Volume 39: December 2018

ISSN 2414-6633

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.39

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief: Max Steuer (Slovakia)

Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Rafael Plancarte (Mexico)

Ana Magdalena Figueroa (Brazil)

Justinas Lingevičus (Lithuania)

Stephanie Mojica (USA)

Gergana Tzvetkova (Bulgaria)

Editorial Assistants

Cláudia Susana Rodrigues de Araújo (Portugal)  Jesslene Lee (Singapore)

Andressa Liegi Vieira Costa (Brazil)  Dana Rice (Australia)

Ngoc Anh Khoa Doan (Vietnam)  Emmanuelle Rousseau (France)

Karla Drpić (Croatia)  Kamila Suchomel (Czech Republic)

Damlı Keşkekci (Turkey)  Bruna Veríssimo (Brazil)
Table of Contents

Editorial Note ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Articles

The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in promoting access to clean water / Jessica Neafie ........................................................................................................................................ 7
“Not Here Nor Elsewhere”: The Local-Global Dialectic in Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) Campaigns; The Case of Italy / Paola Imperatore ........................................................................................................ 36
International Authority of International Organizations and Access Provision for Transnational Actors / Adil Nussipov ........................................................................................................................................ 64
The Impact of Economic Globalisation on the Rise of Nationalism: The Case of Western Balkan Countries / Fiammetta Colombo ........................................................................................................ 86

Call for Papers....................................................................................................................................... 103
Editorial Note

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.39.0

This is the closing issue of IAPSS Politikon for the 2018 calendar year. In the course of the last twelve months, the journal published four issues with 17 contributions altogether. Each of them addresses a noteworthy segment of social reality, contributing to our understanding and interpretation of the world around us. Each of them is a result of a detailed evaluation process. Each of them shows the dedication of the authors to revise and improve their initial manuscripts, taking into consideration the comments from the Editors, Reviewers and Editorial Assistants. This commitment is crucial for the success of the submissions, as not one of these 17 contributions were deemed publishable straight away, in the form they had been received; at least minor revisions were necessary for each of them to be accepted in the end.

The content of this collection varies thematically from political philosophy, through political communication and election studies to international relations and conflict studies—few conventional subfields of Political Science remain without representation. The same holds true for the methodologies and methods employed by the authors. This means that the journal has an added value to readers interested in a diverse selection of latest results of Political Science research and reflections. At the same time, the articles deserve attention within the specific research subfields they belong to. Some of this year’s articles are particularly focused at providing new findings and perspectives to policymakers, such as international and European institutions or governments. Others call for further attention (including academic research) of understudied problems. The Editorial Board hopes that they will generate a cross-cutting conversation, and invites proposals for structured responses to individual articles published in IAPSS Politikon in the form of stand-alone research papers or research notes.

Next year our ambition is to uphold and further improve the publishing standards of the journal, which seem the more important in the current academic environment where poor scholarship can be published without material peer review, in exchange for high fees, in predatory journals. Furthermore, with growing concern we witness attacks on the academia alongside the more general backlash against expertise (Nichols, 2017). While this is nothing new ‘under the sun’, the attacks have reached unprecedented levels with the forcing out of the Central European University from Budapest, Hungary. Hungary is a member state of the European Union that took pride in upholding standards of openness and academic excellence. Hence the sheer fact that this could have happened may encourage further steps along similar lines by other non-democratic actors (for an academically
rigorous elaboration on these developments Bárd, 2018; Enyedi, 2018). Critical discussions in academic journals such as IAPSS Politikon as well as other platforms that stick to the standards of academic work play an important role in assessing current developments in a more in-depth fashion.

We proceed by introducing the four research articles in this issue, starting with Jessica Neafie. Her research puts forward a hypothesis that, contrary to conventional assumptions, foreign direct investment decreases access to clean water. She presents and statistically tests the validity of this hypothesis, as well as of several possible explanations of it. Her findings contribute to the broader debate about the ways how potable water access can be increased. The issue continues with Paola Imperatore’s analysis, based on her paper presented at the IAPSS World Congress 2018 in Paris. She shows how the opposition movement towards locally unwanted land use (LULU) has emerged in Italy, and how it functions. Applying frame analysis to evaluate primary sources from a number of these oppositional movements, she discovers the pushback of infrastructure owners to these movements, and the subsequent ways of reacting to it. These ways indicate how a particular contentious issue may be generalized so that it speaks to general public concerns such as democracy, corruption, the application of public finances and social justice. The background of these discursive constructions point to the dialectic between the local and the global, exemplified in the IAPSS 2018 Annual Theme ‘Diversity and Globalization’ as well. Thirdly, Adil Nussipov presents the revised and abridged version of his graduate thesis which argues that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the ‘international authority’ of international organizations and the levels of access these IOs provide to transnational actors (such as international NGOs or multinational companies). His article explains how organizations with medium authority provide the most access through a perspective of rationalist self-interest: it is these organizations that can gain most by allowing the participation of transnational actors in their decision-making processes. In the final article of this year, also based on a presentation at the IAPSS World Congress 2018, Fiammetta Colombo explores the possible connections between several phenomena that are frequently associated with economic globalization (such as growing rates of inequality and unemployment rates), and the rise of nationalist political parties in the Western Balkans. While no causal relationship emerges, she shows how nationalism goes hand in hand with support of economic globalization in the majority of the nationalist parties of the region, and suggests avenues for further research based on this observation.

1 Among the continuing sources of concern are the violations of academic freedom in Turkey (Özkirimli, 2017; Öztürk, 2018) and the case of dismissal of a tenured faculty member on the basis of fabricated criminal charges in Japan (Kim, 2018).
Each issue of *IAPSS Politikon* is a result of hundreds of hours of work of the authors, editors, reviewers and editorial assistants. As this is a non-profit publication available open access to all interested readers around the globe and considers high-quality evaluation (including peer review) process a core feature of its mission, this investment of time and effort is essential for its functioning. Thus, this year has witnessed the largest growth in the number of Editorial Assistants (currently ten positions) and reviewers (currently over 130) in the journal’s history. The Editorial Board would like to thank each contributor for the time and expertise they invested in the management and publishing of the journal and looks forward to the continuation and development of this cooperation. Here, special thanks go to the senior scholars who are members of our Advisory Committee.

Although the Editor and Editorial Assistant positions might be limited, there is no limit to the number of authors submitting manuscripts for evaluation, and to reviewer applications. Hence, please accept our invitation to consider your first or next active contribution in one of these forms in 2019, or contact us with your suggestions.

Max Steuer  
Editor-in-Chief

**References**

Bárd, Petra (2018): ‘The Rule of Law and Academic Freedom or the Lack of It in Hungary’, European Political Science, online first: pp. 1-10. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0171-x](https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0171-x)


The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in promoting access to clean water

Jessica Neafie

Jessica Neafie from the United States, is a PhD candidate who received her Bachelor’s degree in Asian Studies from the University of Florida. She received an MA in Diplomatic studies from the University of Westminster (London, England), and an MA in Climate Science and Policy at Columbia University (New York City). She currently studies International Relations at the University of Oregon. Her interests include globalization, Chinese politics, foreign investment, development studies, and natural resources. Her Master’s thesis on globalization and water won the award for best graduate student paper in the Environmental Studies Section at the International Studies Association Conference in 2016. E-mail: jneafie@uoregon.edu.

Abstract

Does foreign direct investment (FDI) decrease access to clean water in developing nations? Governments use economic growth from globalization to fund investment in infrastructure to improve water access, but FDI is hindering these efforts through pollution and increased water usage that put pressure on the supply of this public good. I test the hypothesis that growing pressure from increased use and pollution of water by foreign investors reduces water access in developing countries, where impacts are felt more acutely than in developed countries where public goods institutions are stronger. Using a country-year fixed effects regression model on a panel data set of over 130 countries from 1990 to 2010, I assess whether FDI increases or decreases potable water access in developing countries, and the role that development plays in moderating this effect. I find strong evidence of a negative relationship between FDI and access to potable water in developing countries.

Keywords

Developing Countries; Development; Foreign Direct Investment; Globalization; International Political Economy; Natural Resources; Water
Introduction

Increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) lead to reduced water access. The literature on the effects of FDI varies, finding both positive and negative effects on issues of economic development, wages, income inequality, capital distribution across sectors, labor rights, and the environment (Mosley and Uno, 2007; Kentor, 1998; Firebaugh, 1996; Dixon and Boswell, 1996a; Dixon and Boswell 1996b; Bandelj, 2007: 17). Included in this is the debate over the influence that foreign investment has on environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, and the institutes that protect the environment (Bues, 2011; Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Grimes & Kentor, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006a, 2007). However, despite the positive effects that FDI may have, i.e. introducing new ‘environmentally friendly’ technologies and policies, the negative effects, i.e. water use and pollution, significantly impact the water quantity and quality available to the population. This study will address these effects of FDI through the lens of potable water access, and further the debate over whether FDI is a help or a hinderance to developing countries.

Governments in developing countries face ever-increasing challenges in improving access to potable water as populations rise, urbanization becomes more prevalent and climate change limits water resources. Potable water is a particularly challenging resource to manage because governments must supply it in both the quality and quantity needed for consumption across different temporal and spatial scales, and it is essential to the health and well-being of the nation. Water quality alone does not capture the issues between the government and the people, that can be caused by not only wastewater discharge and chemical pollutants infiltrating the waterways but also alterations of water flows for power supplies or industrial uses. Previously, variations in water access have been linked to countries with increased participation in the global economy, but these studies have just started to investigate the relationship between the globalized economy and water access. For instance, a study by Rudra (2011) looked at the way that trade is linked to changes in potable water access in developing countries over a ten year period. Rudra discovered a relationship between reduced potable water access and an increase in trade. However, the findings of this study fail to account for changes that occur due to more robust drivers of developing economies: FDI. This paper explores the in-depth interplay

---

2 A measure of potable water is not just a measure of quality or quantity individually but a measure that captures both quantity and quality at the same time. By only looking at one or the other you are not accurately encompassing the two features that are needed for consumption. People can only consume water that is of drinkable quality, and it must be in a quantity large enough fulfill their daily needs or there is fear of sickness, malnutrition and death. See the World Bank Development Report (2010).
between FDI and resource management started in other research and will evaluate the negative effects of FDI that must be addressed to seek new ways to provide resources better in the future.

How does FDI influence access to potable water? Research shows that FDI has been proven to be the strongest driver of trade and economic growth in developing countries since the 1980s (Fontagne, 1999). Giving these multinational companies the power to appeal to the water management institutions for policies and regulations which allow them to use water anyway they wish for their own interests (Cole et al. 2006; Jorgenson, 2007). During this time, investment has intensively used water both directly, i.e. pollution and use, and indirectly, i.e. water used in supply chain, leading to decreases in water quantity and quality (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Cadbury, 1997; Fontagne, 1999; Jorgenson, 2007; Levallois et al. 1998). At the same time foreign investors have increased environmental policies and brought new technologies and supply chain management techniques that reduce corporate environmental impacts (Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Rudra and Jensen, 2011). However, none of these studies have directly tied the changes in foreign investment to changes in potable water access, that has implications for both the direct effects, i.e. pollution and water use, and indirect effects, i.e. water used in supply chain and policy influence, of foreign investment that may be having independent negative and positive effects on water access.

This paper’s purpose is two-fold: first, to use potable water access as a new way to systemically test the relationship between FDI and the environment and provide new conclusions to the debate over whether investment is a help or hinderance. Second, to show the disparate impact depending on level of development, as the least developed countries have weaker infrastructure and institutions. I hypothesize a strong negative relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and potable water access in developing countries, due to a need for FDI that increases their willingness to give concessions to investors in order to promote development, and the potential for investors to use these countries as “pollution havens”—locations of comparatively large amounts of environmental degradation (Redclift and Sage, 1996). I test this hypothesis in a country-year fixed effects regression model on a panel data set of over 130 developing countries from 1990 to 2010.

This research contributes to the globalization-natural resources debate in two ways. First, the use of the potable water variable contributes to the debate on governance of natural resource, and forms a comprehensive study of the link between globalization and water pollution (Bossio et al. 2012; Bues and Theesfeld, 2012; Jorgenson, 2007; Liu et al. 2013; Rudra, 2008; Sebastian and Warner, 2013). The potable water variable reflects both quality and quantity of water supply and is more salient to the general population who needs access to potable water on a daily basis. It has been used in the
comparative political economy literature to examine the relationship between trade and environmental degradation, and it is an important tool to be used to show how increased engagement with foreign multinational corporations might persuade developing countries to ignore behaviors that affect the supply of some natural resources.

Second, I build on a common claim in comparative politics that FDI yields more influence over domestic politics and institutions in developing countries than in developed countries. Developing countries often attract investors in resource extraction and heavy manufacturing, which generate large demands on the water supply and large pollution loads. Additionally, these multinational corporations are influential on the governments because developing countries are willing to overlook the environmental effects of certain industries in order to encourage needed economic growth.

In the next section I show the links (both implicit and explicitly) in the political science literature to water and introduce key variables that influence access to water: regime type, inequality, as well as other social and economic factors. In the third and fourth sections, I introduce my argument and my main hypothesis: that growing pressure from increased use and pollution of water by foreign investors reduces water access in developing countries. The fifth and sixth sections introduce my country-year fixed effects model and displays evidence to suggest that FDI has a negative effect on potable water access. Finally, I draw conclusions for these findings, and the implications that it has on the larger political economic literature.

**Potable Water Access and Politics**

According to the World Bank (2010) up to 40 percent of the world’s population may be suffering from water stress by 2030, with some areas expected to see increases of up to 85 percent of the population affected by water stress (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). This study evaluates potable water access (see Rudra, 2008) rather than water stress as it the combined impacts of water quality and access. As defined by the World Bank (2012), access to potable water is measured as a percentage of people with reasonable access to clean water from an improved source near their home.\(^3\)

By looking at only one aspect—quantity or quality—research is not accurately encompassing the full effect that a reduction of potable water can have on the political will of the people. Previous

\(^3\) For example, a protected well or spring, public works, or household connection, which must meet a quantity standard of at least 20 liters per day per person from a source within one kilometer of their home. A measure of potable water is not just a measure of quality or quantity individually but a measure that captures both quantity and quality at the same time.
studies have mainly focused on the issues of water quality, and the overall impact of pollutants on water resources (Cao and Prakash, 2010; Jorgenson, 2007). By focusing on issues of pollution impacts alone, they miss other important impacts, i.e. poorer citizens who are denied access to water even when it is clean, and their connection to wider government policy. By looking at quantity and quality of water access we are better able to connect political dissent to issues of water access. Allowing this study to further identify infrastructure and policy accomplishments or problems that are connected to the population’s access to appropriate amounts of potable water.

Potable water access issues more often exist in poorer nations, where the majority of citizens are not politically active and where institutions do not exist to protect these groups. This inspires the motivating questions for this analysis: have policymakers in developing countries had the political will to ensure that high pollution problems and water usage from FDI do not affect access to safe drinking water? Will these policymakers, as compared to developed country actors, take the measures necessary to ensure that water pollution does not adversely affect the population by reducing the availability of potable water? What other factors in developing countries make them more or less vulnerable to the impacts of FDI on water access?

Important political, social, and economic growth factors explored in international economic studies impact potable water access. For example, as states develop increases in the gross domestic product (GDP) are linked to increases in industrialization and consumption, as a result developing countries with higher income that lack institutions of environmental regulation may produce more pollution and use more natural resources, which can severely reduce access to resources, such as potable water (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Liu and Zhang, 2018). At the same time, economic growth and a higher GDP also leads to technological improvements that reduce pollutants and strengthen the regulatory environment, which improves water access. More development also means more residents moving to urban centers which can have both positive and negative effects on water access. When states lack infrastructure capacity fast-growing municipalities put increased pressure on a state’s infrastructure, resulting in decreased access to potable water (Jorgenson, 2007; Khan and Siddique, 2000; Rudra, 2011), but municipalities also see faster gains in access to piped water, between 1990 and 2012 more than twice as many people in urban areas as opposed to rural areas gained access to an improved water source (WHO and UNICEF, 2014).

The type of government and institutions available to citizens affect the capacity to supply water (Li and Reuveny, 2006; Neumayer, 2002). Democracies have been shown to provide greater access to potable water and have a greater ability to overcome the stresses that infrastructure problems cause
on public good supplies. Democratic institutions also provide more access points for members of society to communicate their dissatisfaction to governments, as a result, democratic governments should respond more quickly to water access problems. Even when governments have the capacity to increase water access benefits are not equally distributed, and countries with high levels of inequality give water access preference given to some groups over others, particularly those with more power and economic means (Rodrik, 1999). In these situations, powerful interest groups, like domestic investors, trade partners and foreign investors, have their own demands, and are able to influence policy makers when economic growth is prioritized (Mulligan et al. 2004).

**The Effect of FDI on Potable Water Access**

The globalization-natural resources literature has long debated whether FDI is a contributor to the “race to the bottom” or to the “race to the top”, but evidence suggests that the overall effect of foreign investment on the environment is negative. FDI is able to influence environmental outcomes because it makes developing countries more vulnerable to global-economic conditions that can influence different environmental outcomes. On one hand, the “race to the bottom” literature finds that engagement with foreign multinational corporations increases pollution and water use and leads to weaker environmental regulations and pollution havens (Grimes and Kentor, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). On the other hand, the “race to the top” literature foreign investors facilitate economic development, which, in turn, increases environmental standards, as it provides access to improved technologies and the regulation of supply chains (Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Rudra and Jensen, 2011). This literature also finds evidence to suggest that developing countries are not a haven from pollution, and multinationals are not flocking there to take advantage of weak environmental standards and enforcement (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Redclift and Sage, 1996; Thompson and Strohm, 1996).

However, the globalization literature is criticized for failing to fully investigate the negative externalities of foreign investment, and for a failure to address the large percentage of investment into developing countries in the manufacturing and extractive sectors. Negative externalities can result from the positive features of foreign investment, like when newer technologies demand more water or create new pollutants. In one such case, clean technology transfer resulted in improvements to production methods to clean up atmospheric pollution, but at the same time they increased levels of water pollution (Duhigg, 2009).
Moreover, FDI into developing countries is mostly focused on the manufacturing and extractive sectors, see figure 1. Studies show that these resource intense sectors causes increased water usage creating a water quantity issue (Bues and Theesfeld, 2012), and increased contamination of water sources, creating a water quality issue (Jorgenson, 2007; Roberts et al 2006). It is also common for countries to divert water streams for increased investment, so that even when foreign investors are improving the quality of water diverted streams and water usage reduces the overall water quantity available. These direct effects of FDI has even been shown to disrupt the infrastructure improvements that governments have already made to water quantity and quality (Jorgenson, 2007).

Additionally, due to the perceived benefits of FDI, states become increasingly willing to make the political environment more hospitable for foreign investors (over domestic investors) that are only looking for the promise of adequate infrastructure with natural resource exploitation promise (Bellos, 2010; Bellos and Subasat, 2012; Bues, 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Jessup, 1999; Oneal, 1994). FDI has allowed developing countries to stimulate their domestic growth, increase research and technological domestic know-how, deregulate, stabilize, and liberalize the economy, while creating jobs and increasing the skills of workers (Mosley and Uno 2007; Javorcik 2004; Blomstrom and Kokko 1997; Balasubramanyam et al. 1999). This entices governments to provide concessions to foreign investors that create problems when these investors are not interested in the environmental impact their decisions make in the pursuit of profit (Borregard and Dufey, 2002). Leading to tradeoffs where there

---

4 This bar graph shows all Greenfield foreign investment from 2003 to 2015. Over 60 percent of investment is into developing countries is in the manufacturing and extractive sectors. The other sector is made up of all other sectors including shipping, hotels, and real estate groups.

5 For examples of weak regulatory policies see Kahn and Yardley (2007) and French (2007).
are gains in terms of economic development and labor standards, but weakening of standards in other areas, most importantly water.

Why focus the study on foreign investment rather than domestic investment? First, some studies have argued that domestic investment does less harm to the environment than foreign investment (Jorgenson, 2006b; Rivera, 2004). Domestic investments do not have the same disincentive to ignore environmental concerns or limit water access (Borregard and Dufey, 2002; Jorgenson, 2006a, 2007). Second, not all foreign investors carry significantly better environmental policies and technology than the recipient country’s domestic corporations (Rivera, 2004). This increases the likelihood that investors will participate in environmentally harmful activities and will be less motivated by local interest and stakeholder groups to protect natural resources. The sharp contrast between domestic and foreign investors further increases the importance in studying the effects of FDI.

Particular cases have also shown that while foreign investment does have some positive effects, it may overall have a negative effect on potable water access. In India, reports have shown how polluting of the waterways by Pepsi resulted in reduced access to ground water and contamination of rivers throughout the country (Brady, 2007). India is not alone in this, however; studies have linked the increase in FDI to water contamination and pollution problems in Ecuador (Cueto, 1996), Ethiopia (Bossio et al. 2012; Bues, 2011), etc. and yet, there are limited studies looking into this connection between potable water and FDI. In developing countries, such as India, Ethiopia, and Ecuador, the inflows of FDI have led to high-polluting, labor-intensive manufacturing processes that are not ecologically efficient (Clapp, 1998; Jorgenson, 2006b; Roberts et al. 2003, 2006) and contribute to pollution in both the air and water within a state (Grimes and Kentor, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006b, 2007). This is further supported by a study by the World Resource Institute (2005), showing that sectors associated with high amounts of water contamination and water usage all tend to be sectors that are heavily funded by FDI inflows in developing countries.

These attributes of FDI create a barrier to clean water, and lead to my hypothesis: that increases in FDI lead to higher levels of water consumption and pollution by the investor, and indirect consequences through their supply chain management and policy influences, thus causing adverse effects on access to potable water. The first hypothesis is thus as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** Foreign direct investment (FDI) will have a negative effect on potable water access.
The Moderating Effect of the Level of Development

FDI is an international induced constraint on a natural resource that is vital to the well-being of a nation, and there are political considerations that should influence the degree to which trade affects water access. In developed counties, institutions largely prevent water access from being affected, even in some of the largest polluting nations like the United States and Japan. This is harder to achieve in developing countries where there is less institutionalization and policy is more malleable (Acemoglu et al. 2001).

Policy makers see foreign investment as critical to a developing economy, and fear any policy that might bring about the threat of capital flight (Wallerstein, 2005). To prevent this, they will try to keep labor costs low, lower environmental standards, and suppress labor rights in order to promote economic growth. In many cases allowing foreign investors to shape government policies in directions that favor their interests and harm the interests of the poor and the environment.

The trade-off is such that economic growth and material prosperity have tangible benefits that citizens can quickly realize (Rogoff, 1990). Until development has reached such a level that the citizens can be motivated to engage in collective action to improve the environmental situation, governments in developing countries will be motivated to prioritize growth over environmental resources (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Panayotou, 1993; Yandle, Bhattacharai, & Vijayaraghavan, 2004). Many developed countries also faced issues of unclean water when economic growth was accompanied by industrialization, and only after pressure from political coalitions did these countries create reforms for water and sanitation (Szreter, 1997).

In sum, domestic political process and institutions in developing countries are at a disadvantage, whether democratic or authoritarian, and that it is only through further development that countries will reach a point by which they will start environmental reforms. As a result, actors affected by FDI’s impact on water in developing countries are more likely to suffer from collective action problems and poor water policies. These factors are exacerbated when inequality is high and the economy is growing. The second hypothesis is:

**Hypothesis 2:** FDI’s ability to reduce potable water access will be moderated by the country’s development level.

**Methodology and Variables**

The primary goal of this study is to empirically evaluate the extent to which FDI affects the percentage of the population able to access potable water. Using a country-year fixed effects regression
model, I conduct a series of quantitative cross-national analyses of water access. I use a panel data set\(^6\) of about 136 countries from 1990 to 2010 in the middle (high and low) and low income brackets, defined as developing countries by the United Nations (2017) (see country list in appendix). Potable water data\(^7\) is only collected every five years (i.e., 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010), while most other variables are available every year. The univariate statistics are laid out in Table I, and include my measures of trade, domestic investment, inequality, political regime (polity), gross domestic product (GDP), measures of GDP growth, and urban population growth.

Table I: Summary of Univariate Statistics. Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Access</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>78.83</td>
<td>18.99</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Flows (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>187.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Investment (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>United Nations Statistics Division</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>22.72</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>241.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid economic growth (logged)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
<td>39.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Urban Population (logged)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>-2.01</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>11.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Polity</td>
<td>Freedom House Polity IV</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>21.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^6\) Panel data comes from the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al., 2013).

\(^7\) World Bank data that measured percent of the population with access to a refined source (World Bank, 2007).
**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is water access, measured as the percent of the population with access to at least 20 liters of water per person a day from an improved source within one kilometer of the dwelling (World Bank, 2007). Measures are gathered by the World Bank every five years, I am using the logged value of this data. This value is logged to control for outliers and variance in the water data as can be seen in the summary of the data.

**Independent Variable**

The measure of net inflows of Foreign direct investment (FDI), as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is used, as it is considered the more appropriate measure for this study. This data is taken from the World Bank (2012), and the average lagged measurement of FDI is appropriate as the expected impact of FDI would not be immediate and instead would take time to affect the overall domestic water situation. Net inflows of FDI as a percent of GDP take into account the economic size of a country and can allow a better comparison as country’s with larger economies attract more FDI allowing us to compare between countries and regimes more succinctly (Choi and Samy, 2008). I use net inflows rather than total FDI because I am looking at change over a period of time, which would be influenced by new inflows during that time period. This will give a more accurate assessment of how FDI flows directly impact changes in potable water access.

**Control Variables**

To further test resource management issues, this model will control for variables that would be expected to impact water access and help the model more accurately predict the effects of FDI. I use eight control variables to account for economic, social and political factors that affect potable water access according to the literature linking water to political science and economics. GDP, GDP growth, populations, and urban population growth variables are all logged, and come from the World Bank’s (2012) world development indicators list. Inequality is measured by the GINI co-efficient, in which higher scores represent higher levels of inequality. This measure is not reported in all countries during all time periods. These variables are important in the literature as they have impacts on potable water access and infrastructure within the country and, by controlling for them, I can further isolate the effects of FDI.

---

8 FDI is an investment in the managing stock of a company, measured by the World Bank of any purchase over 10 percent of controlling stock, outside of the investor’s home country (2012).
Domestic investment measured through gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), which was formerly known as gross domestic direct investment, and is included for a more rigorous assessment of FDI. This variable controls for any domestic level investment in fixed assets and allows testing for foreign controlled manufacturing. It also removes the effect of pressure from domestic investors and local communities that may seek “greener” methods of production (Jorgenson, 2007; Young, 1997). This measure comes from the United Nations Statistics division and is measured as a percentage of the GDP.

Trade as a percent of GDP is used to further isolate the effects of FDI. Previous studies have found trade to have negative effects on potable water access (Rudra, 2011) and will provide a test for the robustness of FDI. This model will also use the Freedom House (2011) dataset to control for levels of polity. This is a 10-point scale that measures the level of democracy from zero to 10, from less to more democratic, and this variable will be called polity. It is then averaged across countries for the five-year period between the measurements to capture the average level of democracy over that time period.9

The Model

My model is a country-year fixed effects regression model, in which the variables (where possible) are five-year averages in order to estimate the effect in water access over a five-year period.10 For example, FDI is available for all years and is aggregated into five-year averages so as to identify the average impact of FDI inflows, as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), has on potable water access.11 The model also uses year dummy variables to account for annual trends and clustered standard errors to account for serial correlation.12 The data includes all developing countries for which water and FDI data were available, with control variables.

The following model assesses the effect of FDI on potable water access:

$$\log(water_{it}) = \alpha + \beta_1 FDI_{it-1} + \beta_2 year_t + \beta_k controls_{it} + u_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

9 Water privatization is not included because total water privatization, which prevents water access for the poor, is in decline (Izaguirre and Hunt, 2005). Findings by Rudra (2011) show that water privatization activity was heavily skewed by an outlier, the Philippines.

10 Fixed effects are used because it is assumed that the intercept varies across the cross-sectional units and across the time periods. This was confirmed through a Hausman test.

11 Even when using total FDI rather than averaged FDI, the coefficient is still statistically significant. But the use of averaged FDI considers variation during the five-year period.

12 I also tested my model without the lagged dependent variable and found the direction and magnitude not substantially changed, thus finding no evidence that this variable had any adverse effects on my model (see Achen, 2001).
In this equation, $\text{water}_{lt}$ denotes the percentage of the population with access to potable water in every five-year period when data was collected. $\beta_1$ is the change in log(water) when there is a one unit change in $\text{FDI}_{lt-1}$, the net inflows of FDI into country $i$ at period $t-1$, average of the prior five-year period. $\text{Year}_t$ denotes a time dummy, $\varepsilon$ denotes independent and identically distributed random errors, and $\text{controls}_{lt}$ are the various independent variables that account for any extraneous factor that affect the parameter of interest.

**Results**

Overall, Table II shows strong empirical support for my hypothesis that countries with higher foreign investment inflows have lower access to potable water. The increase in water-intensive and wastewater-inducing production processes due to increases in FDI adversely affects the percent of the population with access to potable water. The first column in Table II reports the results of the baseline results of my model, which focuses on the unconditional and separate effects of FDI, column two reports the effects of FDI controlling for all factors but the inequality score, which limits the data due to data availability, and column three shows the effects of FDI controlling for all other factors.

The effect of FDI is significant, it would be expected that for every increase in FDI, as a percentage of GDP, potable water access will decrease by approximately 1.4 percent, all other factors held constant (column 3). A one standard deviation increase in FDI leads to a decrease of about 13 percent of the population with access to potable water all other factors held constant in this model. Thus, I find that FDI pressure by itself slows the improvements to water access, even in the presence of political, environmental, and other economic controls.

FDI has more robust coefficients than domestic investment or trade. Domestic investment has a positive effect, as predicted by the literature, and trade does not show any significant impact on potable water access (but as expected from the literature the sign is negative). They are also both smaller than FDI. This shows us that FDI is a better indicator of access to potable water in developing countries and has a stronger effect than other economic indicators. The model also shows the sensitivity of potable water access to GDP, population, level of democracy, inequality, and urban growth rates.

The impact of trade is not as robust as previous studies have indicated, though it is in the direction expected. Even when FDI was removed from the data, the impact of trade remains insignificant in this new data set. This shows us that FDI is a better indicator of access to potable
water in developing countries. FDI also has more robust and significant coefficients than domestic investment, which as expected has a positive effect on water access.

Findings on urban growth rates, GDP and population all confirm the literature. GDP has a significant and positive relations with water access, until inequality is controlled for, and then GDP has a negative effect. Populations has a significant negative effect on water access, and urban growth rates improve the access that populations have to water. Finally, as expected democracy has a positive

Table II: Impact of FDI on (logged) Potable Water Access (with controls)
Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI Flows (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-0.0008* (0.00045)</td>
<td>-0.006*** (0.0019)</td>
<td>-0.014** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Domestic Investment (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.0011 (0.0007)</td>
<td>0.005*** (0.0013)</td>
<td>0.012*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.07* (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.33*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Polity (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.007* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.03** (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.0003 (0.0003)</td>
<td>-0.00032 (0.0007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid economic growth (logged)</td>
<td>0.02* (0.01)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Rate (logged)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.45* (0.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.48*** (0.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td>[0.007** (0.003)]</td>
<td>[0.007** (0.003)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.32*** (0.22)</td>
<td>1.40 (3.00)</td>
<td>12.81** (2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
association with potable water access. Confirming the literature that democratic governments are more inclined to respond the demands of their population.\textsuperscript{13}

To further assess the robustness of the negative effects of FDI, I also tested data on the percent of the total population with access to potable water from both the World Development Index and the Environmental Performance Index. These indices provide alternative tests on the relationship between FDI and potable water. As the analysis in the article predicts, the coefficient was negative and significant, suggesting that greater flows of FDI lead to adverse effects on potable water access. The primary findings thus consistently remain stable and confirm the robustness of the results.

\textit{Regional Variation}

Due to variability in levels of development and political landscapes across regions, I further investigate my theory by looking at the regional variation of the effects of FDI in table III, using the variables from model 2.\textsuperscript{14} Foreign direct investment remains significant and has a negative impact in Africa and South Asia, it is only in Latin America does the sign of FDI change but does not have a significant impact on water access. A one percent change in FDI (as a percent of GDP) can result in an approximate 0.44 percent change in access to water. While in South Asia, each percentage increase in FDI can lead to decreases of 5 percent in potable water access. A majority of countries in South Asia and Africa are least developed countries supporting the literature that weaker institutions struggle to counter influxes of FDI in the manufacturing and extractive industries that use more water and produce more water pollution (Grimes and Kentor, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006b, 2007).

Table III also includes a few notable observations. Domestic investment retains a positive effect, with significance in Latin America and South Asia, further confirming the literature that domestic investment is greener. Variations on GDP and urban growth rates should be further explained as these may be related to different political landscapes and social factors. Interestingly,

\textsuperscript{13} In the appendix you can find models that include a succession of relevant control variables that, as stated above, have their own effects on the ability of the population to access water. It also includes models using water as an absolute value, to differentiate from the logged value of water. These provide a robustness check for my model, by including tests of different controls that even when added do not change the significance of FDI. To further test my findings, I reduced all models to the same observations that appear in my earlier models and found that significant adverse effects of FDI remained consistent.

\textsuperscript{14} Model 3 is not used because the GINI coefficient reduces the observations down to a very small sample size that is untestable due to collinearity.
trade is significant and positive in South America, which departs from the findings in the literature and is an area for further study (Rudra, 2011).

Table III: Impact of FDI on (logged) Potable Water Access (with controls) by Region
Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>East and South East Asia</th>
<th>South Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged FDI Flows</td>
<td>-0.0044*</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>-0.00005</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Domestic Investment</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.0015)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
<td>0.0019***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.0007)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Polity</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.0015</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid economic growth</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Rate</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.29*</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-15.94**</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>4.61**</td>
<td>-10.89*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(6.67)</td>
<td>(3.28)</td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>(5.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 145  30  28  43  24
R-squared: 0.48  0.88  0.74  0.83  0.98
Number of Countries: 51  10  14  14  6

Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.1)

Developed versus Developing Countries

My regional models find that FDI is significant and has a negative effect in regions of the world that are the least developed, which leads me to ask if FDI has a unique effect only experienced by the least developed countries? FDI still largely goes to developed countries, only about 40% goes to developing countries, but this amount is steadily increasing (World Bank, 2018). Research contends that populations in the least developed countries will face undersupplied public goods (i.e. water
access) due to insufficient infrastructure, greater collective action problems, and less participatory governance institutions, I want to consider whether the effect of FDI on water access varies between levels of development, to do this I use the same country-year fixed effects regression model with an interaction between FDI and my measurement of development, the human development index (HDI):

$$\log(water)_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FDI_{it-1} + \delta_0 HDI + \delta_1 FDI \times HDI + \beta_2 year_{i} + \beta_3 Controls_{it} + u_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

All parameters and variables remain the same except the inclusion of the human development index as a continuous variable for development and the interaction term. The human development index (HDI) variable is a composite index that measures a country on the basic dimensions of human development (UNDP, 2018). It includes all countries of the world that have data. This is a continuous measure that increases as a country becomes more developed. I interact FDI with the HDI to address the question “does the effect of foreign direct investment on water access vary on the level of development”. Where, $\beta_1$ the is the change in potable water access associated with a one-unit change in foreign investment (as a percent of GDP), and $\beta_1 + \delta_1$ is the change in potable water access associated with a one-unit change in FDI as HDI increases.

In Table IV, I evaluate the extent to which higher developed countries are able to counter the effects of foreign investment, because of better institutional development. I find that for each unit change in HDI, the slope of FDI’s effect on potable water access increases by 0.04. A positive value for the effect of the interaction term implies that the more developed a country is, the more positive the effect of FDI on potable water access. I can accept the hypothesis that FDI has a stronger positive relationship to potable water access as countries become more developed. These findings show that FDI at low levels of development will reduce access to potable water, but as nations develop, FDI can have more positive effects on water access. These results indicate that institutional change as a country develops could be moderating the negative effects of foreign investment seen in previous models.

Conclusions

Finding that FDI has a negative effect on potable water access has consequences for several different literatures, most particularly the “race to the bottom” literature. This paper finds further evidence to support the “race to the bottom” side of the ongoing debate over global economic expansion. I hypothesized that foreign direct investment would have a negative effect on public goods provision due to its impact on resource management institutions. The findings indicate that developing countries are unable to overcome the influence of global economic activities, and as a result parts of the population lose access to water. On average developing countries receive FDI equivalent to about
4% of their GDP, but this amount of FDI could have adverse effects for more than 1 percent of the population, rising to decreases of 4 percent in South Asia. Meaning that FDI is slowing infrastructure improvements that developing countries are making in providing potable water access and creating a “race to the bottom” in countries that are not equipped to manage public goods.

This research also confirms the findings in the literature that development moderates the effects of FDI. As countries develop they see fewer negative effects from FDI, it is possible that their institutions are using increases in FDI to expand potable water access. I conjecture that this is related to the literature that indicates that developing countries are often prioritize economics over the environment, and that institutions in developing countries are unable to keep up with the water demands from development. Further study into institution building as it relates to environmental resources management and globalization is needed in the case of potable water management.

Finally, this analysis points out how international sources of degradation can be more impactful than domestic sources and can have practically large effects on the conditions of the domestic population. Domestic sources of investment have a positive association with potable water access, as would be expected in the literature, because they are connected to the local communities. It may be worth exploring how stronger connections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV: Multiple regression interaction of the effect of FDI on (logged) potable water access dependent on developed or developing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged FDI Flows (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI*HDI (interaction)</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Domestic Investment (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>(0.0013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Polity</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid economic growth (percent change)</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Rate (percent change)</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality Index</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.05***</td>
<td>(2.51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 106
R-squared 0.87
Countries 65

Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.1)
between foreign investors and the local communities influence their impact on local resources and management.

The logic of this argument may hold insights for other resources subject to overuse or pollution. Arable land, forests and fisheries have attributes similar to water; they are consumable goods that impact the lives of the citizens in a state. For example, the recent increase in shale oil to replace depleted easy to access crude oil has led to the use of arable land for fuel supplies rather than food. The depletion of these resources in pursuit of economic growth could have lasting effects on the livelihood and future employment of citizens. Expanding multinational corporations provide incentives to governments to increase the use and depletion of these resources beyond what is sustainable for the population in the absence of an effective management regime. It may be worth exploring whether increasing FDI in developing countries with ineffective domestic institutions affects availability of other natural resources.

Bibliography


Bellos, Sotirios and Turan Subasat (2012): Governance and Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel

15 All online sources are accessible as to 15 November 2018.


Rivera, Jorge (2004). Insitutional Pressures and Voluntary Environmental Behavior in Developing Countries: Evidence from the Costa Rican Hotel Industry', Society and Natural Resources 17: pp. 779–797. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920490493783


Yandle, Bruce et al. (2004): 'Environmental Kuznets Curves: A Review Of Findings, Methods, And Policy Implication', PERC Research Study 02-1 Update. Accessible at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iwt/rerpts/h044740.html

Appendix

Data

All data used can be found on the QoG Standard Dataset website (Teorell et al., 2013): https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata.

Developing Countries included in all models when data is available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Sao Tome and Principe</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Equatorial Guinea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Samoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>St Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>St Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Developed Countries in Interaction Model**

Norway  
United States  
Canada  
Bahamas  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Barbados  
Chile  
Uruguay  
United Kingdom  
Netherlands  
Belgium  
Luxembourg  
France  
Monaco  
Switzerland  
Spain  
Andorra  
Portugal  
Germany  
Poland  
Austria  
Hungary  
Czechoslovakia  
Slovenia  
Greece  
Cyprus  
Romania  
Estonia  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Finland  
Sweden  
Norway  
Denmark  
Iceland  
Israel  
Saudi Arabia  
Kuwait  
Bahrain  
Qatar  
Oman  
Korea, South  
Japan  
Singapore  
Brunei  
Australia  
New Zealand
### Additional Table

**Table IV: Robustness Checks: Impact of FDI on Changes in Potable Water Access (with controls)**
(Source: Author, Data: QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Log(Water)</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Log(Water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged FDI Flows (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-0.00**</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
<td>-0.73**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Domestic Investment (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Polity</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid economic growth</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Growth Rate (percent change)</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>27.53**</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>-18.65***</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>-30.01***</td>
<td>-0.39*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality Index</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>68.73***</td>
<td>-85.45</td>
<td>589.09***</td>
<td>9.96**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
“Not Here Nor Elsewhere”: The Local-Global Dialectic in Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU) Campaigns; The Case of Italy

Paola Imperatore

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.39.2

Paola Imperatore, 27, from Pisa (Italy), is a Ph.D Candidate at the University of Pisa. She holds a graduate degree in International Relations from the University of Pisa where she wrote her thesis on environmental conflicts and forms of protest practiced by local communities. She has additionally worked as a research assistant for various projects on the issue of social movements related with environment, city, refugee crisis and digital platforms. Her current research fields mainly concern environmental movements and LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) campaigns. She is also a member of OPI Social Movements, an observatory on conflict and democracy, as well as a member of Poli.Com where she worked on political communication across social networks during the Italian election. E-mail: paola.imperatore@sp.unipi.it.

Abstract

Over the last decades, several local populations throughout Italy have started to mobilize against the use of land to build infrastructure which is defined by its promoters as crucial to competitiveness in the global market. These challengers have been labeled by institutions and media as NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) and egoistic actors who operate in opposition to the public interest. Local movements have created oppositional NOPE (Not On the Planet Earth) or NIABY (Not In Anyone's Back Yard) discourse to underline the local-global dialectic oriented toward broadly questioning the effects of globalization. Using frame analysis, this paper examines nine Italian LULU campaigns in order to investigate the presence of discursive strategies able to transcend the local dimension, the ability of the challengers to develop and spread a common key of interpretation to the different conflicts and, finally, the existence of recurring and successful frames despite the local peculiarities.

Keywords

Frame Analysis; LULU Campaigns; Model of Growth; NIABY/NOPE, NIMBY
Introduction

The Nimby Forum’s\textsuperscript{16} annual report published at the end of 2017 (Nimby Forum, 2017) noted and confirmed a significant growth in territorial protests against large-scale infrastructure projects in Italy over the last decade. These environmental campaigns\textsuperscript{17} have more than redoubled an amount: from 130 contested installations in 2004 to 359 today (Nimby Forum, 2017). From an observation of the territorial allocation of these campaigns as is shown in the following map (Figure 1), it is possible to point out that they are broadly dispersed all over Italy.

\textbf{Figure 1} – Contested installations. Source: Nimby Forum (2016).

\textsuperscript{16} The Nimby Forum is an observatory on NIMBY protests and it has been active in Italy since 2004. The project is financed by government institutions, national environmental associations and private subjects which are involved in the construction of large-scale infrastructures in Italy. Though the body produces important data through the monitoring of these protests, it is also necessary to note the critical voices regarding the neutrality of the NIMBY Forum due to the participation of private and institutional promoters of the contested infrastructures (Balocco, 2011).

\textsuperscript{17} In this paper the environmental campaigns are understood as series of actions connected to each other in terms of issue and time, aimed toward a specific goal (della Porta and Rucht, 2002: 3), such as against the construction of an infrastructure. In this kind of campaigns participate several groups such as environmental associations, local committees, antagonistic groups and movements, radical left parties and other that can vary in relation to the conflict.
Labelled as “popolo del no” (people of the no) and defined as motivated by NIMBY reasons, these protest campaigns against several infrastructure projects have become important issues in local and national political agendas. To understand their origins, it is necessary to glance at how, since the 90s, neoliberalism has been restructuring economies in Western countries by creating strong competition between cities and territories when it comes to obtaining private investments. Globalization has thus imposed a “growth machine” (Logan and Molotch, 1987) along with related effects: welfare dismantling, gentrification, the privatization of public services and much more. One product of this process has been the promotion of infrastructure projects, portrayed in dominant rhetoric as fundamental for social and economic growth and legitimized as necessary to compete in a global market. As a result, different actors ranging from the no-global movement at the end of the 90s to the environmental movement have been mobilizing against this process. The latter aforementioned movement was strongly affected by the former in terms of its practices, and, over the years, environmental movements became more conflictual and more locally-oriented (della Porta and Diani, 2004).

The relevance of the local dimension as a space in which conflict is expressed has become an object of study in political and social sciences (Slater, 1997; Routledge, 2003; Leitner et al., 2008) and many researchers (della Porta and Andretta, 2002; della Porta and Piazza, 2008; Caruso, 2010; Piazza, 2011) have started to investigate the NIMBY nature of local protest campaigns. Although this existing work represent an essential point of departure for any analysis of the topic, two gaps can be observed in the studies. First, the empirical evidence from which some hypotheses are elaborated stems from a small number of cases (such as one or two campaigns) or focuses only a single-contentious network (such as campaigns against fracking or incinerators). The second gap is related to a single-issue analysis of the contents within the framework of local protests (such as environmental and LULU campaigns, anti-corruption and NIMBY protests, etc.) being the most typical. This paper does not aim to fill these gaps but rather aims to contribute to the debate on NIMBY/not NIMBY using a wide comparison of cases and through a broader analysis of the contents in local actors discourses in order to be able to track a generic counter-frame if one exist. The research aims to discuss the issue by addressing the following research questions from an empirical point of view:

1. What are the real reasons for this broad phenomenon? Is it really the “popolo del no” that wants to obstruct progress?
2. What are the issues in the Italian LULU (Locally Unwanted Land Use) protests that allow for the spreading of common frames among these campaigns?
3. If they exist, what are the more successful and recurring frames?
Framing the Conflict: A Cultural Perspective on Social Movements

In the 80s, the concept of *frame*, elaborated by Goffman in 1974, became and has since remained a highly successful methodological tool for analyzing social movements. Frame has been conceptualized as an interpretative model based on the production of discourses, ideas, and arguments through which actors of a movements give common and shared meaning to reality (Snow and Benford, 1992). Therefore, by using frame analysis it becomes possible to focus on the interaction between collective action and symbolic production. As argued by Snow and Benford (1988), the frame is able to mobilize public opinion in support of social movements demands. In-so-far as a movement’s actors can influence decision-makers only through a broad mobilization of civil society, the frame represents not only an important element of this mobilization but also a key factor in its potential success (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). Snow and Benford (1988) have identified three main steps that take place in a framing process: the *diagnosis*, which occurs when challengers of a phenomenon indicate its problems and causes, the *prognosis* which takes place through the elaboration of solutions and, at the end, the process of the production of *motivations* which incentivize action.

At the same time, Gamson (1988) has stressed that the process of meaning-attribution is a conflictual process in which every actor tries to convince public opinion of their reasons. In this sense, while social movements will try to influence the public opinion and convince others about the reasons behind their protests, counter-movements will also operate in order to defend their interests. The concept of frame makes it possible to capture the cultural dimension of political conflict and to observe culture as an arena of action and disputes between the different parts. In this arena, each challenger defines discourses, languages, symbols and strategies which are considered able to mobilize (Williams, 2004). This cultural arena can also be transformed by the protests (Williams, 2004) which can produce new discursive opportunities more favourable for their claims. If every collective actor can develop a different frame according to their identity, they also have to consider that there are frames which can have more resonance (Snow and Benford, 1988) and that is more probable that such frames will have more potential to convince public opinion and in generalize a protest. Whilst considering political conflict also as cultural conflict between different perspectives in which each actor tries to legitimize itself and to discredit the adversary, the next paragraph discusses the relationship between the framing process and LULU campaigns.

**NIMBY or Not? The Local-Global Dialectic in LULU Campaigns**

There are two main antagonistic coalitions in conflicts related to the use of the territory to build new infrastructures. On one hand, there is the *environmental coalition*, in which a very
heterogeneous network generally composed of local committees, associations, antagonistic left groups, radical-left parties and, sometimes, local institutions frame their opposition to a project as a defence of the environment (della Porta and Andretta, 2002). On the other hand, there is the economic coalition, often composed of industries, unions and local institutions, which promotes the same project being contested by the respective environmental coalition and frame it as an opportunity to generate economic benefits for the given the territory as well as to raise employment levels (della Porta and Andretta, 2002). Since their origin in the 90s, LULU protests have been labelled by institutions, media, and infrastructures promoters as NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard), parochial and localistic mobilizations with egoistic interests. As is pointed out by Neville and Weinthal (2016:570) “industry sees the phenomenon as stifling development, and governments view it as hindering social progress” and public good. The media’s construction and story-telling regarding these protests is mainly oriented towards devaluing them (Lake, 1993; Jobert, 1998; McLeod, 2007) by using a diversionary reframing (Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994) aimed at diverting attention from the pivotal problem and toward redefining the issue on the basis of the unreasonableness of the challengers (Freudenburg et al., 1998). Broad use of the NIMBY label allows for the discrediting of actors labelled as such as adverse to development and the common interest, and so undermines their legitimacy (Wolsink, 2006). Hence, the LULU mobilizations are identified as enemies in-so-far as they are seen as obstacles stemming from the rejection of a few people to pay the necessary costs to create public good useful for the society as a whole (della Porta and Piazza, 2008). These challengers are often charged as anti-democratic actors who paralyze public policies (Mannarini and Roccati, 2011).

Facing a framing process which negatively affects LULU actors, scholars examining these movements have begun to investigate the issue more deeply. The contributions of Bobbio (1999; 2011), della Porta (1999), della Porta and Piazza (2008) Caruso (2010) and Piazza (2012) in Italy, as well as those of McAdam and Boudet (2012), Rootes (2013), and Neville and Weinthal (2016) in other countries have focused attention on the discursive evolution of local protest campaigns. They found that local actors have started to engage even more frequently in the challenge of broadening their frames to encompass other issues – environment, wealth, the model of growth, and participation – which are strongly connected with the main claims of their protests. For example, Schlosberg (2004) has examined the attempt to reclaim participation in environmental policy processes. Meanwhile, Della Porta (1999) has observed how campaigns are linked to a more general demand for democracy from below. This is something she has defined as a meta-discourse of democracy. Through their actions, local challengers question and reject the institutional DAD (Decide, Announce, Defend) approach to decision-making (Kemp, 1992).
By focusing their opposition not against the localization of but on the same existence of large-scale infrastructure, the campaign actors have redefined the debate. They have tried to overcome the NIMBY label by elaborating NOPE (Not On the Planet Earth) (Trom, 1999) or NIABY (Not In Anyone's Back Yard) (Lesbirel, 1998) frames in which the local-global dialectic is pivotal. In the context of globalization, the local protests are related to global topics and have become an opportunity to question the overall development model (Owens and Cowell, 2011). Caruso (2010) has argued that LULU movements are thus contributing to the building of an ideological discourse around specific themes of reflection. These include the use of the commons, lifestyles, the relationship between the centre and periphery, as well as that between homogenisation and multiplicity, and, in particular, the dominant concept of progress. In this discourse, globalization is considered to be a process responsible for producing centralization, homogenization and commodification (Caruso, 2010). In order to capture the process through which LULU actors can develop their frame, Walsh, Warland and Smith (1997) have elaborated the concepts of frame expansion and frame bridging. These processes can take place when a particular frame of collective action is successfully applied to a seemingly separate issue or conflict (Walsh et al., 1997). In this case, a scale shift of the LULU campaigns occurs and bridges “claims and identities” (McAdam et al., 2001: 331) and, at the same time, affects spatial/geographic dimensions because mobilization grows beyond its localized beginnings.

Social movement researchers have agreed on considering the development of a generalized frame as a strategy for gaining consensus by searching for external allies (Roots, 2007; Neville and Weinthal, 2016). They have also agreed that by elaborating a transformation frame (Berbrier, 2002), the movement’s actors are able to avoid the stigma with which they are often labelled. Through such frame re-development, they thus try to reposition themselves in cultural space. However, what was initially only a tactic has over time become a real process in which local actors develop and internalize a universal frame (Rootes, 2013), and, finally, share a common and cohesive identity with other subjects. The final point concerning existing studies on the topic related to the master frame (Snow and Benford, 1989; 1992), that is the more recurring frames in local campaigns. Based on his study on anti-incinerator campaigns in England, Rootes (2013: 110) has argued for climate change as being a successful master frame concerning his particular case, having stated that it “provides local environmental campaigners with a new frame that provides effective bridging not merely between the local and the national but between the local and the global”. Whereas the case of Italy is concerned, della Porta and Andretta (2002) have identified four master frames in relation to the identities of involved actors:
1. Local communities which reject bearing the disadvantages generated by large-scale infrastructure support the NIMBY frame.

2. Environmental associations which argue that their opposition is grounded in defending the ecosystem mainly use the frame of environmentalism.

3. Further actors see large infrastructures as a source of public waste and corruption.

4. And, finally, there are actors that consider decision-making related to the building of large-scale infrastructures as demonstration of centralized and non-democratic decision-making procedures.

By using this theoretical framework as a departing point, this paper will investigate the discursive strategy put in place by different LULU campaigns across Italy, if and how they develop a local-global dialectic and the existence of master frames in movements related to opposing large-scale infrastructure projects.

Conceptualization and Operationalization

In this paper, the NIMBY frame is referred to as the dominant frame which is used by institutions, private investors and the media to portray protest campaigns against large-scale infrastructure projects. On the other hand, a generic NIABY frame developed by local challengers is considered as the counter-frame. The research therefore revolves around the pivotal question of how a frame can be defined as NIMBY or NIABY. In order to investigate the local-global dialectic in protest campaigns against large-scale infrastructure projects, several indicators have been chosen, each related to its own respective issue:

1) Not here;
2) Uselessness;
3) Health of local residents;
4) Right to health;
5) Environment;
6) Public spending;
7) Democracy and participation;
8) Model of growth and social justice;
9) Repression and war;
10) Anti-corruption;
11) Civil rights.

I assume that in the cases in which only the "not here", "uselessness" and "health of local residents" frames are used, the protest is locally-oriented and so the NIMBY label is confirmed. This does not mean that they have less legitimacy, but that the discourse is based on specific local claims and that networks with other collective actors and topics are narrow. When campaigns start to
interconnect their protests with more generic issues, ranging from the right to health (point 4) to civil rights (point 11), we may consider that these campaigns are engaged in a local-global dialectic. The more the issues are elaborated by the actors, the deeper the link between specific and universal or local and global concerns will be. In such cases, we can encounter a NIABY counter-frame. The comparison can reveal to us how different actors frame the same issue and it also allows us to verify the presence of a master-frame which may be shared by several campaigns. Moreover, the comparison makes it possible to answer the following important question: What types of issues and claims are there behind a NIABY frame?

**Methodology and Data**

In order to investigate the building of counter-frames by opponents to large-scale infrastructure projects, a qualitative approach based on frame analysis is used. As della Porta and Diani (2006: 74) have argued, frame analysis allows us “to capture the process of attribution of meaning which lies behind the explosion of any conflict”. Through the close examination of protest campaign manifestos and written texts such as articles and public statements in campaign blogs or other digital sources, the aim is to reconstruct the local actors frames. Through such methodology, the aim is to pass “from the text to the frame” (Johnston, 1995: 219). To evaluate and compare frames across different campaigns, I have used a standardized codebook. It includes qualitative indicators related to protest issues (as aforementioned) which make a more systematic analysis possible. When argumentations related to specific issues are found, a transference is made in the codebook to indicate the presence of these issues in the respective campaigns. By proceeding in this manner for each campaign, a table which denote the campaigns and their issues is produced and this data is consequently visualized and discussed in the “Analysis and findings” section of this paper. In order to investigate the construction of a universal counter-frame elaborated by protest actors in opposition to the dominant one, nine local protest campaigns in Italy are compared. The focus on a single country is for two main reasons. On one hand, it facilitates the selection of campaigns and also the understanding of the collected documents due to the contextual situation of myself as the paper’s author. On the other hand, since large-scale infrastructure projects are strongly debated in Italy as is shown by the Nimby Forum’s data (Nimby Forum, 2017) a deeper analysis of this phenomenon in Italy is particular useful.

To collect data, I have selected campaigns with at least a basic level of structuring, in different areas of the country, of different duration with different histories, and related to different contested infrastructures projects. By combining Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and a Most Different System Design (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Faure, 1994), I compare cases with common features (geographic area, national structure of opportunity, mobilization issues, etc.) but also with
specific and local peculiarities (political culture, occupation, growth levels, local structure of opportunity). In fact, the use of both MSSD and MDSM allows for a comparison of cases with common features but also with dissimilarities by showing how some variables can impact a phenomenon. If, in this study, the analysed campaigns have several similarities in terms of actors, aims, and national context, the territories in which these protests take place present different characteristics. In particular, there is a macro-level difference between the South, with high unemployment and underdeveloped infrastructures, and the North which is more competitive in the global market thanks to high-level of investments and well-developed infrastructures. It can be hypothesized that the dominant rhetoric can have different effects on local populations depending on the local context and, consequently, local actors can produce different counter-frames rather than a common and universal one. In fact, infrastructures policy is portrayed as able to encourage economic and employment growth by improving the integration and the competitiveness of territories in the global market. Taking into account these factors, the following protest campaigns are analysed in this paper: No Tav Terzo Valico, No Expo, No Grandi Navi, No Cave and Piana Contro le Nocività in Northern or Central-Northern Italy, and No Tubo, No Tap, No Muos and No Triv in Central-Southern or Southern Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Italy</th>
<th>Selected LULU campaings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Grandi Navi</td>
<td>No Grandi Navi is a campaign supported by the residents of Venice to oppose the dangerous industry of tourist cruisers. The campaign has been active since 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Tav Terzo Valico</td>
<td>The No Tav Terzo Valico is a campaign against the construction of a High-Speed Train between Genoa and Milan which started in the 90s but has been gaining traction since 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Expo</td>
<td>The No Expo campaign was born in 2007 in Milan to oppose the project of a universal exposition in 2015 (Expo 2015 Milano). During the next years No Expo became popular in Italy with events on the issue happening all over the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cave</td>
<td>The No Cave campaign arose in 2014 to contest the intensive extraction of marble from the Apuan Alps. The extraction that produces recurring floods and it is responsible for environmental destruction and poor socio-economic situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Central Italy

Piana contro le Nocività
Piana contro le Nocività is a campaign that has joined the residents of three main cities (Florence, Prato and Pistoia) in opposition of the construction of a new incinerator and also of the enlargement of Florence airport. It began in 2012.

No Tubo
No Tubo is a campaign against the construction of a gas pipeline through different territories of Central-Italy which are seismic areas.

Southern Italy

No Tap
No Tap campaign arose in 2013 to oppose the landing of a pipeline in a territory with a fragile ecosystem and aims to safeguard the environment and local activities.

No Muos
No Muos is a campaign which began in 2008 against the installation of antennas into the Usa Military Base arguing this is dangerous for the environment and for health.

No Triv
No Triv is a national campaign that joins together several local actors in opposition to the perforation of their territory with drills in order to exploit oil.

Table 1 – Selected LULU Campaigns. Source: Author.

Analysis and Findings

On the one hand, there are institutions and private investors that try to encourage socio-economic development while, on the other hand, there are local communities that reject progress. These opposing positions behind the issue of large-scale infrastructure projects have often been represented in public debate in this manner. The media, in accordance with both public and private promoters, have simplified protest front ideas by referring to local actors as NIMBY subjects. This label has portrayed movements against infrastructure projects as irrational, emotional, ignorant, and anti-modern (Mannarini and Roccato, 2011), motivated by reasons of self-interest and lacking in civic orientation (Freudenberg and Pastor, 1992) thus obstructing the public good. Data collected by the Nimby Forum concerning the reasons of the protests shows that the two main motives behind them are related to the residents’ health and the conservation of the environment (Nimby Forum, 2017). These aspects seem to have remained pivotal over the years covered by this analysis (2004-2017) with growth having taking place for the environmental issue, where it is concerned from 17% in 2004 (Nimby Forum, 2005) to 30% in 2017 (Nimby Forum, 2017), and having peaked at 38,9% in 2014 (Nimby Forum, 2015). The problem of lack of participation entered the foray in 2010 and gradually increased in prominence through to 2017 (Nimby Forum, 2017).
Though these data offer a first glance at the reasons behind NIMBY campaigns, they are limited. This is because the information is collected from newspapers which, as has been argued by Mannarini and Roccato (2011: 809), “contribute to spreading a negative and stigmatising representation of local oppositions” and rarely report in depth on the reasons behind the protests. A deeper comparison of documents produced by local campaign actors has allowed for the development of an understanding of the topics on which the mobilizations are and have been based.

**Not Here**

Figure 2 below shows the first meaningful finding of the analysed cases: none of the analysed cases are related to a “not here” claim. There are no documents in which local opponents, as the reasons behind their protests, argue that the infrastructure projects should be realized in other locations. By observing the discourses produced by local actors, what emerges is that the protest campaigns have problematized infrastructure policy and related rhetoric. In fact, the contention does not concern the location of the infrastructure but, rather, its very existence, as is shown by the recurring use of the “Nè qui nè altrove” (Not here nor elsewhere) slogan.

![Figure 2 – Protest Campaign Issues. Source: Author.](image)

Each one of the analysed campaigns sees the intersection of at least four topics among the selected indicators in an explicit way. The No Triv campaign seems to be a particular case involving less issues. However, if we analyse which issues are involved in this case, we can immediately perceive a universal dimension to it as well as it covers: the right to health, environment, democracy, and also the model of development.
**Environment and Health**

As reported by the Nimby Forum (2017), environmental and health issues are both fundamental topics across the campaigns. Contrary to the mainstream label that portrays these local actors as irrational, the reasons behind the campaigns are often strongly supported by scientific studies (Bobbio, 1999). As has been pointed out by Bobbio (1999), the residents’ fear for their health and territories in relation to the construction of large-scale infrastructures finds confirmation in the reports that scholars and associations produce to reinforce their arguments. These topics can be included into the *environmentalist* frame (della Porta and Andretta, 2002), defined as a frame in which groups oppose themselves to an infrastructure project because it is considered as dangerous for the ecosystem as well as for humans and animals living in the territory that is to be affected. In other words, the claim is related to the potential impact of the infrastructure on the surrounding landscape and environment. Can this frame be defined as egoistic, localistic and unfounded? By seeking to reclaim a healthy environment, the campaigns actors are fighting not only for the interest of local residents, but they are also defending the interests of future generations (Comitato No Tap, 2016). This represents a key element in the discourse of local opponents and, in particular, in groups such as Mamme No Muos (La Sicilia, 2015) or Mamme No Tap (ComuneInfo, 2017) which join mothers in defence of their sons and future generation. At the same time environmentalism as a frame is not just usable within specific territorial borders but may be extended. This is because environmental realities have far-reaching effects and that what happens in one location can produce effects in other territories. In brief, environmentalism can be considered a universal frame. Together with the safeguarding of the environment and public health, Figure 2 shows that other “popular” issues are democracy (in 8 of the 9 cases), public spending (in 5 of the 9 cases), and the growth model (in all cases). Behind each one of these issues lies a radical conflict as concern values that I will proceed to analyse.

**Democracy, Legality, Corruption**

From the comparison in this paper, evidences emerge of what della Porta (1999) has referred to as meta-discourse of democracy. As has been argued by Bobbio (1999), during a campaign, local actors question not only the environmental and socio-economic impacts of an infrastructure project, but also the decisional-making process in which the local population is typically not included. Additionally, the Nimby Forum’s data shows that this lack of inclusion in decision-making arenas is an important issue for local campaigners; during 2017, 21.7% of people opposed projects due to the lack of their ability to participate in them (Nimby Forum, 2017). What the Nimby Forum’s Data doesn’t show nor explore, however, are the radical differences between infrastructures promoters and opponents has regard their understanding of the concept of democracy. What is explicitly
illustrated by the results of the analysis is a conflict between top down democracy - the dominant model based on liberal democracy - and bottom up model in which there is a more interactive relationship between institutions and citizens in the decision-making process. The latter do not necessarily reject the conventional modality of participation but additionally supports the necessity for more frequent, incisive, and inclusive democracy from below.

From the analysis of the discourse across the various campaign documents, it appears evident that the defence of democracy constitutes part of the local actor’s frames. Infrastructure opponents denounce a deficit of democracy (No Expo, 2015), conflicts of interests (Ibid.) and the top down approach of institutions completely excluding local populations from decision-making processes (No Tap, 2018). Through their protests, opposing actors critically discuss mechanisms of delegation which are considered responsible for the progressive estrangement of institutions from citizens (Assemblea Permanente Carrara, 2014). Some actors underline the necessity to defend democracy through respecting the Italian Constitution (Coordinamento Nazionale No Triv, 2015) and law (Comitato No Tubo, 2013). In this sense, it is interesting to observe how divergent ideas can exist behind the same terms. In fact, infrastructure promoters often appeal to the law to impose a project, invoking public interest and the observance of the law. The opponents, meanwhile, make use of the law to counter decisions about a project. This appears particularly true when examining the anti-corruption frame (Piazza and Sorci, 2017) which local actors often support and it seems prevalent in 5 out of the 9 examined cases. By thus linking large infrastructure projects to corruption, LULU challengers strategically used the respect of legality against the project promoters.

A telling example of anti-corruption frame is the No Tav campaign. This campaign is symbolic to movements against large infrastructure projects, having resulted in the use of the “No Tav No Mafia” slogan to underline anti-corruption issues as part of their protest. The No Muos (2012), No Tav Terzo Valico and No Expo (2015) campaigns have been framed by local actors as movements against mafia, corruption, the exploitation of illegal labour (in the construction sites), and collusion between political parties and investors. Large-scale infrastructures projects seem to provide a “Hummus for the Mafia” (No Tav Terzo Valico, 2012), so much so that No Tav Terzo Valico activists have nicknamed the High Speed Train project as a High Speed Mafia (Ibid.) opportunity. Along such and similar lines, LULU challengers invoke the respect of the law in order to stop the construction of large infrastructure projects and to fight related mechanisms of corruption and illegality that characterize them. In so doing, they also bring attention, once again, to the issue of participation in decision-making processes related to the projects. It is therefore possible to observe that local actors have introduced a fundamental element into their discourses, that of a call for a more de-centralized and participative mechanisms of democracy. Several actors argue for
the necessity of a new relationship between the national/transnational and local levels whereby decision-making processes should shift from the local to the global, i.e. from citizens to institutions. The No Triv manifesto is explicative of this demand: it declares that the activist’s action is meant to “defend commons, democracy and the local communities’ interests from power centralization” (Coordinamento Nazionale No Triv, 2016).

Additionally, other actors denounce national and transnational institutions for lacking capacity to pay attention to the voices of territories (Re:Common, 2014) from which a demand for democracy is strongly emerging. The want for direct participation has become a key protest element in several campaigns. On one hand, some campaigns request and suggest the institution of concrete tools of direct democracy (Assemblea Permanente Carrara, 2015; Lucca Libera, 2015). Meanwhile, on the other hand, a will is expressed to take part in polis activities through horizontal, inclusive, and consensual practices and spaces (Assemblea Permanente Carrara, 2014). The vision of democracy that emerges in these campaigns does not exclude representative one (della Porta and Piazza, 2008), but rather stipulate that representation cannot be exhausted merely through administrative functions (Allasino, 2004). Instead, the request for democracy from below seems to embody a vision of local and direct participation. Altogether, the centralized and non-democratic decision-making procedure frame (della Porta and Andretta, 2002) seems to be a key-point of interpretation of the conflict for LULU actors that are promoting decentralized models of participation from below.

**Public Spending: What is the Public Interest?**

The issue of public investments is one which recurs frequently in the analysed texts. Several campaigns frame the large infrastructure projects as high public spending ventures that steals economic resources from social welfare. For instance, the No Tav Terzo Valico protest denounces a mechanism that cuts public spending on social services while simultaneously increasing spending on infrastructures (No Tav Terzo Valico, 2012). This divestment of funds is apparent from reported data which demonstrate an allocation of 6 billion Euros to infrastructure projects and an in tandem retraction of the same value from government spending on retirement (Ibid.). No Tap activists, for example, support redirecting these amounts towards social incomes, public schools and research (Chirenti, 2014).

Several campaigns explain their oppositions to infrastructure projects through a public waste frame denouncing a bad use of collective resources in time of crisis and austerity (No Expo, 2015). In denouncing policies regarding large-scale infrastructure projects, they are denouncing a model in which public resources are used for private interests and in which few people profit to the disadvantage of the collective good. Activists of both the No Tap (Re:Common, 2014) and No Expo (Equal, 2014) campaigns define the different projects they are opposed to as profitable for businesses
and investors, but detrimental for contributors. No Tubo activists further denounce a policy aiming to subjugate the territories in question to the creation of the profits for infrastructure promoters and builders while local communities accrue considerable debt (Comitato No Tubo, 2018b). So framed by the challengers, these mobilizations are seen as an action of defence of the general interests against the particular interest of investors (Bobbio, 2011). From these cases, the use of a “public spending, private profits” counter-frame aiming to critically discuss these projects seems to emerge. At the same time, the conflict between the dominant “public interest” frame and the “public spending, private profits” counter-frame reveals a deeper rift as regards the concept of the public. No Tav Terzo Valico actors have argued that “something is broken in our own language and in our own common feeling. Something that has to do with the same idea of general interest and of being a community. The logic of large infrastructure projects, in particular of the high-speed train, dramatically underlines this rift” (No Tav Terzo Valico, 2013c). It is evident that the attempt to question and redefine the idea of the public relates to the collectivity as a whole and not just to a single campaign. These reflections around the concept of the public demonstrate a process of “remontée en généralité” (Lolive, 1999), understood as a discursive strategy that moves from the particular to the general. LULU actors have thus taken the accusation pointed by them by infrastructures promoters, of obstructing the public interest in a NIMBY sense, against them (Comitato No Tubo, 2018a). For the opponents, in fact, those who are pursuing private and egoistic goals to the detriment of local communities and the public good are in general infrastructure supporters, in so doing for personal profit.

What Kind of Growth Model?

Along with concerns for the environment, a main issue in the studied LULU campaigns, according to the peculiarities of the specific contested projects, seems to be a worry about the potential consequences of the model of economic progress accompanying large infrastructure projects. Each local community respective to each campaign, has developed this topic in a different way. The No Triv (Coordinamento Nazionale No Triv, 2016), No Tap (Re:Common, 2014; Comitato No Tap, 2014), and No Tubo (Comitato No Tubo, 2018a) campaigns (all concerning the exploitation of oil and gas) frame their protests along the lines of the necessity to convert the economic model from the use of fossil fuels to renewable ones in order to have a more sustainable economy. No Cave is opposed to the intensive theft of marble from local mountains and suggests basing local development on responsible and sustainable tourism and also on the artistic use of marble (Salviamo le Apuane, 2014). Other campaigns such as No Expo (2015) and No Tav Terzo Valico (2013b) demand a fair and sustainable growth model by denouncing the overbuilding due to the construction of large-scale infrastructure. At the same time, the No Grandi Navi (2017a)
campaign frames its protest along a critical stance to mass tourism and related effects such as gentrification, the cruiser business and more. All these campaigns also question the social consequences of infrastructure policy, particularly as regard the exploitation of workers and social aggregation. What these campaigns share is a common critical stance to an economic model based on the intensive exploitation of resources and also on activities which negatively impacts on socio-economic development and on environment. The demand for a sustainable growth model is strongly connected to a demand for social justice. A good example of this is the No Tap campaign, which doesn’t only question the construction of a pipeline on the territory it seeks to defend, but also recognizes the right of other communities invested in the pipeline to decide about their resources for themselves (the pipeline is part of a European project but concerns the territories of Albania, Greece, Turkey, Azerbaijan and other countries) (Re:Common, 2014). Through denouncing the prevalent growth model, the No Expo activists, as another example, denounce a neoliberal economy based on the exploitation of resources of Southern countries and oppressed people.

As concerns this hegemonic frame and the labelling of the neoliberal model of development as a categorical imperative to protest, LULU campaigns have introduced a counter-frame able to critically discuss the idea of progress. Protest actors argue for the necessity to perform other “better practices” (Ibid.), in order to guarantee a future for next generations. With a “there are other alternatives” (Piana contro le nocività, 2012) slogan, these actors support a model oriented towards recycling, reusing, and reconverting intensive activities into more sustainable ones, for example by diffusing post-extractivism values (Coordinamento Nazionale No Triv, 2016). What emerges is that, more than a “people of the no”, these actors are a “people of no to this growth model”. In fact, these campaigns show in an evident way an aversion against the dominant model of development based on consumerism, energy wastefulness, and an unhindered reaching for profit (Bobbio, 2011). In opposition to investments in large-scale infrastructure, the challengers propose to invest in what they consider the real priorities for the country. This claim strongly emerges through the slogan “Only one great infrastructure, home, and income for everyone”\textsuperscript{18}, which has become very popular in these kinds of movements and has been adopted by several campaigns that combine the LULU issues with other claims such as precariousness and right to housing.

In short, this slogan is able to show the inversion of priorities in the frame adopted by local actors. It is important to underline that at the core of these campaigns it is possible to identify a key value which orients the mobilizations against the infrastructural projects. These actors adopt the concept of “commons” (Caruso, 2010) and oppose a growth paradigm rooted in a global model

\textsuperscript{18} This slogan is common in Italy among various actors and campaigns. Here some examples: ‘Una sola grande opera. Casa e reddito per tutti’ (DinamoPress, 2013) or ‘Una sola grande opera: casa, reddito, dignità per tutti’ (InfoAut, 2014).
based on the privatization, commodification and exploitation of local resources. As a matter of fact, the “safeguard of common goods” is one of the most popular counter-frame NIMBY actors utilize. As the No Expo’s manifesto declares, the movement seeks to criticize “[this] model of city, of development, of use of territory and of commons” (No Expo, 2015). At the end of their documents, the No Grandi Navi campaigners use the slogan “Laguna Bene Comune” (Laguna Common Good). The idea at the core of Commons paradigm is that local communities can participate in the management of their territory and overcome the state-market dichotomy (Ostrom, 1990). Are the local communities which should be able to decide on their future rather than national/transnational subjects or corporations. As is argued by Andretta and Guidi (2017: 264), “the emphasis on the common goods […] signals the intent to democratize the land use”. The cleavage between the dominant model of growth and alternative growth (Caruso, 2010; Piazza, 2011) is at the core of these kinds of conflicts and essentially puts the same concept of progress into question. In the end, the request for a more sustainable growth model meets and joins up with the request for more inclusive and decentralized forms of democratic participation.

Other Issues

In LULU campaigns, topics such as repression and war (mentioned only twice across the 9 cases analysed) or the civil rights (mentioned only once) seem to have less resonance. It could denote the absence of such frame a lack of attention for the other issues and thus leading to a limited field of possible ensuing action? By discussing what results from this comparison, I argue that some campaigns, due to their specific contexts, face certain topics more head-on than others. As it so happens, No Muos actors discuss the issue of war because they oppose the construction of a military base, yet their history is also ingrained with Sicily having often been used as an outpost for various countries (No Muos, 2012). For No Tav Terzo Valico attention to repression is linked with the political repression of dissident peoples, in their case of campaign activists themselves (No Tav Terzo Valico, 2013a). Concerning civil rights, though it is true that almost all campaigns pay some attention to the issue of participation and democracy, there is a lack of elaboration upon other civil and human rights. The No Muos campaign is an exception. It refers to anti-fascism, anti-racism, solidarity and equality among Mediterranean populations. No other actors, however, have framed their action along the lines of a fight for civil rights. In particular, there are no campaigns that refer to LGBTQ issues19.

19 LGBTQ (Lesbian, gay, bisex, transgender, queer).
If this result can be evaluated in a sense of civil rights being an area in which the counter-frame of LULU actors are lacking, it is also necessary to consider the networks in which these actors are engaged to understand how they interact with other subjects and topics. This is an important research mission which has not been explored in this paper due to the scope of the research. In the next paragraph, I only mention the relationships between individual LULU campaigns in order to underline the strong connections between them.

**Networks**

What emerges from a reading of the documents produced by LULU actors is an attempt to get in contact with other similar campaigns in order to overcome the local connotations of the individual protests. Nearly each analysed campaign has engaged in an effort to mobilize on a broader level. While No Tap, No Tav Terzo Valico, and Piana contro le Nocività activists have joined together multiple local communities over this greater project, No Muos has become a regional campaign through the coordination of 14 local committees into the “Coordinamento dei Comitati No Muos” (No Muos, 2013). At the same time, others such as No Triv and No Tubo, have been successful in transforming the level of coordination from local to national one. No Triv has therefore gained strength through coordination and organized collective action against the exploitation of oil in Italy.

No Tap interacts closely with other campaigns such as No Snam and No Tubo. No Tap activists have also organized a caravan all around Italy to sensitize other communities to their struggle (Pressenza, 2017). No Grandi Navi has launched a transnational campaign named “Facciamo respirare il Mediterraneo” (let’s breath the Mediterranean) which aims to raise awareness about the environmental costs of the cruiser industry and to involve France, Greece, and Spain in a program reducing sulphur emissions (No Grandi Navi, 2017b).

Whereas these attempts to broaden the scope of individual mobilizations is concerned, it is important to take into consideration two meetings, one on the national level and one on the European level, which have occurred over the past two years. The first meeting, named “Agorà of movements in defence of territories and for the environmental justice” (Cdea, 2017), took place in Naples in 2016. With mixed academic and activist participation, this event represented a first moment of confrontation on the issue among scholars and movement actors. On one hand this meeting represented an effort to give an empirical base to LULU claims, and on the other hand it gave birth to an interest in the construction of a broader network able to develop alternative

---

20 Snam is a gas pipeline project of 700 km that aims to pass through the Adriatic territories of Italy. The project is strongly opposed by local communities that denounce the serious and dangerous impacts of Snam for the environment and the health and safety of local population (TuttoOggi, 2017).
strategies to the existing growth model. This latter goal was confirmed by the convocation of a second meeting in Venice at the end of 2017. On this occasion, a conference named “European days of movements for the defence of territories, environmental justice and democracy” (Global Project, 2017) was held. LULU actors were invited from all over Europe, and democracy was added to the event as a pivotal topic of the meeting. By mentioning these meetings is possible to bring attention to the dynamics in which LULU actors are engaged in order to structure a local-global dialectic and to overcome the local dimensions of their protests by framing their opposition in terms of resistance against land exploitation and as a demand for a different model of growth (Ibid.).

Conclusion

By considering the data collected and discussed in this paper, it is possible to draw a series of conclusions. First, the label of NIMBY typically associated with LULU campaigns does not reflect the attitude of the local actors involved in the campaigns. The use of the NIMBY frame, considered dominant, appears to be a strategic diversionary reframing (Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994) choice made by the economic coalition (infrastructure supporters) to delegitimize these forms of protests. In so doing, infrastructure supporters seek to shift the focus of public opinion from the pivotal claims of the campaigns towards the irrationality and particularism of the challengers. Local actors respond to this mainstream representation of them, by engaging in the development of a common counter-frame able to universalize the issues they protest by starting from a “Not here nor elsewhere” slogan to underline the transversal relevance of their claims. This slogan represents the Italian implementation of the so-called NOPE (Trom, 1999) or NIABY (Lesbirel, 1998) discourse.

By framing their actions as a request for social justice, welfare, a fairer working system, a more inclusive forms of local democracy and for a sustainable growth model, the local actors realize a scale-shift in their campaigns through the “geographic expansion of contention” (McAdam and Boudet, 2012: 132). LULU actors have been successful in joining seemingly separate issues within a common interpretative scheme. This frame bridging (Snow and Benford, 1992) has allowed the actors of the analysed campaigns to interconnect issues such as democracy, the neoliberal model, globalization, social justice, anti-corruption, and others to the main claims of their protests. Even though della Porta and Andretta (2002) distinguish between various frames in relation to the actors, in the selected campaigns these frames intersect and seem to have been generalized across all the campaigns independently by the acting groups. This does not mean that there aren’t actors who give privileges to one frame over an-other, but that these keys of interpretation spread across all the campaign’s actors and become a shared discourse. The environmental frame, the public waste and corruption frame, and the centralized and non-democratic decision-making procedure frame act in unison and cross paths across the analysed campaigns.
It is important to underline that the opposition to the hegemonic model of development is immediately connected with criticisms of the dominant model of progress and its notion that large-scale public infrastructures increase competitiveness. In fact, in the diagnosis process (Snow and Benford, 1988), LULU activists identify as the cause of the problem the neoliberal model of growth positing that it imposes specific priorities and also the representative model of democracy which centralizes decision-making processes and so leave the local communities under-represented. In their diagnosis, private investors, often in collusion with public institutions, are subjects which pursue this faulty growth model through the construction of large-scale infrastructures.

At the same time, in the prognosis phase (Snow and Benford, 1988), the challengers propose to overcome these problems by promoting an alternative economic and political paradigm based on participation from below and on the common and sustainable use of land. The motivations (Snow and Benford, 1988) used to persuade third parties to mobilize and to support the protests is related to the defence of the public/general interest. From this perspective, each person has to defend the collective good against private speculations.

A second point worth discussing here concerns the presence of common frames despite the specific differences between campaigns, territories, and local subcultures. In fact, the features of all campaigns and their contexts do not in particular affect their frames. From the north to the south Italy, the issues that characterize the protests are the same. In these Italian cases, there seems to exist a master frame encompassing participation from below and the management of territory. A “commons, democracy and environmental justice” (CDEj) frame bring issues to be closer to the meaning which Italian LULU actors attribute to their protests. In parallel with an enlargement of frames, there is an apparent process of scaling campaigns up through the development of wider networks as a way of “bridging claims and identities” (McAdam et al., 2001: 331). In fact, the construction of national and transnational networks among LULU campaigns demonstrates their awareness of common global implications regarding how the dominant model of progress affects territories and, at the same time, their awareness that unification is necessary to organize against and resist this process.

Future Research

The analysis in this paper has sought to observe if the NIMBY label as a frame mirrors the attitude of LULU movements. It has been found that it does not. The analysis has led to a recognition of the development of an alternative counter-frame and it has pointed to the existence of common discourses and master frames among various campaigns with different contexts. Nevertheless, there are still some aspects that are worth considering through deeper analysis. In particular, I suggest the carrying out of a more detailed analysis of the networks in which local actors engage from both a
territorial and a thematic perspective. This can allow us to understand the kinds of relationships local actors may have with other issues and other collective actors. In parallel, it is necessary to explore how the socio-economic, political, and cultural differences between different areas of Italy can be more or less relevant to conducting LULU campaigns.

References


**Primary online sources**


Comitato No Tap (2014): 'una sola strategia, il bene comune. NO TAP e chiusura immediata di Cerano'. Accessible at: http://notransadriaticpiperline.blogspot.it/2014/01/comunicato-una-sola-strategia-il-bene.html (12 August 2018)


No Muos (2013): 'Comitati'. Accessible at: https://www.nomuos.info/comitati/ (22 October 2018)


No Tap (2018): 'Perchè diciamo NO a TAP'. Accessible at: https://www.notap.it/i-motivi-del-no/ (11 October 2018)


No Triv: 'Blogspot No Triv Coordinamento Nazionale'. Accessible at: http://notriv.blogspot.it/ (12 August 2018)


International Authority of International Organizations and Access Provision for Transnational Actors

Adil Nussipov

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.39.3

Adil Nussipov, Kazakh, 24, from Almaty (Kazakhstan), is a graduate who received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and International Relations from Nazarbayev University (Astana, Kazakhstan) in 2017. In 2018, he graduated with degree in Master of Arts in International Relations with distinction from Central European University (Budapest, Hungary). He wrote his Master's Thesis on the topic of international organizations and transnational access, and currently interns at the Center for Media, Data and Society (Budapest, Hungary). His research interests are global governance, international organizations, models of global governance, financing of international organizations and relations between international organizations and transnational actors. Email: nussipov_adil@alumni.ceu.edu.

Abstract

Why do some international organizations (IOs) provide more institutional access for transnational actors (TNAs) into their policy processes than others? I argue that the international authority of IOs plays an important role in shaping the level of access provision. IOs with high and low international authority levels provide less access than IOs with medium levels of authority. High authority IOs have no functional needs in involving TNAs. Low authority IOs are not mandated with tasks that may require additional input by TNAs. In contrast, IOs with medium levels of authority experience an institutional shortage of authority for achieving the goals of their mandates. For this reason, they see a strong functional benefit in involving TNAs as a way to overcome their authority limitations. I employ regression analysis using existing datasets in order to test the hypothesis. Statistical results support the argument.

Keywords

Access Provision; International Organizations; IO-TNA Relations; Quantitative Analysis; Transnational Actors
Introduction

International organizations (IOs) came to dominate the international scene as the main forums for global policy-making (Johnson, 2016: 738). However, in today’s world, states and IOs are not the only actors in global governance as they were joined by an increasing number of transnational actors (TNAs) such as non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, global policy networks, multinational companies, private lobby actors and epistemic communities (Johnson, 2016: 738). As IOs are the main arenas for the global management of the world, they have been facing the issue of how to accommodate, engage or limit the increasing number and importance of TNAs. Considering the increasing complexity of today’s global affairs, why and how IOs do so become an important area of research.

Yet, International Relations (IR) literature expressed a limited interest in IO-TNA relations. Firstly, the most of academic literature on IO-TNA relations are dominated by comparative case studies approach. Although these studies provide empirically rich analyses, the levels to which their findings can be generalized across a wider scope of IOs is at least questionable. Possibly, the absence of reliable and comprehensive datasets in the past has been one of the key reasons for the lack of quantitative studies in this specific domain. With the release of TRANSACCESS data by Tallberg et al. (2014: 741), on which this paper builds on, extensive data-driven comparative analysis became possible.

Secondly, the IR literature also failed in taking seriously the self-interested behavior of IOs to explain their relations with TNAs. The literature is still dominated by a state-centric approach to global governance, and although states indeed are the main drivers of international cooperation, it still should not constrain our perception of IOs to empty shells filled with state interests. Such understanding not only detaches the academia from the empirical facts, but also limits its ability to explain the complexity of states-IO-TNA trio, and to contribute important knowledge into the policy-making process of improving inter-institutional cooperation.

The present paper addresses both of these limitations. The puzzle it aims to investigate is as follows: considering IOs as self-interested actors, what motivates some IOs to provide extensive access for TNAs into their policy-making processes, and what motivates other IOs to provide limited or no access? I argue that this variation can be explained by authority limitations of IOs. Different levels of authority result in different abilities and willingness of IOs to provide access. Highly authoritative IOs have the highest ability to provide access but they are unwilling to do so. IOs with a low authority neither have the ability nor willingness for access provision. IOs with a medium level of authority, due the limited authority, experience strong functional need in the involvement of TNAs. As such, the argument makes access provision less contingent on members’ interests and
more on IOs’ own functional preferences. I test my argument on the original panel dataset of 29 IOs from 1950 till 2010. Statistical results provide the support for the argument illustrating inverse U-shaped relationship between authority and access.

**Literature Review**

IOs have experienced a gradual evolution of their transnational dimensions, which are comparable to their original pre-dominantly intergovernmental orientation (Cronin, 2002: 55; Willetts, 2000: 199; Alger, 2002: 109). The rise of TNAs as important actors on the international arena pushed IOs to accommodate the demands and utilize the benefits that come from the interaction with them (Pevehouse et al., 2001: 103; Alger, 2002: 110). Although this gives a foundation for arguing about the self-directedness of IOs in global affairs, the IR literature keeps focusing on member-states as the main drivers behind any of IOs’ accommodation of TNAs. As it will be illustrated below, dominant schools of IR provide little space for self-interested behavior of IOs in the access provision.

Neoliberal institutionalism considers IOs as rationally designed institutions created by states to solve their cooperation problems (Koremenos et al., 2001: 761). Consequently, the involvement of TNAs is also a design choice based on the future utility that such involvement will bring to international cooperation among states (Tallberg, 2010: 48; Kahler, 2005: 145). States will allow IOs to provide more participation opportunities for TNAs if such participation promises functional benefits (Raustiala, 1997: 730; Tallberg, 2010: 55). TNAs can serve as useful partners in collecting and analyzing information, bringing new issues to international agenda and acting as implementation partners on the local level (Raustiala, 1997: 731; Raustiala, 2004: 389).

In contrast, according to realism, states design access for TNAs not to solve cooperation problems, but to advance their own national interests (Tallberg, 2010: 62). Relative gains from international cooperation are the main concern for states, as such the involvement of TNAs will be allowed only when it helps to increase the gains of members relative to the previous power balance arrangement. The interests of major powers dominate any cooperative arrangement, which helps realists to explain the global emergence of TNAs by the dominance of the United States’ power in international relations and its interests on keeping its power projection through like-minded IOs and TNAs (Gilpin, 1975: 96). Realists do not deny the functional benefits of TNAs, but they emphasize the power distribution as the main explanatory variable in allowing them to participate in international policy-making (Tallberg, 2010: 62). As such, TNAs that were provided with access to IOs are primarily oriented to serve the interests of the current major power and only those TNAs that align with the major power’s interests are to be provided with such access (Tallberg, 2010: 62).
Constructivism proposes international norms as affecting the access provision by IOs. In the face of intensifying discourse on democratic deficit in global governance, the new norms of global civil society and global democracy pushed IOs to more transparency, accountability and participation in international policy-making processes (Checkel, 2005: 805; Steffek et al., 2008: 45). Discourse on democratic deficit put into danger policies created by international bodies, and the bodies themselves (Vaubel, 2006: 128). It follows then that providing participation opportunities for TNAs should help to address democratic deficit as they are perceived as the representatives of global civil society (Checkel, 2005: 810; Steffek et al., 2008: 55). IOs, however, are not seen as the ones who initiate the access provision. As democratic deficit threatens not only IOs, but also states that allowed them to solve global issues and create policy responses, pushed by domestic constituents, states have strong preferences in providing TNAs with involvement opportunities. The emergence of global democracy norm itself is associated with the dominance of democratic powers on the international arena (Grigorescu, 2007: 626). Major powers tend to diffuse norms that emerged in domestic settings on the international arena to create the community of like-minded states and actors. Since democratic powers have dominated much of IOs in the past decades, the prominence of global democracy norm is associated with their efforts to bring more accountability and transparency that originated from their national discourses to the international level.

The present study extends the neoliberal institutionalist logic in explaining access provision, but instead of putting emphasis on states’ interests, the theoretical argument that will be presented below highlights the importance of self-interest of IOs, namely their desire to be able to perform tasks on their own, as an important explanatory factor.

Theoretical Argument

I define international authority as institutionalized power of IOs to make collective binding decisions on the behalf of, but autonomously from, their member-states (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 309). International authority has legal-rational character (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707). It is “institutionalized, i.e. codified in recognized rules; circumscribed, i.e. specifying who has authority over whom for what; impersonal, i.e. designating roles, not persons; territorial, i.e. exercised in territorially defined jurisdictions” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 14). Legalization of authority through codified rules and procedures provides the main basis for legitimizing international authority (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707-708). It clearly defines the hierarchy of institutionalized relations as collectively agreed.

Authority of IOs is constituted by delegation and pooling (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 310). While delegation reflects the supranational, pooling refers to intergovernmental dimension of international authority. Delegation is a grant of authority to the international secretariat of an IO to
take, institutionally independent of state control roles in the overall decision-making of the organization (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 311). Institutional independence stems from the fact that national governments do not hold privately accountable the officials of the secretariat (Hooghe et al., 2017: 24).

Pooling is a transfer of authority from individual member-states to the body of an IO, which consists of nationally selected representatives of member-states, where member-states cede their national veto to some form of majoritarian collective decision-making (Hooghe et al., 2017: 24). Such bodies inside an IO can take the form of national assemblies or boards of executives, where national representatives are directly selected by their national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 324-325).

**International Authority and Transnational Access**

Institutional access provision by IOs is an institutionalized mechanism that allows transnational actors to take part at different stages of policy-making (Tallberg et al., 2014: 724). As the definition of international authority, the institutional access also focuses on its legal-rational character as codified in legal rules of IOs. Importantly, access does not imply the actual participation of TNAs in IOs, but only the presence of opportunity for such engagement.

To illustrate how international authority and institutional access link, I look at the IOs authority as one single continuum ranging from the extreme high level to the extreme low level. Along this continuum, I differentiate between the levels of access by looking at IOs’ opportunity and willingness for access provision. Opportunity is an ability of IOs to provide access for TNAs, while willingness is IOs’ perception of utility of TNAs’ involvement for the advancement of the goals of their mandates. Considering the difference in access provision between IOs with the highest and lowest levels of authority, we have to remember that these are idealized theoretical cases, which are useful in order to provide a comparative outlook and threshold points for measuring the real-life levels of authority. I argue that IOs with high authority have opportunity for access provision, but they are not willing to do so. IOs with low authority neither have opportunity nor willingness for access provision. Lastly, IOs with medium authority have higher level of opportunity than the ones with low authority, and very high level of willingness compared to high authority IOs (Table 1).

**Table 1: International Authority and Opportunity and Willingness for Access Provision.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IO Authority</th>
<th>Pooling</th>
<th>Delegation</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Willingness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Highest level</td>
<td>Highest level</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
High Authority IOs and Access Provision

In an idealized IO with the highest levels of delegated and pooled authority, member-states exercise minimized control over the secretariat, while the IO itself enjoys significant budget, and final decision-making autonomy. These IOs can be characterized in three aspects: first, they have extensive regulatory competence in the specific policy area they are operating in, possibly to the level of being international rule creating body; second, they have all the necessary resources, including financial and technical-scientific, for implementation of their international policies; and last, considering the two factors mentioned above, they are considered to be the main international rule-making authorities in their policy domain, as such, they enjoy taken-for-granted legitimacy (Abbott et al., 2015: 21; Genschel and Zangl, 2014: 339). With such authority, IOs may effectively govern international issues on their own. However, these IOs are not closed to TNAs, and they do have enough institutional capabilities to provide access. In fact, high authority IOs are the ones who have the highest opportunity for access provision, and the majority of TNAs are more than willing to work with these IOs due to legitimacy and reputation that they will gain (Abbott et al., 2015: 21). However, these IOs do not perceive an urgent utility for their goals in access provision.

Member-states still may want to involve transnational actors for two reasons: either when there is functional need in additional expertise, or states may want to institute additional controlling mechanism over international bureaucracies (Tallberg et al., 2014: 743). In high authority IOs, member-states may want to involve TNAs in order to establish additional monitoring system over international secretariats, illustrated through the concept of “fire alarms” (Hawkins et al., 2006: 12). However, having considered the fact that high authority IOs operate within specific policy domains over which member-states are willing to retain national control, members may be afraid that involvement of TNAs may bring up harmful criticism or advocacy for policies that will not serve their domestic interests.

Low Authority IOs and Access Provision

Alternatively, IOs with the lowest levels of delegated and pooled authority neither enjoy policy and budget independence, nor they are tasked with any extensive mandate that would require such independence. As such, these IOs are delegated with minimized levels of regulatory competence, operational capacity or taken-for-granted legitimacy.
These IOs are dominated by intergovernmentalism, with secretariats playing only administrative and supportive roles in negotiations of states. Their mandates do not require any additional input by TNAs. Although their policy scope may be quite extensive, member-states themselves may want to negotiate and co-operate with TNAs without the intermediary function of IOs because of domestic sensitivity to issues that they cannot compromise over. TNAs will not be willing to work with them, as these IOs neither can provide TNAs with additional resources and rewards for their job, nor do these TNAs will receive international reputation or legitimacy for working with such low authority IOs. These IOs do not have enough opportunity nor are mandated with extensive tasks to be willing to engage with TNAs.

Medium Authority IOs and Access Provision

Having established these two extreme threshold points, we now turn to the authority area where the most of current IOs operate within – the one of medium international authority. These IOs may have a variety of combinations of regulatory competence, operational capacity, legitimacy, and the involvement of TNAs helps them to complement their deficiencies. I argue that exactly this capability gap pushes them to pursue states to establish institutional channels for access provision for TNAs, as it is essential for the achievement of collective goals.

Medium authority IOs have a relatively higher level of delegation, as they usually handle an extensive scope of issues, but a lower level of pooling, with member-states willing to keep things under their national veto. As such, these IOs are faced with functional dilemma: on one hand, they have an extensive list of issues that they should solve, but their hands are tied by member-states’ control mechanisms, which means that every decision taken by the secretariats should gain approval of the members. This makes international policy-making and implementation inefficient, as by the time the secretariat gets the permission to act, the issue may evolve in an unexpected way, and the old policy may no longer be relevant. These IOs are not able to hierarchically govern states through the creation of international laws and enforcement mechanisms, neither they have powers to directly access private actors protected by national jurisdictions in order to ensure the compliance with international policies (Abbott et al., 2015: 24).

The access provision for TNAs helps IOs to overcome these limitations. Firstly, even the soft involvement of TNAs may help an IO to indirectly manage states into compliance with international norms and policies, through public naming and shaming that may re-shape interests and behavior of member-states in alignment with the IO’s mandate goals (Abbott et al., 2015: 24). Secondly, TNAs also help an IO to bypass states in accessing private actors operating under the umbrella of national sovereign jurisdictions, without dealing with states as intermediaries (Abbott et
In both cases, IOs avoid into entering into conflict with member-states over foreign intervention into domestic affairs with the help of TNAs.

Medium authority IOs may use the existing access mechanisms and expand them over time by illustrating that they are essential for the fulfillment of their mandate. The main difference between high and medium authority IOs is that both have the opportunity to expand access over time, but only medium authority IOs go for it. As such, I propose the following hypothesis for the empirical testing:

**H:** Ceteris paribus, international organizations with the medium level of international authority provide the higher level of access to transnational actors than international organizations with the high and low levels of authority.

**Methodology**

In order to test the hypothesis, I compile a panel dataset containing information on the levels of authority and access provision among 29 international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010. As such, the unit of analysis is an international organization in a year. To qualify as such, an international body should be “a formal organization for collective decision-making among at least three-member states”, created “among national governments”, and “structured by rules for a continuous purpose” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 36). IOs in the dataset range from global to regional organizations, covering a variety of different policy issues ranging from energy, free trade, security and environment among others (see Appendix 2). Although it does not cover all existing IOs in the international system, the sample of 29 IOs present in the dataset covers an extensive period of time from 1950 to 2010 with more than 1000 observations.

**Independent Variables**

I operationalize the international authority of IOs through two variables, Delegation and Pooling, which come from Measuring International Authority dataset by Hooghe et al. (2017: 105). Both variables range from 0 to 1, 0 being the lowest level of delegation and pooling, and 1 being the highest level of both.

*Delegation* is operationalized as “an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences to non-state bodies in IO’s decision-making process” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 105). It consists of political delegation and judicial delegation. Political delegation is measured across the bureaucratic bodies within an IO that are composed of non-state actors and have institutionalized ability to “exercise or co-exercise authority” over agenda-setting and final decision-making across six following decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and policy-making in up to five different issue areas.
Judicial delegation is a “conditional grant of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 105).

Pooling measures “the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 113). Pooling is measured by looking at voting rules across the bodies of an IO that involves members’ decision-making in the two processes: (1) agenda-setting, and (2) final decision-making on the six decision areas mentioned above (Hooghe et al., 2017: 113). Because of proposed non-linear relationship, I created square term variables for Delegation and Pooling in each year of the dataset, and labeled them as Delegation_SQ and Pooling_SQ.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, the level of access provided by IOs to TNAs, is operationalized through TNA Access index created by Sommerer and Tallberg (2017: 249). TNA Access is composed of four indicators: the depth of access; the range of access; the permanence of access; and the level of codification of access (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254).

The depth of access is the level of TNAs involvement into IOs’ activities (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). The range is the level of exclusiveness of access to some particular type of TNAs (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). The overall TNA Access index is the combination of depth and range multiplied by two additional institutional indicators – permanence, which is the level of sustainability of access over time, and codification, which is the level to which access is codified in formal rules (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). TNA Access ranges from 0 to 12, 0 indicating the total absence of access, while 12 indicating the ideal type of access into all decision-making activities for all kinds of TNAs on a permanent and codified basis.

Control Variables

I also include eight additional variables in order to control for biased estimates. The data for these variables is taken from TRANSACCESS dataset (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 251). Firstly, it is argued that the heterogeneity of preferences of member-states may have an effect on the level of IOs’ access provision for TNAs. However, there is no clear agreement between scholars on this: while some argue that goal divergence among members leads to the limited authority of an IO, as a result of which the IO will seek TNAs’ involvement to complement its limited capabilities; others argue that if members have similar interests, they are more likely to design more institutional access mechanisms for TNAs (Abbott et al., 2015: 27). The variable Affinity of Members is based on the voting patterns of member-states of IOs in the United Nations Generally Assembly, and measures yearly average policy interest convergence among all possible combinations of member-states of each IO in the dataset (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254).
Secondly, overlapping logic applies to the argument of democratic memberships: IOs that are dominated by like-minded democracies tend to provide more access for TNAs as an extension of domestic democratic principles such as transparency and accountability to the global level (Grigorescu, 2007: 626). The variable Democratic Members captures the average score of the level of democracy among the member-states of each IO as aggregated based on Polity IV scores.

Thirdly, in following constructivist argument that democratic major power in the membership of an IO diffuses its norms and values on the IO and its members, for example through promoting more access opportunities for TNAs (Grigorescu, 2007: 626), I add the Democratic Major Power dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if there is a democratic major power in an IO in a year without any other power of non-democratic character, and 0 if not (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 260).

Fourthly, I include two dummy variables in order to test whether the sovereignty concerns of member-states affect the level of access provision. The argument is that members may fear that the involvement of TNAs may touch upon their sovereign domestic affairs in undesired or unexpected ways, as such they would like to avoid their involvement in two cases: if an IO’s secretariat has major legally binding decision and rule-making capabilities, and if an IO operates in the field of international security (Tallberg et al., 2014: 756). The dummies Decision and Security take the values of 1 if an IO has major decision-making functions and engages in international security issues, and 0 if otherwise.

Finally, in order to account for the argument about the functional need for TNAs involvement, I also include three more control variables that specify the kind of tasks that IOs perform: Technical Complexity, Local Activities, and Non-Compliance Incentives. IOs are interested in providing access for TNAs if their mandate tasks are “technically complex, require local implementation and present significant noncompliance incentives, and where the relevant information – policy expertise, implementation knowledge, and compliance information – is held by societal actors” (Tallberg et al., 2014: 754). The measure of technical complexity of an IO’s mandate ranges from 0 to 1, while the measures of the need for local implementation, and of the level of possible non-compliance incentives range from 0 to 2.

Since this study uses large-T and small-N panel data, meaning extensive time period (1950-2010) relative to a limited number of IOs (29), I employ two-way fixed effect model to account for how the authority and access levels within IOs change over time. The model includes squared delegation (Delegation_SQ) and pooling (Pooling_SQ) terms to account for non-linear causal relationship, organization (u_t) and time (v_t) fixed effects in addition to control variables (Σ γX_{it}) and error term (ε_{it}). The overall base model looks as following:
$$TNA\ Access_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Delegation_{it} + \beta_2 Pooling_{it} + \beta_3 Pooling_{SQ_{it}} + \beta_4 Delegation_{SQ_{it}} + \sum \gamma X_{it} + u_t + v_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

### Results

Before jumping into the empirical results, it is worth to take a minute to look at anecdotal evidence coming from the dataset. Figure 1 illustrates the correlation between the degree of access provision with the level of pooling in 29 IOs in 2010, while in the Figure 2, pooling is substituted with delegation.

**Figure 2: Association between the level of pooling and TNA Access in 2010.**

![Pool and TNA Access in 2010](#)

Source: author.

From both figures it is evident that on the scale from 0 to 1, the maximum levels of pooling and delegation in the dataset reach only 0.3 and 0.25, which may seem as an indication of absence of high authority IOs in the dataset. However, as it was mentioned in the theory section, high and low authority are idealized cases that serve the theoretical purpose of providing a comparative framework for different kinds of IOs. In the essence, it is perfectly legitimate that no IOs with pooling and delegation levels close to 1 exist in the international system, however, this does not deteriorate the theoretical utility of these idealized cases. Data on the maximum and minimum levels
of pooling and delegation that come from the dataset is an empirical fact, as such, the scores for high and low authority levels may be adjusted according to the existing data.

In the dataset, 90th percentile of pooling score is 0.49 with the highest score being 0.53, while 90th percentile of delegation is 0.32 with the highest score of 0.46 (Appendix 3). These scores present an empirical reflection of high authority IOs with high delegation and pooling levels. Throughout the period from 1950 to 2010, there are two IOs that can be characterized as such: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Low IO authority is captured through the lowest 25th percentile: 0.11 and lower for pooling, and 0.06 and lower for delegation (Appendix 3). There is only one IO that consistently fulfils this condition throughout all the years in the dataset – the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Medium authority IOs, consequently, operate within these two extremes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) consistently has been scoring high on access provision and had pooling and delegation scores within the medium range, similar to the Organization for American States and the Council of Europe (Appendix 2). This illustrates the non-linear nature of correlation between two independent variables and access provision.

**Figure 3: Association between the level of delegation and TNA Access in 2010.**

Source: author.
Main Models

Results presented on Table 4 support these trends. I start with a simple OLS regression in the model 1 including all independent and control variables. In accordance with the expectations, there is statistically significant negative relationship between Pooling_SQ and TNA Access: the rate of change in TNA Access in an IO depends on the IO’s level of pooling. Since sign for Pooling is positive, and sign for Pooling_SQ is negative, results indicate that the effect of pooling is positive until the level of pooling reaches 0.422 threshold, after which its effect becomes negative. IOs with the level of pooling of 0.422 provide the highest level of access. As such, there is inverted U-shaped relationship between TNA Access and Pooling_SQ.

Although having a negative sign, Delegation_SQ has no statistically significant effect on the level of access provision. In the terms of magnitude, the effect of pooling is strongest among all statistically significant variables included in the model. Decision comes the second: IOs with the international decision-making powers on average provide less access than IOs with fewer powers.

In order to specifically account for how authority and access vary over time, I employ fixed effects OLS regression controlling for years and IOs in the models 2 and 3. The model 2 includes only main independent variables in the absence of control variables. Picture remains the same; Pooling_SQ is negative and significant, although its magnitude almost doubles. Delegation_SQ remains insignificant.

The model 3 is a base model with all control variables included. Even in the presence of control variables, Pooling_SQ keeps its significance and increases the magnitude of its effect. In the base model, the threshold level of pooling is 0.403: IOs that have the level of pooling equal to 0.403 provide the highest access level to TNAs; IOs with pooling levels below and higher than this, provide less access. Interestingly, Delegation_SQ becomes significant at 95% level of confidence, having a positive effect on the level of access. Decision and Security’s effects on TNA Access remain negative and statistically significant, scoring the third after Pooling_SQ and Delegation_SQ in the terms of the magnitudes. With 1110 observations, the two-way fixed effects OLS explains 70% of within-IOs variation over the whole period in the dataset.
Table 2: Regression results for simple OLS and fixed effect OLS models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS (1)</th>
<th>Fixed Effects OLS (2)</th>
<th>Fixed Effects OLS (3: Base model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POOLING</strong></td>
<td>1.20***</td>
<td>2.15***</td>
<td>2.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POOLING_SQ</strong></td>
<td>-1.42***</td>
<td>-2.02***</td>
<td>-2.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DELEGATION</strong></td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DELEGATION_SQ</strong></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFFINITY OF MEMBERS</strong></td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS</strong></td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER</strong></td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DECISION</strong></td>
<td>-0.5***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.86***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY</strong></td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES</strong></td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²: Within</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of observations</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>1110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author. **Note:** *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; Standard Errors are in brackets. Models (2) and (3) include organization-fixed effect and year dummies.
Robustness Check

I run three additional models in order to check for the robustness of results. Firstly, I run fixed effects OLS models while clustering for standards errors on IOs in order to check for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Results are reported on Table 4. As in previous models, Pooling_SQ remains negative and significant, although its magnitude reaches the highest level among all estimated models: IOs with the level of pooling of 0.38 provide the highest level of access; IOs with pooling levels lower and higher than this threshold provide less access. Delegation_SQ also does not illustrate any changes in comparison to previous models. Out of eight control variables, only two has statistical significance: Decision, which keeps its negative effect on the level of access, and surprisingly, Affinity of Members that did not show significance in the base model (4). One-point increase in Affinity of Members is associated with 0.22-point drop in TNA Access.

Following Tallberg and his co-authors (2014: 761) that used the same TNA Access variable in their study, I also run Tobit regression for the model 5. The choice is motivated by the type of data-points distribution for the dependent variable TNA Access: it is left-censored at zero, thereby indicating a higher density of data-points that score zero in comparison to data-points scoring higher than zero. In the essence, whether TNA Access is equal to zero or not indicates whether an IO provides access to TNAs or not, and all values higher than zero indicate the degree of access provision (Tallberg et al., 2014: 761). Tobit model presents a better suit to account for this left-censored bias in the data, which allows to get the most of information from “theoretically relevant zero entries” (Tallberg et al., 2014: 761). In other words, as these data points reflect empirical observations, even small unnoticeable variations among values that are close to zero may have theoretical significance. Results do not differ a lot from fixed effects OLS model. Pooling_SQ still has the strongest effect and it is still negative. The effect of pooling on access stays positive till it reaches the threshold level of 0.395, after which its effect becomes negative. Decision, Security, and few of other control variables illustrate the same statistically significant but limited effects on TNA Access. Among all models, Tobit model provides the strongest support for my hypothesis. This is due to the fact that surprisingly, Delegation_SQ acquires negative sign which is significant at 95% confidence level: IOs with the delegation level of 0.286 provide the highest level of access to TNAs, while IOs with delegation levels lower and higher than this provide less access. The magnitude of its effect also turns out to be the strongest after the effect of pooling.

Lastly, building from the logic that values in the TNA Access variable that take value of higher than zero indicate the general openness of IOs, I construct a dummy Open dependent variable, which takes value of 1 if TNA Access is higher than zero, and takes value of 0 if otherwise. I run Logit regression in order to test the implications of the substituted dependent variable. Logistic regression
Table 3: Alternative models for Robustness check.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
<th>Tobit</th>
<th>Logit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clustered S.E.</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POOLING</td>
<td>2.54***</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
<td>22.85***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(2.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POOLING_SQ</td>
<td>-3.26***</td>
<td>-2.44***</td>
<td>-31.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(4.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATION</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>8.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATION_SQ</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>-1.15**</td>
<td>-22.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(7.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFINITY OF MEMBERS</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>-4.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>1.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>-0.92***</td>
<td>-0.77***</td>
<td>-9.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
<td>-4.72***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-2.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² within</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>between</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of observations</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>1110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author. **Note:** *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; Standard Errors are in brackets.
is also a useful tool when having data that lacks normal distribution, which is the case with the present dataset: as previously mentioned, zero-values dominate among data points. Looking at general direction of coefficients, we can observe that as in the two previous models, both Pooling_{SQ} and Delegation_{SQ} have negative signs, indicating that on average, IOs with higher levels of pooling and delegation are likely to provide less access for TNAs than IOs with less pooling and delegation levels. Control variables keep their previous signs.

As it can be seen from the models, although estimates for pooling are consistently statistically significant, estimates for delegation lack such consistency. In the models 3, 4 and 5, IOs with pooling level around 0.4 provided the highest levels of access. In the same models, only in the Tobit regression estimates for delegation were statistically significant. This brings an interesting implication for the intergovernmental-transnational conflict in IOs: these results may suggest that pooling is a more fundamental dimension of international authority and as such, IOs are still predominantly characterized by their intergovernmental dimension. Alternatively, it may be the case that pooled authority is more determining factor in one governance tasks, while delegated authority is in another. These hypotheses need further testing.

**Conclusion**

The study makes a claim that the level of international authority of IOs plays one of the determining roles in their levels of access provision. It argues that IOs with the highest level of international authority are able to provide access, but they do not see functional benefit in doing so. IOs with the lowest authority are neither able nor willing to provide access. IOs with the medium level of authority have higher opportunity and willingness to provide access as they want to use it to overcome authority limitations for the fulfilment of their mandate goals.

The findings present an entry point into the understanding of how elites within IOs, namely, international secretariats develop their own preferences, and in which situations they decide to proceed with the advancement of their preferences. International secretariats may have interest in effective achievement of mandate goals and gaining more autonomy and resources from member-states. They base their actions on legal-rational framework of delegated authority and move on from there to proceed with achieving their interests. IOs engage TNAs only when they experience authority shortage, but still enjoy just enough authority to be able to set up institutional mechanisms for access provision. Further research should employ a more extensive dataset covering a wider scope of IOs and a mix of different quantitative and qualitative tools.
References


Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 4: List of Abbreviations of Names of International Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of International Organization</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Community</td>
<td>CAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>APEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td>ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
<td>AMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank for International Settlements</td>
<td>BIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
<td>CARICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
<td>CEMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Nations</td>
<td>COMW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>CoE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
<td>EFTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
<td>ICC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Whaling Commission</td>
<td>IWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
<td>OAPEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Islamic Cooperation</td>
<td>OIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>OAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
<td>NAFTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization</td>
<td>NAFO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>PIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
<td>SCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
<td>WTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2

Table 5: 29 IOs and their levels of delegation, pooling and TNA access in 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION</th>
<th>DELEGATION</th>
<th>POOLING</th>
<th>ACCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>International Criminal Court</em></td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Community</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Islamic Cooperation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Nations</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Whaling Commission</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Free Trade Association</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Central African Economic and Monetary Union</em></td>
<td><strong>0.46</strong></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 0.13 0.07 0.15

Bank for International Settlements 0.33 0.52 0.04

Arab Maghreb Union 0.19 0.02 0.02

Note: Sorted by the highest level of TNA access to lowest. Highest scores are highlighted.

Source: the author.

Appendix 3

Table 6: Summary Statistics of All Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNA ACCESS</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POOLING</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATION</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFINITY OF MEMBERS</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>-8.75</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECISION</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author.

Appendix 4

Table 4: Top 3 IOs with highest and lowest scores for delegation, pooling and access.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Delegation</th>
<th>Pooling</th>
<th>Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 3 IOs</td>
<td>CEMAC, WTO, CoE</td>
<td>UN, BIS, AU</td>
<td>ICC, OAS, CoE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 3 IOs</td>
<td>SCO, OSCE, APEC</td>
<td>ASEAN, NC, OIC</td>
<td>BIS, AU, WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author.
The Impact of Economic Globalisation on the Rise of Nationalism: The Case of Western Balkan Countries

Fiammetta Colombo

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.39.4

Fiammetta Colombo, 25, from Pisa (Italy), is a graduate who received her bachelor’s degree in International Relations at the University of Pisa in 2017. She wrote her bachelor’s thesis on the decolonisation of East Timor and currently studies at the University of Pisa as a master’s degree student. Her interests include Balkan studies, postcolonial studies, and gender studies. E-mail: fiammettacolombo1@gmail.com.

Abstract

The Western Balkans went through a transition process when globalisation was at its maximum strength and expansion. This paper examines the Western Balkan economies during said transition period and the impact of the 2008 economic crisis on their social fabric. The aim is to investigate the repercussions of economic globalisation on nationalism. Using a comparative approach, this work firstly analyses the economic transition of Western Balkans, focusing on social consequences of economic globalisation. The results found in this first step are then compared with the electoral results of nationalist parties in the region. Furthermore, their attitude towards globalisation is examined. The findings show that the economic transition had strong consequences on unemployment, poverty, and inequality rates in the region; this fallout had a subsidiary role in the growth of nationalist parties. Finally, with the only exception of the Serbian case, nationalist forces appear to be in favour of globalisation.

Keywords

Comparative method; Economic crisis; Economic globalisation; Nationalism; Western Balkans
Introduction

Nowadays, the impact of globalisation on nationalism is considered one of the core issues both inside and outside the academic context. The international focus mainly hinges on the rise of a nationalist far-right both in Western and Eastern Europe, where radical parties and movements are gaining increasing support. As stated by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, ‘one of the most dangerous ideas for democracy can be summed up in the maxim that every state should strive to become a nation-state and every nation should become a state’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 29, 30).

With regard to the Western Balkans region, ethnic polarisation of society along with nationalist rhetoric remain the key features of the political scene in the region, despite the fact that each country implemented democratic reforms since the beginning of the political and economic transition. Considering that the Western Balkan countries are moving toward integration into the European Union (EU), the stability of this region has become an important issue. Furthermore, on account of the recent history and the way nationalism was exploited in order to boost ethnic hatred in the 1990s wars, an in-depth analysis of the current nationalist parties has become relevant.

This work aims to contribute to that debate through an analysis of the consequences of economic globalisation on nationalism and nationalist parties in the Western Balkans region. In doing so, the paper firstly investigates how the social fabric of these countries was affected by the economic transition, which led to the opening and integration of their markets into the global economy. Then, in the second part of the analysis and findings, it analyses the main features of the nationalist political scene in the Western Balkans. Finally, it concludes with a comparison of the results found in the first part of the research with the electoral outcomes of these parties. Indeed, a comprehensive analysis of nationalism and globalisation requires a wider investigation that goes beyond the scope of this work. The paper can thus be considered as the first piece of a broader puzzle aiming to stimulate the debate about the issue.

Literature review

The rise of a new wave of nationalism in the era of globalisation, as one of the crucial phenomena of today’s world, has been at the core of many academic works. At first, this process puzzled many authors who predicted the demise of nationalism after the Cold War: indeed, the main features of globalisation, such as technological progress, expansion of democratisation, spread of liberal values, and economic development were expected to promote a supranational integration beyond any national attachment. According to Francis Fukuyama, liberal democracy furthered by technological and scientific progress would represent the ending point of humankind’s political development, fostering the ‘end of history’ through a global recognition of Western values...
(Fukuyama, 1992); moreover, Eric Hobsbawm depicted a fading future of nation-states facing the globalisation process in ‘the era of triumphant bourgeois liberalism’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 38). When the expectations related to a globalised era beyond the nation-state were belied, authors such as Stuart Hall described the paradox of rising nationalism as the ‘most unexpected turn of events’ (Hall, 1992: 314). Others, including Anthony Smith, explained this disorientation through the analysis of the different paths taken by Western and Eastern Europe after the Cold War: in the first case, the nationalist discourse appeared to have been drained, whereas in the latter, the fall of the Soviet Union seemed to have reawakened it (Smith, 1995: 116).

Thus, the academic focus shifted toward the relation between nationalism and globalisation: within this debate, many authors claim that there is a causal mechanism linking these two phenomena. Hence, the paradox of the spreading nationalism was interpreted as a defensive answer against the globalisation process, or, in the words of Anthony Giddens, ‘local nationalisms spring up as a response to globalizing tendencies, as the hold of older nation-states weakens’ (Giddens, 2003: 13). This interpretation was shared by others, such as Peter Shearman in Nationalism, the State and the Collapse of Communism and Alberto Mellucci in Nomads of the Present. Furthermore, one of the main features of globalisation that has been pointed out is ‘the homogenizing, integrative and Westernizing tendencies of globalization that appear most threatening to national identities and cultures, and provoke nationalistic reassertion’ (Sabanadze, 2010: 31). In addition, the unfair distribution of resources caused by globalisation widens the gap in the living conditions both at national and international level and provides the traditional identity with a new meaning. Furthermore, the persistence of nationalism in the globalised era was explained by Smith in the light of its ‘flexibility that has allowed nationalism continually to re-emerge and spread, at the cost of its ideological rivals’ (Smith, 1979: 4), while others identified the primary cause of the rise of nationalism in the erosion of the state sovereignty, along with the increasing social or economic insecurity.

For what concerns the Western Balkan countries, much has been written regarding nationalism, especially in relation to the 1990s wars. As far as the primordialist view is concerned, Robert Kaplan stated in his well-known work Balkan Ghost: A Journey Through History that ancient ethnic hatreds were crystallised in the modern society through an ethnic attachment as a given fact (Kaplan, 1993). On the contrary, instrumentalist authors highlighted the political will as a driving factor of nationalism: in the case of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War, Norman Cigar explained the genocide that happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political plan aiming to create a Greater Serbia and not as an outcome of nationalism (Cigar, 1995). Moving forward to the present time, nationalism in the Western Balkans has been studied as a feature of far-right parties and movements. Věra Stojarová stated that among the main variables impacting the success or failure of
these parties, economic globalisation had an auxiliary influence on their rise (Stojarová, 2013). Moreover, regarding the Serbian case, Djordje Stefanovic affirmed that the economic vulnerability boosted by globalisation had produced a fertile ground for the strengthening of the far-right, especially the Serbian Radical Party (Stefanovic, 2008).

Finally, the literature reviewed for the purposes of this paper insofar as economic transition and economic variables encompasses reports of international institutions or organisations such as the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); moreover, national statistics and reports of the Bertelsmann Foundation were consulted.

**Theoretical framework**

Theories on nationalism and globalisation do not provide an organic or linear explanation of the relation between these two phenomena. Furthermore, in theoretical works, there seems to be an asymmetry between the more developed field of nationalism and the discourse on globalisation, which is fragmented and influenced by the ongoing development of the process. For instance, there is no agreement among scholars on the timeframe of globalisation: the first group of authors states that globalisation has been an ongoing process since the Iron Age, while the second one considers that globalisation started in or just after the 1950s.

Considering that the increasing global interconnectedness and the rise of nationalism are not interacting in a stable pattern, two main approaches have been adopted to unveil the link between these processes (Osterhammel, 2013: 694-695). The first one sees the nation-state and nationalism on the edge of their demise in a time when globalisation is forcing the adoption of a new supranational organisation of the society; on the contrary, the second one states that the strengthening of nationalistic stances is happening in response to the logic of globalisation. Even if representing two diametrically opposed points of view, these two approaches share a common feature: considering globalisation and nationalism as antithetical.

In this debate, a third approach has been proposed: according to it, the two phenomena are not in conflict since they mutually take advantage of each other. As stated by Natalie Sabanadze: ‘nationalist actors [are] accepting, embracing, and even promoting globalization for various, often nationalist objectives. Their coexistence is not a battle in which only one is destined to emerge as the winner and the other as a loser: it is rather a mutually beneficial coexistence of two perfectly compatible tendencies’ (Sabanadze, 2010: 169). In this paper, the author has adopted the third approach, and nationalism and globalisation have been studied as complementary processes.
Conceptualisation

Before analysing the impact of economic globalisation on nationalism in the Western Balkans, it is necessary to define these two phenomena. There is a wide consensus about considering globalisation as one of the most important forces shaping today’s world, but at the same time, it is still challenging to find an appropriate definition of this process because of its complexity. Philip M. Nichols argues that ‘the concept of globalisation is somewhat amorphous’ (Nichols, 1999: 261) and that it can be considered as a process, as a condition, or as a discourse. It is mainly understood as a phenomenon in which conflicting dynamics coexist: Anthony Giddens defines globalisation as the ‘intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’. Such definition implies a dialectical process in which local transformations are not only the consequences of globalisation, but one of the basic elements of its development (Giddens, 1990: 64).

Globalisation is a multifaceted process in which different dimensions interact with each other: the economic environment is influenced by the social, cultural, and political ones and vice-versa, and, at the same time, they are promoting global interactions. Moving closer to this paper’s research question, one of the main dimensions of globalisation on which researchers have been focusing on is the economic one. As said by Natalie Sabanadze:

“At the economic level, globalization manifests itself in the growing economic interdependence and convergence of economic practices. This includes the spreading of capitalist national economies integrated or seeking integration into the global economy through international trade, flows of capital, foreign direct investments, and multinationals. It also involves the promotion of neo liberal economic reforms facilitating such integration, as well as increasing deregulation of financial markets. In this context, state actors who promote such reforms domestically and create enabling environments can also be regarded as agents contributing to globalization” (Sabanadze, 2010: 17).

Moving forward, the other central phenomenon of this work is nationalism. This concept is strictly related to the concept of the nation and can be understood as a political doctrine or as a political movement. As defined in Cas Mudde's *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, nationalism is here considered as a political doctrine that ‘strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde, 2007: 16). Hence, nationalism in the Western Balkans is defined as the will and the strategy to achieve internal homogenisation and external exclusivity: the first aiming at the creation of a mono-ethnic state through different practices such as separatism, expulsion, assimilation, or genocide; and the second intending to ‘bring all members of the nation within the territory of the state’ by way of, for example, population transfer (Mudde, 2007: 16).
In conclusion, regarding the analysed countries, this paper focuses on the narrow definition of Western Balkans excluding Albania, which means that the analysis encompasses Yugoslavia's successor states, i.e. Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, and Kosovo.

Methodology

In order to investigate the impact of economic globalisation on nationalism and particularly on nationalist parties in the Western Balkan countries, the analysis is done in two steps. Firstly, the economic transition of the countries in the region is examined in a comparative way, searching for the social consequences of the markets' opening toward the global economy. In this first part, the variables considered in order to measure the social repercussion were the unemployment rates, the variation in the incidence of poverty, and the unequal distribution of wealth, as measured by the Gini index.

The second step of the paper is focused on nationalism. The analysis is opened by an overview on the nationalist political scene in each country. The studied parties have been chosen in accordance with the analysis of Vera Stojarová in *The Far Right in the Balkans* (Stojarová, 2013). Thus, this part points out their attitude toward globalisation and economic policies, focusing on welfare chauvinism or their position toward EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integration. Afterwards, their electoral results are compared with the variables (unemployment, poverty incidence, and Gini index) studied in the first part of the research.

With regard to the timeframe of the research, the examined period covers the period from the break-up of Yugoslavia21 until the end of the most recent global economic crisis; in particular, the study of the economic transition is divided in three phases: the first one encompasses the 1990s, the second one analyses the growth period in the early 2000s, and finally, the third one considers the years between 2008 and 2012, affected by the economic crisis.

Analysis and findings

*The economic transition and the impact of economic globalisation*

In each country of the Western Balkans, globalisation, and more particularly its economic aspects, followed different paths based on the country's specific historical experience. Hence, if transition economies are in general pushed by globalisation to open and to connect to the global markets, what happened in the 1990s to the Western Balkans was rather the opposite due to several external factors: the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995, the international sanctions against

---

21 The early signs of the 1990s wars in the Balkans started to emerge as early as 1987-1988. However, here the break-up of Yugoslavia coincides with the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 (Pirjevec, 2014: 31-34).
Serbia and Montenegro, the dispute over FYROM’s name, and the ethnic conflict in that same country in 2001 are some of the causes that contributed to the slowing down of the economic development of these countries (Bartlett, 2009: 22). Because of these events, the economic transition had stronger consequences in Western Balkans than in Central Europe, such as high inflation, fall of real GDP, rise of unemployment, and widespread incidence of poverty (Uvalić, 2012: 368). Furthermore, according to Martin Sokol, during the implementation of the transition, the historical legacies of the region pushed these countries into the ‘super-periphery’ of Europe, where ‘political turmoil and instability were experienced and further fuelled by the catastrophic economic situation, social polarization, ethnic and regional fragmentation’ (Sokol, 2001: 651).

It was not until the 2000s that the Western Balkans entered an economic recovery phase characterised by reforms aiming at macroeconomic stabilisation and growth, as well as EU integration. Nevertheless, the economic crisis had already spread throughout the region in 2009, causing a strong contraction in all countries’ economies, the only exception being Kosovo. Furthermore, there was another recession after 2012, when the deepening of Eurozone’s crisis led to a decrease in demand of exports from the Western Balkans, low inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI), and reduced access to credit (Bartlett and Prica, 2012: 2). Hence, it is possible to divide the economic transition in three phases: the first lasted from the break-up of Yugoslavia to the early 2000s, the second encompassed the years from 2000 to 2009, and finally, the third covered the period affected by the economic crisis (2008-2012).

As for the first phase, the economic transition was characterised by a severe deindustrialisation, a low inflow of FDI, and a drop in exports. In the two-year period between 1989 and 1991, the industrial production of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM dropped by 25%. This trend continued in the following years: between 1992 and 1995, FYROM’s economic input dropped by another one-third, Bosnia and Herzegovina had an overall industrial collapse, while the industrial capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was further compromised by UN sanctions (Bartlett, 2009: 26). Simultaneously with deindustrialisation, the region faced a drastic reduction in export markets during the 1990s. Finally, the opening of the private sector to small and medium enterprises (SME) was achieved in the late 1990s.

Since the early 2000s, the economic transition has been boosted by a more stable political environment and the influx of international credit: economic reforms were implemented throughout the region and resulted in macroeconomic stabilisation, sustained growth, and a stronger inflow of FDI. Furthermore, along with the development of a more open economy, the region has taken steps toward EU integration by signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA): FYROM signed it in 2001, Montenegro in 2007, and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008.
In this second phase, the real GDP of the region increased and the recovery from the previous fall in industrial production slowly began: in 2003, FYROM's industrial sector reached around half of its capability compared to the pre-1990s shock level; BiH's stalled at 14% of its 1989 level; and finally, Serbia and Montenegro's industrial production was particularly affected by the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 (Bartlett, 2009: 26). In these years, the region experienced an increase in trade thanks to EU's autonomous trade preferences. Moreover, there has been a raise in FDI inflow, especially involving the banking and telecommunication sectors (Bartlett and Uvalić, 2013: 1). However, at the same time, Western Balkans developed a high account deficit.

Despite the region's growth in the 2000s, by 2008 only FYROM had a higher GDP in comparison to the 1989 level, while the other countries had worse performances: with respect to its 1989 GDP, Montenegro's GDP stalled at 92%, Bosnia and Herzegovina's at 84% and Serbia's at 72% (Uvalić, 2012: 379). In this second phase of the economic transition, the economic growth led to an improvement in the living standards, and poverty fell in terms of the absolute percentage of population under the poverty line; nevertheless, this development showed an increasing gap in inequality (Murgasova et al., 2015: 20). The regional countries had high Gini indices: according to the World Bank estimates, Serbia's 2010 index was 29.6, Montenegro's 2009 index was 30, Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2004 index was 34, Kosovo's 2006 index was 30.3, and FYROM's 2010 index was 42.8. Another social problematic was the unemployment rate, despite the flourishing of the informal economies in the region: this phenomenon was particularly exacerbated by the youth and long-term unemployment. In 2007, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimated the unemployment rates as following: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28.9% of the population was unemployed, 34.5% in FYROM, 46.3% in Kosovo, and nearly 20% in Serbia and Montenegro (Uvalić, 2012: 383). These values show a rising trend in unemployment rates in the 2001-2007 period for all countries in the region except Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzegovina</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IMF, 2018; World Bank, 2018; Gollopeni et al., 2015.

In 2009, the economic crisis spread from the European core to the Western Balkans, causing a sharp contraction in industrial production and in the GDP of the region. The recession was
worsened by the current account deficits that were already particularly high at that time, with peaks in Serbia (17.9%) and Montenegro (50.7%) (Bartlett and Prica, 2012: 6). There were four main transmission mechanisms which propagated the economic crisis in the Western Balkans. The first one was the collapse of the global credit inflow in the region due to the crisis of the banking sector, principally owned by foreign investors. The second one was the collapse of FDI influx. The third one consisted of decreased remittances from migrant workers. Finally, the fourth one was the contraction of export demand caused by the recession of global imports (Bartlett and Prica, 2012: 8). In addition, the vulnerability of the Western Balkans to the economic crisis was linked to their Europeanisation: Montenegro and Kosovo had the Euro as their legal tender, and nearly 80% of private loans in Serbia were denominated in a foreign currency (Bartlett and Uvalić, 2013: 3).

The economic crisis with two recession peaks (the first in 2009 and the second in 2012) and the austerity measures caused a general fall in the regional living standards. The budgets for education and health sectors were sharply reduced, which had repercussions on the formation of a skilled labour force, while local governments faced cuts in their budgets (Bartlett and Uvalić, 2013: 5). The already high unemployment rates increased both in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see table 2), while in Montenegro, FYROM, and Kosovo, this constant trend can be explained by the existence of a large informal economy sector. In FYROM, it was estimated to amount to between 20%-40% of the total output (European Commission, 2016: 27). In Montenegro, the unregistered workers are estimated to make up nearly 30% of the labour force (World Bank, 2017d: 10), while in Kosovo, the informal economy comprises between 30% and 35% (BTI, 2016: 18). Furthermore, the incidence of poverty increased throughout the entire region: in Montenegro it increased from 4.9% in 2008 (Ražnatović et al., 2009: 3) to 11.3% in 2012 (Ražnatović, 2013: 4), in Bosnia and Herzegovina it rose by about 5% between 2007 and 2012 (UN, 2015: 21), and in Serbia, it increased from 6.9% in 2009 to 9.2% in 2010 (BTI, 2012: 16).

Table 2. Unemployment rates 2009-2016 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IMF, 2018; World Bank, 2018; Gollopeni et al., 2015; Kosovo Agency of Statistics 2015, 2016.
Analysis of nationalist parties

Therefore, how much of an impact did the economic transition and globalisation have on nationalist parties in the region? What were their responses and electoral results? Before proceeding with a comparative analysis of nationalist parties’ positions toward globalisation and an evaluation of the impact of social variables on their electoral results, an examination of each country’s nationalist scene is necessary. Echoing Vera Stojarová, nationalism is here defined in relation to both internal homogenisation and external exclusivity; the work will also encompass those parties which claim to have a distinct identity within a nation state (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 42).

Since the 1990s, the Bosnian party system has been delineated along ethnic lines, with the war in 1992-1995 and the international intervention having played an important role in the shaping of its political transition. Furthermore, the main parties in the country are based on ethnic affiliations and exhibit nationalistic features: the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) is mostly composed of a Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims) electorate and strives for a united Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH, HDZ BiH) seeks to reshape the division of the country in two entities (Republika Srpska and Croat/Muslim Federation of BiH) as delineated by the Dayton Peace Agreement, in order to achieve a mono-ethnic Croatian political unity; on the Serbian side, there are two nationalist parties, the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka BiH, SDS BiH), which considers itself a Serbian party and strives for the secession of Republika Srpska (SR), and the Union of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) which in recent years gained the majority of Serbian polls in BiH (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 46). In addition to these four parties, there are several minor political groups which can be defined as nationalist: the Croatian Party of Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska stranka prava BiH, HSP), the New Croatian Initiative (Nova hrvatska inicijativa, NHI), the Croatian Bloc of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatski blok Bosne i Hercegovine, HB BiH), The Serbian Radical Party of RS (Srpska radikalna stranka Republike Srpske, SRS RS), the Radical Party of RS (Radikalna stranka republike Srpske, RS RS), the Serbian National Alliance (Srpski narodni savez, SNS), and the League of People’s Rebirth (Savez narodnog preporoda, SNP) (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 55). If we compare the electoral results of the main four nationalist parties, it is possible to notice that, with the exception of SNSD, all other parties lost popularity between 2000 and 2006: SDA dropped from 18.8% in 2000 to 16.9% in 2006, HDZ BiH gained 11.4% in 2000 but only 4.8% in 2006, and SDS BiH fell from 16.7% to 7.7%. However, between 2006 and 2010, two out of three of these parties grew: in 2010, HDZ BiH had 7% and SDS BiH 8.4% (IFES, 2018).

During the 1990s, the nationalist parties in Serbia could be divided between a more radical group including the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ) (Pribičević in
Ramet, 1999: 202), and a moderate group including the Socialist Democratic Party (SPS), the Democratic Party (DS), and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Nowadays, the party which still manifests nationalistic features is the Serbian Radical Party: SRS strives for the creation of the Greater Serbia, i.e. the annexation of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina. Furthermore, along with the majority of Serbian parties, SRS does not recognise Kosovo’s independence. SRS’s electoral results show that after having gained 8.6% votes in 2000, the Radical Party maintained about 30% of votes between 2003 and 2008. Afterwards, the split led by Tomislav Nikolić and the creation of the Progressive Party caused an important loss of popularity for SRS: in fact, between 2012 and 2014 SRS did not gain any seats in the National Assembly. Finally, in the 2016 parliamentary election, the SRS obtained 8.1% of the votes (OSCE).

Regarding FYROM’s political parties, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) was considered a nationalist party during the 1990s, while in recent years, it has adopted a more moderate program. Nowadays, the main ethnic party in FYROM is the VMRO-NP, born in 2004 from VMRO-DPMNE’s split. Although it is possible to identify some nationalistic and xenophobic features in VMRO-NP, this party does not promote external exclusivity nor the creation of a United Macedonia (Stojarová, 2013: 55). Moreover, VMRO-NP supports FYROM’s accession into EU and NATO and does not support welfare chauvinism (Stojarová, 2013: 50). With regard to ethnic Albanian parties in FYROM, one of the most important ones is the Democratic Albanian Party (PDSh), which promotes ethnic Albanian rights and supports Kosovo’s independence. It is necessary to mention the paramilitary formations such as the Army of the Republic of Ilirida or the Macedonian National Liberation Army, which strive for a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 57).

In Montenegro, nationalism and nationalist parties are not easy to frame because of the recent formation of the state itself. Hence, a census held in 2003 stated that ‘43.16% of citizens identified as ethnic Montenegrins, 31.99% as self-identified Serbs, 7.77% as ethnic Bosniaks, 5.03% as ethnic Albanians, 3.97% as self-identified Muslims and 1.10% as Croats’ (BTI, 2012: 5). Thus, if we focus on the pre-secession period, it seems that most political formations were nationalist or irredentist, while nowadays, ethnic Montenegrin nationalism no longer exists. Nevertheless, some minor parties do fulfil the criteria to be considered as nationalist: on one hand, certain Serbian ethnic parties linked to the Serbian radical scene (SRS) strive for the creation of a Greater Serbia. On the other hand, some Albanian ethnic formations advocate for a Greater Albania (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 50). Before 2009, the main party which could be labelled as nationalist was the Serbian's People Party (SNS), but in recent years, it has moved toward more moderate positions. Thus, according to the 2016 BTI report, ‘Montenegro represents a functional multicultural society,
although it is still divided around unresolved ethnic/national and religious identity issues’ (BTI, 2016: 31).

Finally, the political scene in Kosovo is still characterised by the ongoing state-building process. The country is marked by a polarisation along ethnic lines, with ethnic Serbs in Northern Kosovo refusing to recognise Kosovo’s declaration of independence. On the Albanian side, parties striving for the creation of a Greater Albania are marginalised: one of these is the Kosovar branch of the Albanian National Front, which calls for the unification of all Albanians in one country (Emerson and Stojarová, 2010: 49).

If we look at the electoral results of nationalist parties and compare them with the social variables analysed in the first part of this work, it is possible to notice that correlation between globalisation and the rise of nationalism emerged only in two cases. In particular, in BiH the poverty incidence increased from 18.6% to 23.4% (UN, 2015: 21) during the time period marked by the rise of nationalist parties in 2006-2010, while the unemployment rates and the Gini index remained stable. Regarding FYROM's electoral results, PDSH had a strong growth between 2002 and 2008, during which it almost doubled its votes, while in the following years it lost popularity, obtaining 5.9% of votes in 2011 and only 2.6% in 2016 (OSCE). During PDSH’s expansion period, it is possible to notice an increase in both the incidence of poverty (from 24.6% in 2001 to 31.1% in 2009) and in the unemployment rates (from 30.5% in 2001 to 34.9% in 2007). Regarding Serbia, when comparing SRS’s electoral results with the economic environment in 2003-2008, Stefanovic states that the party's popularity at the municipal level correlates with economic vulnerability and perceived ethnic threat (Stefanovic, 2008: 1211). However, at a national level, a direct relation linking the social variables studied in this paper and the electoral results of the SRS didn’t emerge. Finally, the methodology applied here appeared inadequate to analyse the impact of globalisation on the nationalist parties in Montenegro and Kosovo. In the former case, the comparison between the electoral results and the social variables analysed was not possible because nationalist formations represented in the parliament ceased to exist after the country’s independence. In the latter, every party, whether ethnic Albanian or ethnic Serbian, could be labelled as nationalist during the examined years.

Moving forward, almost every nationalist party in the Western Balkans analysed above shows a positive attitude towards integration into EU or NATO, with the main exceptions being the Serbian Radical Party and its sister parties in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, integration seems to be perceived as an anchor to political and economic stability. On the contrary, for what concerns SRS's position, the party strongly opposes international interference in Serbian economy and politics. Their program opposes EU and NATO integration and states that the
‘economic policy should be protectionist, aimed at economic colonialism, with the key industrial and natural resources controlled by the state. [...] On the other hand, the party supports small business and privatization’ (Stojarová, 2013: 49). Thus, excluding SRS’s policies, it seems that the nationalist parties in the Western Balkans consider isolationism as an obstacle to overcome in order to protect their national identity and culture. Globalisation and international engagement are thus seen as a safeguard for the national independence gained during the 1990s wars.

**Conclusion and future research**

In conclusion, this work offers a general overview of the link between economic globalisation and nationalism in the Western Balkans since the break-up of Yugoslavia until the most recent economic crisis in the region. In particular, it emerged that the majority of the analysed nationalist parties are in favour of and promote the globalisation process, the main exception being the Serbian Radical Party. Thus, in the Western Balkans, nationalism and globalisation do not appear to be in conflict, but rather complement each other, as suggested by Sabanadze in *Globalization and nationalism: the Case of Georgia and the Basque Country*. Furthermore, regarding the socio-economic repercussions of globalisation, the analysis shows that in the Western Balkan countries, the economic transition had a strong impact on their social fabric with respect to unemployment rates, incidence of poverty, and increase in inequality. Nevertheless, a causal mechanism linking these variables with the rise of nationalist parties does not seem to exist. As is clear from our findings, only in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYROM a relation between economic globalisation and the strengthening of the studied parties emerged. Nonetheless, the correlation appears too weak to support the argument that the rise in inequality, poverty, or unemployment rates leads to a growth in the popularity of nationalist parties. Thus, the study of economic vulnerability alone does not offer an explanation for the rising support of nationalist stances. The comparison between the social variables and the electoral results may bring stronger results at a municipal level as stated by Stefanovic regarding the case of Serbia (Stefanovic, 2008: 1204). In the case of Kosovo and Montenegro, on the other hand, the methodology applied here appeared not to be suitable for an analysis of their political nationalism due to their ongoing state-building processes. Because of the complexity of the studied phenomena, this work does not pretend to offer a complete overview over the link between globalisation and nationalism. Indeed, other factors may influence the popularity of nationalist parties, including the historical and political legacy of each country and changes to the class structures and party systems.

Future research on the nationalism in the Western Balkans could investigate, firstly, if the results of the present work may be replicated and applied to a single-case study. The comparative approach that has been used here was meant to produce a broader analysis of the link between
globalisation and nationalism in the Western Balkans. Thus, further studies with a more specific focus on a single nationalist party or a country in the region may bring a more in-depth contribution. It may be meaningful, as well, to examine other social variables behind the rise of nationalist parties. Finally, an examination of the rise of nationalist non-parliamentary groups may also be relevant in order to have an exhaustive analysis on the issue.

References


Call for Papers

IAPSS Politikon

IAPSS Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted by students and researchers of all levels of academic qualification with the usual frequency of four issues per year.

IAPSS Politikon publishes:

- Full academic papers with original research based on new primary data or review of existing literature with strong personal input (see Paper submission guidelines) and the length of up to 6,000 words

- Research notes based on field work notes, raw data and observations with first level of analysis and the length of up to 2,000 words

- Book reviews of the length of up to 600 words.

Papers for publication are accepted on a continuous basis. The next deadline for submissions to an individual issue is 15 February 2019. All articles should respect the formal structure and all requirements stated in the "Paper submission guidelines" at the publisher’s website. The Editorial Board will contact the authors to communicate results of each evaluation (1st Editorial Board Evaluation, 2nd double-blind Peer Review), proposed changes and the planned date of publication.

The Editorial Board will not evaluate articles by authors who already (co-)authored other articles currently under evaluation.

Submissions are to be sent exclusively in electronic format to politikonjournal@iapss.org.