring mostly to the changes that have occurred in the post-Tudjman era and how the European and NATO integration processes have shaped a new public and political discourse that has marginalized the once predominant nationalist one. In the conclusion, main arguments and insight from the Croatian case and the way that its commemoration processes fit with the recollection of the past in a process of state-building are restated and evaluated.

**History, Memory and Identity: Theoretical Considerations**

Most of explanations that are offered in relation to the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia, which supplanted the communist ideology, are concerned (or rather fixated), with the causal relationship of events and trying to figure out why things evolved the way they did. To paraphrase Kratochwil, a combination of “knowing ‘what’ with the knowing ‘how’” (Kratochwil, 2006: 7), would yield a higher resonance of the understanding, beyond a simple causal analyses of why nationalism replaced communism as the dominant discourse in public and political life. An interpretative narrative, specifically concerned with the interplay between memory, history and (national) identity is better suited to encapsulate the chronology and the dynamics of a discourse that saw itself suddenly emerge in the ruins of communism and came to play a significant role in the later events. History is important to be looked upon because it provides the longitudinal lenses of seeing the intrinsic relationship between (holistic) historical accounts and bits of memory that survive through time to resurface when needed. In the first volume of his seminal edited work, Pierre Nora talks of history as “neither a resurrection nor a reconstitution, nor a reconstruction, nor even a representation but, in the strongest possible sense, a “rememoration”—a history that is interested in memory not as remembrance but as the overall feature of the past within the present: history of the second degree” (Nora, 1996: xxiv). For Nora, the understanding of how commemorative acts and practices help in constructing a public memory is crucial in order to link private experiences to collective understanding of history.

The idea of history, as well as memory is strongly connected to that of the nation, or more exactly to the nation-states. The later cannot exist without the former. Ernest Renan, the great French historian has defined the nation based on two main pillars: “to have done great things together” and “to want to do more” (Renan, 1992), or as Nora succinctly puts it: “the nation as heritage and the nation as project” (Nora, 1998: 634). The difference between Renan and Nora is that while Renan saw them as indistinguishable features of the nation, Nora talked about the separation of the two. Herein lays the main difference between history and memory.
History is the chronological, broadly accepted and official blessed narration of how things have proceeded smoothly and in a continuous, linear progression, while memory can be somewhat more malleable, shaped by the progress of understanding of the collective identities. As Kratochwil suggests, collective identities are more easily redefined than individual ones, which are an intrinsic part of one’s self. To put it in other words, if the first is often a necessity for survival, the changing of one’s identity can prove catastrophic. That may explain why politicians often appeal to collective identities (which are affected by ideology etc.), rather than try to persuade someone to change its most fundamental convictions, which lay on the core of his/her personality.

Maurice Halbwachs on the other hand, investigated how individual memories and identities could be used as instruments through which “collective memory recomposes an image of the past tied during each époque to the dominant ideas of society [at that moment in time]” (Bucur, 2004:159). But turning to the idea of differences between history and memory and how they relate to the idea of the nation, we must stress that although both may seem as (mutually) constitutive of it, the differences remain. When referring to the historical nation, Nora writes that it specifically relies:

on specific sites, designated institutions, fixed dates, classified monuments, and ritualized ceremonies to tell its story, maintain its image, enact its spectacle, and commemorate its past... The memorial nation does the opposite. All space is suffused with traces of its virtual identity, and everything in the present is given an added dimension extending into the past. What was once perceived as innocently displayed along the axis of space is now apprehended along the axis of time (Nora, 1998: 636). But as the author reminds us, national memory needs a fragmentation of the historical framework of the nation (Nora, 1998: 636), a break of the understanding of history according to the prevalent official narration, in order to introduce itself and shape the new understanding of past and present events. And when this historical framework is shattered and there is a need for re-creation of collective identity, the “modality of remembering” as Kratochwil puts it, takes new meaning and shapes the past as looked form the standpoint of the present. “It is the present problem that informs the selection of what is considered worth remembering” (Kratochwil, 2006:11) and not vice-versa, where an enduring history dictates the present in a deterministic fashion. This is what in Nora’s language constitutes what he calls the lieux de mémoire, vi where the attitude toward the past and the changes within that attitude constitute the core of Nora’s attached label (Nora, 1996: xvi). On the other hand,
metamorphosis and continuous adaption comprise the very essence of the realm of memory. Lawrence Kritzman, in his foreword to Nora’s first volume, writes that “recycling of knowledge through associations and new symbolic representations” (Kritzman, 1996: xiii), create the conditions for such metamorphosis to take place. He adds that the realm of memory becomes so strongly identified with the national identity that in turn, it may serve as a ‘brain-washer’ for future generations, who through processes of repetition tend not only to blend, but also to inform their myths with their wishes (Kritzman, 1996: xiii).

The symbolic representation is important here, because it may be seen as procedure that helps the fusion of these (collective) desires into cultural myths, while translating them in the easiest of (popular) language, so that everybody can have a taste of ‘living history’. Sometimes open-ended symbolic manipulations are needed to justify the presence of the new ideology. In the case of Croatia, such a case can be for example that of connecting religious experiences, such as apparitions of Virgin Mary to the nationalist cause, although at first sight this looks even beyond comprehension. Zlatko Skrbiš has shown that nationalist discourse and apparitions (such as that of Virgin Mary in Medugorje) not only are linked, but moreover, such apparitions “have been appropriated by Croatian nationalist discourse” (Skrbiš, 2005). Later by repeating continuously these ‘felt’ and ‘living’ experiences, through the rite of repetition, they see themselves being all of the sudden ‘memorized’ and passed in the collective memory. Repetition, writes Nora, paraphrasing Voltaire “after all is what distinguishes commemoration from celebration.”

Pre-communist Croatia and Ustasha legacy
A short description of pre-communist Croatia and the legacy of the proto-fascist Ustasha regime, as well as deeper historical memories that go as far back as the ‘great times’ of the national hero, Ban Jelačić, are necessary to understand the transformative post-communist nationalist changes that took place. Elisabeth Pond writes that “Croat Serbophilia reached its apogee during the Balkan Wars of 1912-14” (Pond, 2006: 125). Not only did Croats at the time perceive themselves as superior to their larger neighbors, the Serbs, but on top of that, they also recalled the myth of “holy defenders of Catholicism and the West-military against the Turks, culturally against the Orthodox Serbs” (Pond, 2006: 123). This kind of national myth as a matter of fact is common to most of the countries that today comprise the so-called ‘Western Balkans’ territory, with Serb history
books written in such a way that they claim as the only ‘significative’ battle against the Ottomans, that of Kosovo Polje in 1389, which since it was lost, is commemorated as a ‘sacrifice’ of the Serbs in defense of Christendom, while Albanians have built their national mythology around the Scanderbeg, national hero, who is said to have been the only ‘true’ defender of Christianity values, against Ottoman hordes, in this part of Europe.

One of the biggest paradoxes that history tells us in the case of Croatia, is that while in the beginning of the 20th Century, Croats were in the forefront of forging for unity among South Slavs, which later culminated with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, while Serbs being suspicious of Croats’ intentions of “diluting them in some amorphous greater identity,” (Pond, 2006: 124) the situation during the Ustasha regime, as well as in the first years of post-communism, was reversed. During the Ustasha regime, infamous leaders, like Ante Pavelić boasted in claims like killing a third of Serbs, while deporting or converting the rest to Catholicism (Pond, 2006: 126). And these were not main rhetorical claims for that matter. As the experience of Jasenovac camp, where thousands of people perished, or the massacres of Jews and Serb Chetnik guerilla fighters or just civilians (Glenny, 1999: 773-780) showed, Ustashas and their leader Pavelić seemed to be true to their word.

The post-communist paradox consisted when almost five decades later the Serbs who wanting to keep past privileges and moreover, reinforce them, were pushing for a greater recentralization of the federation under Belgrade firm hand, whereas Croats, as well as Slovenes, susceptible of Milosević’s intentions, grew increasingly incessant toward separatist goals, and with a nationalist discourse already pervading the public sphere, the step toward declaring independence seemed in a way anticipated. So in less than a century, Croats turned twice from initiators of federalist system who would bring all southern Slavs together in the same polity, toward promoting state-building and nation-building that were highly divisive and discriminatory vis-à-vis the other minorities, notably the Serbs.

Another turning point in between that in fact gave hints of Croatian growing nationalism, was the 1971 Croatian Spring movement, which initially had the backing of Tito, but was later crushed by him because of the concern of putting the entire regime in jeopardy, which brought in mind situations like the Croatia’s Nazi-allied fascist state during World War II (Fisher, 2003: 77). This in itself created the conditions for a growing class of Croatian nationalist intellectuals, including its most prominent member Franjo Tudjman, who would seize the moment and see themselves catapulted in power in first democratic election in 1991. This was made possible through a shifting of nationalist discourse from the margins toward the mainstream public space, to substitute the faltering communist
ideology. Processes of commemoration and other symbolic politics helped Tudjman and his allies to create a new collective memory that was strongly linked to state and nation-building, through these processes of “politicization of commemoration” if we were to borrow the way Nora coined the phenomenon. In turn, these processes helped forging a (myth of) a new Croatian identity, distinct from both primarily Slav and Yugoslav ones.

Rememoration and processes of commemoration in post-communist Croatia

In the beginning of the 1990s, Franjo Tudjman started to use popular rhetoric and demagogy, “as he dropped his Communist atheist persona altogether and embraced the fascist Ustasha regime and the Catholic Church as preservers of Croat identity” (Pond, 2006: 127). Elisabeth Pond writes that:

both rallying symbols were problematic. The resurrection of Ustasha leaders who had butchered tens of thousands of Serbs, Roma, and Jews repelled non-Croats. And the Roman Catholic Church, perceiving itself in fact as a catholic, universal religion, did not lend itself to nationalist particularism as readily as did the autocephalous Orthodox churches (Pond, 2006: 127).

National identity is fluid rather than fixed, as history often depicts it and the case of Croatia where in the early 90s, despite the historical trait of religion which distinguished Croats from their Slav ‘brethren’, a new trait of national identity, that of a distinct language was added, is telling. Mila Dragojević writes that the intellectuals and the new political elites (mostly former dissidents), promoted the new “linguistic engineering” through publication of new books and dictionaries that promoted new rules, from what till then was considered a ‘Serbo-Croatian’ language. As she writes:

Language was the “ideal” trait for the construction of a national identity at the time of Croatia’s independence, because not only reinforced the existing ethnic boundary but it also provided the secular elites promoting late 20th-century nationalism with a superior status and influence within the new state. Religion, on the other hand, continued to an important trait of the Croatian identity, but its role had clearly changed and diminished in comparison to the World War II period (Dragojević, 2005: 79).

The role of a separate Croatian language as a marker of national identity is puzzling if we see it in the historical perspective, when not only was Serbo-Croatian identified as a single, unitary language of all Yugoslavs, but also the new Croatian language did not fundamentally differ from its
predecessor. Only the way of writing the language had a significant shift, with Croats deciding to write their ‘new’ language with Latin letters (rather than Cyrillic) and some other minor changes. If one is to consider former Yugoslavia, where as Roy Gutman writes, the mere possession of a “Croatian” dictionary - rather than a “Serbo-Croatian” dictionary could be a reason for imprisonment (Gutman, 1992), one can be only bewildered by such abrupt changes taking place in such a short time and how recent memories can see themselves not only as shaping the new identity, but also shaping the former history. Dragojević has further argued that the new language “was chosen primarily by secular elites with a goal not only of distinguishing between “us’ and “them,” but also in order to secure a privileged status within their own group” (Dragojević, 2005: 61).

But the extreme nationalist discourse that first emerged from the far right (the so-called pravasi in Croatian) came to dominate the mainstream political discourse in a very short time. Former marginalized intellectuals like Tudjman proved to be some of the necessary catalysts of bringing together a memory of the first independent state in Croatian history, the infamous legacy of the Ustasa regime, while in the same time revitalizing or creating the means for such catapulting of the new discourse, in order to shape the (post-Communist) identity in the making of the Croats. Such means were museums,^{xii} memorials, such as that of Ban Jelačić in the center of Zagreb (previously destroyed by Communists), the new anthem, the new emblem (the same used by the Ustashas), the new (way of writing the) language and other means that served to create a new national identity. Furthermore, a New York Times article of 1993 captures some of these efforts of re-introducing of fascist regimes symbols when it writes that: “[a]t Mr. Tudjman's instigation, Croatia calls its new currency the kuma, the name used during the Ustasha years. Croatia's new coat of arms closely resembles the symbol of the Ustasha state. And Mr. Tudjman not only defends the reputation of surviving Ustasha leaders, but has named one to a seat in Parliament, and another as his Ambassador to Argentina” (Times,1993). This signaled a dangerous turn of the newly independent Croatian state into an ethnocracy,^{xiii} which in itself led to engagement of the new Croatian state in irredentism, especially versus Bosnia-Herzegovina, on behalf of their kin there (Saideman and Ayres 2008).

Tudjman’s nationalist regime made use of many of the symbols of Ustasha regime, while simultaneously distancing himself from a formal endorsement of its legacy. In a way, this seemed logical for a shrewd politician “who planned to build a state on nationalism rather than ideology...” (The Economist, 1999). The appropriation of the symbols from nationalist politicians was merely used as a mean to legitimize them in the political vacuum that the end of communism left. For this reason, a “new
normative order” that “was essential both to legitimize the actions of the new regime and to mobilize the population for the important task of state-building” (Irvine, 1997: 2) was both needed and desired. The new ultranationalist ideology that came to occupy the mainstream political discourse in Croatia at the time consisted of six main features, where the “insistence upon the historical continuity of the Croatian state and the state-building “accomplishments” of the interwar Ustasa fascist movement and the independent State of Croatia (NDH)” (Irvine, 1997: 4), was one of the foremost ones.

The new ideology and efforts of forging a new Croatian national identity, were such that even sportsmen, such as Goran Ivanisević, who went on to win the world’s most acclaimed tennis tournament, that of Wimbledon, soon acquired a status of hero in national media and public discourse (The Economist, 2001). The pantheon of old heroes, such as Ban Jelačić, or the infamous Ante Pavelić, needed more contemporaneous ones, like the war criminal Ante Gotovina or sportists, like Ivanisević, who in different ways represented the best of Croats and the model to aspire. The main problem with this, is that even sport champions like Ivanisevic, or famous musicians, writers and so on, were portrayed as champions of national cause and pillars of superiority of Croats versus the Serbs or the Bosnians, thus constructing a Croat own identity in relationship to the other. And when the other became almost extinct from Croatian society, with the expulsion of hundred thousands of Serbs from the Krajina region, the necessity to enlarge state territory to include Croats living elsewhere (like in Herzegovina part of Bosnia), came just naturally. An ethnocracy, or to put it differently, the politicians in the pinnacle of such nationalist regime, who were the main architects of this form of ‘ethnic cleansing’, need continuously the presence of the Other and the need for to reconstruct it perpetually in order to justify their existence.

One of the best examples of how commemoration processes can help the process of rememoration and how they are closely linked to the process of recreating the collective identity is the monument of Ban Jelačić-- who in 18th Century was the civil and military governor of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, appointed by Austro-Hungarian Empire-- in the main city square of Zagreb. He was credited for the fact that “for the first time after many centuries, at least in formal terms, united under his authority the majority of the Croatian lands,” although as Rihtman-Auguštin claims, “Jelačić’s conception of Croatian national identity lay within the framework of Austro-Slavism. He was loyal to the Austrian crown, but yearned for unity among Slavs” (Rihtman-Auguštin, 2006:182). His statue was removed during Communism and renamed the ‘Square of the Republic’, although he was one of the few uncontested figures in Croatian history, which was much
respected from Serbs and other minorities alike. This is mostly because
during his governship, he did not use a nationalist discourse, but rather a
language of improvement of living conditions, especially in rural areas,
habited both by Croats and Serbs alike and forging ahead together for
development and greater autonomy from Vienna. Nevertheless, since the
monument, which was positioned in the middle of the market place “was
present in everyday life of Zagreb’s citizenry,” (Rihtman-Auguštin,
2006:184) communists perceived it as a threat to their newly found regime
and in order to add more legitimacy to themselves, they thought would be
better if a tabula rasa should exist, where all the pre-existing memories
would be just deleted. Thus, in a Soviet pattern that saw itself manifested
in other Eastern European countries as well, objects of commemoration
were either tossed away or adjusted accordingly to add to the legitimacy of
the new regime. The monument of Jelačić was not an exception.

When the monument was returned in 1990, after being preserved by
some self-conscious Croat historians, who protected it from being
destroyed by Communist authorities, “[i]t seemed that the reinstallation of
the statue symbolized the establishment of democracy” (Rihtman-Auguštin,
2006:188). Everybody seemed satisfied of this historical return and to
properly rejoice the event and commemorate Jelačić’s legacy, an entire
week, named ‘Ban Jelačić Week’, with musical entertainment and concerts
was dedicated to the event. As Rihtman-Auguštin writes, a speech by the
new president, Franjo Tudjman, made possible for him to present himself
“as a personality who creates history- and then interpreting history for us.
So he paced Jelačić in the context of current politics” (Rihtman-Auguštin,
2006:188). This speech was very significant, similar with Milosević’s
speech in Kosovo Polje in 1989, which caused his star to rise and made
possible the rise of a new nationalist ideology in Serbia. In his speech
Tudjman: “...mentioned the ‘undaunted spirit of the Croatian people’,
extolled the Homeland, and boasted how ‘Croatia’s prestige has been
reinstated” (Rihtman-Auguštin, 2006:189).

The use of monuments and other form of symbolic forms for pure
benefit of political ends has persisted even after Tudjman’s death and his
nationalist party HDZ split, albeit in a much more moderate fashion. A new
leader of what remained from the party after a crushing defeat in 2000, Ivo
Sanader, not only managed to recapture power and win two consecutive
elections, but most importantly was involved in an inner battle against the
(nationalist) hardliners inside his party. These battles or “clashes between
Sanader and right-wing nationalists took the form of the competitive
construction and dismantling of monuments to Ustasha leaders- and the
continued poster wars over Gotovina and Ustasha chief Ante Pavelić” (Pond,
135). The symbolic appeal that such monuments of posters have on mob
psychology and creation of collective memory is not to be overlooked. As Rihtman-Augustin points out: “[t]he statue of a historical personality displayed in a public place is a medium which makes history tangible in everyday life. The monument rescues the historical personality from oblivion” (Rihtman-Augustin, 193). It takes much time to re-create the recent history and efforts from different sources of authority among the population.

Post-Tudjman era and the shift in public discourse

In the post-Tudjman era, it seems that the realm of memory has ‘ceased’ to suffuse itself with the national identity and the process of nation-building is not seen as closely identified with that of state-building. Seen from this perspective, we might infer that the “three-fold transformation process” (Offe, 1991) directed simultaneously toward the creation of nation-states as well as transformation toward capitalism and democracy, is almost complete in the Croatian case. Thus, Kritzman’s reminder of processes of repetition that inform collective myths and merge them with populism, to rememorize the past into present seems to largely been overcome.

Furthermore, the Croatian post-Tudjman governments have proven to be more and more willing to cooperate with EU institutions and other international bodies. An example of this is a Croatian court which for the first time handed a conviction to a war general and hero, Mirko Norac (BBC, 2008), as well as the Croatian state decision to cooperate in handing over Ante Gotovina to the Hague where he was charged for crimes against humanity.

But problems relating to the exclusion of participation of the minorities, especially vis-à-vis the Serbian minority can be easily traced. For example, as Djuric has observed, although there is such a Law on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian National Parliament which prescribes at least five to seven representatives elected to the House of Representatives of the Croatian National Parliament, on the other hand, we witness “the fact of only one reserved seat for Serb minority in the Croatian National Parliament in its 2000-2004 mandate.” (Djuric, 2008). Examples like this somewhat show a lack of political will for raising political inclusion and participation from minorities and other marginal groups within society. If more participation is guaranteed, then we may confidently say that Croatia has reached a new level of political maturity and permanently ends the cycle of transition to consolidation of democratic rule.

However, the NATO invitation and prospects of entering EU possibly in 2010, have generated a new wave of Europeanization through the diffusion of norms and values that are completely different and opposed to
the prevailing discourse of nationalism of Tudjman`s era. The shift in public opinion can also be easily observed and not much pressure is put on government when it has taken actions that curtail the power of the military, have reduced the pensions of former commandeers and have sent some of them behind jail, or as the case was with Gotovina, surrendering them to an international Court. This process of de-mystification of national heroes, in association with de-commemoration of certain historical events have not only helped in radically transforming the public and political discourse in the country, but also it has helped to depart from the ‘perpetuation of the memories’ and from living the past in the present. Thus, we witness a departure from such processes of rememoration, if we use Nora`s conceptualization.

Conclusion
This essay addressed the emergence of a new Croatian identity, born from the ‘ashes’ of Communism and built through a process of rememoration. In other words, an identity that is dimensioned through a reinterpretation of history. A history that as Nora suggests, is lived through memory in the present. And this explains why history is interested in memory. The case of Croatia is illuminating because it shows how a past identity of ‘Croatness’ that came to exist only at a particular time and was associated with one of the most infamous fascist regimes in Europe was reintroduced and reinforced in order to justify the ground of first breaking up from Yugoslavia and then as a mean of maintaining the allegiance of its citizens. Jacques Le Geoff writes that often historians help accidentally in constructing collective memories and such thing as writing history objectively, does not exist, since themselves, they are caught in the societal web or context that surrounds them (Le Geoff, 1992). It is not necessarily the case that “collective memory, reflected upon historically, may serve, again, as in Kratowchil, ‘the liberation and not the enslavement of human beings” (quoted in Astrov, forthcoming: 2008). True, as Alexander Astrov writes, the state has indeed “overtaken commemoration” (Astrov, 2008: 7), which in turn has overtaken the process of liberation that Kratochwil mentions. The case of Croatia where a former nationalist dissident historian-turned-president, Franjo Tudjman, is the strongest evidence for this claim, where a direct overtaking and moreover, abuse of the commemoration processes from the state has taken place.

Nora writes that “[a] new concern with identity resulted from the emergence of this historicized present” (cited at Astrov, forthcoming: 10). And one cannot look at the future and deal with it unless one deals with its past if we were to paraphrase Nietzsche. The process of “deciphering one’s memory’ is what Kratochwil believes political activity to be” (Astrov,
forthcoming: 10). But since the ways of dealing and reconstructing such (collective) memories in order to fit the interests of (identity of the) present are not only finite but moreover concentrated in only few hands, who is better suited to perform such task than historians and politicians. Even better when the two of them are merged in one as the case of post-Communist Croatia and its first President Tudjman, tells us. It takes time and efforts from different societal groups, as well as willingness from the political class, for resisting the populist appeal of usage of commemoration processes or nationalist symbols to help reshaping a new collective memory and subsequently a re-definition of one’s collective identity.

Croatia in the post-Tudjman era, seems to have witnessed a fresh and vigorous start in its race toward democratic consolidation and the completion of integration toward Euro-Atlantic structures. Not only it was recently invited to NATO, but also is on the forefront of Western Balkan countries for membership in European Union, most probably expecting to join in 2010. This has in turn impacted domestic discourse, by shifting the focus of debate away from nationalist talk and raising public awareness of democracy, rule of law and other EU-advocated issues that signal an abrupt break with the past. A new collective memory is slowly being shaped and this in turn requires a new historical revisionism, including the recent past. The ability of dealing with the past in a rational and impassionate manner and distancing themselves from leaving the past within present, will serve the greater absorption of democratic values, a move toward a more civic and inclusive national identity and a quicker pace in the race toward full integration in the European family.

1 In fact, since this is a case-oriented analysis, this paper tries to pursue both a historically interpretive and casually analytic investigation. As Charles Ragin has pointed out: “There is not necessary contradiction, between doing empirically based causal analysis and interpreting cases historically. Both goals are important; having one does not entail a denial of the other.” See Charles Ragin. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. P.35

ii A point of clarification: here I do not mean that the idiosyncratic character of Croatian nationalism led to the break-up of Yugoslavia, but that its new nationalistic discourse in tandem with Serbian, Slovenian, Kosovar and other nationalist discourses that came to be predominant in each of the republics and autonomous regions, led to the violent fragmentation of once the most successful federal republics. For the purposes of this paper I focus only at the Croatian case, but traces of same patterns that are analyzed in this essay can be easily discerned in other neighboring republics as well.
Mostly Serbs, particularly those living in Krajina, which were systematically discriminated, persecuted, forced to leave or even killed in a similar fashion that for many Serbs was a reminder of Ustasha (fascist regime) of World War II.

I make this (counter-intuitive) point here, because some events of commemorations, which will be discussed below looked like came spontaneously, either from citizens` direct request or from local municipalities, rather than the power-center of Zagreb and the executive. However, even when the initiative came from below (or at least looked like it), it was broadly supported from the center.


Nora has defined such lieux (ang. realms) as “any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community” (Nora, xvii).

Such apparitions and the consequent turning of these ‘sacred’ places into pilgrimage sites through rites of commemoration, like in the case of this village of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have significant symbolic relevance for shaping of the nationalist discourse, which may in turn lead to irredentist policies, like the case of Croatian state heavy involvement in partitioning of Bosnia as a mean of ‘protecting’ not only Croatian population there, but also sites of particular significance to its (recent) history and collective memory.


From 1941 to the end of the World War II, Croatia was ruled from a fascist regime, called Ustasha. Although they were local fascist, Ustashas were backed openly by their counterpart fascist regimes of Italy and Nazi Germany. Ustasas soon passed racial discriminatory laws against Jews, Serbs and Gypsies and set up the Jasenovac concentration camps where thousand of people perished. Tudjman, after starting out as a partisan and devoted Communist in its early career, turned to be a nationalist later on, when he first talked about a myth of Jasenovac, when the actual number of people, was exaggerated (as he maintained). After these claims, he was dismissed as one of the leading official historians of Croatia from the Communist regime, but used (successfully) this nationalist and populist rhetoric to catapult himself to power in 1991.

Ban Jelačić, (16 October 1801-25 May 1859) was the civil and military governor of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and governor of Rijeka.

The genesis of this come from the 16th Century with Domenican Vinko Pribojević preaching the ideology of pan-Slavism, “and in the nineteenth century a Croat “Illyrianism” romantically cast all Slavs as descendants of the pre-Roman inhabitants of the Balkans, rather than fourth-century late-comers” (Pond, 123-124).
In the case of museums, despite changing the content of the most of them, making thus room for more pre-communist commemoration objects, the case of the Jasenovac is somewhat the reverse, where the new regime at least neglected (or even helped tacitly) the destruction of the some of its content that served symbolically to commemorate thousand of Jews, Serbs and Gypsies killed during the Ustasha regime.

State rule or total political dominance lies exclusively with an ethnic group.

References


“Croatia jails war crime general,” BBC online. 30 May 2008.


