Understanding the enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union: The case of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract

The research note addresses the enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined shortly after its establishment in 2015. In theoretical terms, it aims to test Frank Schimmelfennig’s concepts on enlargement of integration communities. In practical terms, it seeks to answer why and how new members enter the EAEU. Qualitative research methods, such as historical, deductive and comparative analysis, to demonstrate that Schimmelfennig’s theoretical concepts can explain the process of enlargement of the EAEU.

Keywords

Enlargement; Eurasian Economic Union; Integration Theories; Post-Soviet Integration; Regional Integration

11 The research note is based on findings and conclusions of the PhD thesis “Eurasian integration as a way to respond to global challenges” defended by the author at the University of the Basque Country, Spain (Syssoyeva, 2015).
Introduction

This research note studies the enlargement process of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), whose treaty came into force on January 1st, 2015. It aims to answer the question: why and how its new members, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, were admitted into this organization?

The EAEU is an organization of regional integration, whose origins date back to 2000s. It is based on the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), established on October 10th, 2000 as a free trade zone consisting of five former Soviet countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2007, due to a similar level of economic development, common political views and close industrial ties, three EurAsEC members, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, agreed on the creation of a Customs Union, which came into force on January 1st, 2010. Two years later, the same countries formed the Eurasian Economic Space, a common market of goods that removed non-tariff trade barriers and prepared the basis for the establishment of the EAEU. Building on their close economic, military, social and political interdependence, the founding members of the EAEU, inspired by the EU integration model, launched this regional integration project with the goal to form a single market of goods, services, labor and capital. Armenia joined the Union on January 2nd, 2015 and Kyrgyzstan entered on August 12th of the same year. Single markets of goods (including pharmaceuticals) and labor between these five countries were since created, and a common electricity market is planned for mid-2019, while common markets of oil and oil products are expected to be put into operation by 2025. The Union has a supranational executive body (Eurasian Economic Commission) and judiciary powers (Court of the EAEU), and its highest supranational body is the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, composed of the head of states of its members; by 2025, the establishment of a financial regulation institution is also planned (EAEU web-portal).

The study of the enlargement of the EAEU is relevant because it changes the geopolitical balance of power in the post-Soviet area and indicates the zones of influence of its regional players. It is also of high policy relevance as its members have a long-term priority to change the international order, currently led by the USA: they promote a multi-polar world to be based on five or more regional pillars (or centers of power) in the post-Soviet area, Asia, Europe, Latin America and other regions (the number of pillars still not being clearly defined). Implementation of this concept will have an influence on the global security and economy architecture. As such, the geopolitical importance of this organization goes far beyond regional concern and has global-level consequences (Bogaturov, 2009: 26). In social terms, and similarly to the EU, the EAEU may affect the formation of social values and identity of its members’ peoples (this is, however, a long-term prospect as the current development of the Union is limited to economic issues).
As the EAEU is a new integration community, no integration (or re-integration) theory has so far been developed specifically for its explanation. Theorization of the EAEU is a new topic in international relations studies, and it provides wide opportunities for both recently graduated and experienced scholars to design novel approaches. The purpose of this paper is to test Frank Schimmelfennig’s concepts on Armenia and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Union. It analyses the issue from one direction only – it aims to explain the reasons why the founding members are interested in enlargement of the Union and the processes which make it possible. As such, this research note does not analyze the reasons why Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are interested in joining it.

**Literature review**

In theoretical terms, the article is based on concepts related to the expansion of integration communities as described by Frank Schimmelfennig (2001). The author provided an analysis of and formulated theoretical claims relating to enlargement, which were originally developed to explain the expansion of the European Union.

In order to test these theoretical statements, the author mostly studied the works of post-Soviet scholars, who developed their research driven by the national interest of Russia and Kazakhstan and who are loyal to the policies of their governments.12

Regarding publications of scholars loyal to Russian governmental policy, the most significant works on post-Soviet space are those by Marina Lebedeva, Anatoly Torkunov, Alexei Bogaturov, Sergei Glaziyev and Andrei Kazantzev. They are academic employees of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, 2018), members of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS, 2018) or public officials (Kremlin, 2018). These authors analyze the issue from their considerable experience within relevant organizations and consider Eurasian integration as a promising opportunity for industrial and economic development of integrating countries and as a process that changes the existing balance of power in the international arena in geopolitical terms, which is consistent with the idea of a multi-polar world order mentioned above.

As for scholars loyal to Kazakhstani governmental policy, the author finds that publications by Murat Laumulin (2008) and Bolat Ahmetgaliyev (2010) are the most valuable. They share nation-centric political views, which coincide with the multilateral political course of the Republic (officially called as “a multi-vector policy”), focused on balancing power amongst world powers competing in the region, and consider the issue of integration through the prism of its opportunities for the internal development of Kazakhstan.

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12 As it is difficult to affiliate these authors with certain theoretical schools, the author classifies scholars into those who are loyal to the governmental policy of Kazakhstan, and those who are loyal to the governmental policy of Russia. The distinction between Russian and Kazakhstani, therefore, follows a purely geographical principle.
Herewith, the author uses Schimmelfennig’s theoretical concepts as a theoretical basis for this article and considers the contributions of Russian and Kazakhstani scholars as additional tools to help with the analysis and evaluation of the case study.

**Theoretical framework**

Frank Schimmelfennig considers enlargement of integration communities as being an “efficiency-driven” response of their member-states to increased interdependence with newly integrating members (Schimmelfennig, 2010: 221). His concepts are related to a) interests of member-states which intend to involve new members into this community; and to b) interstate negotiation of the process of enlargement. He distinguishes those member-states, which favor the process – the “drivers of integration” – from those which oppose it – the “brakemen of integration” (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 416).

Concerning the interests of its new members, they are likely to be influenced by **geographical proximity**, **threats** and the opportunity for **influence**. Proceeding from geographical proximity, three arguments are worth noting. First, member-states that are geographically closer to candidate-countries are more interdependent and thus more vulnerable to crises, conflicts and other political changes occurring in their neighbor-states than in the more distant members. Second, economic benefits increase with geographical proximity because of low transportation and communication costs. And third, and taking into account these political and economic dynamics, it is reasonable to note that those countries that have a common border with candidate member-states, or are at least situated close to them, are likely to be drivers of their involvement (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 50-51).

In relation to threats, the experience of already existing integrated communities demonstrates that potential disputes can take place among those members and candidates that specialize in the same industrial fields or claim equal financial aid from supranational bodies and community funds. As far as potential influence opportunities, again proceeding from world integration experience, it may be stated that under conditions of asymmetrical interdependence, those states that are geographically closer to candidates gain more influence over them (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 52). This explains why Germany is considered the major beneficiary of Eastern enlargement of the EU and France is known as its traditional brakeman (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 53; Schimmelfennig, 2001: 62).

**Concerning interstate negotiation of the process of enlargement,** Frank Schimmelfennig’s theoretical contribution relates to the conditions of successful bargaining and “rhetorical entrapment”, which takes place in a situation when new members find themselves caught up or “entrapped” into an integration community (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009: 501). In the sphere of “rhetorical entrapment”, Schimmelfennig proposes two theoretical concepts – “rhetorical action” and “political conditionality” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 495).
Rhetorical action relates to the strategy of drivers of enlargement, which could be summarized as “strategic use of norm-based arguments” (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 62). The main instrument of this strategy is legitimacy, with norms determining standards of behavior, affiliation, rights and obligations of those who can become members of integrated community; it states the rules on how governance should be exercised, decisions to be implemented, the initiatives to be proposed, etc. Theoretically, rhetorical action could be used by all actors: allowing less powerful actors to influence more powerful ones, as those states which behave in accordance to institutional legitimacy increase their bargaining power on common issues (Schimmelfennig, 2010: 230).

Political conditionality also relates to the process of interstate bargaining under the enlargement process, but it concerns the external relations of integrated community, not the internal ones. It is a top-down mechanism for determining rules, principles, norms and standards of behavior that should be followed by those candidate countries which claim the community’s financial support, association status and – ultimately – membership, in order to obtain all these gains (Schimmelfennig and Choltz, 2010: 445).

Schimmelfennig finds that political conditionality frequently takes the form of “reinforcement by reward” and is a widely used strategy by integrated communities in shaping the relations with their neighbors and candidate countries. This strategy implies the practice of extending benefits to those “target” states which have fulfilled prescribed norms – from technical assistance and financial aid to access to internal markets and membership, and differs from “reinforcement by punishment” (charging penalties if norms have not been complied) and “reinforcement by support” (giving absolute support), the other two strategies of political conditionality, as it gives the integrated community a wide scope for maneuver – for example, it allows the integrated group to control target countries’ behavior without coming into long-term agreements with them. The most efficient means of this form of coercion are intergovernmental, taken the institutional form of treaties on cooperation, trade, association and – ultimately – admission agreements (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003: 496-497).

All these theoretical observations of Frank Schimmelfennig can be applied to the example of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EAEU described at the “Analysis and findings” part of this paper, where the following concepts will be used:

- Rhetorical action,
- Rhetorical entrapment,
- Political conditionality,
- Reinforcement by reward,
- Reinforcement by support,
Driver of integration,

Brakeman of integration.

Methodology

This article prioritizes explanation of the enlargement process of the EAEU, and it is based on qualitative methods of rationalization and testing of theoretical concepts. More precisely, the author uses historical research, deductive and comparative analysis (Berg, 2012).

Historical research explains how and where events happened and allows understanding the past as “a source of experience”; the observer is separated from his/her object of cognition by time and space and he/she uses a heuristic technique in order to discover and to interpret what happened in the past (Špiláčková, 2012: 22-23). In the present paper, historical research is used for explaining the context of the case-study, i.e. the establishment of the EAEU and the circumstances under which Armenia and Kyrgyzstan entered the Union.

Deductive analysis is used to test theories; according to Bruce Berg, it is widely applied by scholars, who use a theory as a conceptual framework for developing their reasoning and explanation of the topics they study (Berg, 2001: 246). In this paper, the concepts by Schimmelfennig create a framework for explaining the issue of enlargement of the EAEU.

For comparative analysis, both qualitative and quantitative data can be used. The method is based on comparing an issue “A” and an issue “B” in a bid to establish similarities and contradictions in these cases (Mills et al., 2006: 621). Within the present paper, comparison is made between Armenia’s and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EAEU.

Data

Data used by the author can be divided into two groups: primary and secondary sources. Primary sources relate to qualitative data from original articles by Prof. Schimmelfennig, from which the concepts that explain enlargement of integration communities were captured. Secondary sources are articles, agreements, internet-resources, and statistical data offered by UNCTAD, IMF and other statistical agencies, which were used for explaining the case-study, and to back up the primary sources.

Analysis and findings

Entrapment through political conditionality: the case of the Republic of Armenia

In the case of the accession of the Republic of Armenia (RA) to the EAEU, the Russian Federation (RF) is the main driver of integration. RF-RA are asymmetrically interdependent. Armenia is largely dependent on Russia in economic terms (the RF is Armenia’s second trade partner
after the EU), in energy (Yerevan is dependent on RF fuels supply), investments (Russia is the main investor in RA) and migration issues (migrants’ remittances accounts for more than 22% of RA’s GDP) (EURASEC ANTI-CRISIS FUND). Yerevan is also dependent in security issues: Armenia considers Russia a reliable military partner because the country is isolated by its neighbors, with whom it does not maintain diplomatic relations and whose borders are closed (the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is closed due to the Nogorno Karabakh conflict, and the Armenian-Turkish border is closed due to the Armenian genocide, as well as Turkey-Azerbaijan close relations) (Kazanzev, 2014). In this situation, military support by Russia and assurance of its non-alliance with Azerbaijan in Nogorno Kazabakh’s case is vital for securing Armenian interests in this conflict and for its national security.

Russia is dependent on Armenia primarily in security issues: Russian decision to drive Armenia to join the Union is rationalized by Armenia’s geographical proximity to the Russian Caucasus, an important region in the RF’s security system, and especially to Chechenia, the region of relative internal instability. Herewith, for both countries, cooperation is a matter of security reasoned by considerations of geographical proximity and military threats (Glaziev, 2014: 29).

Concerning negotiation of the enlargement, Armenian entrapment into the Union is an example of the use of the political conditionality strategy by Russia. Yerevan actively participated in the Eastern Partnership program by the EU and negotiated Association Agreements with it. In spite of that, in 2013 when negotiations were almost finished, Armenia stated that it would access the EAEU instead of the integration projects proposed by the EU (Fayos, 2014: 8). In addition to the economic consideration for that change in direction, there are also military questions related to the Nagorno Karabakh, an issue always influencing Armenian’s foreign policy decision-making. In this situation, Armenia’s preference to maintain the conflict frozen makes it prioritize partnership with the RF over any other potential benefits proposed by the EU (Mirzayan, 2014). Considering these dynamics, Fernando Garcés de Los Fayos observed that Yerevan’s “U-turn in policy” was forced by the RF’s agreement with Baku to supply Azerbaijan with new weapons one month before the Armenian declaration of commitment to join the EAEU (Fayos, 2014: 8). This case of entrapment can be seen as an example of “reinforcement by punishment” tactics used by Russia, forcing Armenia to decide in favor of the Eurasian organization.

However, and similarly to the EU, Russia prefers to use more sparing tactics such as “reinforcement by reward”. The country is the main investor in Armenia: total Russian FDI in this Caucasus republic is around 2,5 billion USD, representing more than 50% of all FDI funds accumulated in the country) (UNCTAD). Moscow also pursues a loyal energy policy toward
Armenia, for whom the price of natural gas is kept at the level of 150 USD per 1000 m³, the most “friendly” price for Russian gas in the world (Neftegaz, 2018).

The breakmen of Yerevan’s accession to the Union was Kazakhstan, which demanded (and achieved) that Armenia enters the Union with its borders recognized by the international community and the UN, i.e. without Nogorno Kazabakh (Muminov, 2014).

In spite of the limited economic contribution of Armenia to the EAEU economy (the Republic accounts for 0.5% of the RF GDP) (IMF), its entrapment represents an important achievement of Moscow.

“Reinforcement by reward” and “reinforcement by support”: the entrapment of the Kyrgyz Republic

Similar to Armenia, the current economic development of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) cannot largely contribute to the material prosperity of the Union – KR’s GDP is much lower than its partners and accounts for only 0.4% of Russian GDP (UNCTAD). KR is one of the poorest republics in the region and its industrial capacity has largely decreased since the collapse of the USSR. Even though the country has one of the most liberal regimes in the region in terms of openness to foreign investments, its industrial base, inherited from Soviet times, was largely destroyed, especially concerning machinery, agriculture and manufacturing of consumer goods (Glaziev, 2014: 28).

Kyrgyzstan’s accession can be explained in terms of security. After 9/11 and proclamation the war against international terrorism by the USA, Kyrgyzstan has been involved in Washington’s sphere of potential geopolitical interests. This was against Russian interests, as it traditionally considered this Central Asian republic as its zone of influence. The competition between the RF and the USA for influence over KR is seen in the example of military bases deployed by both powers in that country: as of 2001, Washington used Manas airport (situated close to KR’s capital) as its base, assuring herewith its military presence in Kyrgyzstan (Wilkinson, 2014: 146), while Russian military presence has, in turn, been legitimised by KR’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which Moscow used in order to establish Kant military base in 2003, following the USA agreement with Bishkek regarding Manas. Kant became the first new military base opened within the CSTO (Russia inherited all other bases in the region from Soviet times) (Klimenko, 2011: 12). In 2009, Bishkek announced the closure of the Manas base, following a Russian offer of 2 billion USD credit, to which Washington responded by offering a 180 million USD payment, thus keeping the base at American disposition (Wilkinson, 2014: 146), with a change of name: from “Manas Air Base” to “Transit Center Manas”. In 2013, Bishkek did not prolong the agreement with Washington and American troops left Manas in 2014 (Russia Today, 2014), which can be considered as Russia’s political victory. In such a manner, Eurasian entrapment of Kyrgyzstan
coincided with a Russian victory in the struggle with the USA for influence over that country. For
Kyrgyzstan, in turn, accession to the EAEU is a way of preserving its political stability and
nationhood development, widely disturbed by conflicts endured by the country (Glaziev, 2014: 29).

In its entrapment policy toward Bishkek, Moscow uses not only political and military
leverages but also the “reinforcement by reward” and “reinforcement by support” tactics, seen in the
support of KR’s economy through an 8.513 billion USD EurAsEC Anti-crisis fund largely financed
by Moscow (7.5 USD billion) and Astana (1 USD billion) (Dodonov, 2012: 65) and in a 1 billion
USD Russian-Kyrgyz fund to support the agriculture, services and industrial base of the country,
established after KR declared its commitment to Eurasian integration (The Moscow Times, 2015),
among other financial support.

It should be added that 31% of Kyrgyz GDP depends on remittances of its workers abroad
(primarily in Russia) (Schenkkan, 2014). By joining the EAEU, Kyrgyzstan will largely improve the
situation of its workers in Kazakhstan and Russia, as the common labor market agreement will ensure
similar working conditions to its citizens, close to those of the citizens of its neighboring countries.

Conclusions

The present article sought to explain the process of accession of new members to the EAEU
by using Frank Schimmelfennig’s theoretical contributions. This analysis demonstrates that Russia is
the main driver of the entrapment of both new members – Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – to the EAEU.
In the first case, entrapment is determined by Yerevan’s need for Russian military support, significant
Russian FDI into the Armenian economy and low prices on natural gas. The brakemen of Armenia’s
accession was Kazakhstan, which insisted (and achieved) that Armenia enters the Union without
Nagorno Karabakh. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, entrapment was done through Bishkek’s military
considerations, Russian “reinforcement by reward” and “reinforcement by support” tactics (also
used in the case of Armenia), via financial support to the country, and giving equal rights to workers
from Kyrgyzstan, on whose remittances the country’s economy is largely dependent on.

Application of theoretical concepts proposed by Frank Schimmelfennig demonstrates their
usefulness goes far beyond explanations of EU integration, for which they were originally designed.
Analysis confirms that his concepts, such as driver and brakeman of integration, rhetorical
entrainment and its strategies (i.e. political conditionality, reinforcement by reward, and
reinforcement by support) can be used for explanation the enlargement process of the EAEU.
Future research

This research note analysed Schimmelfennig’s concepts from one direction only, i.e. from the perspective of the founding members of the EAEU. The next step to fully understand this issue would be to analyze these dynamics from the perspective of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

New concepts by Schimmelfennig can also be considered in explaining the development of the EAEU, such as “widening” of integration or “horizontal institutionalization”, which refers to the process of increasing the area of influence of integrated communities (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 503). Application of these concepts might explain the process of establishment of free trade zones between the Union and not-EAEU allies, such as Vietnam, Serbia, Egypt and Iran.

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